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This dissertation revisits the question of “who comes after the subject?” posed by Jean-
Luc Nancy in 1986. Assuming a position commensurate with the radical horizon of 
Nancy’s challenge, this dissertation responds with the reject. Through close, 
“deconstructive” readings of Nancy, Derrida, Deleuze, Cixous, and Badiou, Towards a 
Theory of the Reject demonstrates that the reject has in fact always been at issue in 
“post-structuralist” philosophy. In the first section, I show how the reject not only posits 
a future relation beyond all current understandings of friendship, love, and community, 
but also offers a critique of today’s garrulous network-centric sociality. The second 
section elucidates how the reject is at the heart of contemporary French thought’s 
“deconstruction” of both sacred and secular worlds. In the third section, I articulate the 
political potentiality of the reject as a radical critique of existing “democratic” practices. 
Through these three sections, I also suggest that the reject responds to current “post-
secular” endeavors to make faith and knowledge coexist, as well as to “posthuman” 
investments in the animal question and systems theory. The reject, moreover, can have 
ethical and political import for “post-secular” and “posthuman” futures. In general, this 
dissertation goes against the grain of resurrections of the subject in recent intellectual 
discourses, and argues that theorizing the reject, a figure not as yet explicitly 
formulated, while nonetheless a condition that almost all of us irreducibly experience in 
 some ways at one time or another, can open up possibilities of another ethics and 
politics. Attempting to avoid the frequent reliance of earlier intellectual endeavors on 
the subject, whose assumed sovereign position only serves to negate the perspectives of 
others, Towards a Theory of the Reject shows that various approaches to ethics and 
politics can potentially and respectfully negotiate differences such that the articulation 
of one difference does not come at the expense of another.  
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“Before/ After the Subject”: The Reject 
 
The Question Again, or Let’s Drop the Subject 
Everything seems […] to point to the necessity, not of a ‘return to 
the subject’ […] but on the contrary, of a move forward toward 
someone – some one – else in its place […].  
– Jean-Luc Nancy.1 
There is never for anyone the Subject […].  
– Jacques Derrida.2 
 
The motivation for this present project comes from the question Jean-Luc Nancy posed 
in 1986: qui vient après le sujet or who comes after the subject?3 Given the date of 
Nancy’s question, it might seem at first glance that it is rather anachronistic, if not 
(better), untimely, to revisit that question today. And yet, I would argue that there is, as 
with all things untimely, a certain necessity in addressing that question again. I will say 
why this is so in a while, but I would first like to recall that Nancy’s question comes in 
the wake of the dissolution, or even the “liquidation,” of the subject. As Nancy says, his 
question comes after “the critique or the deconstruction of subjectivity,” which, 
according to him, “is to be considered one of the great motifs of contemporary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Letter of February 1986, reproduced in Nancy’s “Introduction” (trans. Peter Connor) to Who Comes 
After the Subject? eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, New York and London: 
Routledge, 1991, 5. 
2 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », in Points de suspension: entretiens, choisis et présentés 
par Elisabeth Weber, Paris : Galilée, 1992, 279. This interview with Nancy also appears in Who Comes 
After the Subject? I have chosen to refer to the original French text. Translations of this text are mine.  
3 See Nancy’s “Introduction” in Who Comes After the Subject?, 5. 
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philosophical work in France […].”4 The subject, to put it in a very simple and 
admittedly unjust manner here, is that category or figure of thought that has served the 
humanist aspiration to ascertain Man’s holistic presence or existence, and his power to 
think or to (apparently) rationalize. However, Man in this case is typically, or rather 
limitedly, “the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard 
language.”5 As it tends to be the case too, those certainties of presence and the power to 
rationalize will be taken to be the foundation of this male subject, from which he will 
seek to assume a position of power or even sovereignty, where he is convinced that his 
point of view is the only true one, worthy to be disseminated to the rest of the world, 
while the perspectives of others can be ignored or even negated.6 Thought or discourse 
that is predicated on the subject therefore will prove to be nothing less than problematic. 
Thus, by the time of Nancy’s question, intellectual discourses, especially those inclined 
towards contemporary French thought, will have launched an extensive critique of the 
subject, not only to expose the fiction of its certainty and foundation or even 
sovereignty, but also to recognize and affirm the existence and perspectives of others, 
especially female others or even nonhuman others, and those not in a position of 
power.7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 “Introduction” to Who Comes After the Subject?, 4. 
5 Here, I follow Brian Massumi’s translation of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 105. The French 
original says « Homme-blanc-mâle-adulte-habitant des villes-parlant une langue standard-européen-
hétérosexuel quelconque » (Mille plateaux : capitalisme et schizophrénie, Paris : Minuit, 1980, 133). 
6 Just as the birth of the modern subject can be found in Descartes, as many scholars, including Nancy, 
have argued, the sovereign-like negation of others can also be located in Descartes. In the second 
meditation, as Descartes seeks to establish the certitude of his thinking, which proceeds via the 
unrestrained touching of the honey wax before him, one finds Descartes more than ready to make nothing 
of that experience of touching the object, or worse, even to dispel the existence of that object by claiming 
it to be possibly a mere object of his imagination or dream. 
7 To be sure, the picture of contemporary French thought in relation to the question of the subject is not so 
clear and straightforward: the critiquing or “liquidating” the subject does not follow a simple, linear 
progression. The rejection of the subject is no doubt evident in early, pre-68 French structuralism – in the 
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The deconstruction of the subject that has begun with contemporary French thought has 
given rise to a subsequent archival explosion of works continuing the critique and 
problematizing of the subject. This archive continues to grow today. In that respect, one 
could continue to tarry with such critique or deconstruction of the subject to further 
elicit the intricate and complex problems in deploying the subject. Otherwise, one could, 
as Gilles Deleuze says in his response to Nancy, “construct new functions and discover 
new fields that make [the subject] useless or inadequate,” which Deleuze considers to 
be the “better” strategy.8 Or, as is Jacques Derrida’s suggestion to Nancy, one could free 
oneself from “the necessity to keep at all cost the word subject, especially if the context 
and the conventions of discourse risk reintroducing what is precisely in question.”9 
Keeping the word subject, as Derrida finds in the “decentered” or “lost” or “fading” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, and also Michel Foucault, for example. 
Things get a little complicated from 1967 onwards. In 1967, via a different, more mobile mode of 
structuralism, or even “post-structuralism,” Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze would continue the 
rejection of the subject, a project they never abandoned in their respective philosophies. Foucault, on the 
other hand, from the 70s onwards, would return to the subject but rethink it in more corporeal and plural 
terms, not just away from the Lacanian subject reduced to a linguistic structure therefore, but also away 
from the classical subject that assumes itself to be a unitary male human in a singular or exceptional 
position of power. For the complex intellectual history of the subject in relation to contemporary French 
thought from structuralism to “post-structuralism,” see especially François Dosse’s two-volume Histoire 
du structuralisme (Paris: La Découverte, 1991/ 1992), a text that I discuss later in this introduction). 
Étienne Balibar and John Rajchman in their French Philosophy Since 1945 also do not neglect this 
rejection and rethinking of the subject in contemporary French thought. Whether it is rejection or 
rethinking, they argue that it is something not quite the subject that contemporary French thought seeks, 
but “something in our lives, or in our ways of being and being-together, that can’t simply be self-reflected 
or constituted by continuities of memory, that is im-personal or irreducible to persons of speech or 
discourse, that can’t be individualized any more than collectivized, that can’t be centered or made present 
in a consciousness or a ‘proper body,’ with its voice and its gaze” (French Philosophy Since 1945: 
Problems, Concepts, Inventions (Postwar French Thought, Vol. IV), New York and London: The New 
Press, 2011, 193-194).  
8 “A Philosophical Concept…” (trans. Julien Deleuze) in Who Comes After the Subject?, 94, trans. 
modified. A version of Deleuze’s French text, « Réponse à une question sur le sujet », can be found in 
Deux regimes de fous : textes et entretiens 1975-1995 (Édition préparée par David Lapoujade. Paris : 
Minuit, 2003). The quote is on p. 326. Otherwise, the original, « Un concept philosophique », appears in 
Cahiers confrontation 20 : 89-90, hiver 1989. 
9 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 274.   
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subject in Jacques Lacan,10 in the subject of “interpellation” in Louis Althusser, or in 
Michel Foucault’s author-subject as an effect of a network of discourses surrounding 
the intellectual and economic production of texts, has only seemed to have “placed the 
subject behind them.”11 In other words, in Lacan, Althusser, and Foucault, “the subject 
is perhaps reinterpreted, resituated, re-inscribed; it is certainly not ‘liquidated’.”12 One 
therefore needs “a passage beyond,” “an annulation” [péremption] of all tarrying with 
the subject.13 For Derrida, this “passage beyond” is the postulation of a “who” that 
“responds even before the [subjective] power to formulate a question, that is responsible 
without autonomy, before and in view of all possible autonomy of the who-subject [qui-
sujet],” a “who” that “is perhaps no longer a grammatical derivation [ne relève peut-être 
plus de la grammaire], not even of a relative or interrogative pronoun that always 
returns to the grammatical function of the subject.”14 Derrida would also posit this 
“who” in terms of a “differing and deferring singularity” [singularité différante],15 
while Deleuze would postulate “pre-individual singularities and non-personal 
individuations” whose constantly mobile “emissions […] constitute a transcendental 
field without a subject.”16 In any case, Derrida will say that for any such “passage 
beyond,” or to “overhaul [refondre], if not to refound [refonder] in a rigorous fashion, a 
discourse on the ‘subject,’ on what would take (or replace the place [remplacera la 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 On the “lost” or “fading” subject in Lacan, see his “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness 
Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever,” in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism 
and the Sciences of Man, eds. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1970, 189, 194. 
11 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 272. 
12 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 271. 
13 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 271. 
14 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 275, 277. 
15 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 277. 
16 “A Philosophical Concept…”, 95. See also « Réponse à une question sur le sujet », 328. 
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place]) of the subject,”17 one must pass through “the experience of a deconstruction [of 
the subject],”18 which, to be precise, does not relegate to total oblivion the subject which 
is always necessary to deconstruct. As he says later, “it always seemed to me that it was 
better, once the way was inaugurated, to forget a little the word [subject]. Not to forget 
it – it is unforgettable, but to move it, to subject it to the laws of a context such that it no 
longer dominates from the center.”19 
 
However, aside from Derrida and Deleuze, and also aside from Blanchot (who proposed 
to think of the figure of children), most of the other responses to Nancy, first published 
in English as a volume of the journal Topoi, then in the French journal Cahiers 
confrontation under the title of Après le sujet qui vient, and then finally in English again 
as a book with the original heading of Who Comes after the Subject?, would only reveal 
a resistance to “construct[ing] new functions and discover[ing] new fields that make 
[the subject] useless or inadequate” or to seeking “a passage beyond” that would “forget 
a little the word [subject].” In other words, they demonstrate a hesitation in articulating 
a figure of thought that is not a subject. They either stay with the subject – which are the 
responses of Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Gérard Granel, and Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen, or else add to the subject predicates that have been previously left out in its 
foundation – as in Étienne Balibar’s response, where he argues for the supplement of 
the attribute of citizenship to the subject, calling henceforth for the thought of the citizen 
subject. In my view then, most responses to Nancy’s questions have been somewhat 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 286. 
18 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 286-287. 
19 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 282. Deleuze would also say that “a concept [such as 
the subject] does not die simply as and when one wants it to […]” (“A Philosophical Concept…”, 94, 
trans. modified). 
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inadequate, in the sense that the responses that remained with the subject did not match 
the radical contour or promise of Nancy’s question. In other words, an articulation of a 
category or figure of thought otherwise of the subject remains lacking in the responses. 
If not, it could even be said that what these responses had done, consciously or not, was 
to discourage, or even reject, the coming to presence, or the articulation, of a figure of 
thought other than the subject. We have yet to generate a response that is adequate, 
radical or not, to Nancy’s question therefore, and this is why we still need to go back to 
Nancy’s question and attempt that more adequate response, which is the endeavor of 
this present work. 
 
In a way, responding adequately to the question of “who comes after the subject” is 
perhaps also the unfinished business of contemporary French thought. In other words, 
despite all the desires of naysayers to have done with contemporary French thought, if 
not their claims to be witnessing the “deaths” of “French Theory” over the past decades, 
we are not done with contemporary French thought yet.20 To be precise, providing an 
adequate response in no way signals a closure of contemporary French thought. As I 
will suggest in the present work, articulating finally (but not once and for all – since I 
do not mean at all that there is only a singular adequate response to Nancy’s question) 
the figure of thought that “comes after the subject” can show “French Theory” to have 
relevance to, if not application for, the contemporary world. This is perhaps a view Cary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Beyond, or even without, Nancy’s question, Balibar and Rajchman, in their introduction to French 
Philosophy Since 1945, would say that despite the negative criticism and reception of “French Theory,” it 
has to be recognized that “translated into many languages, [“French Theory”] remains a key philosophical 
inheritance and resource for the twenty-first [century]. It was [in the twentieth century] not only a matter 
of the academic discipline of philosophy. It was the sort of philosophy that would exert an often 
transformative influence in many fields, sometimes assuming an ongoing role within them; no area would 
remain unaffected. It is hard to imagine, for example, what the current study of humanities or social 
sciences in English-speaking countries would be without it” (French Philosophy Since 1945, xvii). 
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Wolfe shares too in his What Is Posthumanism?, since he suggests there that 
“posthumanism” or “posthuman” discourse is no less preoccupied with contemporary 
French thought’s question of “who comes after the subject.”21 Contemporary 
“posthuman” discourse is certainly not the only benefiting party here. Putting 
contemporary French thought into dialogue, via the articulation of the figure otherwise 
of the subject, with the contemporary world, can in turn ensure the maintenance or even 
futures of contemporary French thought, since contemporary demands and contexts can 
encourage contemporary French thought to push further the radical horizons it had 
already set for thought, to go beyond its own limits. In this case, instead of prematurely 
and perhaps unjustifiably declaring the end of contemporary French thought, one could 
say, la pensée française contemporaine: encore un effort!  
 
The other reason why we need to readdress Nancy’s question of “who comes after the 
subject,” perhaps urgently this time, is because, despite the extensive work done by 
contemporary French thought and by other intellectual discourses elsewhere in 
unveiling the problems of predicating any thought on the subject, we are witnessing the 
marked rise or even resurrection of the subject, in a different form of course, as a 
category of thought in philosophy. This is evident as Anglo-American scholars in the 
last decade or so, and then French intellectuals more recently, begin not only focusing 
their attention on the work of Badiou, but also celebrating it. Badiou, as mentioned, was 
one of Nancy’s respondents, and one of those who remained faithful to the category of 
the subject, in line with his early political Théorie du sujet (1981) that predates his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 This is rather evident from one of his chapter titles – “Learning from Temple Grandin: Animal Studies, 
Disability Studies, and Who Comes after the Subject” (What Is Posthumanism? Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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response to Nancy. Badiou never loses sight of the subject, as he continues to develop 
his theory of the subject in the more philosophical L’Être et l’événement (1988) and 
Logique des mondes (2006), and reaffirming it, or even calling for the militant subject 
of the event, in his more recent political tracts such as L’Hypothèse communiste (2009) 
and Le Réveil de l’histoire (2011). Even though Badiou would claim that his subject is 
radically different from all other subjects that have been based on, or rather mutated 
from, Descartes’s “self-supposing” or “self-positioning” ego sum,22 I would say that it is 
still haunted by similar problems. The main problem – and I discuss this in greater 
detail in the section on the “post-secular” – is that it still tends to take on a sovereign, 
imperialistic contour, which in turn risks violently negating others who have no claims, 
or have no wish to lay claim, to this subject. In any case, the resurrection of the subject 
via Badiou’s philosophy, which undoubtedly brings with it similar or even worse 
problems associated with the subject, is not insignificant and cannot be ignored. In the 
face of such a return of the subject, one can surely respond with an incisive critique. But 
one can also respond by going back to Nancy’s question and respond without hesitation 
with a figure of thought that can counter the subject (which is surely no less a critique, 
albeit an oblique one). 
 
The latter is the strategy of this present work. In other words, I will not tarry with the 
subject here. Neither will I tarry with texts that continue to problematize the subject. 
And even though I have mentioned Badiou’s work, and I will, as said, critique it in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For the analysis and critique of Descartes’s ego sum as “self-supposing” and “self-positioning,” see 
especially Nancy’s Ego sum (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) and « Un sujet ? » (in Homme et sujet : la 
subjectivité en question dans les sciences humaines, conférences du Centre d’Études Pluridisciplinaires 
sur la Subjectivité, réunies et présentées par Dominique Weil, Paris : L’Harmattan, 1992, 47-114). 
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section on the “post-secular,” I will not, in general, tarry with the more problematic 
texts that continue to refer, if not return, to the subject, usually written not just “by those 
who would like to think that nothing has happened, and that there is nothing new to be 
thought, except maybe variations or modifications of the subject,”23 but also by those 
who choose to believe that the subject, in a different form from its classical 
manifestation, might be useful for their causes.24 All such texts will always continue to 
proliferate. I seek then to “construct new functions” that are not those of the subject, to 
“forget a little” the subject, to “no longer speak of it,”25 even though I do keep in mind 
that what follows from my gesture is not detached from the deconstruction of the 
subject. In that sense, I do not seek so much “to write over” [écrire « sur »]26 the subject 
but rather to write under the subject another concept, another “who.” That is to say that 
I do not mean at all to totally erase, reject, or even obliterate the subject. I follow Nancy 
here, when he cautions that “that which obliterates is nihilism – itself an implicit form 
of the metaphysics of the subject (self-presence of that which knows itself as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 From the letter, dated February 1986, of Nancy to those he invited to respond to his question. The letter 
is reproduced in Nancy’s “Introduction” to Who Comes After the Subject?, 5. On a related note, Derrida 
has likewise observed and foresaw that there are “those who would want to reconstruct today a discourse 
on the subject that is not pre-deconstructive, on a subject that no longer assumes the figure of the mastery 
of the self, the figure adequate to the self, the center and origin of the word, etc., but would define the 
subject rather as the finite experience of the non-identity to the self, of the underivable interpellation 
[l’interpellation indérivable] that comes from the other, from the trace of the other, with the paradoxes 
and aporias of being-before-the-law, etc.” (« « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 280).   
24 This is true for certain feminist and postcolonial discourses. Just to name a few here: see for example 
Judith Butler’s Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), Rosi Braidotti’s Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual 
Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 
(which, while adopting Deleuze’s nomadic thought, seems to me to not take into account Deleuze’s 
rejection of the category of the subject), Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the 
Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Rashmi Varma’s The Postcolonial City 
and Its Subjects: London, Nairobi, Bombay (New York: Routledge, 2011), Petrus Liu’s Stateless Subjects: 
Chinese Martial Arts Literature and Postcolonial History (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 
2011), and Vivienne Jabri’s The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/ Governing Others in Late 
Modernity (New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2012). 
25 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 282, 282-283. 
26 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 283. 
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dissolution of its own difference).”27 In any case, it is time, even though it is already 
untimely, to drop the subject, to gesture towards “that to which one can no longer allot 
the grammar of the subject nor, therefore, to be clear, allot the word ‘subject’.”28 
 
Towards a Theory of the Reject 
To the supposition of a subject, must one still suppose 
something else? From the moment one has begun to make a 
supposition, why not suppose further, if not up to the point of a 
de-supposition [dé- supposition]? 
 – Jean-Luc Nancy.29 
 
Let’s drop the subject then, or else “de-suppose” the subject, without further hesitation. 
To the question of “who comes after the subject,” I would respond by saying: the reject. 
The reject, as I would like to conceptualize it here, is constituted by three turns. The 
first turn concerns the reject as it is conventionally understood: a passive figure targeted 
to be denied, denigrated, negated, disregarded, disposed of, abandoned, banished, or 
even exiled. The reject is not always passive, however. In its turn, it can actively 
express a force of rejection in retaliation to the external forces acting against it. The 
reject can in fact also be the one who first rejects things and people around it with a 
force so overwhelming that it is only subsequently that it is rendered a reject by those 
around it. The reject as an active figure constitutes the second turn of the reject. The 
third turn concerns the reject’s turning of the force of rejection around on itself, and this 
is where one may speak of the auto-reject. Now, auto-rejection is not something 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 “Introduction” to Who Comes After the Subject?, 4. 
28 “Introduction” to Who Comes After the Subject?, 6. 
29 « Un sujet ? », in Homme et sujet : la subjectivité en question dans les sciences humaines, conférences 
du Centre d’Études Pluridisciplinaires sur la Subjectivité, réunies et présentées par Dominique Weil, 
Paris : L’Harmattan, 1992, 51. 
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nihilistic. The auto-reject does not reject itself only to let itself precipitate into an 
anguishing abyss of abjection, at which point everything hopelessly falls into absolute 
ruins. Rather, the auto-reject puts in place an auto-rejection in order to not hypostasize 
itself on a particular thought or disposition.30 In this way, it is always able to think 
(itself) anew constantly, to be always open to what arrives to thought and to itself, and 
this can be not only from the future but also from the past.31 Auto-rejection then 
involves creative regeneration, and not, I repeat, self-annihilation.  
 
These three turns are certainly not mutually exclusive. Instead, they turn on each other 
constantly. But what a theory of the reject here would like to underscore is the third turn 
of the auto-reject. The auto-reject is a critical turn in many ways, and let it be said at 
the outset that this turn not only sets the reject apart from the subject, but also affirms 
the theory of the reject as a question of ethics before everything else. Given these stakes, 
let me explicate a little further this particular turn then. Now, it is relatively easy to see 
oneself as a passive reject, especially when one is placed, if not when one places oneself, 
in a victim position. It is also relatively easy to position oneself as an active reject, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 As Nancy notes, “hypostasis is only another word for hypok!imenon, (placed below, supposed 
[supposé], a very important word in Aristotle), which in Latin is translated as subjectum. There is an 
entire family – ‘substance,’ ‘subject,’ ‘hypostasis, ‘hypok!imenon,’ of which one could say that it is all 
the family of the suppositum” (« Un sujet ? », 67). 
31 This is perhaps close to the sense of Nancy’s “who” or “some one” [quelqu’un] in place of the subject. 
According to Nancy, this “who” or “some one” “makes sense by itself, without this ‘self’ being a 
substance itself; makes sense by itself without being a subject, or makes sense without supposing itself 
sensed [sensé]” (« Un sujet ? », 113). This sense is not intelligible or logical sense. It is “sense [sens] that 
has no relation to a subject of meaning [sujet de sens], to a subject that could bear [supporter] this sense 
[sens] and present it in a manner or another, to signify it, and more, demonstrate it” (ibid, 113). Nancy 
goes on: “instead of that which is to be discovered or supposed behind or in advance, [it] would be what 
singularly engages itself, guarantees itself, promises itself each time, at each moment, not behind or 
before, but precisely here, at the place of the exposition of a singularity” (ibid, 113-114). It is this 
unintelligible sense that Nancy’s “who” or “some one” “is each time in an infinite newness [nouveauté ou 
novation] of sense” (ibid, 114), that it is “inventing itself each time, interminably, or ‘terminably,’ as a 
new possibility of singular sense” (ibid, 114). 
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projecting a force of rejection against anything. It is not so easy, however, to think 
oneself as an auto-reject, to regard oneself as a reject by oneself. It actually requires 
much humility, when the auto-reject rethinks or reassesses its existing thought or 
disposition and sees to its complete abandonment. This goes beyond auto-critique, since 
in auto-critique, one might change one’s strategy or means, but the horizon or end in 
sight remains largely the same. In auto-rejection, one does not just deviate from one’s 
original trajectory or strategies, but the horizon changes too. The auto-reject, in 
rejecting itself, seeks other means and other ends (if any intended end ever comes to an 
end). Giving up all that one has prepared and gathered for oneself, and giving up the 
position that one has begun to ground or found oneself on with all that one has gathered: 
that is what the subject is unable or reluctant to do. The auto-reject, in contrast, 
detaches or frees itself from such gathering and (self-) positioning.   
 
Where auto-rejection becomes a question of ethics for the theory of the reject is when 
the auto-reject rejects itself by keeping in mind that there is always the possibility that 
one is a reject in the eyes of others. In doing so, one also rethinks and modulates one’s 
thoughts, actions, and behavior, but this time in order to make sure that they do not 
compromise those of others’. Sometimes this might involve a shifting or a sidestepping 
to an adjacent space, and at other times, an adoption of an entire mode of being, which 
might also mean once again the renunciation of one’s previous thought, actions, and 
behavior. This auto-rejection evidently frees no less the reject from any hypostasis of 
thought and action. But it is also ethical because this auto-rejection stems from the 
affirmation and respect of others. This is especially so when the shift or sidestepping to 
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an adjacent space further requires that the auto-reject respect the other’s desire to not 
fill the space left by the auto-reject. In this respect, the auto-reject rejects in itself the 
demand for the other to arrive. It recognizes that it is always possible too that the other 
rejects coming to presence, that is to say, rejecting appearing in the presence of the 
auto-reject. (In the sidestepping of the auto-reject, which may amount to a walking 
away too,32 and the leaving free of the other to come and/ or not to come, and go, I 
would even wager that this is perhaps “another possibility” of being “responsible 
without autonomy” according to Derrida,33 a possibility that is “neither subjective nor 
human,”34 which does not assume, but rather renounces, any autonomy or power to 
question “who comes,” or to call or even to proclaim to give hospitality to the other 
within its space.35) In other words, the auto-reject rejects any false presumption of 
having the prerogative to demand that the other disclose itself, and in this case, avoids 
appropriating the other and its predicates into itself, as the subject is wont to do. Again 
then, the auto-reject, unlike the subject, has no interest in accumulating for itself 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 I will elucidate the question of walking away in Catherine Clément and Luce Irigaray in the following 
“ethical/ philosophical” section on friendship, love, and community. But let me say here that walking 
away does not constitute the absolute characteristic, gesture, or strategy of the auto-reject: the auto-reject 
does not make walking away its necessary condition. I recall that the second turn of the active reject 
(which is always at work, as said, simultaneously with the first and third turns) will require the reject, in 
certain situations, to stay and repel forces that are denigrating it. However, as I try to suggest in the 
section on politics, even in these situations, the reject must also be open to the option of walking away, 
especially when life, not just its own but also of others, is in danger. Walking away in this case does not 
entail the total abdication of its cause and goal. Rather, it is a means of surviving or continuing to live, in 
order to construct other strategies that can reach its aim in life-affirming ways. 
33 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 275. 
34 « « Il faut bien manger » ou le calcul du sujet », 276. 
35 I would like to highlight that to renounce proclaiming to give hospitality to the other is not contrary to 
Derrida’s “unconditional hospitality,” which is hospitality that is open to anyone, without any demand for 
any return from the other, without any demand either for the other to identify himself or herself. My 
rhetoric, instead, is meant to prevent any subjective appropriation of “unconditional hospitality,” any 
assuming of such hospitality as a property of any particular subject, as something that he or she alone has 
the power, right, authority, or even generosity to give the other. Certainly, one must work towards a 
condition where “unconditional hospitality” can be put in place and maintained; but one must be vigilant 
to avoid making oneself the guardian of this hospitality, from which place, i.e. before “unconditional 
hospitality,” he or she consciously, and therefore subjectively, summons or even makes the interpellation 
for the other to come.  
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predicates that might contribute to its foundation; it has no interest in totalizing 
everything, including elements outside of itself, within its grasp and control. It has no 
“madness” of the subject for “the unconditional surveillance of everything that could 
undermine its absolute exception [or sovereignty] […].”36  
 
The auto-reject is also critical in preventing any return to the subject, which the reject, 
admittedly, can risk regressing to. That regression can occur through the second turn of 
the reject, that is to say, when the active force of rejection goes unchecked. This could 
lead the reject to a point where it is not much different from the subject, since the 
subject is also known to pride itself on its power to negate others, not only in cognitive 
but also material terms.37 Auto-rejection, which can moderate the active force of 
rejection, then prevents the regressive sliding of the reject into the subject. The auto-
reject can also save the reject, especially the passive reject from sinking into a condition 
of an abject figure. According to Julia Kristeva’s theorization in Pouvoirs de l’horreur 
(1980), the abject, with all that is improper, dirty, disdained, and despised that comes 
along with it, can also be a figure that challenges or throws into upheaval the subject 
that thinks itself to be proper, to be in an elevated position, and to be pure, if not 
immune from all things base. However, Kristeva’s abject is also one that comes after 
experiencing a debasing master-slave relation. The abject keeps this traumatic history of 
being subjected, or of being a passive reject, in memory, and remains caught up in this 
traumatic memory, which only means too that it remains caught up in a master-slave 
relation. And so, as Kristeva says right at the beginning of her text, the abject “does not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Nancy, “Mad Derrida: Ipso facto cogitans ac demens,” trans. Celine Surprenant, in Adieu Derrida, ed. 
Costas Douzinas, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2007, 26. 
37 See note 6. 
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cease to defy its master.”38 To me, that signals, however, a certain inability to walk 
away from its subjugated situation. The movement from a passive reject to abject then 
only seems to be an incessant work of mourning for its strife with its (past) master, and 
consequently, perhaps a mark of being unable to trace its own liberated and new 
trajectory. The auto-reject, it is hoped, will be able to have done with mourning its past 
subjugated condition, to be indifferent to its (past) master, and re-create another 
trajectory of life for itself.39 
 
Auto-rejection, in any case, is a difficult dimension of the reject. And yet, as suggested 
above, the auto-reject is ready to counter any return of the subject, or to free the reject 
from an abject condition, and open to another ethics, “another possibility” of being 
“responsible without autonomy” that nonetheless affirms and respects the other and its 
differences. A theory of the reject must therefore always make it its task to put in place 
the auto-reject, no matter how difficult it is, to foreground it even, when everything 
hinges too fixedly on the active or even passive reject. And finally, on the motif of the 
auto-reject, I would like to note that even as each reject is different from the other reject 
in its condition of being a passive reject – differently rejected by different external 
forces, and in its being an active reject – rejecting in different ways different targets, it 
is via the auto-reject, that is to say, whether one is capable of auto-rejection or not, and 
in what ways and to what degree one rejects oneself, that each reject is distinguished 
from another. I bring to mind again that the auto-reject is more inclined to free itself 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Pouvoirs de l’horreur : essais sur l’abjection, Paris : Seuil, 1980, 10. 
39 To be sure, I am not saying that the walking away of the auto-reject here puts in place an absolute 
forgetfulness of a traumatic past. Rather, it is a demonstration of its ability to not burden itself eternally 
with a traumatic past or memory of a past master.  
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from any fixed predicates than to gather them, upon which it can conjure up some 
foundation of itself. In this respect, it will always be difficult to reduce rejects into some 
sort of common or similar rejects, unlike the situation of the subject, whose predicates 
of self-supposition, self-positioning, self-representation, consciousness, unitariness, and 
mastery, allow one to speak of subjects in somewhat homogeneous terms, if not a 
Subject for all subjects.   
 
Having responded to Nancy’s question of “who comes after the subject” with the reject, 
I would like to state that the reject is not of my conjuration. In other words, when I 
respond to Nancy’s question with the reject, I am, in a certain way, responding “without 
autonomy.” I might have articulated the term or the name reject; I might even have 
outlined a possible theory of the reject. But I would say that the reject, either as a figure 
or a gesture, has always subtended philosophy. The reject can even be said to be with 
philosophy already at its beginning, that is to say, with Plato. Socrates, Plato’s 
philosophical “conceptual persona,” to borrow Deleuze and Guattari’s term in Qu’est-ce 
que la philosophie?, practices a dialectical method that is constituted by first eliciting 
from others what they claim to be concepts, following which, he systematically rejects 
almost them all. Nothing is spared at the end. As Deleuze and Guattari would put it in 
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, everyone is vanquished at the end of the philosophical 
feast, save for Socrates the soliloquy bird, hovering above and surveying the destroyed 
terrain of the philosophical banquet. In other words, Socrates is not really interested in 
dialogues, a view that is also shared by Derrida.40 But Socrates certainly does not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 In a letter to Hélène Cixous, Derrida has written: “Even where there are dialogues, in Plato… these 
dialogues remain in the service of the monologic thesis” (Unpublished correspondence with Hélène 
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escape the force of rejection either. The Apologia stands as the testimony of Socrates 
being a reject in the eyes of Athens’ moral authorities. Socrates’s (mis)teachings of 
Athenian youths to deviate from (or even reject) the conventional ways of learning set 
by these authorities can no longer be tolerated, and so these authorities put him on trial 
for corrupting the education of Athens’ youths. But the Apologia also goes further to 
show Socrates turning the force of rejection, albeit an auto-nihilistic one here, against 
himself, when he declares that he would rather choose suicide than to submit to the 
injunction by the Athenian tribunal to stop thinking. One could say that auto-rejection in 
Socrates extends to the Phaedo too, but this time round, without any tinge of auto-
nihilism. This occurs when one witnesses Socrates there reflecting on poetry in relation 
to the immortality of the soul. But one knows that poetry is the art of writing that 
Socrates famously denounces in the Republic. In that case, one could say that towards 
the end of his life, Socrates is beginning to doubt, and therefore also reject, what he has 
previously insisted on in his philosophy. 
  
The reject traverses philosophy no less after Socrates/ Plato. In fact, it can be said that 
the force of rejection is very much a philosophical constant.41 Without going into details, 
it is almost evident that each philosophy tends to reject the one before. Before Descartes 
constructed the ego or rather ego sum from the act of thinking (cogito), Descartes would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cixous, quoted in Cixous, “Co-Responding Voix You” (trans. Peggy Kamuf), in Derrida and the Time of 
the Political, eds. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009, 
50). 
41 I note here that Foucault has even once raised the question if all philosophy after Plato is essentially a 
rejection of Platonic philosophy: “Are all philosophies individual species of the genus ‘anti-Platonic’? 
Does each begin with a declaration of this fundamental rejection [my italics]? Can they be grouped 
around this desired and detestable center?” (“Theatrum Philosophicum” (trans. Donald F. Bouchard and 
Sherry Simon), in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French 
Thought, ed. Timothy Murray, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, 216). 
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first declare his rejection of the thought-systems that have come before him. Then Hegel 
rejected Kant and Fichte. Deleuze rejected Hegel. Badiou rejected Deleuze, Derrida, 
Nancy, and other “post-structuralist” thinkers. The story goes on. And in that case, the 
reject can even be considered to come, as Nancy puts it, “before/ after the subject.”42 It 
is impossible for this present project to cover all the rejects in Western philosophy. It 
will only concern itself with eliciting and elucidating the figure of the reject that has 
subtended contemporary French thought, with particular focus on the writings of 
Derrida, Deleuze, and Cixous. I have chosen to pay particular attention to these thinkers, 
not just because they (Derrida and Deleuze) were respondents to Nancy’s question, but 
also because in their quest to depart from the subject, they have not only constructed 
radical conceptual figures (of the reject, as I will show) such as the friend who leaves 
town (Derrida), the homo tantum (Deleuze), the blind or myopic figure (Cixous), or the 
messianic figure “without messianism” (Derrida), but have even gone far to make 
thought approach the animal – a figure of the reject no doubt for a long time in 
intellectual discourses, via the motifs of animots (Cixous and Derrida), divinanimalité 
(Derrida), animal-messiah (Cixous), and the becoming-animal (Deleuze). To be sure, it 
will not be a homogeneous figure of the reject that is at work in Derrida, Deleuze, and 
Cixous. Once again, the different degrees and force of the auto-reject will be the 
distinguishing feature that sets each reject in each thinker apart from another. 
 
I certainly have not forgotten Nancy, when I said I would turn my thoughts particularly 
to Derrida, Deleuze, and Cixous here. Certainly, there will not be as much close 
readings of Nancy’s texts as of Derrida’s, Deleuze’s, and Cixous’s. However, as it will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 “Introduction” to Who Comes After the Subject?, 7. 
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be evident at the beginning of each following section, Nancy’s writings will always 
form some sort of guiding thought, which will constantly lead towards a thought 
“without subject,” as Nancy would say. But before turning my focus onto Derrida, 
Deleuze, and Cixous, I would like to point out that the reject is no less nascent in Nancy, 
precisely in his deconstruction of the subject. According to Nancy, right from his early 
Ego sum (1979), the subject conjures, re-presents, and posits itself from the Cartesian 
enunciation of ego sum or “I am.” In other words, the subject exists only in, or as, the 
linguistic articulation of ego sum: “The pure subject is ‘I’ who in enunciating 
enunciates myself [le sujet pur est je qui s’énonce énonçant].”43 However, this subject 
can never fully capture the sense of the actual, existing, corporal body that says “I.” 
There is certainly a presence to that body, but Nancy will also say elsewhere that 
“presence precedes and succeeds itself always, […] and has for its essence passing the 
moment it is there, and more precisely, to be there only in passing and in effacing at that 
instant the present that it is.”44 The body, coming into presence at each instance, ex-
isting in existence always, is then each time singular: “In the passage, what passes, each 
time, is a singularity.”45 The (enunciation of the) subject is never adequate to the 
presenc-ing or existing of the corporeal body. Given that the enunciated “I” “is distinct 
from my body (as I am a thing that thinks),” saying ego sum then does not entail any 
“positive knowledge of the nature of [the] substance” that is the thinking body.46 To 
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43 Ego sum, Paris: Flammarion, 1979, 126. Gérard Granel, on his part, takes Descartes’s ego sum as a 
textual inscription. According to Granel then, “as Ego cogito cogitata mea, the subject in his text has 
never been someone”; instead, “it has always been a ‘what’” (« Qui vient après le sujet ? » in Écrits 
logiques et politiques, Paris : Galilée, 1990, 327, my translation. Granel’s response is also reproduced in 
Who Comes After the Subject ?).    
44 « Passage », in Jean-Luc Nancy et Jean-Claude Conésa, Être, c’est être perçu, Saint-Just-la-Pendue : 
Éditions des Cahiers intempestifs, 1999, 23, my translation.  
45 « Passage », 20. 
46 Ego sum, 140, 139. 
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persist in thinking oneself as a subject, or in believing in the fable of a “complete and 
veritable being [l’être véritable et entier]” in ego sum, one only alienates, if not rejects, 
oneself from any true relation with one’s true corporeal existing: “saying I does not 
indicate some distinct thing, does not posit a distinct substance, but produces the 
distinction with everything (and with every judgment on the reality and/ or the true of a 
thing). I entrench myself [further in the fictionalizing of myself as a subject] or cut 
myself off from myself [je me retranche], and I separate myself from myself [me 
distingue]: it is the I that sets me apart [me distingue], and entrenches me or cuts me off 
[me retranche].”47 In other words, the subject, in enunciating itself, always rejects the 
existing, corporeal body that it seeks to locate and identify; and vice versa, the corporeal 
body, in its coming to presence in différance or in difference/ deference at each instant, 
always rejects the subject that enunciates it either too early or too late. Ultimately, “I 
must renounce defining [the subject].”48 This is because, after all, the instantiation of a 
subject always only involves a certain (auto-)rejection: “That which enunciates itself,” 
as Nancy argues, also “denounces itself.”49  
 
Nancy returns to the deconstruction of the subject again in the essay “Mad Derrida.” 
This time, he further observes that ego sum says more than “I am”: the verbal form of 
sum already includes the first-person pronoun in question in the enunciation, “without 
the need of an additional pronoun,” and so ego, which “announces the subject of the 
sum,” is only “a superfluous pronoun.”50 In other words, ego sum literally says, “I, I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Ego sum, 145-147. 
48 Ego sum, 124. 
49 Ego sum, 24. 
50 “Mad Derrida,” 17. 
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am,” and the enunciation of ego instantiates the subject that seeks to establish or 
reaffirm the first-person pronoun in sum. However, the superfluity of ego only betrays 
the fact that the latter, in its manifestation as an enunciation as sum, that is to say, as a 
linguistic articulation, has already disseminated itself to an outside beyond the control 
of both the ego and the speaking body: in ego sum, “I present myself outside and 
consequently I stray. I stay ‘me’: I expose it and I exile it outside of its dwelling 
[demeure].”51 In other words, the subject, as it announces itself superfluously in ego, is 
again a reject, this time before the first-person pronoun inscribed in sum, since it never 
finds the latter, and thus is not only “alone” but also always “remains abandoned.”52 In 
short, it can be said that what unfolds from Nancy’s deconstruction of the subject is 
some form of a reject. As Nancy says, the subject after all “knows itself not to be 
itself.”53  
 
The Rise of the Reject in France c. 1968 
As said, I will be focusing on eliciting and elucidating the reject in Derrida, Deleuze, 
and Cixous in the following sections. In doing so, I am also no doubt suggesting that the 
emergence or stirrings of the reject is rather marked in contemporary French thought. 
The entrenched questioning and critique of the subject in contemporary French thought, 
which had begun with early French structuralism and to which the respective 
philosophies of Derrida, Deleuze, and Cixous are closely linked, can be said to play a 
major role in that. But it could also be because the reject subtends as much the historical 
genealogy of twentieth century French thought and the historical experience of its 
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51 “Mad Derrida,” 31, translation modified. 
52 “Mad Derrida,” 29, 30. 
53 “Mad Derrida,” 25. 
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thinkers. Now, my work here being one of a philosophical or theoretical trajectory, I do 
not claim to be competent to do work of an intellectual history nature at any part of this 
project to support the latter claim. The only recourse I can take here then is to point to 
François Dosse’s two-volume Histoire du structuralisme (1991-1992), commonly 
regarded as an authoritative intellectual history of contemporary French thought. Dosse 
certainly does not explicitly deploy the term reject, or any similar terms that the French 
language allows to signify a reject (I will return to the question of the difficult relation 
between the English term reject and the French language). However, that does not 
prevent one from sensing that the history of structuralism and/ or structuralist thinkers, 
as Dosse narrates it, is very much a history of rejects. The beginnings of structuralism 
and/ or structuralist thinkers can even be said to be already those of rejects, as Dosse 
underscores that the structuralist movement in the early 60s took place very much 
outside institutional walls, as it was “disarmed on the plane of institutional 
legitimacy.”54 In other words, structuralist thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, 
Barthes, and Lacan all faced in one way or another initial rejections by established 
academic or research institutions such as the Sorbonne or the Société Psychanalytique 
de Paris. As Dosse tells it, structuralist thinkers, however, did not remain as passive 
rejects: they fought against the institutional force of rejection acting against them; at 
some point, they even gathered into micro-constellations, fragments of intellectual 
arrangements, which oftentimes were constituted by individuals who crossed disciplines: 
“The weight of the Sorbonne marginalized those who contested it, and drove them to 
seek support, convergences [points de suturation], and new alliances between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Histoire du structuralisme I: le champ du signe, 1945-1966 (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 459, my 
translation. 
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disciplines, and the definition of an ambitious program and the broadest possible 
readership/ electorate [lectorat/ électorat], in order to bypass, hijack [détourner], and 
evict [débouter] the incumbent mandarins.”55 The interdisciplinary dissemination of 
these rejects would in fact contribute to the irresistible force of structuralism, rendering 
it an undeniable and prevalent force of thought as the epoch approached the eventful 
date of May 68. But before May 68, “structuralists for the most part were marginal.”56 
 
And yet May 68 would turn out to be “contradictory” or “paradoxical” times for 
structuralism and/ or structuralist thinkers.57 Firstly, print (especially journals) and 
visual media would be advertising and celebrating structuralism as a spirit of the times. 
However, all these worked against structuralism at the same time, as these gestures 
“[seemed] to reduce thought to its only form of structural expression.”58 Then there was 
also a growing disenchantment with structuralism. According to Dosse, fault lines had 
in fact appeared within the collective intellectual enterprise of structuralism before 1968. 
The increasing exclusive gathering of structuralist thinkers, who shut out (or rejected) 
modes of thought that were either not structuralist or failed to adhere to early Lévi-
Straussian structural rejection of history and empirical phenomena, was becoming 
distasteful for some. By 1967, that camp of exclusive structuralism was beginning to 
lose its initial force as a “revolt against tradition” or “counter-culture.”59 From there, 
there grew “a certain reticence, if not exasperation, mixed with theoretical rejections 
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55 Histoire du structuralisme I, 237. 
56 Histoire du structuralisme II: le chant du cygne, 1967 à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte, 1992), 173, 
my translation. 
57 Histoire du structuralisme II, 159. 
58 Histoire du structuralisme II, 134. 
59 Histoire du structuralisme II, 10. 
!! 24 
and frustrations [mouvements d’humeur] before a discourse that, becoming dominant, 
does not hesitate to pass from theorizing [théoricisme] to a certain intellectual 
terrorism.”60 It is not surprising then that those uneasy with, if not repulsed by, “the 
totalizing structuralist imperative” [l’exigence globalisante du structuralisme]61 would 
begin to recoil from structuralism, take their distance from Lévi-Strauss, seek other 
thought trajectories, or “to avoid the ‘structuralist’ label, claiming to have never been 
one themselves.”62 May 68 then became, for those disenchanted with structuralism, to 
be the moment as well of the “rejection” of structuralism.63  
 
But structuralism would survive the student movement of May 68. As Dosse notes, “A 
veritable whirlwind of contradictory effects, May 68 will also have paradoxically 
assured the success of structuralism. The target of the [student] movement concentrated 
on the Sorbonne, the seat [fief] of the mandarins, of academicism, and dishonored 
tradition. Based on this plan of attack, the structuralist critique of classical humanities 
was in complete correspondence with it.”64 And so “structure triumphed […] while [the 
event of May 68] receded and things returned to the former state. The failure [of May 
68] was felt as the expression of the inexpugnable force of structure.”65 But 
structuralism had also learned its lesson. It realized that it could no longer hypostasize 
itself into a singular, monolithic, and immobile form of thought. It had to regain its 
mobility as it had in its beginnings, when it mobilized itself outside institutional walls, 
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60 Histoire du structuralisme II, 134. 
61 Histoire du structuralisme II, 13. I follow Deborah Glassman’s translation here in History of 
Structuralism, Vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 3. 
62 Histoire du structuralisme II, 9. 
63 Histoire du structuralisme II, 158. 
64 Histoire du structuralisme II, 159. 
65 Histoire du structuralisme II, 170. 
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experimenting with interdisciplinary connections: it had to rejuvenate itself as a mobile 
concept, in short. According to Dosse, the works of Derrida, especially beginning with 
his 1967 « La structure, le signe et le jeu essay » that critiqued Lévi-Strauss’s structure 
as one that centers structure and prevents the play of structure,66 the works of Deleuze 
that pass from the essay « À quoi connaît-on le structuralisme » also of 1967 to his 
works on nomadic thought, and also the post-68 works of Foucault, which see him 
engaging with historical or empirical phenomena such as power relations between social 
bodies and the biopolitics of government practices, were manifestations of such post-68 
structuralism: “What May was going to favor especially was the success of what one 
would call ultra-structuralism [which Dosse associates with Derridean thought more 
than anything else]: it revisited what was essential of structuralist orientations to open 
them towards pluralisation, towards undetermined, ‘nomadic’ concepts, which became 
the dominant categories of thought after May.”67 However, post-68 structuralism or 
“post-structuralism” as Anglo-American academia would call it, would not be as strong 
a force in France as the initial form of structuralism was in the early 60s. The “decline 
of the structuralist paradigm,” as Dosse calls it in his book for the section of 
structuralism as it moved into the 70s and 80s, was imminent; in a sense, structuralism 
from 1967 to the early eighties, which saw the demise of the main stars of early 
structuralism – Barthes, Lacan, Althusser, and Foucault, was also really a swan-song or 
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66 « La structure, le signe et le jeu » was also presented at “The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences 
of Man” at the John Hopkins Humanities Center in 1966. As the story goes, Derrida stole the show from 
Lacan, who delivered the paper “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject 
Whatever,” and who was supposed to be star of the symposium. For the collection of the interventions 
presented at this symposium, see The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the 
Sciences of Man, eds. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1970. 
67 Histoire du structuralisme II, 171. 
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le chant du cygne, according to Dosse’s sub-title of the second volume of his historical 
account of structuralism. 
 
Given Dosse’s historical narrative, I do not think it unreasonable to recast the 
development of contemporary French thought in its trajectory from structuralism to 
“post-structuralism” as a history of the reject. Cast in this light, there are several lessons 
a theory of the reject today can learn from Dosse’s account. Firstly, the reject in its 
almost passive or weak sense, that is to say, when it is denied any recognition by 
established institutions and thereby refused any inclusion into the latter as well, can be 
effectively productive even in this state. That was the condition the early structuralists, 
rejected by main institutions such as the Sorbonne, found themselves in, as they began 
mapping out an entire network of structuralist thought across disciplines outside the 
walls of the Sorbonne, to the point where structuralism became a veritable force to 
reckon with, against which the walls of the Sorbonne could no longer resist in 1968, 
leading to the discrediting and overthrowing of the Sorbonne’s mandarins during the 
student movements of May 68. In this case, the passive rejects became active rejects, 
rejecting in turn the force that first suppressed them. But Dosse’s account also warns us 
of the danger of pursuing too far and too deeply the active reject. This was the problem 
with structuralism in 1966 to 1967, when it was ossifying itself as a monolithic form of 
thought that rejected deviations or alternatives. Here, the reject ironically assumed the 
form of that which has initially rejected it. In turn, the reject lost its counter-institution 
or counter-culture force, losing its spirit or even élan vital to generate new, radical 
trajectories of thought. The reject then had to learn to reject itself or auto-reject. As 
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Dosse suggests, that would be the work of ultra- or “post”- structuralists such as Derrida 
and Deleuze, who refused any hypostasis on any fixed, singular structure, but sought 
and affirmed supplemental traces or nomadic deterritorializations that would undo any 
temptation to found or establish a closed, interiorizing, and totalizing, “self,” “proper,” 
or autos of thought. In all, if the history of structuralism and/ or structuralist thinkers 
can be considered to be an embedded history of the reject, as Dosse narrative seems to 
suggest, the experience of contemporary French thinkers as rejects in their structuralist 
beginnings and even in their departure from early structuralism could have informed the 
latent inscription of the reject in their writings, and hence the more apparent surging of 
the reject from within contemporary French thought.  
 
In addition to Dosse’s work, I would also like to mention Gary Gutting’s French 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (2001). It does not really treat to a great extent the 
structuralist or “post-structuralist” thinkers concerned here as it does the philosophers of 
the Third Republic and French existentialists and phenomenologists, but I mention it 
nonetheless because of the force of rejection that Gutting finds in twentieth century 
French philosophy in general. (I would have wanted to make something out of the 
numerous occurrences of the word “reject” in Gutting’s narrative, but I believe it will 
only be a trivial, if not banal, point.) Gutting’s argument there is that twentieth century 
French thought has always been a question of freedom: it makes it imperative that one is 
free from the confines or limits of institutions and disciplines. And it is from such an 
imperative that French philosophy bears a force of rejection (and in that sense, 
Gutting’s story of twentieth century French philosophy is very much the story of active 
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rejects). Gutting locates this force first in the philosophers of the Third Republic, when 
French philosophy at that time found itself almost inextricably tied to religion or 
spirituality. Science and technology, meanwhile, were on the way to further the progress 
of humanity in the real world. Distanced from that world, French philosophy was 
quickly losing any sense of legitimacy of thought. To regain legitimacy or 
contemporary relevance, Third Republic philosophers such as Boutroux, Le Roy, and 
Duhem then rejected all unquestioned or naturalized links to religion and began to 
engage themselves with the discipline of science. However, to maintain the autonomy 
of its mode of inquiry, philosophy also had to make sure that scientific principles do not 
violently supplement philosophical discourse, to the point of supplanting or dominating 
the latter. And so, as Gutting points out, French philosophy of the Third Republic, after 
rejecting the insular religious horizon, subsequently had to launch another gesture of 
rejection against science: deterministic scientific laws or principles had to be rejected in 
order to affirm a notion of human freedom that is nothing less than the freedom to think 
beyond the limits of such determinism.  
 
As Gutting’s narrative goes, this line of rejection in twentieth century French 
philosophy will continue with Brunschvicg, Bergson, and then with the phenomenology 
(of perception) of Merleau-Ponty, which goes against scientific perception, and 
culminating in the aforementioned structuralism of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, which 
claims to be free from the determinations of history and the human subject, a claim that 
will lead it to declare itself a science that can even rival the traditional discipline of 
science itself. On the structuralism of Barthes and Foucault, especially the Barthes of 
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« La mort de l’auteur » and the Foucault of « Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur », where the 
“elimination of the authorial subject” affirms the emergence of other entities that would 
supplement the text or event in question with “an endless succession of meanings,” 
Gutting will say that this structuralism has kept the question of freedom in twentieth 
century French philosophy alive by giving place to “the creative ability of individual 
critics to constitute new interpretations.”68 Gutting is not so generous, however, with his 
remarks concerning the “post-structuralism” especially of Derrida and Deleuze. 
According to Gutting, “poststructuralism contributed little to our philosophical 
understanding of freedom.”69 He continues: “[Post-structuralist thinkers] remain content 
with a naïve, prereflexive commitment to the unquestionable status of transgression, 
novelty, plurality, and difference as absolute ethical ideals. […] [They] endorse the 
most radical liberation without stopping to ask just what it would consist in and why it 
is so important.”70 The best he would grant to “post-structuralist” thought is to say that 
“there is a real possibility that the twentieth-century French problematic of freedom has 
finally worked itself out [in “post-structuralism”]. It has, after all, thoroughly developed 
the topic through embedding freedom in general systems of thought, describing our 
lived experience of it, and deconstructing the forces that act against it.”71 I would say, 
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68 French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 249. 
69 French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 389. 
70 French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 389. 
71 French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 390. Despite this apparent concession to “post-
structuralism,” Gutting’s suspicion of the latter remains, which manifests itself in a stronger and more 
sustained critique in his more recent Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960 (which can 
be read as a sequel to French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century). The question of the impossible, for 
example in Derrida’s “deconstruction” of the gift, becomes Gutting’s point of critique. According to 
Gutting, who grounds himself on existing examples of giving that can always include “a mixture of 
altruistic and self-interested motives,” Derrida “fail[s] to establish the impossibility of the concepts 
deconstructed” (Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, 188, 190). I find this a misreading, on the part of Gutting, of the Derridean impossibility, 
however. Derrida is not seeking to think about “inconceivability” (ibid, 191) (of giving) in everyday 
examples. The Derridean impossibility is not delimited by past and present examples or conditions. 
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however, that if Gutting had pursued as rigorously as he did with the philosophers of 
science the force, if not the figure, of the reject – as I will do in this present work – 
“embedded” in “post-structuralist” thought, he might come to recognize that there is no 
less the working out of the question of freedom in “post-structuralist” thought.  
 
But to return to Dosse’s work: given the absence of references to more “post-
structuralist” texts such as Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille plateaux (1980), Lyotard’s La 
condition postmoderne (1979), or Baudrillard’s Simulacre et simulation (1981), I 
suspect that the early 80s served as an end-point for Dosse’s historical work (even 
though Histoire du structuralisme was to be published in 1991 and 1992). The story of 
contemporary French thought as a story of rejects certainly does not end there, however. 
François Cusset’s French Theory picks up from where Dosse left off.72 It tells the story 
of the success of “post-structuralism” in the United States, where thinkers such as 
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Instead, it looks towards a future where, for example, the notion of giving goes beyond all its past and 
present understanding and perception; and this is how the Derridean impossible is impossible, i.e., 
impossible to past and present standards of thinking about things or doing things. Another problem that I 
find in Gutting’s later text is his claim that “recent French philosophers show significant weaknesses, 
particularly in logical rigor, clarity, and relevance. All of these are connected with what I have called their 
disdain for the obvious: their failure to give proper attention to the mundane concepts and truths of 
everyday life […]” (ibid, 202). I have already suggested that the “lack” of “logical rigor” is due to 
contemporary French thought’s radical sidestepping of the narrow limits of empirical data. And to say 
that it lacks “clarity,” I point to Gutting’s failure to consider that the claimed “obscurity” surrounding 
“post-structuralist” texts might in fact be an effect of translation. And given the later political texts of 
Derrida, which deal with real events such as 9/11, or Badiou’s critique of the last two French elections 
and the Arab Spring of 2011, I cannot see how Gutting can make that leap to say that recent French 
thought “fail[s] to give proper attention to the mundane concepts and truths of everyday life.” But what I 
find most problematic about Gutting’s later text is when Gutting demands that contemporary French 
thought “meet[s] the (legitimate) standards of analytic philosophizing” (ibid, 203). This, to me, is a 
failure to discern, respect, and affirm the different modes of thinking and the different thought horizons 
involved in “continental” and “analytic” philosophies respectively, even though they might share the 
same object or topics of philosophical inquiry. In any case, I would like to make a final note to point out 
that the force of rejection in the “post-structuralist” strand of French thought continues to subtend 
Gutting’s narrative in this later text. As he notes of Derrida’s différance, for example, “everything Derrida 
says about it amounts to a rejection of thinking about it in any particular way” (ibid, 192, my emphasis). 
72 See French Theory: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Cie et les mutations de la vie intellectuelle aux 
États-Unis, Paris: La Découverte, 2003. 
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Foucault, Baudrillard, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Balibar, 
were received in the fashion of Hollywood stars there. But this apparent success in the 
US of French “post-structuralists” is only a veil for the continued rejection of French 
structuralism and/ or “post-structuralism” that was already under way before May 68, 
according to Dosse. This rejection remains evident today, as a quick survey of the 
French intellectual landscape will immediately reveal the minority status of French 
structuralism and/ or “post-structuralism.” Except for marginal pockets such as the 
Université de Paris-VIII (which no doubt has lost much of its post-68 reputation as a 
place for radical, cutting-edge research and thinkers), there is really not much place for 
the teaching of contemporary French thought in major French universities 
(contemporary French thought being once again largely absent in the curriculum at the 
Sorbonne). Meanwhile, at the École Normale Superièure (rue d’Ulm), there are 
certainly Marc Crépon in the Department of Philosophy and Frédéric Worms and Elie 
During under the aegis of the Centre International d’Études de la Philosophie Française 
Contemporaine, all of whom remain faithful to “post-structuralist” thought. However, in 
my view, they do not make up a sufficient number to champion the critical value and 
pertinence of “post-structuralism” today. And where the (French) epigones of French 
structuralist and/ or “post-structuralist” thinkers are situated institutionally today can 
also be symptomatic of contemporary French thought bearing the status of rejects in 
France today: Catherine Malabou (former student of Derrida), Eric Alliez (former 
student of Deleuze), and Frédéric Neyrat (former student of Nancy), for example, do not 
occupy major positions in main Parisian universities but are seeking to carve out their 
respective careers either in the UK or the US. In all, contemporary French thought and 
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thinkers today, as much as the structuralist beginnings in the early 60s, remain very 
much as rejects. 
 
« Une mauvaise idée de langage » 
Now, if intellectual histories of contemporary French thought by Dosse, Cusset, and 
Gutting can be shown to suggest that the history of contemporary French thought 
inscribes at the same time the embedded history of the reject, and if this current work is 
going to demonstrate that the reject subtends the thoughts or writings of contemporary 
French thinkers, one could ask why is it that contemporary French thought itself has 
never articulated the figure of the reject. One possible response may be that this figure 
has always lived out a condition under which it is made to be true to its name, that is to 
say, present but denied from coming to presence, and hence the reticence even from 
contemporary French thinkers with regard to the articulation of this figure. But the more 
precise response would be that the French language does not possess a term that French 
thinkers could deploy in order to articulate the reject as I have sensed from my reading 
of contemporary French thought and which I outline in this work, i.e. the reject in all its 
senses of the passive and active reject, and of the auto-reject. The French language 
certainly has rejeter to signify the act of rejection, but one does not say rejet in French 
to mean a figure of thought, a “conceptual personage” (Deleuze and Guattari), a person, 
or a thing, as one says sujet for the subject, objet for the object, abject for the abject, or 
even trajet (Virilio) for the traject. To reiterate, rejet in French typically signifies the 
act of rejection. The closest the French language comes to articulate something of a 
reject is perhaps rebut, which is commonly translated into English as trash or waste. 
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Rebut is obviously not adequate for the reject that is at stake here, since it points too 
much to the passive condition of being thrown out or being disposed of. It does not 
capture the sense of active rejection that the reject also bears, and neither does it suggest 
in the least that critical aspect of the reject as auto-reject.73  
 
So again: the French language does not admit rejet into its lexicon as a figure of thought 
in the likes of sujet, objet, abject, and trajet. In that respect, I also remember well 
Nancy’s response to me when I first brought up the question of the reject with him 
sometime in 2009. Communicating in French, I proposed to him « le « rejet » en tant 
qu’une figure de pensée ». Very politely and gently, as is always the case with Nancy, 
he expressed his suspicion that my rejet might just be une mauvaise idée de langage – a 
bad wordplay. To be precise, he has no major disagreement with what the reject is about 
conceptually, but as a matter of language, to think rejet as a figure of thought is a move 
he cannot quite agree with. I could certainly let this incommensurability between the 
English language, which calls with ease the reject anyone who is denigrated or 
abandoned, and the French language, which resists, if not considers impossible, the use 
of rejet to describe one such person, be the amicable “dissensus” between us. But I 
could also make an appeal, which I would prefer to do, not only to Nancy, but also to 
the French language, to be open to the possibility of accommodating rejet as a figure of 
thought, or for the French language to open itself to the sense of rejet as a figure of 
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73 The verb form of the French rejeter might point to auto-rejection as I understand it, that is to say, as 
creative regeneration. One could morphologically break rejeter into re- and jeter, where jeter, which 
means to throw, or to launch, is modified by the re- prefix, which signifies the act of repeating. And so in 
rewriting rejeter as re-jeter, one may see the event of a re-launching, the event of being thrown, or 
throwing oneself, again. But in fact, the French rejet, used in the context of botany, can also signify the 
sense of re-beginning in re-jeter or even in the auto-reject, since in that context, it names the new growth, 
an offshoot, springing forth from an existing stem of a plant. 
!! 34 
thought. Put another way, and to borrow Nancy’s term from the title of his first volume 
on the deconstruction of Christianity, I would make an appeal for the “dis-closure” 
[déclosion] in the French language in order for it to welcome, to receive, what it has 
always considered impossible. To let arrive that which is impossible, is that not also an 
event according to Derrida, or more precisely, the event according to Badiou, since 
Badiou’s event concerns the affirmation of the coming to presence of what has been 
previously relegated (by dominant powers, dominant discourses, and majority groups) 
as “inexistent” (which is surely some form of the reject)? To receive the event, or for 
the “dis-closure,” of le « rejet » en tant qu’une figure de pensée : that is my modest plea 
to the French language and to Nancy. Or else, I would like to think that le « rejet » en 
tant qu’une figure de pensée resounds within or beneath the French language as its 
silence (Derrida), its stammering (Deleuze), its murmuring or (animal) grunting 
[borborygmes] (Nancy), its animot (Derrida, Cixous), its counter-signature (Derrida 
again), its écriture feminine (Cixous), or even its syncope (Clément).  
 
Having made the appeal for the French language to open itself to le « rejet » en tant 
qu’une figure de pensée, one could in fact reconsider the absence of a French equivalent 
for the English reject and argue that that absence might in fact turn out advantageous to 
the present endeavor to articulate the reject as a theory, which should entail that the 
reject resonates with a general condition of being that not only transcends temporal 
limits but also the spatial confines instituted by national frontiers. In the absence of a 
French equivalent to the English reject, one can never claim that the reject is strictly a 
French conceptualization (even though I seek to locate its marked emergence in 
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contemporary French thought), as one might claim the subject to be when one attributes 
the thinking of the sujet to Descartes (even though he does not mobilize that term), if 
not claim it to be German when one points to the transcendental Subjekt in Kant or the 
Subjekt of Spirit or Absolute Knowledge in Hegel. The reject, in contrast, knows no 
national boundaries, knows no epochal delimitations (of which the subject seems to 
have been subjected to when Heidegger proclaimed the end of metaphysics with 
Nietzsche and announced Dasein in place of the subjectum – the subject that is capable 
of comprehensively re-presenting himself and the world to himself). The reject is more 
common than being Anglo-American, French, German, or Italian, more common than 
being a phenomenon of a particular time period.74 Furthermore, the reject is also more 
common, without it ever having to have proclaimed or to proclaim to form some sort of 
common, than the common that is formed by the contemporary multitude according to 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.75      
 
The Reject Now 
We live, more than ever perhaps, in an age of rejects. The reject gradually fills the 
thoughts of our time, as we come to acknowledge the reject to be a general condition of 
contemporary being.76 Already in 2004, Zygmunt Bauman, inspired by the work of the 
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74 I note here too that the German language has no similar term for the reject as it has for the Subjekt. 
Instead, it has Ausgestossene (for a person) or Ausschuss (for a thing). And while the French, as 
mentioned, has rejeter as a verb for the act of rejecting, the German has ablehnen, abweisen, verweigern, 
and zurückweisen. Meanwhile, there is reietto in Italian to mean reject.   
75 See especially Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009. 
76 Shall we even say that there is an increasing turn to and celebration of the reject today? One takes into 
account the growing archive of works on topics such as animal lives and disabled beings, “subjects” that 
used to be neglected or even rejected (especially the topic of animals) in dominant intellectual discourse 
just decades ago. And on a less serious note, can we ignore the success in popular culture of the television 
hit-series Glee, which tells the story of a group of high-school rejects who make good by coming together 
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Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the homo sacer, which is undoubtedly very 
much a figure of the reject, was speaking of “wasted lives” or lives that are considered 
to be like trash in the eyes of global capital in our contemporary world. According to 
Bauman, “The production of ‘human waste,’ or more correctly wasted humans (the 
‘excessive’ and ‘redundant,’ that is the populations of those who either could not or 
were not wished to be recognized or allowed to stay), is an inevitable outcome of 
modernization, and an inseparable accompaniment of modernity. It is an inescapable 
side-effect of order-building (each order casts some parts of the extant population as 
‘out of place,’ ‘unfit’ or ‘undesirable’) and of economic progress (that cannot proceed 
without degrading and devaluing the previously effective modes of ‘making a living’ 
and therefore cannot but deprive their practitioners of their livelihood).”77 He goes on 
later: “To be ‘redundant’ means to be supernumerary, unneeded, of no use […]. To be 
declared redundant means to have been disposed of because of being disposable […]. 
‘Redundancy’ shares its semantic space with ‘rejects,’ ‘wastrels,’ ‘garbage,’ ‘refuse’ – 
with waste.”78 As Bauman notes too, one cannot, however, simply make these rejects 
disappear in “the waste yard, the rubbish heap.”79 The rubbish heap grows too, and 
around the world, there is also the sense that there is not only not enough space in these 
heaps for wasted rejects, but also not enough space for such rubbish heaps. Here, the 
space of rubbish heaps is also a subject of rejection.  
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and forming their show-choir club, not to mention the alternative rock group All-American Rejects that 
was formed since 1999? 
77 Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts, Oxford: Polity, 2004, 5. 
78 Wasted Lives, 12. 
79 Wasted Lives, 12. 
!! 37 
And yet the over-spilling of more “wasted lives” would become unstoppable with the 
global financial crisis that begun in 2007. The increasing phenomenon of “wasted lives” 
would explode into the Occupy movements in late 2011 not only in cities in the US but 
also in major cities around the world, when the sense or even the fact that we are almost 
all rejects ourselves will be forcefully acknowledged, as declared by the movement’s 
slogan of “we are the 99%,” that is to say, the 99% rejected of the wealth enjoyed by 
the 1% due to unequal economic distribution, and are now rejecting the questionable 
financial and banking practices that have produced that economic inequality. But the 
reject is really more than a mere product or remnant of the economic machine. It is also 
a political condition (as testified by illegal immigrants, refugees, stateless people, the 
sans papiers in France, the Roms in Europe, and in a more “eventful” way, by what 
Badiou calls the “inexistents” in their massive uprisings during the Arab Spring of 
2011), as well as an existential condition. And I think that a general theory of the reject 
(even though it inclines towards contemporary French thought as its basis) can show 
that. As I have suggested earlier, and as I will also further explicate in the rest of this 
work, a theory of the reject goes beyond the recognition of passive “wasted lives.” It 
can even offer the latter to think beyond their condition as “a destiny,” to think 
themselves otherwise than being hopelessly “vanquished,” but incite them to “strategies 
of resistance against [their] putting-to-waste [mise-au-rebut].”80 Or else, and I stress 
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80 Jacob Rogozinski et Michel Surya, « Présentation » au collectif sur « Le rebut humain » in Lignes 35, 
Paris : Lignes, juin 2011, 6. I note that this collection is also inspired by Bauman’s work, and like 
Bauman, several of the contributors make reference to Agamben’s homo sacer. Like Bauman again, most 
contributors consider le rebut humain or human trash as something produced. In Rogozinski’s piece on 
the lepers of the Middle Ages, he argues, “In truth, there is no figure of the rebut that is ever originary 
[originaire]: all are constituted by a complex process where the rupture of an initial ambivalence 
[regarding what is pure or not, sacred or not] plays a decisive role” (« Pire que la mort », 27). Marc 
Nichanian, on his part, argues that the rebut is a conjuration of the humanist subject, that the construction 
of a subject in its unitary properness and sanctity “needed the rebut” (« Le rebut du sujet », 40). But this 
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again the role of the auto-reject here, a theory of the reject can encourage them to see 
beyond the anguishing limits of their condition, or even make light of them, and pursue 
another trajectory of thought or living that frees them from their “vanquished” 
condition.81  
 
Without delay then, we need a theory of the reject, and we need to articulate or 
elucidate the stakes of such a theory. In that regard, the following sections will be 
engaged in eliciting the figure of the reject, if not a nascent theory of the reject, in 
concepts that primarily preoccupy contemporary French thought – concepts such as 
community and friendship, the concept of “religion without religion,” and the political 
concept of democracy. At the same time, the chapters will also situate the reject 
according to contemporary French thought in more current contexts, for example, the 
explosion of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the “post-secular” 
condition, the apparent impasse in radical political thought in the post-9/11 
“democratic” world, and the contemporary “posthuman” interests in animal and 
bacterial life and system theories. In engaging with these contemporary contexts, the 
aim would be, on the one hand, to show how the reject according to contemporary 
French thought can make a critical intervention in these contexts, if not how the reject is 
in the process of positing another ethics, another “religion without religion,” another 
politics, “without the subject.” On the other hand, the aim would also be to consider 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
only means that the rebut is in effect “the inverted image [of the humanist human subject] in the mirror” 
(« Le rebut du sujet », 47). And according to Jérôme Lèbre, “the human trash does not cease to be created, 
because it is humanity itself, expelled from itself” (« Les failles du monde », 72).    
81 Martin Crowley, in his contribution to the issue on « Le rebut humain » of Lignes (see note above), 
argues that there is even life on the side of the rebut, on the side of those that are separated from the rest 
of the world: “Life […] from the other side. At a distance” [La vie […] de l’autre côté. À l’écart] (« Vivre 
à l’écart », 60). 
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how current developments in the questions of community and friendship, religion, and 
politics can refine or redefine a theory of the reject, thereby pushing contemporary 
French thought beyond its existing horizons or limit. 
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1.  
(After) Friendship, Love, and Community 
 
As I have claimed in the introduction, the reject has all along been nascent in 
contemporary French thought, except that it has never been explicitly articulated. In 
other words, the reject is not an arbitrary conjuration but a figure of thought that has 
always been subtending contemporary French thought. The aim of the following pages 
is to demonstrate that. In this present section, it will show how the reject underlies 
contemporary French thought’s engagement with the related or interrelated concepts of 
friendship, love, and community – concepts that almost every contemporary French 
thinker from Bataille to Badiou more recently is invested in, each in their respective 
ways. Put another way, what is at work in these thinkers’ “obsession”1 with these 
concepts is the latent inscription of the reject. As I would argue here, the subterranean 
mobilization of the reject has the purpose of radicalizing those concepts, i.e. it is with 
the reject that contemporary French thinkers give those concepts new and future 
trajectories, beyond the limits imposed by past and present understanding. But I go 
further too to argue that articulating the reject can also broaden those radical horizons. 
To demonstrate that, merely eliciting the reject from within concepts is inadequate. 
Instead, one needs to situate the reject in contemporary thinking and practices of 
friendship, love, and community, and see if it can make any critical intervention there. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This word is used by Blanchot in La communauté inavouable (Paris: Minuit, 1983) to describe 
Bataille’s engagement with the thought of community. It has been picked up again recently by Andrew J. 
Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree in their edited volume of essays on Bataille and community, The 
Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and Communication (Albany: Stat University of New York 
Press, 2009).  
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That is perhaps the real task and challenge of theorizing the reject today: not just to 
elicit it from within safe textual boundaries and elucidate it “on paper,” but also to 
contextualize it amidst the irreducible and undeniable fact of existing with others in the 
real world. Such contextualization of the reject within both textual and empirical 
domains of friendship, love, and community is in fact indispensable for a theory of the 
reject, since the reject does not and cannot exist on its own in absolute terms. There is 
after all no reject without others rejecting it (or without it rejecting others), and so it is 
senseless or meaningless to theorize the reject or to even think about the reject, if one 
claims it to be absolutely singular without others. The fact of existing with others, that 
is to say, to exist amidst the existence of others, cannot be denied in the thinking of the 
reject, which is to say too that the existence of real others is always at stake or 
irrefutable in the reject’s relation to the thinking of friendship, love, and community.  
 
One can reformulate the above as follows: in situating the reject within the reality or 
fact of community, a theory of the reject places itself in a kind of limit-situation 
whereby one inquires into the way the reject negotiates with others in the world, or how 
it pursues its desires without negating the existence and differences of others. It 
becomes a question of how the reject can coexist with others in friendship, love, and 
community: How does it function in relation to those three terms? What role does it 
play there, and how does it play itself out? Does one, or even should one, transform 
one’s thinking of friendship, love, and community, as one takes into account the reject, 
especially when one re-cognizes oneself as a reject? Is it possible to think a friendship, 
love, or community of and for rejects? Are these concepts still relevant, or even 
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possible, with the reject? Can the reject be the figure of thought for a critical rethinking 
of contemporary friendship, love, and community? If, at the outset, the term reject gives 
the impression that it makes the thinking of friendship, love, or community almost 
impossible, let it be said here that any sense of anti-community, anti-friendship, and 
anti-love that the reject projects is not in view of nihilistic or destructive ends. That 
would only be the over-projection of the second turn of the active reject, something that 
is too easy to accomplish and more characteristic of the supposedly sovereign subject 
that is always too keen to negate others in order to serve its own ends. As this present 
work insists, that force must not over-assert itself; and as this section and the following 
ones will show, it is more critical, ethically and politically, to give place to the third turn 
of the auto-reject. In any case, if the reject is made to articulate or manifest itself within 
the concepts of friendship, love, and community, it is done only to keep open the radical 
horizons that contemporary French thought has introduced to those concepts, and to 
allow something other than the radicalized notions of those concepts to inflect those 
very same radicalizations. I would even say that what is at stake in thinking the reject in 
relation to friendship, love, and community is a new ethics of being in, or “being-with,” 
as Nancy would say following Heidegger, the world, an ethics that is always 
modulating itself at every instant as different beings come into contact with one another. 
 
Just as the endeavor to theorize the reject is a response to Nancy’s question of qui vient 
après le sujet, the quest to think if friendship, love, and community are possible with the 
reject stems from Nancy’s call to think of a “community without subject.”2 To be sure, 
Nancy was not the first to posit a “community without subject.” Bataille, before Nancy, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See Nancy’s introduction to Who Comes after the Subject?, 8. 
! 43 
had already put forth a thought of community where the subject undergoes a dissolution. 
This is particularly evident in L’Expérience intérièure, which can be said to be 
Bataille’s critique of the appropriation and determination of everything, including the 
thought of community, by knowledge – especially Hegelian, dialectic absolute 
knowledge. Under the latter, everything is claimed to be knowable or develop within the 
limits of speculative knowledge, while those that resist such determination are relegated 
to the shadows of a night that one can remain blind to. In other words, everything in 
Hegelian dialectical knowledge is reduced to the possible, which is to say too that 
everything is at an impasse, since things cannot play out in ways unthought of by 
speculative knowledge. In Bataille’s analysis, this impasse arises out of the subject and 
“its will to knowledge.”3 With the latter, what one experiences is only “limited 
existence,”4 where everything transpires only according to the determinations of the 
subject and object, only within the confines of either the one as possessor of another, or 
the other as possessed by another.5 In that case, one forgets the “ecstasy” – to use 
Bataille’s word in L’Expérience intérièure, of being immersed in “human existence,”6 
as in an ocean – another of Bataille’s imagery,7 where, should one wish to retain the 
terms subject and object, there will only be a subject without knowledge [sujet non-
savoir], and an unknown or unknowable object [objet l’inconnu].8 Bataille calls this 
immersion “communication,” which is not just something before and beyond all 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 L’Expérience intérieure, Paris : Gallimard, 1943, 74, my translation. 
4 L’Expérience intérieure, 40. 
5 See L’Expérience intérieure, 74. 
6 L’Expérience intérieure, 15. 
7 L’Expérience intérieure, 40. 
8 L’Expérience intérieure, 21. 
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intelligible, linguistic discourse, and which may therefore include silence too.9 It is also 
the fact of existence of one and the other, before and beyond all construction of one and 
the other as subject or object. Simply put, it is the fact of existing with the other who is 
already there and the other who is to come. It is existence where “there is no longer 
subject=object, but ‘gaping opening’ [brêche béante] between one and the other; and in 
this gap, subject and object are dissolved. There is passage, communication, but not 
from one to the other: one and the other have lost distinct existence.”10 It is in this sense 
that Bataille will say, “existence is communication,” and “communication” in this sense 
is also, for Bataille, “the sense of a community.”11 And to attain this sense of 
community, there must be, according to Bataille, the “contestation,”12 if not rejection, of 
the categories of subject and object, and consequently, of all knowledge, or of what is 
claimed to be known and knowable.    
 
Bataille’s “contestation” assumes various forms. In addition to the abovementioned 
ecstasy, it also includes laughter, poetry, sacrifice, anguish [l’angoisse], hopelessness 
[le désespoir], and unproductive expenditure [la dépense]. Nancy’s thoughts on 
community are clearly indebted to Bataille, and Nancy duly acknowledges this in La 
communauté désœuvrée. However, Nancy makes a break with Bataille in refraining 
from resorting to radical, anguishing measures that tend towards extreme ends such as 
sacrificial unproductive expenditure, where the thought of community freed from all 
present forms or understanding can be found only in the day after the apocalypse, after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See L’Expérience intérièure, 28-29, on silence. In a later passage, Bataille also argues that “the refusal 
to communicate [i.e. silence] is a more hostile means to communicate, and the most powerful” (ibid, 64). 
10 L’Expérience intérieure, 74. 
11 L’Expérience intérieure, 115, 40. 
12 L’Expérience intérieure, 24. 
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the ruin without remainder of everything, that is to say, after the absolute loss of the 
sacrificial victim, the executioner of the sacrifice, the witnesses of the sacrifice, and the 
very structure of sacrifice itself. For Nancy, that thought of community does not depend 
on such apocalyptic messianism as a necessary condition. In fact, one could say that for 
Nancy, there is, always already, such a community or such a thought of community, if 
not community tout court, except that it has been smothered by the teleologic quest for 
some sort of communitarian fusion, communion, closed finality or identity, and even 
totality, based on the determination of either a singular, sovereign subject or a collective 
of likeminded subjects.13 Nancy would even go further to argue that community is not 
just beyond “the immanence of a subject,” but is also “originary or ontological.”14 In 
other words, the existence of every entity, especially of every singularity before its 
constitution as a subject or individual, already articulates community, as long as one 
recognizes that this existence always already situates itself beside or among the 
existence of other entities. It is through this recognition that the Heideggerian Being or 
Dasein, or even Mitsein or being-with [être-avec], must be rearticulated or refined in 
Nancy’s philosophy as giving exposition to community, or even simply “as 
community”15: there is the exposition of community through the co-presence, or what 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 It is this affirmation that there is always already community that forms Nancy’s critique of Bataille’s 
community of lovers, which Bataille celebrates as standing opposed to all formations of community in 
society – communities that are constituted to be functional, purposeful, and productive. For Nancy, the 
community of lovers does not stand outside of community. Otherwise, there is the risk that the 
community of lovers become some sort of insular, subjective, communion, and hence antithetical to all 
thoughts of community. See La Communauté désœuvrée, Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986, 90-98. See also 
60-65 for Nancy’s critique of Bataille not going far enough with his critique of the subject, allowing a 
trace of the subject or subjectivity to remain in his thought. And on the difference of Nancy’s there is or il 
y a of community with Levinas’s il y a and an ethical community based on the face-to-face instant, see 
224.  
14 La Communauté désœuvrée, 152, 71. 
15 La Communauté désœuvrée, 22. 
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Nancy calls comparution, of beings.16 Such existence as always already community is a 
fact of existence that is shared by all beings, a sharing that makes each of us, according 
to Nancy, being-in-common [être-en-commun], a commonality that must not be 
confused with the idea that each being is homogeneous to the next: “being is in 
common, without ever being common.”17 And given the prepositions that Nancy 
unveils in the thinking of being, from “with” [avec] to “in” [en] and to “to” [à] in 
Nancy’s more recent rephrasing of being as being-to or être-à,18 one could say that 
being for Nancy is always prepositional being, that is to say that being is always pre-
positioned towards community before it positions itself as a subject. Being, in short, for 
Nancy, is always (already) existing and moving among other entities; or, being is 
always approaching another community in the movement of its existence in the world. 
And this has nothing to do with the work or project of a subject or individual. Instead, 
this is but “the passion of community,”19 which escapes all determination of a subject or 
individual.  
 
It is at this point where one finds a force of rejection in Nancy’s thought on community, 
which is articulated in terms of désœuvrement or unworking, that is to say, the undoing 
of all subjective work or project seeking the constitution of a defined or definable 
community. Désœuvrement is also put in simpler terms as “resistance,” more precisely 
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16 To return to the there is or il y a of community of Nancy, I refer here to Nancy’s essay « Cum » (in La 
pensée dérobée, Paris : Galilée, 2001), where he gives the notion of Mitdasein a further analysis than 
Heidegger had done. For Nancy, Mitdasein must be rearticulated as mit-da-sein or “being-with-there” 
[être là avec] (« Cum », 120), where “with-there” points being to its fact as “being sharing or sharing 
itself according to the there [da], which strives to designate the “opening” – the “opening” of the 
exposed” (ibid, 120).       
17 La Communauté désœuvrée, 225. 
18 See L’Adoration: la deconstruction du christianisme, 2, Paris: Galilée, 2010. 
19 La Communauté désœuvrée, 151. 
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as “infinite resistance,” to anything that seeks to render community as complete(d), 
absolute, defined, or accomplished.20 It is with such a force of rejection that community 
affirms that it is always there, that it “never disappears” in the face of all the works and 
projects on a supposed perfectible community.21 But Nancy would be precise to say too 
that the “passion of community” is vigilant to unwork itself as well, or to (auto-)reject 
itself as I would say, when community is on the verge of establishing itself as a 
hypostasis or foundation: the “passion of community” must be “incompletion” 
[inachèvement] itself, “an activity constantly unworked, unworking” [à nouveau, une 
activité désœuvrée, désœuvrante].22 Given the force of rejection and auto-rejection of 
community that will only ceaselessly affirm itself, it does not mean that all that remains 
for us is to simply say that there is community. In fact, the task for us is to precisely 
expose that fact of community that remains despite or after the rejection of all work of 
the subject, the fact of community that remains when entities or singularities depart and 
occupy a different space, the fact of community, in other words, that all beings 
irreducibly continue to share in one way or another in common. In Nancy’s words, that 
is “the task of exposing the inexposable ‘in’” of being-in-common, the “in” where we 
are all thrown or “abandoned” (and therefore in a way rejected) to be “first […] 
received, perceived, felt, touched, managed, desired, rejected [my italics], called, named, 
communicated.”23 The question that I would pose here is: which figure of thought can 
open us up to this task of “exposing the inexposable ‘in’,” which can keep open the 
thought of community even when we are “rejected” in this “in,” and which can maintain 
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20 La Communauté désœuvrée, 198. 
21 La Communauté désœuvrée, 146. 
22 La Communauté désœuvrée, 87. 
23 La Communauté désœuvrée, 230, 226. 
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the désœuvrement of community? For Nancy, this figure of thought is clearly not the 
subject since, as he states right at the beginning of La communauté désœuvrée, it is that 
“which is not [my italics] a subject [that] opens and opens itself instantaneously onto a 
community.”24 Would the reject be this figure of thought then, the reject that is no less 
“rejected” in the “in” of being-in-common? Would it be the reject that also risks not 
being counted in what Nancy calls the “community of the arrived” [communauté 
d’arrivée],25 since it has departed or is departing, constituting (without any conscious 
intention) henceforth a community of the departing or departed, if not a community of 
the rejected [communauté de rejeté], or even what Bataille calls “the community of 
those who have no community”? 
 
At this point, I would like to note that the Italian thinker Giorgio Agamben in The 
Coming Community has indeed taken up Nancy’s challenge to think of “a community 
without presupposition and without subjects.”26 In place of the subject, Agamben 
proposes the singularity of “whatever being.”27 According to Agamben, the force of 
“whatever” or quodlibet frees a being – and one might elicit some sort of (auto-)reject 
here – from all binding to a class or set, from all determination of having this or that 
predicate or property in order to assume a definable form or identity. “Whatever” or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 La Communauté désœuvrée, 41. 
25 La Communauté désœuvrée, 260. 
26 The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991, 65. I note too that another Italian thinker, Roberto Esposito, has also taken the cue from 
Nancy to think about community with a critique of the subject as its point of departure. See especially 
Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community (trans. Timothy Campbell, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). I mention Agamben above in particular simply because The Coming Community, 
more than Communitas perhaps, posits a figure of thought otherwise of the subject in relation to the 
rethinking of community.  
27 The Coming Community, 1. 
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quodlibet is just the very force of being, the force of “being such as it is,”28 or – and 
Agamben comes close to Nancy’s rhetoric here – its very exposure or “its own taking-
place” before anything else.29 In Nancy’s terms, such “taking-place” would be the very 
presence of being itself, before it articulates itself and before it works out a relation with 
others around it. For Agamben, an example of “whatever being” would be the example 
itself, which speaks of and for itself, but whose very articulation “holds for all cases of 
the same type” as well, speaking “for each of them and serve for all” at the same time.30 
“Neither particular nor universal” in this case, “the example is a singular object that 
presents itself as such, that shows its singularity.”31 The ipseity of the subject or 
subjectivity, with its predicates that define its distinction from others, is evacuated here. 
In the example’s articulation of itself, in making itself “purely linguistic being,” the 
example can also be said to take on a contour of the auto-reject in terms of rejecting any 
ground of substance, or rejecting thinking its substance as a ground of subjective 
certitude, for “the proper place of the example is always beside itself [in the linguistic 
articulation of itself as example], in the empty space in which its undefinable and 
unforgettable life unfolds.”32 (In that case, it can be said too that the example sidesteps 
all appellation to subjectivity or subjecthood according to Althusser’s theory of the 
subject, even though it is “defined […] by being-called.”33) But this auto-reject has a 
force of rejection on its own: by force of its “exemplary being,” that is to say, by 
articulating what it has in common with others, and reserving a singularity and hence 
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28 The Coming Community, 1. 
29 The Coming Community, 2. 
30 The Coming Community, 11. 
31 The Coming Community, 11. 
32 The Coming Community, 11. 
33 The Coming Community, 11. 
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difference for itself at the same time, the example or “whatever being” as “the Most 
Common” undoes all forms of community delimited by the horizons of class, properties, 
predicates, or identities that are shared more or less in common by their members.34 
According to Agamben, “whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do 
not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek 
recognition.”35 This auto-reject then “cuts off any real community,” and that is “the 
impotent omnivalence of whatever being.”36 And yet that is not to say that “whatever 
beings” are anti-community in a nihilistic sense, or that they resist all sense of 
community. The contrary is true instead. Their “impotent omnivalence” would mean 
that “whatever beings,” through the fact that they exist alongside one another, “form a 
community without affirming an identity,” “an absolutely unrepresentable community,” 
or one could say, whatever community, no matter how transient in finite temporality 
such a community may be.37 They are examples that testify to the fact that “humans co-
belong,” before and beyond all circumscription of community, “without any 
representable condition of belonging.”38 
 
To go further in positing the reject in relation to community in Agamben would require 
further discussions on the problematic questions of Agamben’s homo sacer, bare life, 
the state of exception, and the open.39 However, the scope of this work, as said, is 
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34 The Coming Community, 11. 
35 The Coming Community, 86. 
36 The Coming Community, 11. 
37 The Coming Community, 86, 25. 
38 The Coming Community, 86. 
39 For a critique, especially on the limits, of these concepts, see especially Dominick LaCapra’s 
“Approaching Limit Events: Siting Agamben” in History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004) and “Reopening the Question of the Human and the 
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contemporary French thought, and so I will now leave Agamben aside and return to the 
question of the reject in contemporary French thoughts’ engagement with the concepts 
of community, love, and friendship. This section will focus on those concepts in the 
works of Derrida and Deleuze, with slight deviations to the writings of Catherine 
Clément and Luce Irigaray. As will be shown, Derrida’s and Deleuze’s respective 
engagement with those concepts tends towards a forceful exposition of the figure of the 
reject. That is not to say, however, that their thoughts on friendship, love, and 
community, in relation to the reject, are not problematic. The contrary is true in fact. 
For example, there is the unequivocal rejection of community in Derrida: in A Taste for 
the Secret, Derrida acknowledges that “if I have always hesitated to use [the] word 
[community], it is because too often the word ‘community’ resounds with the 
‘common’ [commun], the as-one [comme-un]”40; and towards the end of his Politiques 
de l’amitié, he would reflect on “why the word ‘community’ (avowable or unavowable, 
inoperative or not) – why I have never been able to write it, on my own initiative and in 
my name, as it were. Why? Where does my reticence come from?”41 However, it is not 
clear as to how far Derrida goes in rejecting friendship. With regard to Deleuze, the 
distrust and rejection of friendship are almost precise, but his position on community 
can be ambiguous when he seems to disdain it on the one hand, and yet advocates, on 
the other, the concept of nomadology, which is undeniably communitarian, since 
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Animal” in History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2009).  
40 Derrida and Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, eds. Giacomo Donis and David 
Webb, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, 25. 
41 Politiques de l’amitié, Paris: Galilée, 1994, 338. I have consulted and used in large part George 
Collins’s translation of this passage in Politics of Friendship, London: Verso, 1997, 304-305. This is also 
true for the other references to Politiques de l’amitié. Subsequent citations from this text will therefore be 
indicated by references to the French text first (to be marked as PA), followed by those to Collins’ 
translation (henceforth marked as PF).  
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nomads, from which nomadology is derived, do form some sort of group or community. 
These ambiguous oscillations between (rejecting) friendship and community constitute 
an interesting problematic, and hence the focus on Derrida and Deleuze here.42 The 
more critical motivation to focus on Derrida and Deleuze, however, is the context of the 
rising dominance or hegemony of teletechnologies and digital modes of communication 
from which Deleuze and Derrida launch their respective rejections of existing 
community and friendship. That technological context is certainly not distant from our 
present network-culture.43 Hence, if Derrida and Deleuze show how ideologically 
corrupt friendship and community are within such context, and if one can elicit the 
workings of the reject in their philosophical critiques of such friendship and community, 
the reject can also be mobilized to likewise combat our contemporary network-centric 






42 I also note that a critique of the withdrawal from the radical trajectory in relation to friendship in 
Derrida, and an inquiry into the question of community in Deleuze, are insufficiently dealt with in 
Derridean and Deleuzian scholarship. Turning to Derrida and Deleuze here hence seeks to fill certain 
gaps in those scholarships. 
43 I acknowledge too that our contemporary teletechnological world, especially its operative or 
operational aspect, forms the backdrop or point of departure for Nancy’s critique of community as well. 
For a comprehensive study of that, I refer to Philip Armstrong’s Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the 
Networks of the Political (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), where he correctly points 
out that Nancy’s notion of community or being-with [être-avec], being-together [être-ensemble], or 
being-in-common [être-en-commun] is anterior to all (tele)technological – in the instrumental sense – 
supplement. I note too that Armstrong does an inimitable job as well in situating Nancy’s philosophy, 
especially its political implications, within today’s network culture, in order to critique the latter. I hence 
defer all considerations of Nancy’s philosophy as critique of contemporary network-centric friendship, 
love, and community to Armstrong’s book, and will focus only, as said, on Derrida and Deleuze.   
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1.1 Desiring an “Untimely Being-Alone”: Derrida’s Politiques de l’amitié for 
Today 
I will begin with Derrida’s philosophy of friendship, particularly in Politiques de 
l’amitié. As will be shown in a while, if the reject is at the center of Derrida’s 
philosophy of friendship, it results from Derrida’s “deconstructive” reading of several 
friendship texts in the history of philosophy. However, as mentioned above, the cultural 
context, i.e. the burgeoning teletechnological culture, in which the writing and 
publication of Politiques de l’amitié is situated,44 could also serve to motivate the 
thinking of the reject in friendship. That cultural context, as said too, is not something 
with which we have made a radical break; in fact, we may be at the height of it. I 
reiterate therefore that elucidating Derrida’s philosophy of friendship where the reject is 
at work, and the intertwined, implicit critique of teletechnological culture which further 
motivates the need for the reject, can have critical import for our times. Before going 
into Derrida’s philosophy of friendship then, some notes on that teletechnological 
culture that forms the backdrop of Politiques de l’amitié, a context that is no doubt 
shared and further elaborated by Deleuze, are first in order. 
 
By the late 80s, Deleuze was already suspicious of the nature of communicative 
sociability and societies, especially those predicated on teletechnologies. They are of 
suspect firstly because they contribute little to creating concepts in the true 
philosophical sense. Secondly, they are oftentimes complicit in perpetuating the 
capitalist ideology underlying the very teletechnological apparatuses on which they base 
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44 Derrida does not really highlight this in his text. As announced by the book’s title, he is more inclined 
to posit the political implications of his philosophy of friendship. 
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themselves and which they disseminate. Such sociability or societies only encourage the 
production and subsequent selling of newer communicative apparatuses, as they buy 
into those teletechnologies wholesale without critical resistance. The situation 
degenerates, for Deleuze, when these modes of sociability also buy into the illusion, 
offered by the industries driving those productions, that they are actively and creatively 
collaborating with those industries to articulate new “concepts” through information and 
communicative technics.45 When “instant communication” via “cybernetics and 
computers” was quickly developing into a universal condition of sociability by the 
1990s, Deleuze will announce the arrival of “societies of control” where communicative 
sociability or societies built upon teletechnologies are but the expression of capitalism’s 
hegemony in digital format.46  
 
This hegemony was no less discerned by Derrida around the same time, recognizing it 
in all forms of media technics like “[the] news, the press, tele-communications, techno-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 As Deleuze says in an interview, “Today, it is information technology, communication, and 
commercial advertising [promotion commerciale] that have appropriated the words ‘concept’ and 
‘creative,’ and these ‘conceptualists’ form an arrogant race that expresses the activity of selling as 
capitalism’s supreme thought, as the cogito of merchandising” (Pourparlers: 1972-1990, Paris: Minuit, 
1990, 186. In translating this passage, I have also consulted Martin Joughin’s translation in Negotiations: 
1972-1990, New York: Columbia, 1995, 136). For Deleuze, the task of creating concepts does not lie 
with information and communications industries and advertising enterprises. Instead, it properly belongs 
to philosophy, and the true (philosophical) act of concept-creation has no time for, or has nothing to do 
with, communication, conversations, discussions, and exchange of views or opinions or gossips. (See also 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? on this question of concept-creation.) In fact, 
according to Deleuze, things predicated on speech and communication are not only non-philosophical or 
non-conceptual but also corrupt: “Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re 
thoroughly permeated by money: not by accident but by nature” (Pourparlers, 238). It seems then that for 
Deleuze, speech and communication are intrinsically already inclined towards buying into, or even 
bought by, capitalist ideology, hence his suspicion not only of them but also of any “concept” that they 
claim to articulate. Irigaray, in a less polemic way than Deleuze, has also expressed her mistrust of 
teletechnologies with regard to future relations nonetheless in Way of Love (trans. Heidi Bostic and 
Stephen Pluhá!ek, London and New York: Continuum, 2002) and Être deux (Paris: Grasset, 1997).  
46 Pourparlers, 236-237. 
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tele-discursivity, techno-tele-iconicity.”47 Derrida will point out that the increasing 
“homogeneity of a medium, of the norms of discussion, and of discursive models,” such 
as the unstoppable shift to network-based communications, is a testimony to the 
“instituted hegemonies [hégémonies constituées]” of “the new effects of capitalism 
(within unprecedented techno-social structures).”48 According to Derrida too, all 
existing dominant modes of communication and discourse are always already products 
or determinations of a veiled capitalist mechanism that has already evaluated their 
(speculated) profitability “in the supermarkets of culture.”49 With Derrida’s analysis, 
one can perhaps speak of “evaluation societies” to complement Deleuze’s “societies of 
control.” And just as users of teletechnological communications in “control societies” 
are never the ones in control, neither are those in “evaluation societies” autonomously 
evaluating their preferred modes of communication. And while users in “societies of 
control” do not create any real concepts, those in “evaluation societies” are neither 
invested in the Nietzschean transvaluation of existing modes of thoughts and practices. 
In the face of the growing hegemony of “continuous control and instantaneous 
communication” or of a dominant mode of communicative sociability,50 there is to be 
no philosophical compromise, for both Deleuze and Derrida, with “societies of control” 
or “evaluation societies.” One must respond with a critical stance against them. For 
Derrida, “it is necessary that we learn to detect, in order to resist new forms of cultural 
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47 Spectres de Marx : l’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale, Paris : Galilée, 
1993, 88. 
48 L’Autre cap, Paris: Minuit, 1991, 54, 53, 57. 
49 L’Autre cap, 117. 
50 Deleuze, Pourparlers, 236. 
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takeover.”51 Deleuze, adopting a more radical position, will call for “a hijacking of 
speech” or the creation of “vacuoles of non-communication, circuit-breakers, to escape 
control.”52  
 
In our present early 21st century, it is clear that “societies of control” or “evaluation 
societies” are no longer imminent phenomena. It is not the case, however, that we have 
freed ourselves from them today. On the contrary, we find ourselves very much situated 
within such societies, as they have established themselves as an undeniable reality. 
Today, they are fortifying themselves stronger than ever behind the global expanse of 
digital social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. These are apparatuses that not 
only enable communicative sociability to be redefined by the overexposure of real-time 
messages incessantly exchanged and disseminated via digital platforms; they also 
enable users to maintain and augment an archive of almost all the friends they have had 
by creating digital links to an ever-expanding social network. Here, friendship is clearly 
the “concept” that digital social networks are claiming to redefine or “create.” However, 
what results is but the perversion of friendship, turning it into a mere “gregarious” buzz 
where one “defin[es] ‘friend’ simply as [anyone] who communicates a wish to be 
one.”53 In the Deleuzian analysis, this would only mean that the (philosophical) concept 
of friendship is in the process of being appropriated and corrupted by those digital 
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51 L’Autre cap, 55. Here, I follow Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Nass’s translation in The Other 
Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, intro. Michael B. Nass, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, 54. 
52 Pourparlers, 238. Here, I have also consulted Martin Joughin’s translation in Negotiations, 175. 
53 See Randall Stross, “When Everyone’s a Friend, Is Anything Private?” New York Times, March 8, 
2009. I recall Deleuze here, who says that the true, philosophical task of concept-creation requires the 
commitment to the difficult endeavor “to understand the problem posed by someone and how the latter 
poses it,” and “to enrich it, to vary the conditions, to add to it, [and] to relate it to something else” 
(Pourparlers, 191). The mere or frivolous communicative gregariousness of network-centric friendship 
then surely disqualifies it as a real concept, and hence one must refer to it only as a “concept.” 
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apparatuses. There is also no doubt that digital social networks are determining 
themselves to be the universal if not dominant (discursive) norm, condition, medium, 
model, and even law of friendship today.54 Furthermore, that a capitalist machine of 
“continuous control and instant communication” continues to motivate and drive this 
hegemonic dimension of digital network sociability is evident when the re-
“conceptualization” and dissemination of friendship through networks or even as 
networks serve only to promote the development, proliferation, and selling of all sorts 
of network technics and services, feeding what Deleuze calls “capitalism’s supreme 
thought” of marketing.55 The “concept” of friendship proclaimed by digital social 
networks then is no less corrupt than the mode of communicative sociability that 
Deleuze has analyzed in the late 80s and early 90s. And users of contemporary social 
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54 The New York Times article cited in the above note also reports that people over 30 years of age have 
been resistant to the kind of friendship offered by digital social networks. However, as “each week, a 
million new members are added [on Facebook] in the United States and five million globally; the 30-and-
older group is its fastest-growing demographic.” It also notes an evolving “Law of Amiable 
Inclusiveness” among digital social network members, where they accept, without much if any thought, 
any request by anyone to be their friend just by a quick and simple digital function. See also CNN’s 
September 16, 2009 report, “Facebook Nearly as Large as US Population,” on Facebook crossing the 300 
million users threshold, close to the 307 million people living in the US, and that its “fastest growing 
demographic is people older than 35.” The report also quotes Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg saying 
that Facebook is “just getting started on [their] goal of connecting everyone.” The universalizing or 
universal dimension of network-centric friendship will give the Deleuzian perspective another occasion to 
point out that network-centric friendship does not constitute a real concept since, according to Deleuze, “a 
concept is not a universal […]” (Pourparlers, 200).       
55 Pourparlers, 186. See also note 45 above. Digital social networks as a source of information to be 
commercially mined by telecommunications corporations for the development and sales of future 
products or objects of desire is evident in a report on the launch of Motorola’s mobile phone, Cliq. In the 
report, one finds a Motorola spokesperson proudly proclaiming that Cliq, with its “Internet-based service 
called Motoblur that integrates all of a user’s e-mail and social networking accounts,” “is meant for 
young people obsessed with social networks” (Saul Hansell, “Motorola Phone Focuses on Social 
Networks,” New York Times. September 11, 2009). I also point to the controversial Beacon software that 
Facebook subjected its users to in 2008. The software stealthily tracked consumption patterns of 
Facebook users, and the information gathered from those evaluations was then sold to enterprises that in 
turn sent product advertisements to all the friends of those users to generate greater sales. According to a 
report, this dubious “sharing” of personal information, “without users’ consent,” is but a testimony of 
companies “looking for more ways to make money” (Adam Cohen, “One Friend Facebook Hasn’t Made 
Yet: Privacy Rights,” New York Times, February 18, 2008; see also Maria Aspan, “After Stumbling, 
Facebook Finds a Working Eraser,” New York Times, February 18, 2008). And on the profitability of 
Facebook, see the CNN report cited in the preceding note.    
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networks, caught up in, or bought into the friendship archive fever and the ecstasy of 
hyper-gregariousness56 that digital social networks offer, are equally complicit in 
sustaining capitalist ideology and its network apparatuses.  
 
Given the global scope of digital social networks today, one could say that “societies of 
control” or “evaluation societies” have “upgraded” into an empire of networks or a 
network empire.57 What remains then of the Deleuzian and Derridean philosophical 
imperative to resist the hegemony of capitalist information and communication technics 
in the face of this network empire? With regard to that question, I will not be so 
concerned with the critical import of Deleuze’s philosophy for today, since several 
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56 Cf. the New York Times report of Mar 8, 2009 cited in note 53. On another note, the phrase “ecstasy of 
hyper-gregariousness” is evidently informed by the works of Baudrillard. I use “hyper” in hyper-
gregariousness on the one hand to refer to the virtual or electronic dimension (as in “hyperspace,” 
“hyperlink,” “hyper-reality,” or “hypertext”) where the contemporary form of friendship is developing. 
On the other hand, I also use it in the Baudrillardian sense, as in Baudrillard’s notion of the “hyper-real” 
or the simulacrum, which refers to things more real than real or in excess of the real, yet at bottom are in 
fact empty or without truth (see Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation (trans. Sheila Faria Glaser, Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) and America (trans. Chris Turner, London and New York: 
Verso, 1988)). In that sense, the hyper-gregariousness of friendship proliferating in digital social 
networks is but a symptom of hyper-friendship – empty and without truth. The notion of “ecstasy” is of 
course taken from Baudrillard’s Ecstasy of Communication. Baudrillard there was writing mainly on 
television culture, and not on real-time digital connectivity, but his observation that “ecstasy is all 
functions abolished into one dimension, the dimension of communication” clearly is applicable to 
contemporary network culture (The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and Caroline Schutze, ed. 
Sylvère Lotringer, New York: Semiotext(e), 1988, 23-24). Predicating friendship on the incessant real-
time exchange of messages in hyperspace, reporting on almost everything – from the extraordinary to the 
most mundane and banal – of one’s everyday life, has certainly given network-centric friendship a quality 
of ecstatic “cool communicational obscenity” (The Ecstasy of Communication, 24). Baudrillard’s notions 
of “hyper-real” and “ecstasy” no doubt relate to Deleuze’s argument that superfluous conversation 
exchanged only for the sake of communicative exchange neither underlies nor leads to any true concept. 
57 In invoking the idea of a network empire, I am here following a line of contemporary theorists like 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, Brian Massumi, and 
McKenzie Wark. Building on Deleuze’s prophecy of “societies of control,” these theorists identify the 
mode of “continuous control and instant communication” of such societies in the 21st century in the form 
of something like a network empire, which “has emerged as a dominant form describing the nature of 
control today” (Galloway and Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007, 4), and which “not only regulates human interactions but also seeks directly to 
rule over human nature” or “social life in its entirety” (Hardt and Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000, xv). And pertinent to the point at hand, Hardt and Negri also argue that 
the network empire is the manifestation of “capitalism’s colonization of communicative society” (Empire, 
404). See also Brian Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002, 87. 
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contemporary theorists have also already developed Deleuzian responses and critiques 
against the network empire.58 Having said that, the latter responses and critiques, 
however, do not necessarily presuppose nor entail any thorough understanding of 
friendship and community according to Deleuze, and so I will return to that topic after 
the treatment of Derrida’s philosophy of friendship. For the moment, I will be 
concerned rather with the potentiality of Derrida’s philosophy today to break with, or to 
“be unequal,”59 to the dominant and universalizing “concept” and communicative norm 
of friendship as disseminated by digital social networks: Can Derrida’s philosophy 
wrest the concept of friendship back from its ideological appropriation by digital social 
networks or the network empire, as Deleuze did with the concept of the concept?60 One 
may indeed say that this question is raised in an untimely fashion, since Derrida in 1994 
has already published his work on friendship in Politiques de l’amitié. Politiques de 
l’amitié, in short, exposes the illusion of any friendship predicated on counting one’s 
number of friends and on a foundation of similitude in terms of personality traits, habits, 
and likes and dislikes. It critiques such friendship as ultimately narcissistic, devoid of 
any critical attention to the absolute difference if not otherness of the friend. In the wake 
of Politiques de l’amitié, network-centric friendship comes across as nothing but an 
immense philosophical let-down: to reiterate, its fever for friendship archive is borne 
largely by an anxiety to make a spectacle of one’s ability, as the hyperlinking technics 
of digital social networks allow, to possess and acquire a massive number of friends; 
and friends here are usually similar to oneself, betraying the fact that network-centric 
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58 See note above. 
59 L’Autre cap, 53, my translation. 
60 Cf. note 45, where I point to Deleuze’s commitment to reclaim the task of concept-creation back to 
philosophy, by revealing the false and ideological nature behind the “concepts” that information and 
communications industries and advertising enterprises claim to “create.” 
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friendship hardly displays any regard for the dissimilar friend. But even before 
questioning network-centric friendship’s openness to the other who is different or 
dissimilar, it is already difficult to speak of its genuine interest or sincerity in truly 
knowing – in the most basic sense – even the hyper-linked friend.61 Given that there is 
no stopping the technological drive that will enhance and further proliferate current 
digital social networks, nor the global dissemination of the dox! that this contemporary 
hyper-gregariousness is the true condition of friendship today, can a return to Politiques 
de l’amitié allow one to “write and think, in particular as regards friendship, against 
great numbers”?62 Once again, the question is an untimely one, but untimeliness, 
according to philosophers from Nietzsche to Deleuze, Derrida, and Agamben,63 is but 
the proper philosophical response to what today or the contemporary is. According to 
Derrida, philosophy’s critical engagement with today is an opening of the contemporary 
as the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present,”64 in contradistinction, for 
example, to the hegemonic determination of contemporaneous ideological technics; in 
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61 Following the article cited in note 52, I note that while digital social networks allow one to count 
friends incredulously in the thousands, many of these “friends” are most likely people who one would 
have merely exchanged a message or two in hyperspace. In other words, they are hardly those one would 
have met physically and interacted for a duration of time in real life. I contrast this with Blanchot’s idea 
of friendship as “a slow work of time” in Pour l’amitié (Tours: Farrago, 2000, 7, my translation): « Sait-
on quand elle commence? Il n’y a pas de coup de foudre de l’amitié, plutôt un peu à peu, un lent travail 
du temps. On était amis et on ne le savait pas »/ “Does one know when [friendship] begins? There is no 
love at first sight of friendship. Rather, little by little, it is a slow work of time. One would be friends and 
one would not know it.”  
62 PA, 90/ PF, 70-71. 
63 Cf. Nietzsche: “the philosopher […] has, in every age been and has needed to be at odds with his today: 
his enemy has always been the ideal of today” (Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future, eds. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, 106 §212). See also Agamben’s “What Is the Contemporary?” in the collection 
What Is an Apparatus? And Other Essays (trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009). The collection also includes Agamben’s essay on friendship, where he draws an 
almost unfriendly distinction with Derrida. This is not the space to treat Agamben’s thinking of friendship 
and its difference from Derrida’s. For that, see Samuel Weber’s “‘And When is Now?’ (On Some Limits 
of Perfect Intelligibility)” (MLN 122: 1028-1049, 2007) and Simon Morgan Wortham’s “Law of 
Friendship: Agamben and Derrida” (New Formations 62: 89-105, Autumn 2007). 
64 Spectres de Marx, 16. 
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short, it is to “consider other rhythms and other trajectories.”65 The purpose of an 
untimely rereading of Politiques de l’amitié here then would not only be about eliciting 
the reject, but also, in relation to the contemporary appropriation of the concept of 
friendship, to “consider other rhythms and trajectories” in the thinking of friendship, 
and “not to let oneself be fascinated by [the] quantitative immediacy”66 of network-
centric friendship. 
 
At this point, I note too that Politiques de l’amitié builds explicitly on Nietzsche’s call 
for an anti-gregarious solitariness. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche has written, 
“We are born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude, our own deepest, most midnightly, 
noon-likely solitude. This is the type of people we are, we free spirits! and perhaps you 
are something of this yourselves, you who are approaching? you new philosophers?”67 
In other words, according to Nietzsche, the future philosopher, or new philosophy, 
arrives by way of articulating a certain solitariness within communitarian space and by 
disseminating it within that same space. The future philosopher, who is “not exactly the 
most communicative spirit,” and who is also a sort of reject as I will explicate later, 
yearns for such a space so as to stand apart from the rest of the world. From there, he or 
she will be able to critique the world’s dox!, dominant values, and norms of 
communicative discourse, and subsequently create new values and concepts, and new 
modes of articulation befitting those new values and concepts (and this is why he or she 
is a jealous friend of solitude). With the saturation of the contemporary world by digital 
social networks, the arrival of the future philosopher/ reject seems to be at risk today. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 L’Autre cap, 119. 
66 L’Autre cap, 119. 
67 Beyond Good and Evil, 41 §44. 
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And should the future philosopher/ reject have the chance to arrive, the same saturation 
would also make him or her more jealous than ever of solitude, since solitary spaces are 
almost effectively precluded or closed off now. Rereading Politiques de l’amitié today 
then would also entail staking a claim for the Nietzschean force of thought, to insist on 
a chance for a future new philosophy or new philosopher/ reject, and on the chance for 
the emergence of a solitary, if not anti-gregarious, or even anti-communitarian space 
amidst the contemporary swarming of friendship networks.68 That would in a way 
constitute the politics of friendship today, a politics of Politiques de l’amitié also, 
through which one creates a syncope to disrupt, displace, if not short-circuit or even 
hack, the dissemination of the network-centric “concept” of friendship and the capitalist 
network empire behind it (I will return to the question of syncope later). To be sure, this 
will not be politics in terms of state or institutional acts, but rather politics in a 
philosophical sense, which is to say, politics as a question of reading, arising from a 
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68 In this respect, I depart from the strategies of resistances of contemporary theorists mentioned in note 
57. Their strategies often take on a communitarian and even communicative outline. For example, as 
some form of counter-empire, Hardt and Negri (Empire, 407) – and this would apply to Cesare Casarino 
too – invoke the “common,” constituted by “singularities” which are those who have broken off from the 
ideological capture and control of network empires and are wresting back their rights to “free access to 
and control over knowledge, information, communication, and affects” (in Casarino and Antonio Negri, 
In Praise of the Common : A Conversation in Philosophy and Politics, Minneapolis : University of 
Minnesota Press, 2008, 82). Hardt and Negri, and Casarino, make it explicit that the common is 
predicated on communication or conversation, but a mode of communication different from that which 
“has become the central element that establishes the relations of production, guiding capitalist 
development and also transforming productive forces” (Empire, 347-348; see also Multitudes, 2004, 204). 
Casarino puts it this way: “To converse is to be in common, to produce the common” (In Praise of the 
Common, 2). “Multitude,” Hardt and Negri’s other term for “the common,” resonates in certain ways with 
Paolo Virno’s “multitude,” which is no less communitarian. The communitarian basis of the latter is not 
determined by a teleological goal, e.g. building a single body like a State to govern all. Instead, it comes 
from the ground, its “unity” arising from “language, intellect, the communal faculties of the human race” 
(A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. Isabella Bertoletti, 
James Cascaito, Andrea Casson, foreword Sylvère Lotringer, New York: Semiotext(e), 2004, 25). Virno 
will also say that it is created by “idle talk,” in contrast to the negative implication Heidegger gives to that 
term. For Virno, the communicative mode of “idle talk” is liberating, radical, and inventive (A Grammar 
of the Multitude, 89-90). With these communitarian and communicative aspirations, a certain distinction 
is clearly drawn between these contemporary theorists and Deleuze. As mentioned in the text proper 
above, Derrida, like Deleuze, is not inclined towards the thinking of anything like a common either.   
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particular mode of reading of a particular text or concept, and resisting a prevalent 
dox!.69 In other words, if contemporary philosophical discourse on friendship were to 
project a political force, I would argue that it must put forth a reading that unveils and 
demolishes the simulacral “concept” of friendship of digital social networks.70 A 
rereading of Politiques de l’amitié would serve that end, and it must be done with a 
view to posit, in a sustained manner, the disturbing truth that underlies Politiques de 
l’amitié, which is the radical truth that there is no such thing as friendship. As my 
following critique of Derrida will show, Derrida ultimately does not see the rejection of 
friendship to its end. Instead, Derrida will seem to retreat from that trajectory. However, 
if Politiques de l’amitié is to have critical force today against contemporary hyper-
gregariousness, and for the chance for a Nietzschean solitary space to emerge, it is 
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69 This is what Derrida says of the politics of his Spectres de Marx. In response to queries about the 
political dimension or responsibility of Spectres de Marx, Derrida will say, “the form of my gesture 
would seem to include, at a minimum, the demand that one read, a demand which remains, for its part, at 
once theoretical and practical: it asks that people take into account the nature and form […] of this 
gesture, if only to criticize its utility, possibility, authenticity, or even sincerity” (“Marx & Sons,” trans. 
G.M Goshgarian, in Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ed. 
Michael Sprinker, London : Verso, 1999, 200). Jean-Luc Nancy, in speaking about the politics of 
Derrida’s works, argues for a form of politics “on paper” – albeit a politics of writing or conceptualizing 
rather than reading – instead of concrete political action on the part of philosophers: “the political 
character of a work of thought is not to be measured only, indeed far from it, by the practical 
interventions of the man. […]. The thinker […] acts politically before all else by thinking the truth […] of 
a world, of the situation of a world in which concepts like politics, as well as aesthetics or ethics, have to 
be put back in play, put to work, and elaborated. The first political duty of a philosopher is to 
philosophize, just as the first political duty of a musician is to compose” (in Lorenzo Fabbri, “Philosophy 
as Chance: An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancy,” trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, in The 
Late Derrida, 216).    
70 I certainly do not deny the importance of discussing the politics of friendship or politics of Politiques 
de l’amitié at the institutional level (see especially AJP Thomson’s Deconstruction and Democracy: 
Derrida’s Politics of Friendship (London: Continuum, 2005) on this topic). Furthermore, the same digital 
social networks have already implicated themselves in American party politics in the 2008 US 
presidential campaign, wherein they created a hyperspace of political fraternity by disseminating 
mutually shared hopes and ideologies precisely through their digital platforms (see Brian Stelter, “The 
Facebooker Who Friended Obama,” New York Times, July 7, 2008). That is the kind of politics of 
friendship that Derrida critiques precisely. However, the interest of this section is much more inclined 
towards ethical and/ or philosophical considerations, and so I would like to limit any notion of politics of 
philosophical friendship and/ or Politiques de l’amitié here to the question of reading as stated above. 
That also means that there will be no manifesto-like point-by-point application of my reading or argument 
towards a possible political action against contemporary digital social networks. I leave that to activists 
who, if possible, have the will to reject friendship while striking out against social network apparatuses. 
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necessary that a reading of Politiques de l’amitié today sustains that rejection of 
friendship. As I argue here, that can be done by eliciting the figure of the reject from 
within Politiques de l’amitié. And once that figure is elicited, one must not repress or 
veil it again, but affirm it and articulate it in every discourse of friendship. 
 
I Have Enough of You, My Friend, For Now 
That Politiques de l’amitié articulates a force of rejection against friendship in 
friendship itself is not missed by several readers.71 That is made clear after all right at 
the beginning of Politiques de l’amitié, where Derrida puts forth without reserve the 
disturbing truth that there is no such thing as friendship or that friendship is impossible. 
There, Derrida brings to surface the unsayable or “nothing sayable” (PA, 17/ PF, 1) that 
subtends all friendships,72 and this “nothing sayable” is but the Nietzschean “murderous 
truth” (PA, 72/ PF, 54) that “there are no more friends” (PA, 71/ PF, 53). In other words, 
friendship, if there is such a thing, is always already rent by a projective rejection of 
friendship. If there remains an appearance of friendship, it is only because the silence of 
the “nothing sayable” is maintained by those who continue to seek friendship, a silence 
constituting an “illusion” (PA, 72/ PF, 53) or simulacrum of friendship, a silence kept 
“between friends, on the subject of friends, so as to not speak the truth, a murderous 
truth” (PA, 72/ PF, 54, trans. modified).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Just to cite two relatively recent readings of Derrida’s Politiques de l’amitié: John W Phillips writes 
that “what we learn about friendship in Politiques de l’amitié is, strictly speaking, unacceptable; 
friendship itself will turn out to be unacceptable” (“Loving Love or Ethics as Natural Philosophy in 
Jacques Derrida’s Politiques de l’amitié,” Angelaki 12 (3), 2007, 166); and in the words of David Wills, 
“friendship [in Politics of Friendship] involves turning one’s back” (“Full Dorsal: Derrida’s Politics of 
Friendship,” Postmodern Culture 15:3, 2005, §8).    
72 I note here that the French original is « Rien peut-être de dicible ».    
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Derrida certainly has no interest in further repressing that “nothing sayable” of 
friendship that rejects friendship. Instead, he makes it the task of Politiques de l’amitié 
to unconceal that dark thought of anti-friendship at the very heart of both friendship and 
a line of friendship texts in the history of philosophy. Before going into that, I would 
like to add that the “nothing sayable” of friendship also concerns those irreducible 
occasions when one friend quietly thinks, in an about-turn of friendship, I have enough 
of you, my friend, for now (and I note that this takes place even in the absence of quarrel 
between friends). However, for fear of murdering what they have between themselves, 
friends, in their respective secret reserves of thought, have not dared to say it. And yet, 
as long as this irreducible moment of refusing friendship always remains, it will forever 
throw any notion of friendship into disarray: it will always present itself as some sort of 
contradiction to or in friendship, an impasse or aporia that any thought of friendship 
must always stand before. It is also perhaps that which underlies Nietzsche’s anti-
gregariousness or rejection of friendship, since what unfolds from the Nietzschean 
“nothing sayable” or “murderous truth,” according to Derrida, is the fact that “solitude 
is irremediable and [therefore] friendship impossible” (PA, 72/ PF, 54), or that we all 
desire ultimately, at some point, an “untimely being-alone” [être-seul intempestif] (PA, 
73/ PF, 55). This fact of “an untimely being-alone” is what I call the irreducible anti-
community (without any sense of nihilism, as I explicate in the subsequent section on 
Deleuze) and therefore perhaps anti-friendship reserve of every individual, the 
undeniable desire at times to depart from, or leave aside, the friend. If the task of 
Politiques de l’amitié is to foreground and maintain the murderous “nothing sayable” of 
friendship in order to destabilize the amicable concept of friendship in the history of 
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philosophy and at present, I would say that one must no longer keep in reserve that 
irreducible thought of anti-friendship, but to give it exposition with force. The question 
then is how to articulate and insist on such an exposition. I will return to this later.   
 
As Politiques de l’amitié demonstrates, the history of philosophy of friendship before 
Nietzsche lacks the will to unveil the inherent rejection of friendship in friendship itself. 
Derrida’s deconstructive critique of the friendship texts of Cicero and Aristotle then 
functions to bring them to terms with that repressed truth and force of rejection. With 
Cicero and Aristotle, Derrida shows that what ultimately overturns friendship in their 
texts is not only a narcissistic ipseity that essentially supplants any genuine or sincere 
thinking of the friend, but that this narcissism at the same time involves a perverse 
looking forward to death in friendship, which only implies a looking forward to a 
physical breakage in friendship. For Cicero, “virtuous friendship” concerns the work of 
illuminating the exemplary character of the self by the friend, and this is the narcissistic 
part of friendship. The worse part is that seeking this “virtuous friendship” is actually 
predicated on a speculation of the death of the self: one looks forward to the death of the 
self, the absolute (physical) separation of the self from the friend, because it is only then 
that the friend’s work of mourning, whereby the friend remembers and embellishes the 
life and work of the self, can possibly be set into motion.  
 
In Aristotle, one deals not with the death of oneself but the death of the other, i.e. the 
beloved friend. Here, the death of the other or the friend is structured around the 
preeminence of loving or to-love, which Derrida will refer to as l’aimance (“lovence” 
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according to George Collins’s translation), over being-loved. In Derrida’s analysis, that 
death is inscribed by rendering the beloved or being-loved not only an object of 
l’aimance, but also an object through l’aimance. As Derrida writes of Aristotle’s 
aimance: “If we trusted the categories of subject and object [in friendship], we would 
say in this logic that friendship (philía) is first accessible on the side of its subject, who 
thinks and lives it, not on the side of its object, who can be loved or lovable without in 
any way relating himself to the sentiment of which, precisely, he remains the object” 
(PA, 26/ PF, 9-10, trans. modified). Such reification of the beloved friend announces his 
or her death, even though the beloved friend is not yet dying or dead, because l’aimance 
of the one who loves or befriends proceeds and survives (or sur-vivre, as Derrida would 
say, which is to outlive all mortality) regardless if the object-other knows, receives, and 
responds to this aimance. In that regard, the other can be presumed to be inanimate or 
else already dead. Here is Derrida again, reading Aristotle: “One cannot love without 
living and without knowing that one loves, but one can still love the deceased or the 
inanimate who then know nothing of it. It is even through the possibility of loving the 
deceased that a certain lovence comes to be decided [à se décider]” (PA, 26-27/ PF, 10, 
trans. modified). In short, the beloved-friend is really secondary in this scheme of 
friendship of l’aimance. What matters more is the perfectibility of a narcissistic giving 
of friendship or l’aimance on the part of the self; one can almost be care-less about 
whether the other is living or not in Aristotelian friendship. Here, the rejection of 
friendship operates in such a way that it “plunges the friend, before mourning, into 
mourning” and “weeps death before death” (PA, 31/ PF, 14). Aristotle’s aimance, in 
Derrida’s reading, would only be the “grieved act of loving” (PA, 31/ PF, 14), or a 
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“grieving survival [survivance endeuillée]” (PA, 32/ PF, 15). The narcissism and work 
of mourning in friendship in both Cicero and Aristotle then render any thought of 
friendship nothing but a “post mortem discourse” (PA, 21/ PF, 5), a projection of an end 
of friendship, of which Derrida will not hesitate to suggest how tiresome such scene of 
friendship is. As Derrida chides, “who does not abhor this theater? Who would not see 
therein the repetition of a disdainful and ridiculous staging, the putting to death of 
friendship itself?” (PA, 21/ PF, 5).  
 
Friends, or Rejects 
Once the essential tear in the thought of friendship – ruptured by Nietzsche and auto-
deconstructed in Aristotle and Cicero – is unveiled, the point, according to Derrida, is 
not to weave a suture over this terrifying rent: “so be it, since it is so; and keep it intact 
in memory, never forget it” (PA, 44/ PF, 27). In other words, one must always give 
exposition to the force of rejection of friendship, always make an exposé of that 
rejection, always articulate that “murderous truth” of an irreducible anti-friendship that 
is already shared between friends. One must plunge friendship into that impasse or 
abyss and let it dwell there, especially when anything resembling friendship is at the 
brink of (re)founding itself. In short, there must be no rapprochement. It must be 
admitted, however, that articulating this force of rejection is a difficult task. Its 
exposition or exposé in general tends to be repressed and forgotten, especially in the 
cacophony of contemporary hyper-gregariousness. In order to maintain a constant 
affront against any form of gregariousness, and also against any rapprochement with 
regard to the rejection of friendship, I suggest that raising the figure of the reject in 
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friendship would be instrumental. In relation to friendship, a figure of the reject would 
not only be the solitary one, the one who stands apart from friendship, but also the one 
who raises the impasse or abyss of friendship before friendship, raising it before the 
other and against himself or herself, constantly plunging friendship into that abyss. This 
figure of the reject does not stand outside the history of philosophy of friendship. As I 
will soon demonstrate, it subtends that history. It traverses Politiques de l’amitié too, 
and it is in this sense that one can regard Politiques de l’amitié not only as a book about 
the rejection of friendship but also a book about rejects.  
 
The figure of the reject already inheres in Aristotle. This reject is the being-loved that is 
unbearable to Aristotle, rejected from Aristotle’s theater of “perfect friendship” because 
he or she knows nothing, does nothing, and says nothing, or in short, does not 
reciprocate. In Aristotle’s perspective, this reject is insensible to the aimance of the 
loving friend. In Derrida’s nuanced reading of Aristotle’s take on the rejected being-
loved, he would posit the following reflection: “Being loved – what does that mean? 
Nothing, perhaps […]” (PA, 26/ PF, 9).73 At first glance, the apparently judgmental 
“nothing” gives the impression that Derrida here is speaking in Aristotle’s voice. But 
the “perhaps” that enjoins almost immediately disrupts, if not overturns, the Aristotelian 
judgment of the beloved as an insignificant “nothing” or mere reject: the Nietzschean-
Derridean “perhaps” would recall the Nietzschean “nothing sayable” that announces the 
“murderous truth” of an essential rejection of friendship within friendship itself. In 
other words, the being-loved as reject or “nothing” – the being-loved as meaning-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 In the French original: « Être aimé, qu’est-ce que cela veut dire? Rien, peut-être […] ». Compare the 
French original of “nothing sayable” quoted in note 72. 
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nothing or being-nothing – now comes to unveil itself as the violent “nothing sayable” 
of murderous friendship. The being-loved, previously a targeted or passive reject, now 
becomes a figure that potentially bears the active force of rejection of friendship, 
precisely through his or her silence, inaction, and non-response. One is now uncertain if 
the being-loved, in his or her secret silence, is not in fact consciously rejecting 
acknowledging and responding to the aimance of friendship. In other words, this reject 
may already be putting in place, furtively but in an active manner, the “murderous 
truth” of rejecting friendship, through his or her non-response. If this is indeed the 
secret potentiality of the being-loved as reject, perhaps it is towards this figure that one 
should turn to today, rather than to denigrate it as Aristotle does, so as to locate a force 
of rejection to strike out against the contemporary dox! of hyper-gregariousness. 
 
The reject also figures in Nietzsche’s thought of friendship, particularly in his 
conception of the “new philosophers.” The reject in Nietzsche, unlike Aristotle’s, is an 
explicitly active figure, which is to say that it is probably this figure that initiates any 
act of rejection. According to Derrida, these “new philosophers” reject coming to 
presence, and reject all proximity, resemblance, access, or links to friendship or any 
communitarian structure. These rejects are “inaccessible friends, friends who are alone 
because they are incomparable and without common measure, reciprocity or equality, 
therefore, without a horizon of recognition” (PA, 53/ PF, 35). They are “the 
uncompromising friends of solitary singularity” who “love only in cutting ties [se 
délier]” (PA, 54/ PF, 35). However, that does not mean that Nietzsche’s reject will be 
free from being a target of rejection. It will not be surprising that from the moment these 
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“new philosophers” declare their rejection of any form of human alliances, they will 
very quickly become targets of rejection themselves, for even today, such anti-
communitarian spirit remains as unbearable as articulating the irreducible thought of 
anti-friendship between friends.74 But again, perhaps it is precisely because this 
Nietzschean reject bears or articulates something so radically displacing or disruptive 
against friendship that only the exposition of this figure can posit a shock to the entire 
network-centric system of simulacral friendship, and in that process, short-circuit or 
undo that system.  
 
There is the figure of the reject in Derrida too. Derrida, however, does not make his 
reject articulate the irreducible thought of anti-friendship. Instead, he makes that 
enunciation unfold through or from the other. In other words, the other is rendered an 
active figure of rejection, while the self becomes the passive target of that rejection. The 
other must become, like Nietzsche’s reject or the “new philosopher,” the figure that 
actively rejects friendship. Meanwhile, the self renders himself or herself like 
Aristotle’s reject (i.e. the beloved friend), a target of rejection of friendship. In that 
sense, one could say that Derrida’s reject plays out, in an inverse manner, both the 
Nietzschean reject that forcefully initiates a refusal of all ties with other humans and the 
passive beloved friend whom Aristotle rejects but who may be coyly or implicitly 
rejecting friendship in his or her non-reciprocity. There are indeed two figures of the 
reject here, and Derrida sets up this scene of rejects for us: this scene takes place “as if I 
were calling someone, over the telephone for example, saying to him or her, in sum: I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 On the refrain also of contemporary theorists from breaking away from the thinking of community, see 
note 68 above. 
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don’t want you to wait for my call and become forever dependent upon it; go take a 
walk [va te promener], be free not to answer. And to prove it, the next time I call you, 
don’t answer, or I won’t see you again. If you answer my call, it’s all over” (PA, 198/ 
PF, 174, trans. modified).75 
 
For Derrida, making oneself a reject in the sense of a passive target, if not an auto-
reject, is as critical as actively rejecting friendship. One can perhaps understand 
Derrida’s rendering oneself a reject as a preemptive measure against lapsing into the all 
too human weakness for some sense of amicability or gregariousness. In other words, 
only by reminding oneself that one is a reject in friendship, by redirecting the abyssal 
force of rejection against oneself – a traumatic gesture no doubt for some, can one resist 
or discourage oneself from any rapprochement with the other. For Derrida, it is also by 
making oneself a reject that one learns to respect the distance of the other, to respect the 
other as free in himself or herself, without any need for him or her to approach, speak, 
respond, or disclose any information about himself or herself. It is as a reject in this 
manner that I learn that “I must […] leave the other to come […],” – and go, I will add 
– “free in his movement, out of reach of my will or desire, beyond my very intention” 
(PA, 198/ PF, 174). Derrida will always remind us that there is the other who will arrive 
from the future. But I add that there is always also the other who does not want to arrive, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 One could also argue that Derrida’s reject arrives by way of modulating Aristotle’s oft-cited phrase, “O 
my friends, there is no friend.” It is with this phrase, in its form of an address, that one can elicit too the 
sense that both the self and the other are rejects in or before friendship. On the one hand, the address 
rejects the other by structuring the latter’s imminent disappearance. According to Derrida, through 
Aristotle’s phrase, “[friends] are summoned to be spoken to […] then dismissed […] saying to them, 
speaking of them, that they are no longer there. One speaks of them only in their absence, and concerning 
their absence” (PA, 197/ PF, 173). In other words, a certain dismissal of friends is at work in this phrase, 
rendering the friend a (passive) reject. On the other hand, the phrase also signals some form of refusal of 
the other to respond to the address. This is where the self is rendered a (targeted) reject, because “there is 
no friend” that has responded. 
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and does not arrive, before our presence (and it is in this respect that I argue that one 
must not only think of what Nancy calls la communuaté d’arrivée or “the community of 
the arrived (or arrivants)” but also a community of the departed or departing – la 
communauté de départ.) Only by rendering myself a reject, because the other rejects 
responding to me, that I will begin to learn to accede to the “desire to renounce desire” 
(PA, 198/ PF, 174) for any amicability or gregariousness. It is in this way that I will not 
forget the force of rejection in friendship, not forget that the irreducible thought of anti-
friendship is equally desired and shared by the other. This is how I will not forget the 
“murderous truth” of friendship, the truth that we are all rejects in friendship. Rejects in 
or before friendship, each and every one of us will have the right to refuse to respond, or 
even the right to walk away, silently, without explanation; and there will be neither 
rapprochement nor reproach. This is what has to be kept in mind at every instance of 
thinking about friendship, whether at the level of intellectual discourse, or in the 
practice of everyday life. 
 
At this point, I would like to add that even though Nietzsche’s thought of the new 
philosopher seems close to my reject, there is hardly in Nietzsche that force of auto-
rejection that leaves a place for the non-response, if not the walking away, of the other, 
and this is perhaps where the (auto-)reject differentiates itself from Nietzsche’s reject. I 
have earlier quoted a passage from Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche 
senses the imminence of the “new philosophers,” and hails them. There is no walking 
away here: Nietzsche does not walk away from their approaching, and he does not tell 
the new philosophers to disperse, or to be “free in [their] movement, out of reach of [his] 
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will or desire, beyond [his] very intention,” as Derrida tells the other. In fact, the 
address or call to the new philosophers – and Derrida says that Nietzsche makes a 
“teleiopoetic or telephonic call to philosophers of a new genre” (PA, 53/ PF, 34, trans. 
modified) – is made in expectation that they “follow” Nietzsche and other like-minded 
“free spirits,”76 rather than to not respond or “take a walk” as in Derrida’s scenario. This 
following would seem to precipitate, despite the respective solitudes of Nietzsche and 
the new philosophers, into some sort of ensemble, which is in fact already presupposed 
by the “we” that Nietzsche uses to address the new philosophers. One wonders then if, 
between Nietzsche and the new philosophers, the “murderous truth” of friendship has 
been smoothened out, as if Nietzsche and the new philosophers are now somewhat 
immune or exceptional to the irreducible thought of anti-friendship. But perhaps one 
may say that it is precisely because of an acknowledgement of that dark thought of 
friendship that they will come to recognize among themselves a “we.” In either case, 
Nietzsche’s “we” precariously betrays a certain readiness to abandon his deepest 
solitude and those of the new philosophers, articulating instead a looking forward to 
some sort of rapprochement between himself and the new philosophers.77 The auto-
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76 See Beyond Good and Evil, 104 §210. 
77 As Derrida observes too, “Nietzsche makes the call […] to his addressee, asking him to join up with 
‘us,’ with this ‘us’ which is being formed, to join us and to resemble us, to become the friends of the 
friends that we are!” (PA, 53/ PF, 35). I do think that Derrida also finds this Nietzschean “we” suspicious. 
When Derrida speaks of the “unheard-of” and “totally new” “arrivant” (PA, 46/ PF, 29) that is to come in 
or from the future, I do not think that he attributes it to Nietzsche’s free spirits or new philosophers. 
Reading §214 of Beyond Good and Evil, Derrida underscores that in the “we” of Nietzsche and the new 
philosophers, Nietzsche also “declares his appurtenance qua heir who still believes in his own virtues” 
(PA, 51/ PF, 33), claiming an alliance to a no doubt rare but nonetheless existing or past spirit whose 
virtues are or have been to strike out against other past values (e.g. Platonic philosophy and Christian 
religion). This only means that Nietzsche is always ineluctably tied to the past, and as such, the question 
of a “totally new” or “unheard-of” “arrivant” will be undeniably diluted in Nietzsche and also, by 
implication, in the new philosophers, by virtue of the “we” that Nietzsche addresses them with. Perhaps 
this is also why Derrida in Politiques de l’amitié says that “we will not follow Nietzsche” (PA, 51/ PF, 
33)? I do agree with Derrida’s reading. Nietzsche may indeed proclaim that he and the new philosophers 
are “not to be stuck to our virtues” (Beyond Good and Evil, 39 §41) but, “beyond what [Nietzsche] 
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reject, on the other hand, always keeps in mind the irreducible thought of anti-
friendship before the other, regardless if the other is a new philosopher or not, and 
ceaselessly insists on the rejection of any slightest sense of rapprochement. I have said 
that what is at stake with regard to the contemporary condition of friendship is also the 
chance for the arrival of the new philosopher and his or her space of solitariness, but I 
state that it is the possibility of his or her irruption within the contemporary world 
saturated by digital social networks that one must seek. Thinking how that chance may 
be created does not constitute hailing the arrival of the new philosopher; it does not 
demand that he or she responds, or that he or she joins me in this present endeavor. This 
is where I depart from Nietzsche therefore. I will now return to explicate Derrida’s 
thinking of friendship, and as it will be revealed, the Nietzschean problematic arises in 
Derrida too. 
 
Derrida’s nouvelle aimance 
Is Derrida’s auto-reject courageous or radical enough to walk away, so as to put in 
effect a veritable rupture, breakage, or rejection of friendship? Or does this auto-reject 
remain at the borders of an abyssal or already-rent friendship, hoping and waiting for a 
rapprochement or even suture, like what Nietzsche does before the new philosophers? 
To be sure, Derrida never considers such a gesture as walking away: walking away is 
not Derrida’s strategy, not only in thinking about friendship, but also in all his other 
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believes, what he thinks he believes” (PA, 52/ PF, 33) as Derrida says, there is always that one virtue that 
explicitly and forcefully remains, which is Nietzsche’s will to demolish old values, morals, religions, and 
philosophies. And in relation to Derrida’s “arrivant” that rejects both setting a teleologic program for 
itself and all a priori or existing programs, Nietzsche’s singular virtue is undeniably programmatic, which 
is perhaps betrayed in his following words on the new philosophers: “we do not want to fully reveal what 
a spirit might free himself from and what he will then perhaps be driven towards” (Beyond Good and 
Evil, 41 §44). 
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concepts such as hospitality and democracy-to-come. The Derridean strategy, as is well-
known, is attendre sans s’attendre or waiting without expecting, as Derrida writes in 
Foi et savoir and other places. My quarrel with this waiting-without-expecting is that it 
indirectly sets up a demand for the other to arrive. In other words, it inadvertently gives 
rise to a situation where the other, who has no desire or intention at all to arrive in the 
first place, but because of some sense of ethical responsibility or obligation to respond, 
posed (or even imposed upon) undeniably by the presence of the one who awaits, comes 
under pressure to (re)approach. One can see this even in Derrida’s scenario where the 
other is instructed not to respond to the call made by the self: the self might be 
programming for himself or herself a kind of waiting-without-expectation, but the fact 
that the other is instructed to not pick up the phone, in other words, that the other is 
made to know that the self nonetheless is in some way waiting for (though claiming not 
to expect) some form of response, might ultimately compel the other to call back some 
time later. I believe this is how Derrida’s stakes for a future radical relation based on a 
non-response by the other risk failing in a way reminiscent of Nietzsche’s case with the 
new philosophers. In this case, attendre sans s’attendre, an imminent rapprochement or 
even a suture over all theaters of friendship ironically begins to emerge as a promising 
or even possible, realizable horizon in Derrida’s thinking about friendship, resurrecting 
the very thing that Derrida’s deconstructive critique of Cicero and Aristotle seeks to 
reject.  
 
I would also say that what adds to Derrida’s hesitation to walk away from friendship is 
the notion of l’aimance. L’aimance, as pointed out earlier, is a term Derrida reads into 
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Aristotle’s philosophy of “perfect friendship.” As shown too, Derrida disagrees with 
such an aimance because it is essentially only a narcissistic loving in friendship that 
looks forward to the death of the friend. Yet Derrida is nonetheless enchanted by the 
leitmotif of l’aimance, and seeks to maintain it in his thinking about friendship. It is 
with l’aimance, however, that Derrida’s thought on friendship makes an about-turn 
from its radical trajectory and takes on instead a limited contour, if not a reactionary 
swerve. This is because l’aimance, functioning as a supplementary leitmotif of attendre 
sans s’attendre, will keep Derrida faithful to some amicable notion at the point where 
he could have walked away from friendship, or where the rejection of friendship could 
have been carried out completely. It is as such that one must problematize Derrida’s 
aimance, especially if Derrida’s thought on friendship is to be a critical force against the 
dominance or hegemony of network-centric friendship today. 
 
In a way, Derrida’s nouvelle aimance is a recuperation of l’aimance after its violent 
appropriation by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Derrida’s critique of the respective aimances 
of Aristotle and Nietzsche concerns the renunciation of l’amour. Aristotle’s thinking of 
a “perfect friendship” will reach a point where he will say that “loving seems to be the 
characteristic virtue of friends” or that “friendship depends more on loving.”78 However, 
as Derrida observes, this “loving” or aimance arrives via a denigration of amorous love. 
Aristotle indeed makes the claim that a “perfect friendship” of loving is “permanent” or 
“an enduring thing,” while amorous love lacks this quality of everlastingness.79 It is 
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78 The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and intro. David Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925, 205-
206, 205. 
79 The Nicomachean Ethics, 197, 196. In Aristotle’s words, “Young people are amorous too; for the 
greater part of the friendship of love [in contradistinction to the friendship of l’aimance] depends on 
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from such a critique of love that Aristotle proceeds to set up the preeminence of 
“loving” in friendship’s aimance over l’amour. With regard to Nietzsche’s aimance, 
Derrida locates it in Nietzsche’s “new philosophers,” identifying them as those “who 
love lovence” (PA, 54/ PF, 35). Just as in Aristotle’s case, Nietzsche’s aimance will be 
of a force greater than the love of l’amour, “a love more loving than love” (PA, 83/ PF, 
64, my italics), where all forms of friendship will be ruptured, leaving only 
“disappropriation” or “infinite distance” between the “new philosophers” (PA, 84/ PF, 
65). At this point, I would postulate that it is not difficult to deduce that Nietzsche’s 
aimance here, in excess of l’amour, as Derrida reads it, guarantees the rejection and 
non-rapprochement of friendship, and is therefore a potential force against any form of 
gregariousness.80 Derrida does not follow through with this force of Nietzsche’s 
aimance, and this does not come as a surprise, given that Derrida, as already evident in 
his reading of Aristotle’s aimance, is disagreeable with any aimance that denigrates 
l’amour (which includes Nietzsche’s). 
 
The supersession in Nietzsche and Aristotle of l’amour – the very concept from which 
l’aimance, which undoubtedly bears some sense of loving, is derived – constitutes 
Derrida’s critique of their respective aimances. In place of the latter, Derrida rethinks, if 
not countersigns, l’aimance by reaffirming in it a sense of l’amour. In contradistinction 
to Nietzsche and Aristotle, Derrida claims that there is always love at the beginning, at 
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emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often 
within a single day” (ibid, 196). 
80 I emphasize that this radical Nietzschean aimance is a result or effect of Derrida’s reading. I have 
already pointed out above that Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil in fact reveals the problematic of a 
possible rapprochement, on the part of Nietzsche, arising between Nietzsche and the new philosophers, 
rather than “disappropriation” or “infinite distance” as Derrida reads it.  
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the heart, and at the end of thinking about friendship. Of Politiques de l’amitié, Derrida 
will after all say, « J’aimerais croire que ce livre traite avant tout de l’amour », or “I 
would like to believe that this book concerns love before anything else.”81 This love 
clearly will not be the simultaneously appropriative and negating aimance of Nietzsche 
and Aristotle, an aimance that leaves the amorous love of l’amour as a rejected remnant. 
Instead, Derrida reinstates love as constitutive of l’aimance: one arrives at l’aimance 
only when l’amour undertakes a certain movement or crossing, a crossing of love to 
friendship.82 In more precise terms, it is, according to Derrida, through the passage of a 
devenir-amitié de l’amour or “becoming-friendship of love [devenir-amitié de 
l’amour]” that one is granted a glimpse of “a new form of ‘lovence’” or nouvelle 
aimance (PA, 85/ PF, 66). One gets only a “glimpse” of this aimance because one can 
suppose that Derrida’s nouvelle aimance is of an ephemeral quality. After all, Derrida 
posits his nouvelle aimance in terms of a momentary or transitory experience, 
something that happens once in time and that is all: “Perhaps one day, here or there, one 
never knows, something may happen between two people who are in love, and who will 
love each other with love (is it still the right word?) of the sort that friendship, just once, 
perhaps, for the first time (another perhaps), once and only once, therefore for the first 
and last time (perhaps, perhaps), will become the correct name, the right and just name 
[…]” (PA, 85/ PF, 66, trans. modified). Evidently, there is no walking away (from 
friendship) here in Derrida’s aimance. There is instead an indubitable attendre sans 
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81 “Entretien avec Robert Maggiori,” Libération, November 24, 1994. 
http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/ami.html. My translation. 
82 One could also add that Derrida is countersigning Aristotle’s aimance in another way here. Aristotle’s 
aimance only loops back to the self or the loving friend. In other words, it begins and ends where it starts 
in the Aristotelian perfect friendship. With Derrida however, it is from a space outside of friendship, i.e. 
love, that l’aimance begins, and it reaches something other than what it was before, which in this case 
would be friendship.  
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s’attendre for a “friendship,” which “will become the correct name, the right and just 
name” of a relation beyond all conceptualizations of friendship in the history of 
philosophy.83 I certainly do not disagree with the question of a crossing of love. In fact, 
as I will explicate later, a passage through love will be necessary for any thought that 
seeks to see through to its end the rejection of friendship.  
 
The problem I have with Derrida’s aimance is that in speaking so lovingly of l’aimance, 
it very quickly resurrects an all too hopeful promise or possible horizon of “friendship” 
at the end of this crossing of love. I would argue that this possibility is undeniable even 
though Derrida would claim this “friendship” to be absolutely different from all present 
ideas of friendship, “a friendship which will never be reduced to the desire or the 
potentiality [puissance] of friendship” (PA, 35/ PF, 17), or a “dream of friendship 
which goes beyond [the] proximity of the congeneric double” (PA, 12/ PF, viii). But I 
would ask: why stay with the term “friendship”? Why (re)call or (re)name “friendship” 
as the horizon of l’aimance? By holding on to that name of “friendship,” does it not risk 
a nostalgic maelstrom that will pull everything that is absolutely new and different in 
this aimance back to what has been known as “friendship,” and hence override the 
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83 Let me say that I do not refute the ethics that arises from not walking away from friendship or from this 
waiting-without-expectation at the margins of friendship (and love). Contrary to Aristotle’s aimance, 
which concedes to the insurmountable experience of chronological time and therefore sets up a practical 
limit as to the number of friends one can love, Derrida’s aimance will not put arithmetic into operation. 
Waiting without expecting, Derrida’s aimance is not averse to the immanence and imminence of 
whoever, whatever, or anyone (to follow Derrida’s rhetoric in his texts on cosmopolitanism and the 
voyou) that arrives. Derrida’s aimance does not count who or what can arrive. It looks towards a relation 
between singularities that do not add up, an aimance that opens up (to) a “singular world of singularities” 
that is “of non-appurtenance” (PA, 62/ PF, 42). There, one does not know, and one is not interested to 
know, how to begin counting the singularities within such a relation: “How many of us are there? Does 
that count? And how do you calculate?” (PA, 54/ PF, 35) There will be no quantifying of friends, nor 
delimiting the boundaries of friendship by predicating it on a recognition of similarities. In other words, 
Derrida’s aimance is open to a non-counting multiplicity of singularities and their heterogeneity. It does 
not judge any of these singularities as good or evil, friend or enemy, and therefore also takes the 
audacious risk of welcoming even the figure that is, or potentially is, monstrous.   
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alterity proper to l’aimance? Derrida might attempt time and again to qualify this 
“friendship” at the end of the crossing of love as wholly different from any present 
conception of friendship, but do not the qualifications only betray a rather weak or 
precarious faith in a future relation that resembles nothing that we have at present? 
Worse, do not the same qualifications risk betraying an irresistible yearning for 
friendship as we always know it, a symptom that seems to have manifested itself 
surreptitiously when Derrida hands over the articulating of I have enough of you, my 
friend, for now to the other, rather than declaring it oneself? With this horizon of 
“friendship,” how truly is the other “free in his movement, out of reach of my will or 
desire, beyond my intention”? Why not leave whatever happens with l’aimance an open 
term, an unnameable event, leaving it as something that has yet no name, leaving it – so 
as to be true and just to the eventness of l’aimance – to be named only in the future, 
such that it does not in any anterior fashion recall or threaten to recall an already 
existing concept? Why not therefore completely reject the name of “friendship” (which 
is different from rejecting tout court that future relation that resembles nothing that we 
have at present)? Derrida himself has in fact considered this option, asking of the event 
of l’aimance: “how to name an event? For this love that would take place only once 
would be the only possible event: as an impossible event” (PA, 85/ PF, 66, trans. 
modified). And yet, as shown, Derrida nonetheless takes recourse to the name of 
“friendship.”84  
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84 I note that Derrida is not forceful with the rejection of the term “friendship” as he is with regard to the 
term forgiveness. The rhetoric Derrida deploys in speaking of forgiveness is almost similar to the rhetoric 
in his instruction to the other to not pick up his call. In the latter, as seen, he warns that should the other 
pick up the call, friendship will be undone. With regard to forgiveness, he writes, “forgiving must […] be 
impossible […]. If when I forgive, the wrongdoing, the injury, the wound, the offense become forgivable 
because I’ve forgiven, then it’s over [my emphases]” (“A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the 
Event” [2003], trans. Gila Walker, in The Late Derrida, eds. W.J.T Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson, 
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One could say then that the re-naming of “friendship” as the possible horizon of 
l’aimance risks undermining the radicality of Derrida’s deconstructive critique of the 
history of philosophy of friendship. Consequently, it also becomes somewhat 
unconvincing when in relation to l’aimance, Derrida says, “I am saying nothing, then, 
that can be said or is sayable” (PA, 89/ PF, 70), especially when this “nothing sayable,” 
as discussed earlier, is nothing but the “murderous truth” between friends, the truth that 
a force of rejection underlies all friendships, or that friends are all rejects in and before 
friendship. With the naming of “friendship” as the horizon of l’aimance, I believe that 
Derrida’s force of thought does not quite match up to his reading of a Nietzschean 
wager in an “infinite distance” or an “uncompromising […] solitary singularity” at the 
heart of the “nothing sayable” or “murderous truth” of friendship. The hope for a 
becoming-friendship of love only reveals a hesitation in Derrida’s aimance at the 
threshold of a complete breakage with friendship. Put another way, the passion to 
recuperate l’amour back into l’aimance has seemingly made Derrida give in to an 
amicable reflex or reflex of amicability in what has been so far a radical critique or 
rejection of friendship. A fully articulated “nothing sayable” of friendship therefore 
remains wanting in Derrida. In the face of hyper-gregarious digital social networks that 
are swarming the contemporary world, which severely threatens the solitary space from 
which the new philosopher will arrive, one cannot entertain the above risks in any 
contemporary rereading of Politiques de l’amitié. The rejection of friendship subtending 
Politiques de l’amitié must be put forth unequivocally today, without leaving any 
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Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 234). There, Derrida will repeatedly insist on an 
impossibility of forgiveness. One then wonders why Derrida does not insist on the impossibility of 
friendship as thoroughly as he does with the term of forgiveness. 
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slightest possibility or chance to resurrect that concept or even name of “friendship” that 
Politiques de l’amitié has so far critiqued.  
 
One could further problematize Derrida’s aimance. Derrida’s aimance might occur only 
once, for a moment, or “just once, […] once and only once, […] for the first and last 
time,” but it does not really say that everything would be renounced, or to put it more 
positively, re-begin, after that “once.” In other words, there would be the risk of resting 
with this “once” – and that would still keep to the sense of being “the first and the last 
time” – and making it the foundation for a future relation or friendship, which then risks 
compromising the eventness of a further future relation that is not only “a friendship 
which goes beyond [the] proximity of the congeneric double” but also exceeds the name 
of “friendship.” If l’aimance is something really ephemeral, something that occurs “just 
once” without it settling down to become a norm or condition that would determine and 
regulate future events of relations, then it certainly must learn to walk away, especially 
away from friendship. What characterizes the ephemeral after all is its dispersion.85 
Playing on the French aimant, which can mean 1) the person immersed in l’aimance, 2) 
the adjective “loving,” and also 3) magnet, Samuel Weber has interpreted l’aimance as 
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85 I note that dispersion also constitutes part of the theoretical strategies by the aforementioned thinkers 
such as Hardt and Negri, and Galloway and Thacker, against the network empire. One might add that the 
strategies are reminiscent of the tactic of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic war-machine in Mille plateaux, 
i.e. the tactic of smashing a system from within. I will just cite the example from Hardt and Negri. 
According to them, for the multitude to resist the network empire, the tactical position that is “most 
effective is an oblique or diagonal stance. Battles against the Empire might be won through subtraction 
and defection. This desertion does not have a place; it is the evacuation of the places of power” (Empire, 
212). For desertion as a future “resistive act,” see also Galloway and Thacker (The Exploit, 101, 111). But 
once again, the difference between my position and theirs is that there is no “construction of a new 
society” (Hardt and Negri, Empire, 404) nor any opening into “the common” (Galloway and Thacker, The 
Exploit, 111) at the end of my dispersion.     
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something of a magnetic quality, related to the force that draws magnets together.86 But 
I would add that the same magnets, when they have the same poles facing each other, 
will experience the force of repulsion when they try to come together. This repulsion is 
not, however, an immediate reaction: one can feel, even though this sensation is 
admittedly very minute and lasts only for an almost imperceptible duration, an 
undeniable attraction drawing these magnets together before a force-field is generated 
between them to prevent them from approaching. If one wants to retain the term 
l’aimance, I would then like to think of it in terms of this nuanced force of attraction-
then-repulsion that develops when two magnets of the same pole encounter each other. 
In other words, there must be in l’aimance a walking away from any recalling or even 
renaming of friendship, a walking away even from any attendre sans s’attendre. To 
reiterate: if Politiques de l’amitié is to constitute today an adequate philosophical force 
against the dox! of contemporary hyper-gregariousness, it cannot afford any regressive 
or reactionary reflex that risks reinstating a possibility of friendship. Otherwise, it might 
even seem that it gives sanction to that dox!. L’aimance cannot compromise the radical 
rejection of friendship. To that end, one must perhaps bring l’aimance to a point where 






86 « L’aimance comme l’attirance de l’autre : Réponse à « L’aimance et l’invention d’un idiome » 
d’Abdelkébir Khatibi. ». Unpublished address presented at the colloquium “Khatibi’s Œuvre: Materiality 
and Writing,” Northwestern University, 12-17 April 2007. I thank Samuel Weber for sending me his 
manuscript.  
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1.2 Syncopic Love, or Walking Away: Clément and Irigaray 
As said previously, I do not dispute the crossing or movement of love that Derrida puts 
to work in l’aimance. In fact, I think it necessary that such a crossing takes place, but 
only so as to arrive at the “murderous truth” of the rejection of friendship, rather than to 
invoke the possibility of another form of amicability, no matter if one tries time and 
again to claim that this new amicability will go beyond all present forms of friendship. 
That is to say that I do think that Derrida’s aimance, which reinstates l’amour and 
initiates its movement or crossing, can be a critical force against any form of 
gregariousness. Except, contrary to the hopeful trajectory that Derrida gives to 
l’aimance, where the optimistic horizon would be the becoming-friendship of love, one 
must dare to think that love does not fully succeed in the crossing towards friendship. 
One must dare to think that love will fail friendship, precisely in that crossing. With 
love, there will be no deliverance to a future friendship. Put another way, the crossing of 
love would only bring about a syncope of friendship: love will suffocate, choke, 
smother, sink, drown out, all possibilities of friendship as we know it. Love’s syncopic 
operation will only bring to surface the suffocating silence of the “nothing sayable” of 
friendship, the “murderous truth” between friends that “solitude is irremediable and 
friendship impossible.” In short, it is with love that the force of rejection of friendship 
comes to the fore affirmatively. For l’aimance to combat the contemporary dox! of 
hyper-gregariousness, one must then follow where love in l’aimance leads to: one must 
sink to the depths of love with l’aimance, rather than to strive towards “friendship.”  
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At this point, the discourse of Catherine Clément, who speaks of syncope as the promise 
of a new mode of thought, might help further elucidate the syncopic experience of love. 
Clément’s syncope bears in mind the pathological experience of a loss of consciousness, 
and she pays particular attention to the crossing from that syncope to the return of 
consciousness. What fascinates her about syncope is the duration involved in this 
syncope before consciousness is regained. For her, this duration is reminiscent of the 
musical notion of syncopation, a time-lag or “a note lag[ging] behind,”87 which she 
argues to give place to a whole new dimension of thought and experience. Clément goes 
further to say that it is imperative to remain a little with or within that time-lag, to dwell 
within that abyss, so as to experience the “radical surprise [where] one remains 
effectively syncopated.”88 Whatever is new lies in that time-lag. In that sense, one must 
learn to survive not only the syncope but also what comes after it, for everything will 
not be the same anymore. Any return to a prior state of reciprocal relation is lost forever 
in the syncopic experience of love.89 According to Clément, “from syncope, just as from 
love; no one returns the same as when he left: he will not come back as he was at the 
beginning, he will never be the same. He will be ‘dis-similar’ […]. It is the impossible 
return to the same.”90 Out of the syncope of love, there is no rapprochement, no return 
to love’s previous conditions or stability. That is to say too that in a future love born out 
of syncope, there will be no reciprocity that is often expected or worked towards to in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 La Syncope: philosophie du ravissement, Paris: Grasset, 1990, 189. Here, I follow Sally O’Driscoll and 
Deirdre M. Mahoney’s translation in Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture, foreword by Verena 
Andermatt Conley, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1994, 119. 
88 La Syncope, 198, my translation. 
89 Such syncopic love certainly will not be love according to Alain Badiou. In his Éloge de l’amour 
(Paris: Flammarion, 2009), which proceeds via a critique of contemporary love arranged by online sites 
for potentially compatible lovers to be paired up and meet, Badiou defines love as the chance or 
uncalculated encounter of difference. The subsequent test of this love is not just the declaration of fidelity 
to it, but the fidelity to make this encounter endure, to make it a work of lasting duration. 
90 La Syncope, 202. Here, I follow the translation in Syncope, 128. 
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love. As Clément writes, “love will never be reciprocal, between a man and a woman,” 
“and syncope will be the effect of such a perfect technique.”91  
 
If there is to be l’amour in l’aimance, it is this syncopic experience of love that 
l’aimance must dare to dwell with, a love whose crossing does not return to a previous 
amorous state, a love that breaks with any future reciprocity, and more importantly, a 
love that rejects friendship. In this aimance, parties are walking away. Someone, or both 
aimants, would have walked away from a past love, and someone will also be walking 
away from a future possible return to love or friendship. One can perhaps say that all are, 
once again, rejects in l’aimance. In a way, the syncopic experience of solitary love is 
not foreign to Derrida’s aimance in Politiques de l’amitié. I tend to think that it 
potentially lies in the references to night, darkness, shadows, or obscurity that Derrida 
attaches to his notion of a future friendship of l’aimance.92 But I would reiterate that 
one must be willing to dwell, if not get lost, in those dark syncopic spaces, and that is 
something Derrida certainly does not retreat from in those spaces. As he says, « J’aime 
y risquer des pas, j’aime aussi m’y perdre, le temps de m’y perdre »/ “I like to risk steps 
there; I also like to lose myself there, and the time of losing myself there.”93 Losing 
oneself in syncopic spaces, as I would say, is nothing short of experiencing oneself as 
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91 La Syncope, 204-205. I follow once again the translation in Syncope, 130. Keeping in mind the current 
work’s endeavor to move away from the subject, I note too that syncope, for Clément, is also where the 
subject “no longer exists” (La Syncope, 205), or that it is only a “Subject Undone” [Sujet Défait] (ibid, 
200) that remains there. 
92 I will just cite two examples here. Firstly, there will be the moment when Derrida speaks of the 
necessary faith in indecision or indetermination, or a “break with calculable reliability and with the 
assurance of certainty” in thinking about friendship, and Derrida will say, “the truth of friendship, if there 
is one, is found there, in darkness [“l’obscurité” as the French original goes]” (PA, 34/ PF, 16). Secondly, 
the imperative to refrain from any outward gesture to compel the friend to enter into a proximity with the 
self essentially “produces an event, sinking into the darkness [here, the French original says “pénombre,” 
which could mean half-light or penumbra] of a friendship which is not yet” (PA, 63/ PF, 43). 
93 “Entretien avec Robert Maggiori.” Libération. November 24, 1994. 
http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/ami.html. My translation. 
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an auto-reject. Nietzsche’s “deepest, most midnightly […] solitude,” wherein lies the 
“nothing sayable” of friendship, is certainly another syncopic space, provided one does 
not commit the Nietzschean lapse, as noted, of proclaiming a “we” that will hail the 
other into some sort of rapprochement. In a time of hyper-gregariousness, a time and 
space where the chance of the arrival of the Nietzschean solitary new philosopher or 
philosophy is at risk, one must learn to love getting lost in the syncopic experience of 
solitary love, without casting out a name like “friendship,” or an address like “we,” as a 
possible lifeline out of the abyss and darkness of syncope. One must learn how to walk 
away from any buoy marked with “friendship.” One must always remember to reject 
“friendship,” or remind oneself that one is always a reject in and of friendship. And that 
is perhaps “the most impossible” – and I would add, necessary – “declaration of love” 
(PA, 198/ PF, 174). 
 
On this point of (syncopic) love, I would like to return to the idea of dispersion as 
discussed with regard to l’aimance. I have said that dispersion is akin to walking away 
(or even taking a walk in Derrida’s scenario of friendship between rejects), and I would 
like to highlight here that for Luce Irigaray, walking away is also something to be 
affirmed in love or in any relation between beings.94 In her recent Sharing the World, 
Irigaray argues that an encounter between two beings – and for Irigaray, it is typically 
two beings of different sexes – is initiated especially by an “intimacy” that lies within 
the female.95 It is this “intimacy” that draws the (male) other to her, which in turn gives 
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94 I note that Irigaray’s « L’amour entre nous » was included in Who Comes After the Subject? It 
subsequently appears as the introduction to her J’aime à toi : esquisse d’une félicité dans l’histoire, 
Paris : Grasset, 1992 . 
95 Sharing the World, London : Continuum, 2008, 20. 
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her a sense of presence. As Irigaray makes clear, there is no necessity for physical 
contact in this “intimacy,” or for physical contact to bring the encounter between the 
two further, since “intimacy” is already a haptic event in itself, making the (male) other 
feel that “the tactile nature of the environment […] [has] changed.”96 According to 
Irigaray, “intimacy” affects a material change in the air, which engenders a “gesture” in 
the (male) other – “the gesture of going with respect and reverence” toward the female 
being.97 This approach between the two must be meticulous to not see to the 
subordination of the female by the male, and it is at this point that Irigaray insists on a 
certain walking by each party in this approach. In Sharing the World, Irigaray calls this 
walking away a “[coming] back home,”98 and in The Way of Love, the “step back.”99 In 
this walking away, or step back home, what is at stake is “self-affection,” which, 
according to Irigaray in Sharing the World, is the preservation of the female’s 
subjectivity or the integrity of the female subject. This is to ensure that her constitution 
and mode of presentation, following her own desires and according to what she deems 
proper to herself, are not lost or erased in the encounter with the (male) other. The 
female subject must get back in touch with herself so as to not abdicate or submit her 
differences to those of the (male) other, and for Irigaray, walking away serves that 
purpose. 
 
As evident, Irigaray keeps to the subject as a category of thought. This is somewhat 
surprising, given that her work in general involves a sustained critique of the male 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Sharing the World, 32. 
97 Sharing the World, 20. 
98 Sharing the World, 10. 
99 The Way of Love, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen Pluhá!ek, London and New York : Continuum, 2002, 
77. 
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subject’s denigration and marginalization of the other and the other’s difference. In not 
calling for the dissolution of the subject, she deviates rather significantly from the 
common move made in “post-structuralist” discourse. It is perhaps out of respect for 
difference – which would include the male subject’s difference – that Irigaray lets the 
(male) subject be and not seek his dissolution. It is more certain though that if Irigaray 
refrains from any negating critique of the male subject, it is because she recognizes the 
fact that humanity is essentially or originarily constituted by two subjects, one male and 
the other female, and that humanity cannot proceed without one or the other subject. For 
Irigaray, the future or perpetuation of humanity will always require at least these two 
male and female subjects. However, as Irigaray recognizes throughout her work, the 
female subject has always been repressed or oppressed in the world. Irigaray makes the 
militant call then – while letting be the male subject – for the articulation and 
affirmation of the autonomous female subject – she who is not only irreducibly different 
but also free from all determination by the male subject. 
  
This is perhaps where one may understand Irigaray’s motivation in maintaining the 
category of the subject in her discourse: not at all to take recourse to, or further promote, 
the thinking of the male subject, but to let emerge another subject – the female subject, 
to serve as a counterpoint to the male subject. In keeping with the category of the 
subject in this manner, Irigaray no doubt changes the conceptual terrain of subjectivity: 
in Sharing the World, she argues that with the affirmation of the female subject, we 
move from a “vertical transcendentalism” where the world is reduced to the 
determination of the male subject, to a “horizontal transcendentalism” where the world 
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is shared equally by the two male and female subjects without one subjugating the other. 
It is with “horizontal transcendentalism” that the autonomous female subject comes into 
presence in her own terms. As Irigaray argues, the recognition of the female subject in a 
“horizontal transcendentalism” is how one begins to acknowledge and respect the 
differences of each and every one of us in the world. Walking away in the encounter 
between two subjects, for Irigaray, then serves to reaffirm that the female subject is 
perfectly capable of establishing her subjecthood or subjectivity by herself or on her 
own terms, and is not dependent on another, especially the male subject.  
 
To be sure, walking away and the subsequent process of “self-affection” apply to the 
other (male) subject too. The latter must no less maintain his identity and difference in 
his own terms. Walking away then ensures that there is no fusion or assimilation in the 
encounter, where one risks identifying with the other, or where one’s identity and 
difference are appropriated or neutralized by the other. In walking away, the 
subjecthood proper to one and the other, that is to say, the subjectivity of the female 
subject and that of the male subject, are kept intact. However, I would argue that 
thinking with the subject, even if it is with the radically different female subject, puts 
the question of difference at risk, even in the event of having walked away. After 
walking away, as Irigaray argues, it is not the case that subsequent encounters are 
precluded. On the contrary, future meetings are desirable. Walking away, to put it 
differently, is then the process to allow subsequent encounters to become constant 
negotiations of recognizing and respecting the differences of others, constant 
negotiations of co-existing with others. But what happens when the other refuses the 
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following encounter? Irigaray is certainly aware of this possibility, and does not deny its 
occurrence. As she writes, the duration between the initial “gesture” and future 
meetings always rests “on pain of the encounter no longer taking place.”100 In the event 
of the latter, it is also possible that the one who is rejected of a subsequent encounter 
sinks into a self-berating abyss of abjectness, feeling that he or she is inherently or 
ultimately unworthy of recognition by the other. Here, the recourse to the rhetoric of the 
subject might prove critical as it lifts this imploded self from such an abyss. “Self-
affection” in this instance becomes a reminder for the self that he or she is a subject in 
his or her own right, exercising his or her freedom to exist in the world in his or her own 
difference, and is independent of how he or she is perceived by the other, independent 
of whether the other wants to meet him or her (again). 
 
However, the certitude or re-ascertaining of the self, granted by the rhetoric of the 
subject, might go the other extreme. Some sort of disappointment or disenchantment, if 
not resentment, with regard to recognizing and respecting the differences of others or 
being in touch with others, might grow. And to shield himself or herself from the 
confidence-shattering rejection by others, the subject, through his or her defensive 
mechanism, subsequently might be inclined or tempted to re-create an insular ipseity, 
risking the closure of the openness to others and their differences. It is as such that 
staying with the subject risks threatening all endeavors to be in touch with the 
difference of others. Furthermore, the assertion (or re-assertion) of the sovereign 
certitude and constitution of the subject does not arise only from its reaction to a 
rejection of a future meeting. In fact, it follows from any foundation of the subject, as 
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100 Sharing the World, 43. 
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has been the case since Descartes. This would also be the case for Irigaray then, as she 
stays with the subject, and this is evident especially in her Entre orient et occident. 
There, she makes the claim that a mode of breathing, particularly that which is practiced 
in yoga, is through which humanity will finally recognize the equal existence and 
freedom of one and the other, and through which humanity will thence begin to solve its 
problems. However, I would argue that an unconscious slippage into some sort of 
subjective sovereignty, typically projected by the male subject, occurs when Irigaray 
claims that only the female subject knows how to breathe properly in the sense of 
knowing how to share breath, or that only female breath holds the reserve of a life-
affirming and regenerative breath and hence the promise of the future of the world. Now, 
if Irigaray has critiqued Sartre for his claim that it is the (male) subjective caress that 
grants the caressed other a sense of subjectivity, one could similarly critique Irigaray’s 
argument for its implication that it is the breath of the female subject that grants the 
future possibility of the male subject. Certainly, Irigaray has stated that it is not her 
intention to create “a reversal of power” between male and female subjects.101 But the 
rhetoric there in general, especially the rhetoric of the subject, nonetheless inclines 
toward privileging the female subject, giving it pre-eminence over other subjects. With 
the rhetoric of the subject, it is always difficult to avoid a certain denigration of the 
other subject (male or female), which then risks undoing the entire project of co-
existence or the recognition and respect of differences.  
 
This is why I am arguing for the reject, which may be critical in avoiding those risks in 
Irigaray’s notion of walking away. In accepting the condition of always being a reject, 
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the slide into resentment, when one is refused a (subsequent) meeting with the other, 
may be avoided. Already accepting itself to be irreducibly a reject, it is not displaced or 
devastated when the other says do not approach (again). The reject in a way always 
anticipates such an utterance; it is always prepared for it. In the face of it, the reject 
therefore hardly feels any resentment. Resentment in that sense is meaningless to the 
reject: it is indifferent to such sentiment. In that case too, there is no (need for any) 
reactionary restitution or resurrection of the self as a sovereign subject certain of itself, 
no (need for any) reactionary will to defend its constitution by deflecting the other’s 
rejection with his or her own rejection of being in touch with others. In all, the reject 
does not seek to withdraw into a “self-affection” as Irigaray’s female subject is wont to 
do. The reject sidesteps all moments of “self-affection,” which would only lead to its re-
foundation as a subject.        
 
 
1.3 Towards “A People to Come”: From Le Prétendant to the Nomadic War 
Machine in Deleuze and Guattari 
In my critique of Derrida’s philosophy of friendship, I have pointed out that Derrida 
does not follow through the force of rejection against friendship, particularly against 
naming “friendship” as the event of a future encounter between those who are not 
averse to that chance encounter or nouvelle aimance “which will never be reduced to 
the desire or the potentiality of friendship,” or “which goes beyond [the] proximity of 
the congeneric double.” In what follows, I would like to demonstrate that Deleuze, in 
contrast, puts forth a stronger or more affirmative force of rejection, and therefore also a 
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more active figure of the reject, letting (the names of) friendship and community to fall 
by the sides. In this section, I will be focusing more on explicating the figure of the 
reject from within Deleuze’s philosophy. In doing so, I will no longer make references 
to the specific cultural context of teletechnological communication and the hyper-
gregarious condition that it produces and disseminates, since I believe the above section 
has been sufficient in underscoring the stakes or critical urgency of thinking and 
articulating the reject in the face of contemporary network-centric friendship or 
community. One would just have to keep in mind that any articulation and exposition of 
the reject will always bear a critique of all existing dox! of friendship and community. 
Staying within Deleuze’s philosophy, however, will not mean that his figures of the 
reject – the lone philosopher, le prétendant, homo tantum, the lover or the beloved – are 
detached from the real world. As will be shown, Deleuze’s figures of the reject have the 
function of revealing the real, harsh truths of impossible friendship and syncopic love in 
the relations that we form with other beings in our everyday life. And this is despite the 
fact that Deleuze himself is never really interested, at least in writing or thought, in 
friends or friendship that we are so familiar with in lived experienced. As he says in the 
television interview with Claire Parnet, he is not interested in “an actual friend,”102 but 
the figure of the friend that has not simply been appropriated by philosophy as its figure 
of thought but manifests itself in heterogeneous forms in the history of philosophy. 
 
Deleuze’s engagement with the question of friendship is clearly obvious in his co-
authored text with Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, especially in the 
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Boutang, transcribed and trans. Charles Stivale. www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/D-G/ABC1.html 
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introduction. But Deleuze’s own writings – his very early and seldom discussed essay 
“Statements and Profiles,” his Marcel Proust et les signes, and his final essay 
« L’Immanence: une vie » – also revolve around the topic of friendship in equally 
significant ways. The section will therefore discuss the question of friendship in 
Deleuze by way of these said works. But to go back to Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? a 
little: let it be said at the outset here that friendship in Deleuze and Guattari will be 
invoked only to have its terrain radically undone. For Deleuze and Guattari, there will 
be friendship only if it is (already) secant. It will be something of post-friendship or 
after friendship, not without a sense of violence, and not without a post-apocalyptic 
inflection. Perhaps one might even speak here of the despairing condition where one 
and the other are all rejects in and before friendship and love. However, any tearing or 
rejection of friendship in Deleuze and Guattari, like the force of rejection in Derrida’s 
philosophy of friendship, is not nihilistic, but in fact looks toward another form of 
relation between beings or a new understanding of relations. In other words, present 
notions like “friends” or “friendship” in Deleuze and Guattari will come to be revealed 
as anachronistic misnomers; and unlike the case of Derrida, there will be no reversion to 
these terms or names here. 
 
I have already noted that Deleuze is not really interested in the real, actual friend, but 
the friend as a figure or image of thought in philosophy. As he writes with Guattari in 
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, the interesting question of friendship would be, “What 
does friend mean when it becomes a conceptual persona, or a condition for the exercise 
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of thought?”103 One should not expect that the friend as a figure of thought will take on 
an amicable contour, however. Contrary to what philosophy of the Greek heritage has 
always seemed to suggest, the friend or friendship does not actually lead to philosophy. 
That Grecian idea that philosophy is always linked to friendship is mere fiction, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?. Or as Deleuze says 
in his Marcel Proust et les signes, the friend as a figure of thought is never that which 
“leads us towards conversation, where we exchange and communicate ideas” so that it 
“invites us to philosophy.”104 Deleuze and Guattari will go further to argue that Greek 
philosophical “friendship,” at the end of it all, is in fact not just devoid of harmonious 
accord or intellectual conversation, but also of “social relation.”105 The philosopher, in 
truth, cannot bear friendship very much: what he desires is solitude, the silence of which 
conditions a lucidity of thinking. In other words, the philosopher essentially rejects the 
company, community, and friendship of fellow philosophers. And this is perhaps why 
Plato’s Symposium ends with an image of a philosopher who stands alone – the image 
of a solitary Socrates, alone in thinking, and without lack of companionship. That is the 
striking image of Socrates that remains, which Alcibiades, enamored with Socrates, 
finds unbearable and injurious.106  
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103 Deleuze et Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Minuit, 1991, 9. 
104 Marcel Proust et les signes, Paris: PUF, 1964, 25, my translation. 
105 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 76. 
106 “One morning he started thinking about a problem and stood there considering it, and when he didn’t 
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people noticed him and said to each other in amazement that Socrates had been standing there thinking 
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dawn and the sun came up; then he greeted the sun with a prayer and went away” (Symposium, trans. and 
intro. Christopher Gill, London: Penguin, 1999, 60). 
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That image is certainly resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Socrates as 
essentially disinterested in dialogues, noting that while Socrates is undoubtedly engaged 
by, or drawn into, forms of dialogues or dialectical debates, the dialogues mark at the 
same time Socrates’ gradual rejection of those forms: “Did Socrates not make 
philosophy a free discussion among friends? Is it not the summit of Greek sociability, as 
a conversation of free men? In fact, Socrates did not cease to render all discussion 
impossible, both in the short form of a sparring [agôn] of questions and answers and in 
the long form of a rivalry between discourses. He made the friend the friend of the 
single concept, and the concept into the pitiless monologue that eliminate turn by turn 
the rivals.”107 Philosophy is very much averse to discussions, dialogues, or 
conversations, especially those that take place among friends. As Deleuze and Guattari 
point out: “Sometimes philosophy is made to be the idea of a perpetual discussion, as 
‘communicational rationality,’ or as ‘universal democratic conversation.’ Nothing is 
less exact […].”108 Instead, “philosophy has a horror of discussion.”109 Or, “the taste for 
discussion barely appeals to the philosopher. Every philosopher flees when he hears the 
phrase ‘let’s discuss a little’.”110 Discussion among friends, more than marking the 
activity of philosophy or the trait of a philosopher, only detracts philosophy or the 
philosopher from the proper task of concept-creation (as noted in the previous section 
on Derrida).  
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If the philosopher has no time for discussion with the friend, it is because the 
philosopher has been struck by a force of thought, or one could say that he or she has 
been called to the task of concept-creation. To focus on the latter, one must learn to 
walk away from amicable discussions, as Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest when 
they say, “We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We 
lack creation.”111 In philosophy, one should turn away (from) the friend and follow the 
solitary line of flight towards the work of concept-creation. This is how philosophy 
reveals itself to be not really interested in the friend, that real, other corporeal being that 
one relates to amicably in lived experience. If there is the figure of the friend in 
philosophy, it is otherwise of the latter. According to Deleuze and Guattari, it has to be 
recognized that “the friend such as he or she appears in philosophy no longer designates 
an extrinsic character [personnage], an example or empirical circumstance.”112 And 
they go on to add: “With philosophy, the Greeks violently submits the friend no longer 
to a relation with an other but with an Entity, an Objectness [Objectité], an Essence.”113 
In other words, philosophy, since the Greeks, has in fact been working out a rejection of 
the actual friend or actual friendship. Doing nothing for philosophy, the Greeks have 
been smashing the notion of amicable discussion, if not friendship tout court, from 
within: “The idea of a Western democratic conversation between friends has never 
produced a single concept. The idea comes perhaps from the Greeks, but they distrusted 
it so much, and subjected it to such harsh treatment, that the concept was more like the 
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as “Objectality” (see their translation of What Is Philosophy?, New York: Columbia University Press, 
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ironic soliloquy bird that hovered over [survolait] the battlefield of destroyed rival 
opinions.”114  
 
Deleuze himself had also put forth a forceful rejection of the actual friend or friendship 
in Marcel Proust et les signes. According to Deleuze there, “Thought is nothing without 
something that forces to think, and that does violence to thought. More important than 
thought is what ‘leads to thinking [donne à penser]’.”115 And friendship is lacking 
precisely in that violence or force that will lead one to think or create new concepts. 
Following Proust, Deleuze argues that “friends are like well-disposed minds that 
explicitly agree on the significations of things, words, and ideas,”116 such that these 
“communications of garrulous friendship [l’amitié bavarde]” are essentially “ignorant 
of the dark zones where effective forces are elaborated and act on thought, forces that 
are the determinations that forces us to think.”117 In other words, one will not find in 
friendship those dangerous regions of darkness (regions not distant from the abyssal 
region of syncope according to Clément as seen earlier in the section on Derrida) from 
which a force that leads to thought arrives. If philosophy seeks the truth, then “a friend 
is not enough for us to approach the truth.”118 
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Le Prétendant 
While Marcel Proust et les signes radically renders the friend an inadequate figure of 
thought, and while the philosophical task of concept-creation in Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie? sees the philosopher walking away from all friendly conversation or 
discussion, one has to be precise to say that Deleuze and Guattari do not negate the 
relation between friendship and philosophy in an absolute manner: a certain amicable 
relation remains to be deployed in and by philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari might have 
shown that philosophy turns away (from) the (actual) friend, but that does not mean that 
philosophy, at its nascent stage and at its completion, does not need the friend. In fact, 
Deleuze and Guattari will not fail to explicate that the task of philosophizing always 
involves a certain apprenticeship in relations at the stages of creating concepts and of 
perpetuating the future of concepts. I consider the question of the future of concepts first. 
A concept might end up looking like a “pitiless monologue,”119 according to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s analysis, but it is always highly attentive in terms of a geographical 
sensitivity to its milieu. In other words, it takes constant survey of its milieu, not at all 
in the sense of a policing surveillance, but constantly flying over existing components 
so that it is always alert to components that continue to make themselves available to 
the concept, or to other components that have been left out previously, so that it can 
attach itself to any of these at any moment for its development. As Deleuze and Guattari 
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119 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 33. 
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say, “the concept is in a state of survey in relation to its components,” or, “the ‘survey’ 
is the state of the concept or its specific infinity.”120  
 
Concepts might stand alone, but it cannot do so without other concepts, or without the 
problematic that thought encounters, and which motivates the construction of the 
concept. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, “A concept is devoid of meaning as long as it 
is not connected to other concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps 
to resolve.”121 A concept might at a certain moment stand above other concepts, but that 
does not mean that the latter are from then on completely vanquished or redundant. A 
certain relation with other concepts is always maintained: it is even always at work, 
either folding one concept into another or unfolding one from the other.122 That is to say 
too that a concept might need another to renew itself: “a concept also has a becoming 
that each time concerns its relation with [other] concepts situated on the same plane. 
Here, concepts link up with one another, support one another, coordinate their contours, 
articulate their respective problems […]. In fact, every concept, having a finite number 
of components, will bifurcate toward other concepts composed differently but […] 




120 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 26. Here, I follow Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell’s translation 
in What Is Philosophy?, 20, 21. 
121 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 76. 
122 “In any concept there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts […]. This is 
inevitable because each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, and must be 
reactivated or recut” (Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 23. Here, I hollow Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell’s translation in What Is Philosophy?, 18). 
123 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 24. 
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In that sense, a certain amicable relation is still somewhat mobilized in philosophy for 
the future of concepts. Put another way, concept-creation always passes through a 
certain pedagogy of relations, an apprenticeship in learning how to co-exist with another 
concept even though it is standing above the other at the present moment, so that it may 
lay claim to components that it deems critical for its further construction. For 
philosophy, or for the future of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari still need friendship. 
They will look for a friend, and they will not fail to acknowledge that friendship might 
still engender philosophy, that it might even make possible the ultimate question of 
philosophy, which is the question of what philosophy is, a question that “had to be 
possible to pose […] ‘between friends’.”124 Lest one thinks that one is here returning to 
a figure of the friend or friendship as one knows it, one should be precise to say that 
when Deleuze and Guattari seemingly re-invoke the friend or friendship, especially 
after unveiling the truth of the philosopher’s aversion to amicable conversations, and 
after the irreducible image of the lone philosopher standing at a distance from everyone 
else, what they are trying to bring to critical awareness in fact is that something has 
happened to friendship or the friend in the course of philosophy since the Greeks. In 
creating concepts (and not in amicable discussions), philosophy since the Greeks has 
needed friendship, but it has at the same time transformed the friend or friendship into 
something else. Given what we have seen of the “amicable” relation that goes on in 
concept-creation, which involves first walking away from (real) friendship, then 
standing aloof in solitariness, and then reforming friendships (with other concepts) for 
the sake of the future of the concept, one is not dealing with true friendship in this case. 
A question of sincerity in forming and sustaining friendship is certainly in question here, 
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as it seems that friendship is always posited only to be betrayed, especially when the 
concept, at the moment of its triumphal construction, hovers as “a pitiless monologue” 
over all the other concepts it has surpassed. What Deleuze and Guattari do then, it can 
be said, is to reveal this true color of friendship in philosophy: they bring to surface the 
figure of betrayal at the very heart of the mythic image of the friend in philosophy. 
 
To see that in more detail, I return to the creation stage of the concept. As said, 
conversations or intellectual discussions between friends do nothing for the 
philosophical task of concept-creation. For the latter, philosophy must turn from the 
tiresome scene of friendship: there must at least be “a turning away, a certain fatigue, a 
certain distress between friends.”125 And concept-creation does not arrive by way of a 
reception of a gift, like that which is exchanged between friends for example. 
Philosophers “must no longer accept concepts as a gift,” or wait to be presented with it 
like a gift: “Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like celestial bodies. There is 
no heaven for concepts.”126 Concepts must be created out of the singularity of the one 
who thinks it, and be marked with his or her signature.127 This creative step is not an 
arbitrary or random act, though. A very specific act of creation is involved here. The 
thinker is first absorbed into a field of the problematic, where a problem interests the 
thinker. That interest is augmented when the thinker is struck by the possibility of him 
or her addressing or resolving the problem, which then leads to the construction of a 
concept, a concept that will bear the thinker’s signature because of the attention and/ or 
solution he or she brings to the problem. It is in this sense that some sort of friendship 
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comes (back) into play in philosophy (after it has rejected the actual friend), for the 
thinker must think of himself as “the friend of the concept, [that] he is capable of the 
concept [il est en puissance de concept].”128 The thinker turns away (from) the friends 
of conversation or discussion, but he or she nonetheless must turn amicably towards the 
imminent concept.  
 
All this time, one must never assume that there is only one philosopher seeking the 
same concept, or that he or she alone is worthy of that concept. The field or plane of the 
problem is always open to anyone; the problematic can interest anyone. For the (lone) 
philosopher then, there is always the possibility of competition over the concept. 
Combat, rivalry, and strife are lurking in the vicinity, not only in rival philosophers, but 
also in the thinker’s friend or friends. The philosopher therefore cannot remain the calm 
or passive friend of the concept, or of his or her fellow philosopher(s). He or she has to 
be more than that: he or she has to be a little more forceful, if not aggressive, with 
regard to the concept, almost adopting a combative stance in relation to other rival 
philosophers and philosopher-friends. For Deleuze and Guattari, he or she must at most 
be a claimant or at least a lover. He or she must strive towards the concept, taking into 
account the possible competitions or rivalries that abound in the neighborhood. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the philosopher becomes le prétendant, the figure 
that names suitor, claimant, and pretender altogether at the same time. As le prétendant, 
the philosopher can only pretend to be friend-like, while already slowly shedding away 
the pretensions of friendship or all the niceties that accompany the figure of the friend, 
since the philosopher cannot allow any friend to reach the concept before he or she does. 
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Not only mistrust cuts across friendship here, but the philosopher must also in effect 
reject his or her friend(s). He or she must jealously watch over the imminent concept 
and reach towards it like a lover or claimant to the object of desire, which implies 
making all other philosophers his or her rivals, leaving them in his or her trail of 
concept-creation. With regard to this philosopher/ le prétendant, Deleuze and Guattari 
will write: “is [he or she] not rather the lover? […] Or else, is it not a matter of someone 
other than the friend or lover? For if the philosopher is the friend or lover of wisdom, is 
it not because he claims it, striving for it potentially [en puissance] rather than actually 
possessing it? Would the friend also be the claimant [le prétendant] then, and that which 
is said to be the friend would be the Thing on which the claim would be made, but not 
the third [le tiers], who would become on the contrary a rival? Friendship would bear as 
much an emulating distrust [méfiance émulante] with regard to the rival as a loving 
tension towards the object of desire.”129 
 
One cannot lay claim to any sincere friendship therefore in this secant community of 
philosophers who have gathered around the field or plane of the problematic, from 
which the concept will imminently emerge via one of those philosophers who hovers 
over that plane, i.e. the one who emerges victorious in the rivalry to put his or her 
signature onto the concept to come. Here, friendship is very quickly undone, betraying 
an irreducible combative mistrust between friends in philosophy. The philosopher is 
“but a friend who no longer has a relation with his friend except through a loved thing 
bearing rivalry [une chose aimée porteuse de rivalité].”130 And once again, at the end of 
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this combat over the concept, the image that remains is the image of a lone philosopher, 
he or she who has laid claim on the concept, and now stands over his or her vanquished 
rivals, surveying the field of combat as le survol. In this image, “there would not be two 
great philosophers.”131 This image is not shared between friends, for there are no friends 
(left).  In the eyes of the lone, victorious philosopher, all other fellow philosophers are 
but rejects since they have failed to lay claim to the concept. And in return, surely, in 
the eyes of the other philosophers, the solitary philosopher left standing is also a reject, 
someone they shun away from since that philosopher, in his or her quest to appropriate 
the concept, has betrayed their friendships by turning them into rivals. 
 
Le prétendant in philosophy then is the a priori traitorous figure, always already 
undoing friendship at the beginning of philosophy, even before philosophy traverses the 
pedagogy of relations in its work of concept-creation. As indicated above, I read le 
prétendant as a figure of the reject – the one who not only rejects but also betrays 
friendship, and the one who will no doubt in turn be rejected by his or her other 
philosopher “friends.” Whatever apprenticeship in relations that follows from 
philosophical concept-creation, that apprenticeship would already have been tainted, 
betrayed, or even undone by the mistrust and rivalry of le prétendant. Le prétendant: 
suitor, claimant, pretender, and reject – this is what has become of the friend in 
philosophy, what happens to friends as a “condition of thought” in the philosophical 
quest to lay claim to the concept to come. In other words, the aim of the deconstruction 
of friendship in Deleuze and Guattari, which involves the rejection of (real) friendship 
while maintaining some sort of apprenticeship in relations in the domain of concept-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 52. 
! 108 
creation, is to undo all the harmonious niceties that are attached to the notion of 
friendship, and to reveal that the friend is always already the irrepressible traitorous 
prétendant (or reject). From then on, one must not hesitate to re-cognize that friendship 
is always already secant, and that is why Deleuze and Guattari will always trust the 
ultimate question of what philosophy is to arrive more from a situation where friendship 
is rent with distrust and mutual combat, when the question is posed “ before the enemy 
like a challenge, and at the same time reaching that crepuscular hour [cette heure, entre 
chien et loup] when one even distrusts the friend.”132 To put it bluntly, philosophy 
reproduces the image of the friend only to make use of friendship to lay claim to a 
concept. Otherwise, one can say that the image of the friend is appropriated as the 
philosopher’s foil to soften the force of the claim to the concept, making it easier to sign 
the imminent concept to oneself. In short then, philosophy no doubt needs the friend at 
times. It even befriends, but only on the condition of making use of the friend for 
concept-creation. Philosophy in this case serves as a preview to the revelation of a bleak 
world where friendships or relations are likewise essentially secant, betrayed, or made 
use of. Or, as Deleuze says in his early “Statements and Profiles” essay, philosophy is 
“an introduction to an unpleasant world.”133  
 
Bleak World: Making More (Use of) Friends 
If the world that Deleuze unfolds in “Statements and Profiles” is indeed “unpleasant,” it 
is because one finds in that essay the nascent unveiling of an essentially solitary world, 
where friendship is refused, and where friendship is once again something to be made 
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used of to the benefit of the narcissistic self. According to Deleuze in that Sartrean 
essay, an “I” creates a subjective point of view of the world, and projects this 
consciousness of the world into the world as the world. However, the pure and simple 
fact of existence of another being – for example a male counterpart, in his simple 
anonymity and not yet particularized as a specific identity, and therefore a “male-Other” 
that is “the a priori Other” as Deleuze calls it134 – complicates and destabilizes that 
seemingly solitary world. The “I” may conceive the latter as a world of fatigue, as in 
Deleuze’s example, but the a priori Other, in his slightest gesture of gaiety contests that 
representation. In other words, he reveals the fact that the fatigue world “does not have 
an objective consistency.”135 “I” then comes to see the a priori Other, positing a 
worldview in contradistinction to that of the “I,” to be potentially aggressive: “I” see the 
Other as an imminent negation if not denigration of the subjective certainty of the 
fatigue world. But things can get worse: the consciousness of the fatigue world begins 
to implode in the “I,” overwhelming and flooding the “I” with an unbearable insularity, 
causing his body to collapse, and leaving his “collapsed body [to] [stand] alone.”136 In 
Deleuze’s analysis, this implosive solitariness constitutes the “fundamental mediocrity” 
of existence or being,137 and a “mediocre-I” is that “I” who has the revelation that the 
world-as-I-see-it is precisely just that – a particular viewpoint, which is always exposed 
to the supplement if not contest of another viewpoint, either from the body next to “I” 
or from whoever comes before “I.” In that sense, the “mediocre-I” is also nothing less 
than a despairing or even abject (auto-)reject. But “fundamental mediocrity” can also be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 “Statements and Profiles,” 87. 
135 “Statements and Profiles,” 87. 
136 “Statements and Profiles,” 87. 
137 “Statements and Profiles,” 90. 
! 110 
where the rent in friendship has its germination. This is because it marks the 
fundamental contest in viewpoints before all friendships, before any amicable 
communication or relation with the other. In other words, the first reflex of any 
encounter with the other, or what quickly gives way in the encounter, is rivalry, a scene 
of enmity where one “knows itself in solitude, and knows the male-Other in hatred, 
without breaking with its solitude.”138 One is always already concerned about horizons 
of viewpoints, concerned whether they touch amicably or threaten to cross (out) one 
another. One quickly guards one’s horizon against that of the other, and this is how the 
world in which the “I” is always in the presence of others becomes, or proves to be, 
unpleasant. 
 
Despite this primacy of a secant encounter, Deleuze would argue in this “Statements 
and Profiles” essay that friendship remains possible. As he says, “the possible world 
that the male-Other reveals can also be called the offer of a friendship.”139 That is to say 
that if one could see past the edgy horizons of different world-views, and negotiate 
those differences without one negating the other, one could proceed towards a mode of 
living where living in the world with others is living as what Deleuze calls a “team,” 
which is even close to “a sports team or a social team.”140 According to Deleuze, living 
as a team could bring relief to “fundamental mediocrity”: “The Team is the only way to 
escape from mediocrity.”141 And yet, the real world, unfortunately, is not so amicable 
whereby this “Team” can be easily consolidated among people: there remain “those 
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who cannot or do not want to go beyond mediocrity towards the Team.”142 This is 
where one can see once again how friendship is rather impossible in the Aristotelian-
Derridean sense, or how friendship can be formed only to be made use of in order “to 
go beyond mediocrity.” In Deleuze’s analysis, two ways present themselves for those 
who are unable or unwilling to join the “Team.” First, there is the absolute anti-
community gesture, the enclosure of oneself within oneself, completely shutting the 
world off. This is where one would “internalize mediocrity,” keeping to oneself, 
“touches only itself,” and not let oneself be touched.143 In this case, one refuses the 
violent supplement of the possible worlds of the Other; one refuses to take into account 
the latter, and slips in between them instead: “She parts herself and let herself pass.”  
 
Then there is the endeavor “to acquire at least the inner life they lack.”144 Now, the “a 
prior Other” creates anxiety for the “I” not only because of the possible world he or she 
expresses, but also because of “an enormous inner life” that he or she holds in secret 
reserve,145 an inner world that is hardly disclosed in the world, and which the “I” can 
never know for sure if “I” am included or not in that world. According to Deleuze, that 
reserve is the secret of being, that which constitutes the singularity of every being in all 
its plurality and heterogeneity. And if there is to be a “team,” it has to be sustained by 
the acknowledgement of the “inner life” of the other and the maintenance of the 
respective secrets of respective inner lives of all who have come to form this “team.” 
The one who refuses the “team” is one who cannot bear the “inner life” of the other. For 
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this “mediocre-I,” the “inner life” that is never shared gradually comes to be seen as a 
lack within himself or herself, and the “mediocre-I” copes with this apparent lack 
through “the acquisition […] of an inner life […] of the secret.”146 According to 
Deleuze in this essay, it takes the form of “pedastry,” which the translator of Deleuze’s 
essay notes as “either homosexuality among men or the love of young boys by men.”147 
That there is something Greek about this “pedastry” is not difficult to elicit, since 
Deleuze’s example of “pedastry” is set in the context of a lycée, a place of learning, not 
to mention that in Deleuze’s analysis, there is also “something intellectual” in 
“pedastry.”148 An echo of Greek, philosophical homosexuality, as is often read in 
Plato’s Symposium, where Alcibiades desperately seeks to elicit the secret or some sort 
of “inner life” from within Socrates, surely resonates here. 
 
In “pedastry,” the mediocre-being makes the other invest an “inner life” in him. But he 
has to first create a hint of an “inner life.” Thinking he lacks one, he turns “fundamental 
mediocrity” into “the secret,” turning in other words the solitariness of “fundamental 
mediocrity” into “the sign of an abject and painful independence.”149 He “shares [this] 
with the child,” making the child charmed by such a secret, obsessing the child to create 
for him a further “enormous inner life,” which is only in the end “what seemed […] to 
be an inner life.”150 As such, the desperate need for an “inner life” comes to be 
disseminated to the “mediocre adolescent.”151 The “mediocre adolescent” in turn desires 
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an “inner life,” which he understands he can derive from the one he loves or who loves 
him. And it is here that friendship becomes instrumental, where it is useful only to 
fulfill the apparent lack of an “inner life” in oneself. Put another way, friendship here is 
needed only to set up a scene of love where one can witness the beloved investing an 
“inner life” in oneself. It is here that one begins to look for the friend, so as to overcome 
one’s “fundamental mediocrity,” while at the same time refusing the friendship offered 
by the “Team.” Let me quote Deleuze’s explication at length: 
The statement of the mediocre adolescent: I have never conceived of the 
confession of love except in the form of insults. And when I dream a little, […], 
it is always the same thing. I am hidden in a cupboard at a friend’s house. A 
young girl comes in, and cries: ‘Pierre (or Paul, or Jacques, and finally my name) 
is a dirty bastard, a revolting, stinking pedarast […].” So I come out of the 
cupboard, and say ‘It’s me.’ What follows is of little importance, since I know 
how to make her confess her love, by untying her injury like a complicated knot. 
But there it is: it is of absolutely no importance that the girl exists; it is much 
more important that a cupboard is really, effectively, in the room of one of my 
friends […] and without a cupboard I could never have given my dream any 
priority over fixed objectivity. Will I find one? I am looking for a friend.152 
 
The instance of “I am looking for a friend” certainly recalls Derrida’s critique in 
Politiques de l’amitié of the deployment of friendship in the history of philosophy for a 
generally narcissistic purpose. In the case of Deleuze’s critique here, friendship is the 
relation through which one makes use of one another to create an “inner life” for oneself, 
so that there will be someone to embellish one’s “fundamental mediocrity” with the 
contours of an “inner life.” One might be tempted here to speak of the “mediocre-I” 
here as some sort of auto-reject in the sense of a self that disdains himself or herself 
because of a perceived lack of an “inner life.” However, I insist that there is a difference 
with the auto-reject that I am elucidating in this study. As I have discussed in the 
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previous section on Derrida, the auto-reject that I am theorizing in this study rejects 
itself not because of any lack, but because it does not want to be striated by any single 
thought. Such an auto-reject is affirmative and needs to be affirmed, while the 
“mediocre-I” as auto-reject is evidently something almost nihilistically self-negating or 
self-denigrating. I have also stated earlier that the auto-reject in friendship is one who 
recognizes himself or herself as a reject in friendship, which implies that he or she 
would affirm the irreducible rent in friendship, rather than seek to create a supplemental 
suture over it, or to make use of the friend, as is the case of the “mediocre-I.”  
 
Love (Again) 
In the section on Derrida, I have pointed out that for Derrida, love, if not l’aimance, can 
play the critical role of “deconstructing” all present friendships, opening them up 
towards another form of relation (without relation) that will bear “the just name of 
friendship.” What role can love play for Deleuze’s “Team”? Does love give a hopeful 
horizon to Deleuze’s bleak world as well? Love, for Deleuze, in fact sidesteps the 
construction of a “Team,” if not lures one to reject it. According to Deleuze,153 not only 
is the “Team” undone because of rivalry or because “many have only been able to 
choose rancor,” but also because of love, which “expels [lovers] from the Team.” Love 
might take one (and the beloved) out of the “Team,” but does love then bring one to 
another amorous or amicable structure (as in Derrida’s nouvelle aimance), otherwise 
than the plural or more-than-two “Team,” such that love here provides a salvation or 
form of escape from worldly solitariness? Does love not always promise some sort of 
union with another, promising, as Bennington suggests, to “tend towards a fusion of the 
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parties to it”?154 Love in Deleuze, however, will not be an amorous or amicable respite 
from the world of secant friendships. Love takes one away from the “Team,” but it does 
not lift one from the depths of solitariness; love instead will plunge one further into that 
abyss. Reminiscent of Clément’s syncopic love, love in Deleuze will be the passage 
towards the revelation of a world where relations are always already secant, and where 
solitariness or solitude is indeed “irremediable.” That is the lesson of Deleuze’s Marcel 
Proust et les signes. There, Deleuze follows Proust in giving preference to love over 
friendship, even if it is the slightest or shortest of all loves: “a superior mind or even a 
great friend are not worthy of a brief love.”155 The lesson that love offers with regard to 
always already secant relations in the world is in fact harsher than friendship. One can 
always refuse friendship, refuse the “Team”; one can always be suspicious of an 
offering of friendship, and even sully that offering with a hue of perceived competition, 
thereby surpassing friendship with rivalry or hatred. In other words, standing before 
friendship, one can choose to withdraw into solitariness. However, in love, one is lured 
by the promise of a union with another; one chooses to enter into a union with another, 
to affirm a relation with the other, to enter into a world where the two bodies in love are 
always present to each other. It is not a solitary world that one looks for, or even expects, 
in love. That will only be the disappointment of love; and yet, love will not hesitate to 
disappoint.  
 
Love begins by an allure of the Other, the beloved, whose secret of her entire “inner 
life” draws the lover to her. The beloved emits a sign of this allure, which incites in the 
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lover a desire to unlock or unveil that inner world, to elucidate that world completely, so 
as to know it or share it as a common property between the lovers, such that there will 
be no more secrets between them: “to love is to seek to explicate, to develop these 
unknown worlds that remain enveloped within the beloved.”156 But the moment 
explication proceeds, the lover gradually comes to realize that the beloved’s inner world 
of “unknown worlds” is impassable. Instead of an elucidation of the inner life of the 
beloved, the lover is met with worlds “reflected from a point of view so mysterious that 
they are […] like unknown, inaccessible countries.”157 The promise of a world shared 
between two fades as love progresses. In that sense, love repeats the despairing image 
of a solitary self under the sign of “fundamental mediocrity,” where one realizes that 
others have existed before oneself, or that a multiplicity of heterogeneous world-views 
are always already out there, and that one’s world-view is never for certain shared or 
taken into consideration by the other. As Deleuze writes, “We cannot interpret the signs 
of a loved person without entering [déboucher] into worlds that did not wait for us to 
form, but were formed with other people, and in which we are at first only an object 
among others.”158 The will to reconstruct a world shared between two is essentially 
denied – and one can perhaps speak of the lover as a reject in this aspect. In love, no 
less than in friendship, a fundamental exclusion or fundamental secant relation is 
revealed, despite the lover’s demands for the reparation of such suture: 
 
The lover wishes that his beloved bestows to him her preferences, her gestures, 
her caresses. But the beloved’s gestures, at the moment when they are addressed 
and dedicated to us, still express the unknown world that excludes us [my italics]. 
The beloved gives us signs of preference; but because these signs are the ones 
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that express worlds in which we play no part, each preference by which we 
profit draws the image of the possible world where others would be or are 
preferred.159 
 
Further, the mistrust that haunts friendship (as in the case of le prétendant) is present in 
love too. Mistrust here will be reminiscent of the betrayal function of le prétendant/ 
“friend,” a mistrust derived from the beloved concealing the fact that she withholds a 
world that excludes the lover, a mistrust derived from the beloved’s lie that all is shared 
between the lovers and that no secret remains. It must be said however that betrayal 
here is without conscious or deliberate intent, “not by virtue of any particular ill will of 
the beloved.”160 In any case, in his or her fundamental exclusion or rejection from the 
beloved’s “unknown world,” the lover is left only with a solitary condition, a “fate […] 
expressed in the motto: To love without being loved.”161 In other words, love in Marcel 
Proust et les signes unveils without reserve the condition of living in the world as 
solitary being, revealing to us, if not exposing us to, a bleaker world.162  
 
After Friendship: From Jean Améry’s homme du ressentiment to Deleuze’s Homo 
tantum 
The discussion of friendship in Deleuze (and Guattari) has shown that the question of 
friendship for them is not so much that which unfolds in lived experience but how 
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philosophy has folded the image of the living friend into itself as “a condition for the 
exercise of thought.” That does not mean that they consider the treatment of friendship 
in philosophy as different from the treatment of friendship in life, however. That there is 
ultimately a non-distinction or even continuum between philosophy and life in Deleuze 
(and Guattari) can be elicited from Deleuze’s following of Spinoza, where he would 
seek a point where “there is no longer any difference between concept and life.”163 That 
is to say then that Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of philosophical friendship is not, and 
will not be, without regard for the conditions of friendship as they are lived in the real 
world. In other words, it is not without thought of how actual friendship may be 
transformed or challenged, or how the limits of present actual friendship may be 
overcome. The proximity between Deleuze and Guattari’s always secant friendship and 
the real world can be drawn from their reference to Auschwitz.164 In a way, it is their 
keeping in mind of the abyss that has been opened up between humans after Auschwitz 
that leads Deleuze and Guattari to speak of a friendship that is always rent with distrust 
or rivalry. For Deleuze and Guattari, Auschwitz stands for “a too overwhelming ordeal, 
an unspeakable catastrophe” [une trop forte épreuve, une catastrophe indicible],”165 and 
one might add that it was an ordeal and catastrophe also because it testified to a human 
potentiality for an annihilating or nihilistic anti-community – and anti-friendship no 
doubt as well – will and power, which humans have been shown to execute with 
systematic, indifferent precision. In the wake of the rupture of such anti-community or 
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anti-friendship violence in humans, friendship, and not just poetry according to Adorno, 
is almost impossible after Auschwitz.166 Deleuze and Guattari will therefore say, “It is 
not only our States but each of us, each democrat, who finds ourselves not responsible 
for Nazism but sullied by it. There is indeed catastrophe, but the catastrophe consists in 
the society of brothers or friends having undergone such an ordeal that they can no 
longer look at one another, or each at himself, without a ‘fatigue,’ perhaps a mistrust 
[…].”167 Actual friendship after Auschwitz, which may be called post-apocalyptic 
friendship, will be one in which one cannot avoid distrusting the friend or the other (to 
advocate or pursue the cause and course of another fascistic nihilism). One cannot trust 
oneself either (to do likewise). Consequently, one looks at the friend or the potential 
friend with a certain fatigue, as one and the other bear in their own ways that historical 
trace of nihilistic anti-community violence. 
 
One can certainly put in place a mistrust of Deleuze and Guattari here on friendship, 
especially real friendship after Auschwitz since, as already highlighted, the question of 
friendship that interests them is more the question of friendship as concept rather than 
real friends. However, if one turns to the essay “Resentment” of Jean Améry, himself a 
survivor of the Nazi concentration camps, one reads how (real) friendship and 
community are indeed almost impossible after Auschwitz. Now, Jews under the reign of 
the Nazis can be said to be rejects, especially rejects in the sense of passive figures 
targeted to be denigrated, banished, and even exterminated in this case. For Améry, the 
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sense of rejection (by others) further degenerates into auto-rejection in and beyond the 
camps: “In the jails and camps of the Third Reich all of us scorned rather than pitied 
ourselves because of our helplessness and all-encompassing weakness. The temptation 
to reject ourselves [Selbstverwerfung, my emphases] has survived within us, as the 
immunity to self-pity.”168 I note however that auto-rejection here does not bear the same 
sense of the auto-reject that I am trying to set out in this present work. The auto-reject 
that I am seeking to trace is, I repeat, of creative regeneration, not just without all 
nihilistic self-deprecation or self-denigration, but also without the self-scorn that Améry 
speaks of. If there is an auto-reject in Améry, it is one with ressentiment, or one that 
passes through l’homme du ressentiment, which Nietzsche is averse to.  
 
L’homme du ressentiment is a target of rejection for Nietzsche not just because it 
represents the inability to act or to actively create its own ways to respond to forces 
around it, but also because it turns its repressive or reactive forces, which discourage all 
action, into a rejection of others, to berate others or to put others down.169 As Nietzsche 
argues in On the Genealogy of Morality, l’homme du ressentiment says “‘no’ on 
principle to everything that is ‘outside,’ ‘other,’ ‘non-self’.”170 This is nothing more 
than a slave morality or slave revolt of l’homme du ressentiment, stemming from 
“temporarily humbling and abasing himself,”171 while letting a desire for revenge to 
brew from within, hoping, through the rejection of others, or through its revenge, “to be 
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powerful one day.”172 It is as such that Deleuze, in his reading of Nietzsche’s homme du 
ressentiment, will speak of “the frightening feminine power of ressentiment,” which is 
the quest for “the blamable [des fautifs], the responsible” for his or her state of 
ressentiment, the quest to impress onto the world that “others are bad [méchants] so as 
to be able to feel that he or she is good.”173 That would be “the triumph of the weak as 
weak,” which only demonstrates the inability, or rather the refusal, to forget the sense of 
ressentiment, and to trace a creative or affirmative line of flight from or against it.174 
And yet l’homme du ressentiment will find that the world in general tends to be 
indifferent to his or her ressentiment, and, according to Nietzsche, this is when 
ressentiment degenerates into bad conscience. In Nietzsche’s words, bad conscience is 
“a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most 
fundamental of all changes which he experienced, – that change whereby he finally 
found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace.”175 Put another way, 
l’homme du ressentiment here turns the rejection of the world around on itself and 
“impatiently rip[s] himself apart, persecute[s] himself, gnaw[s] at himself, [gives] 
himself no peace and abuse[s] himself.”176 One may be quick to point to the auto-reject 
here. But again, l’homme du ressentiment with bad conscience is not the auto-reject of 
creative regeneration but of (auto-)nihilism. Furthermore, this homme du resssentiment, 
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in Deleuze’s analysis, also demands the contagion of bad conscience in the world, 
demanding that the rest of the world suffers as well from this nihilistic auto-rejection.177 
 
Améry’s homme du ressentiment bears all the characteristics of l’homme du 
ressentiment that Nietzsche and Deleuze critique, and this is not surprising since Améry 
explicitly seeks to oppose Nietzsche by raising the figure of l’homme du ressentiment 
rather than repressing or denigrating it as Nietzsche does. So there is the rejection of the 
world contemporaneous to Améry’s homme du ressentiment: he or she “cannot join in 
the [post-war] unisonous peace chorus all around him, which cheerfully proposes: not 
backward let us look but forward, to a better, common future!”178 There is the desire for 
revenge, perhaps even some “barbaric, primitive lust for revenge,” against those who 
subjected l’homme du ressentiment to the tortures of Nazi concentration camps, the 
desire to “want at least the vile satisfaction of knowing that [his or her] enemy is behind 
bars.”179 Or as Améry says later, following Thomas Mann, “The spiritual reduction to 
pulp by the German people, not only of the books, but of everything that was carried out 
in those 12 years [of Nazi rule], would be the negation of the negation: a highly positive, 
a redeeming act. Only through it would our resentment be subjectively pacified and 
have become objectively unnecessary.”180 Then there is the bad conscience seeking to 
disseminate auto-rejection in the enemy of l’homme du ressentiment. “I demand that the 
[torturers] negate themselves and in the negation coordinate with me,” Améry says, and 
continues later to say that “the problem [of his ressentiment] could be settled by 
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permitting resentment to remain alive in the one camp and, aroused by it, self-mistrust 
in the other [camp of the torturers].”181 Or, in general, what Germany as “a national 
community” could do to assuage l’homme du ressentiment is to “reject everything, but 
absolutely everything, that it accomplished in the days of its own deepest 
degradation.”182 
 
Following Nietzsche’s (and Deleuze’s) understanding of l’homme du resssentiment and 
his or her bad conscience, one may deduce that l’homme du ressentiment presents an 
obstacle to any form of friendship or community, or that he renders any friendship or 
community almost impossible. And yet, after Auschwitz, and in light of Améry’s 
writing, one must reevaluate Nietzsche’s (and Deleuze’s) critique of l’homme du 
ressentiment, if not put forth “a genuine anti-Nietzschean ethics of resentment” as 
Améry has done according to Agamben.183 If there is a trace of anti-community or anti-
friendship in l’homme du ressentiment after Auschwitz, one must recognize that an 
irreparable anti-community (and anti-friendship) force has been first imposed upon the 
Jews. From then, as Howard Caygill has commented through a reading of Edmond 
Jabès’s Livre du partage and Livre des questions, “The experience of the Shoah shatters 
not only the memory of community – the sense of belonging to a land, a people, to 
oneself – but also the sense of belonging to a shared world.”184 In other words, after 
Auschwitz, one cannot demand l’homme du ressentiment to forgive and forget, to 
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York: Zone, 1999, 104. 
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elevate himself or herself from his or her ressentiment and/ or bad conscience to rejoin 
the world.185 As evident in Améry, this is almost impossible for l’homme du 
ressentiment after Auschwitz. The resistance to forgive and forget stems not only from 
the “experience of the Shoah” but also from the discernment of l’homme du 
ressentiment that the sense of community or friendship offered by what Nietzsche calls 
“society and peace” is essentially superficial. In fact, “the greater community of all the 
uninjured in this world” continues the rejection of l’homme du ressentiment after 
Auschwitz: “The social body is occupied merely with safeguarding itself and could not 
care less about a life that has been damaged.”186  
 
It is perhaps reasonable then, or even just, to leave l’homme du ressentiment after 
Auschwitz, which is really more the passive reject rather than the active reject, his or 
her right and freedom to reject or walk away from all appellations to community and 
friendship by “all the uninjured” or by “society and peace,” rather than force a facile or 
banal suture between l’homme du ressentiment and society, while at the same time 
rejecting any genuine understanding of the post-traumatic state of l’homme du 
ressentiment after Auschwitz. In other words, and this is what Améry argues, l’homme 
du ressentiment after Auschwitz must have the right and freedom to remain as l’homme 
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du ressentiment, to be the (auto-)nihilistic (auto-)reject. Letting be l’homme du 
ressentiment as he or she is, waiting without expecting [attendre sans s’attendre] for 
him or her to work out or work through a yet unthought of future community or 
friendship with the rest of the world,187 is perhaps the least, and at the same time 
perhaps the most, one can do for this homme du ressentiment who has survived 
Auschwitz. Besides, after Auschwitz, there is no doubt a danger in following Nietzsche 
to the letter in advocating the rise or aufhebung of l’homme du ressentiment into its 
active, creative counterpart, i.e. “those artists of violence and organizers.”188 According 
to Nietzsche, the latter may be “some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and 
master race, which, organized on a war footing, and with the power to organize, 
unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace,” who see to the rise of “a structure 
of domination,” and who “do not know what guilt, responsibility, [and] consideration 
are,” “ruled by that terrible inner artist’s egoism which has a brazen countenance and 
see itself justified to all eternity by the ‘work’.”189 We now have the hindsight to say 
retrospectively that Nietzsche never foresaw that the place of these “artists” would be 
usurped by Nazism or the Nazis. And yet, even if it were not the Nazis, would this 
artist-organizer not put in place yet another closed, insular community driven and 
determined by the work of a self-proclaimed sovereign subject, precluding therefore 
other forms of community nascent alongside those constructed by the artist-organizer-
subject, other forms that might undo [désœuvrer] the work of the latter? In fact, there is 
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not much of community to speak of with this artist-organizer-subject. As Nietzsche 
would acknowledge, any sense of community remains secant with so-called artists-
organizers, for their “perverse inclinations, all those other-worldly aspirations, alien to 
the senses, the instincts, to nature, to animals” only “[separate] us more profoundly 
from them.”190 
 
But to return to the question if friendship and community are absolutely impossible 
after Auschwitz: that would seem to be the case with Améry’s homme du ressentiment. 
In response to Nietzsche’s anxiety of l’homme du ressentiment, Améry assures that the 
ressentiment and bad conscience of l’homme du ressentiment after Auschwitz do not in 
effect have the disseminating affect or effect that Nietzsche cautions of: “The fears of 
Nietzsche and Scheler [author of L’homme du ressentiment] actually were not warranted. 
Our slave morality will not triumph. Our resentments […] have little or no chance at all 
to make the evil work of the overwhelmers bitter for them.”191 What seems to remain 
for l’homme du ressentiment after Auschwitz, according to Améry at least, is only auto-
nihilism. “Soon we must and will be finished,” as Améry says,192 and there is always 
the possibility that the (reactive) auto-nihilism here involves the abdication to death.193 
But must it be that it ends absolutely with self-negation, with the absolute impossibility 
of community and friendship? I have tried above to suggest not, suggesting that if time 
allows, a time that does not neutralize or efface the sufferings inflicted on the victims of 
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Auschwitz or the guilt of their torturers, a future community and friendship with the rest 
of the world, initiated, evoked, desired, and worked out from the side of l’homme du 
ressentiment, may be possible. Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest that too with 
regard to friendship after Auschwitz: mistrust and fatigue in post-apocalyptic friendship 
“do not suppress friendship [my emphases]” after all, “but give it its modern color and 
replaces the simple ‘rivalry’ of the Greeks. We are no longer Greeks, and friendship is 
no longer the same.”194 
 
Something like friendship, but unlike all friendships that we have known, remains then. 
The critical point, for Deleuze and Guattari, is to take into account “mistrust” and 
fatigue in friendship and go beyond it.195 Unveiling “mistrust” and fatigue is then the 
condition for moving towards a new contour of relation by rejecting all present 
friendships that still hold on to the anachronistic and perhaps naïve ideals of amicable 
relations or harmonious conversations, friendships, in other words, “founded on the 
community of ideas and sentiments.”196 Perhaps the question of friendship in Deleuze 
and Guattari then is ultimately a question of surviving relations that are always already 
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195 One may compare this point to Judith Butler’s take on post-traumatic communities in her afterword to 
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to put it in a Derridean way, sur-vive, experiences of loss. Community is not impossible after the trauma 
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community” (Lost: The Politics of Mourning, eds. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, Berkeley: 
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community or a future community in light of certain highly mediatized catastrophes – one may recall the 
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196 Deleuze, Marcel Proust et les signes, 25. 
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secant: only by living through the shadows or darkness of those relations (apocalyptic 
or not) in the world can one pave the way towards new relations free(d) from all present 
forms, conditions, determinations, definitions, and performativities.197 An example of 
this may be the case of Deleuze’s homo tantum, that is to say, Dickens’s Mr. Riderhood 
according to Deleuze’s reading. Known to be a rogue, which is also to say a reject, Mr. 
Riderhood has a secant relation with the rest of society. However, in meeting with a 
near-death (or even syncopic) drowning incident, some sort of previously unthinkable 
friendship or community with this rogue or reject, “between his life and death,” begins 
to form, as “everybody present lends a hand, and a heart and soul.”198 In Deleuze’s 
reading, there arises “a sort of urgency, respect, and love for the least sign of life in the 
dying man.”199 Friendship and/ or community remain possible therefore, after relations 
have been rent, after the catastrophe of secant relations, and that new constellation of 
relations is what Deleuze and Guattari are seeking to bring to surface precisely through 
their critique of friendship or through their unveiling of the shame, despair, mistrust, 
and fatigue of post-apocalyptic friends. One must overcome secant friendship or 
community, in order to philosophically “resist death, servitude, the intolerable, shame, 
and the present,”200 and from there “form a new right of thought”201 with regard to a 
future relation that, in Derrida’s terms, “will never be reduced to the desire or the 
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potentiality of friendship,” or which “goes beyond [the] proximity of the congeneric 
double.”  
 
“A People to Come”: Community in Deleuze and Guattari 
One may return to Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? to see such an exercise of thought at 
work at the conceptual level. As discussed, the creation of concepts passes through 
secant relations with other concepts: concepts have non-communicating, non-relating 
relations, or rent relations that always resist a harmonious totality. They are marked by 
tendencies or desires to depart from one another, rather than to cohere. They are like 
friends who do not talk to each other, friends who say I have enough of you, my friend. 
They seek refuge in their respective reserves of silence, or are inclined towards a 
resolve to silence that always seems to project the desire to walk away. Yet all this is 
without reproach, for concepts “freely enter [my italics] into relations of nondiscursive 
resonance,” where nothing quite holds together: “they all resonate instead of cohering 
[se suivre] or corresponding with one another. There is no reason why concepts should 
cohere.”202 Concepts are always tending to break off in heterogeneous trajectories: 
“[concepts] do form a wall, but it is a dry-stone wall, and if everything is held together, 
it is only by diverging lines.”203 They even share rough edges with one another,204 
always already on the edge of rivalry or contest so that each may be a cutting-edge 
concept. And yet, at the end of it all, such secant friendship at the level of concepts in 
philosophy is but philosophy’s vitalism, its force of life, or élan, through which 
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concepts renew themselves or through which new concepts are created: “philosophical 
thought does not bring its concepts together in a friendship without again being 
traversed by a fissure that leads them back to hatred or that disperses them in the 
coexisting chaos where it is necessary to take them up again, to seek them out again, to 
make a leap.”205 And it is from such philosophical élan, that is to say, via the edgy 
relation of concepts, that Deleuze and Guattari will postulate the emergence of a new, 
future relation between beings: “The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, 
it calls for a new earth and a people that do not yet exist.”206  
 
This “new earth and people that do not yet exist” perhaps concerns those who reconcile 
with the fact of always already secant relations, those who are no longer exhausted from 
the fact that relations are potentially tearing all the time. They would perhaps be those 
always seeking without reserve to think and experience what new relations would come 
after present ones, without deciding on what arrives. They would be at ease, without 
fatigue, without the need for discussions or reciprocities, and without the anxiety to 
decide. They would always be at “that threshold of proximity at which everything 
undoes itself [se défait] and again becomes nebulous.”207 Perhaps they would be those 
partaking in what may be called a philosophy of a life, where a life, according to 
Deleuze in his « Immanence: une vie » essay, would simply be “pure immanence, 
neutral, beyond good and evil,” “the immanent singular life of a man who no longer has 
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a name, but which does not at all leave him being confused with another,”208 a life that 
opens itself to all around it. I note that Deleuze’s text here once again hinges on 
Dickens’ reject, Mr. Riderhood, which then suggests it is with the reject wherein one 
may find the potentiality for a life. In any case, in such a life, because it is “neutral, 
beyond good and evil,” one goes beyond the “mistrust” and fatigue that haunt present 
post-apocalyptic friendship. In other words, there will be a life after post-apocalyptic 
friendship: one does not self-destruct, or negate life or any encounter, in the despair and 
mistrust of post-apocalyptic friendship. Instead, one leaps over that anguish so as to 
create everything anew, letting emerge an “incommunicable novelty” or an event that is 
“neither foreseen nor preconceived,”209 such as new relations that have no need for, or 
rather are free from, the present conditions, determinations, or definitions of community 
or friendship. And for Deleuze and Guattari, what lurks after friendship is “a new earth 
and people that do not yet exist,” or a “shadow of ‘the people to come’.”210  
 
In the “shadow of ‘the people to come’,” one is surely also in the shadow of the 
question of community in Deleuze and Guattari. Interestingly, like the silence of a 
shadow, the question of community forms some sort of silent problematic in their 
philosophy, making it almost incongruous to think that the thought of community lies at 
their philosophical horizon. This is not just because community is not a theme that is 
particularly in the foreground of their philosophy, but also because in L’Anti-Œdipe and 
Mille plateaux, community hinges on something negative, something that thought must 
not regress to, if not something that is anti-thought. For example, in Mille plateaux, 
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where Deleuze and Guattari argue for unrestricted or non-regulated movement, 
“community” is the site wherein lies “the risk of reproducing […] the rigid [la dure].”211 
In that respect, it is not surprising if there is a force of rejection against community in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille plateaux. However, what remains a critical concept in and 
for that text – nomadology, is undeniably something of a community, since nomads, 
from which nomadology takes its image, are irreducibly tribal or of the pack, and 
therefore communitarian in one way or another. In other words, the communitarian 
trace in nomadology is almost indubitable, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s apparent 
reservation to acknowledge that. How does one then reconcile the irreducible 
communitarian trace in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and their apparent rejection, 
at the same time, of such a concept as community? 
 
Before inquiring into the apparently anti-community force in Deleuze and Guattari, I 
would first like to consider if the term anti-community could, or perhaps even should, 
apply to real-world engagements with the concept of community. But why posit a term 
that suggests a violence against something that has at least put in place in this world 
some form of harmonious living between humans? Perhaps one could begin less 
radically by saying anti-“community” first, and from there begin to discern why an anti-
community trajectory would seem philosophically desirable today. In anti-
“community”, the quotation marks around the word community would signal linguistic 
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markers, indexing community as a mark of verbal speech. To be more precise, they 
would mark community as an excess of speech, fallen from any act of thought, 
rendering community and/ or “community” as a meretricious speech act. As Zygmunt 
Bauman has observed, the word “community” as how we have been treating it has been 
“so loud and vociferous” that we have invoked “community” only to uncritically sing 
its praises, “telling the others to admire them or shut up,” so much so that “community 
is no more (or not yet, as the case may be).”212 In other words, to every existing 
community, there is to be no disagreement to the practices, codes, and norms that are 
already in place. Communities and their practices have become impervious to critique 
and to any suggestion of their futures via altogether different strategies. Such a 
philosophical let-down with regard to thinking about community becomes evident 
simply by a quick turn to contemporary affairs of the world. In contemporary 
geopolitical discourse, there can be no doubt that there has always been much talk about 
community, particularly about an “international community.” However, one is often left 
thinking what or where such a community is, if not its veracity. Furthermore, the term 
“international community” has been invoked oftentimes only as an alibi to justify the 
violent decimation of a state-entity by another of greater global politico-economic-
military leverage when the former resists or deviates from the political and economic 
interests of the latter. Otherwise, when the “international community” has been 
appealed to so that a cosmopolitan collectivity of sovereign states may be formed in 
order to put in place an effective force to end humanitarian violence, poverty, tyranny, 
etc., in some place in the world (and here, one remembers, since the beginning of this 
21st century, the names Darfur, Sudan, Haiti, etc.), the response unfortunately has been 
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less than desirable, which henceforth only severely weakens the idea of the existence of 
any such “international community.”  
 
Despite the shortcomings of existing communities and the “international community,” 
anti-“community” is not about rejecting communities absolutely. The “anti” of negation 
in anti-“community,” to reiterate, operates not so much on community as an idea or 
thought as on the linguistic articulation of that idea. In other words, with anti-
“community,” we will have to begin to refrain from uttering “community,” since, 
according to Bauman, it is really the verbal invocations of “community” – articulated 
endlessly without submitting it to critical thought, or enunciated as if it could ever 
adequately give us that thing called “community” – that has so far perverted any future 
possibility of thinking about community. In this case, the force of rejection in anti-
“community” acts only against all declaration and proclamation of the myths and false 
idealisms of community. Such force of rejection is deployed then only to return 
community to an active process of thought. Put another way, if there is any need or call 
for a philosophical anti-community, it is not about anti-community per se, not anti-
community in the sense that looks towards an absolutely nihilistic horizon for 
community. Instead, anti-community will be called for only to create a clearing for a 
free space of thought for another thinking of community. That is to say that one projects 
an anti-community force not so that we will stop thinking about community but to 
return community to a thinking without horizon, a thinking that is always open to its 
futures, open to the newcomer in his or her difference, and open also, without reproach, 
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to the one who departs. That is also what I argue to be the communitarian force of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s apparently anti-community nomadology.  
 
The Nomadological War Machine: Against the State of Community 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadology, or to be more specific, their concept of 
the nomadological war machine, certainly reads very much as something individual or 
singular rather than communitarian. After all, as Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge, it 
“attests to an absolute solitude” (MP, 457/ TP, 377), not to mention its “social 
clandestinity” (MP, 504/ TP, 405) and its rather glaring anti-social “anti-dialogue” and 
“noncommunicating” force (MP, 468, 472/ TP, 378, 380). Furthermore, it seeks to hold 
on to that space of solitude (only to increase the desert of that space and not to saturate 
it with accretions of properties or possessions), while it has no similar insistence on 
holding on to its nomadic tribe, to its community in other words. In fact, even within the 
nomadic tribe, there is the sense that the singular nomadic war machine is already 
betraying its community by disavowing it or by deviating from it.213 And yet, one has to 
be precise to say that the betrayal function of the nomadological war machine goes into 
operation only when it sees its tribe enclosing both itself and everything else that it 
receives into, and as, a structural totality. As Deleuze says in an interview with Claire 
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Parnet regarding the betrayal function of the nomadic war machine: “One betrays the 
fixed powers which try to hold us back, the established powers of the earth.”214 In other 
words, in the face of any striating structuration, nomadology does not hesitate to project 
its combative force as a war machine in its fullest intensity, so as to dismantle or undo 
such fixed or established arrangements; and close-knit social arrangements such as 
communities are not exceptional to this force. It is under such a condition that the 
nomadological war machine takes on an explicit anti-community contour.  
 
But to give Deleuze and Guattari a more precise reading, the word “community” is 
hardly articulated as the primary target of nomadology. Instead, it is the State that the 
nomadological war machine inclines towards with an angle of attack, and the 
nomadological war machine conducts war with the State only because the State has 
delimited ways of movement and thought that the nomadological war machine has 
taken to be (its) freedom. The State typically imposes a homogeneity of thought; it 
discourages, represses, and sometimes suppresses deviations. In this process, the State 
even captures thought as its rationalizing interiority, through which, “thought is 
[thereby made to be] capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is rightfully [en 
droit] universal, of elevating the State to a status that is universal by right [de droit] ” 
(MP, 465/ TP, 375). In other words, the State appropriates thought so that it can lay 
claim to be a force of an enlightened institution, an institution that none can disagree 
with. To maintain that supreme authority, along with its will to establish spatial 
integrity, sovereignty, or security, the State also limits the freedom of movement of 
people within its territory. This can be seen quite clearly in State globalization, where 
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the transnational or trans-border movement of information, capital, and goods are 
almost without restriction, while the movement of people across national or economic 
communities does not enjoy the same freedom but is still delimited by citizenship 
criteria. In any case, the State, in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, is the capture of space, 
movement, thought, and people into a regulated, policed, and determined zone, or what 
they call “striated space”; and their concept of nomadology is meant primarily to 
combat against such striation. 
 
Now, if communities become swept up in the combative trajectory of the nomadic war 
machine, it is because they have become State-like in their outlook. This is the case 
when communities become overcodified by their linguistic idioms, customs, economic 
practices, political inclinations, etc., and membership into the community is predicated 
only by the knowledge, acceptance, observance, adherence, and communication of these 
codes. Here, community becomes nothing less than a political economy signified by a 
circuitous flow: everything has to circle back onto itself; and everything is organized 
into, or rooted onto, a closed arborescent structure, to follow the rhetoric of Mille 
plateaux. Every face of every body within this community also becomes reduced to a 
signifying articulation of the community, becomes an over-conscious investment of 
community, which also means that the body in such an economy of community 
becomes reduced to a mere denigrating faciality. Faciality, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari in Mille plateaux, is that process by which the face is reduced to a site of signs 
pointing towards what it invests in, or that which invests in the face, and whence there 
is no longer any regard for the body in its singularity. It is also with faciality that the 
! 138 
operation of quantification begins, i.e. when everything counts in this space. Not just 
bodies count because of the number of their faces that will add to the progressive façade 
of the community, but even ethics begins to be quantitatively measured. I cite the 
example Bauman uses in elucidating some of the myths of community. Within social 
structures that we mythologize as communities, we take it as natural, or given, that once 
we have helped someone in the community, “our right, purely and simply, is to expect 
that the help we need will be forthcoming.”215 In other words, one good turn must be 
returned by another – no more, no less. Even the friend will be counted. It will be a 
matter of my friend, someone I can count (on) to add quantitative measure to the 
community (as is the case of contemporary networked-centric friendship that I have 
critiqued earlier with the aid of Derrida’s philosophy of friendship); it will not be that 
estranging friend, the friend that is the other, or the friend that brings to the structure of 
community a difference or even rivalry (like Deleuze and Guattari’s le prétendant, as I 
have discussed before) so that community is never a rigid or closed structure. But to 
return to the point of quantification: Deleuze and Guattari will also argue that “the 
number has always served to gain mastery over matter, to control its variations and 
movements, in other words, to submit them to the spatiotemporal framework of the 
State” (MP, 484/ TP, 389). In other words, when everything counts or begins to count in 
a community, one is not far from witnessing the community becoming a s/State. 
 
Certainly, a close-knit community where everything is counted or numbered, where 
every body is subjected to a faciality, or where there may “never [be] strangers,”216 may 
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215 Community, 2. 
216 Bauman, Community, 2. 
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offer a nice sheltering architecture. However, because it is not open to any relation with 
an exteriority, not open to an invitation to the “friend” or le prétendant who brings with 
him or her the question of rivalry to the beliefs of the community, not open in other 
words to any deviation, the architecture of community can become familiarly strange or 
estranging too. Its architecture will be “like a besieged fortress” as Bauman would 
say,217 or to follow Paul Virilio and Deleuze and Guattari, it takes on a bunker 
architecture: community becomes bunker community. The deathly architecture of a 
bunker is what one enters into at the limit of anything that seeks its own absoluteness or 
totality, since something is absolute only nothing else exists beside it, and that would 
only mean the death of the thing itself or of those beside it. In other words, with a 
fortress or bunker architecture of community, the thinking of community – the thinking 
of its future, or the thinking of its future form otherwise than its present manifestations 
– no longer has a (horizonless) horizon: there is no longer a free space of thought, or a 
space of freedom of thought, for community. Community as bunker community, or as 
State-like, as State-community, or community-State (Bauman reminds us that a 
homogeneous community may be a mirror image of the consolidation of the State via 
the project of nationalistic nation-building that it implements; and Deleuze and Guattari 
will also say that “the modern State defines itself in principle as ‘the rational and 
reasonable organization of a community’” (MP, 465/ TP, 375), is therefore ultimately 
more anti-community than communitarian, more anti-community – in the sense of 
negating all veritable thinking of community – than the nomadological war machine.  
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217 Community, 15. 
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It is this s/State of community or State-community/ community-State that the 
nomadological war machine seeks to disarticulate. From within the striated space of 
State-community, it seeks to reterritorialize a smooth space, a space where tangential 
trajectories are possible, where heterogeneous elements are free to come together out of 
desire, and are equally free to break away without causing any spatial anxiety. Again, it 
is a comforting thought, no doubt, that being a member of a community grants one 
almost automatic hospitality within the community. However, within hospitality, or 
within a practical ethics of hospitality, there should not only be the right of the host to 
reject hospitality as Derrida has already observed,218 but there should be cases where the 
receiver of hospitality reserves also the freedom to refuse hospitality, the freedom to 
break away from the enclosures of “hostpitality,” the freedom, in other words, to 
deviate or to not even enter into that space of hospitality. The smooth space of the 
nomadological war machine potentially opens up such a freedom, for, having “no 
homogeneity,” it “is precisely the space of the smallest deviation” (MP, 459/ TP, 371). 
It is in this sense of opening up a heterogeneous space of deviation that does not view 
the absence of organization as a lack and that critiques all homogenizing structures that 
the nomadological war machine appears anti-“community” or even anti-community. 
But it is precisely in that sense too that it is communitarian, particularly in the sense 





218 See Derrida’s discussion on “practical hospitality” in De l’hospitalité : Anne Dufourmantelle invite 
Jacques Derrida à répondre, Paris : Calmann-Levy, 1997. 
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N-1 Community 
In a way, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that the nomadic war machine is more a 
solitary force than a communitarian one, it cannot be denied that the nomadological war 
machine is nevertheless open to a space in which that space is constituted by beings 
other than itself. Smooth spaces, after all, “are not without people or unpeopled” (MP, 
631/ TP, 506). But these people are those who have left behind the striated spaces of 
State-communities. They do not bind or delimit themselves within a defined territorial 
organization: “They have a local construction that excludes the possibility of 
determining in advance a (political, juridical, economic, or artistic) base domain. They 
have extrinsic and situational properties, or relations irreducible to the intrinsic 
properties of a structure” (MP, 255/ TP, 209). Deleuze and Guattari will also call this 
people “multiplicities” that affirm and exercise the freedom to come together or break 
away: multiplicities enjoy “a certain flexibility [souplesse] following tasks and 
situations, between the two extreme poles of fusion and scission” (MP, 255/ TP, 209). 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is also a relation between multiplicities and 
smooth space: “a heterogeneous smooth space […] is wedded to a very particular 
multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities, which occupy space 
without ‘counting’ it and can ‘only be explored by legwork’” (MP, 460/ TP, 371). The 
bodies of multiplicity may be “non-metric,” but as multiplicity, there is inevitably the 
notion of number, or rather the numerous, and yet there is nothing numerically 
definitive about it. In other words, the number here is no longer that of a quantitative 
measure: “The number is no longer a means of counting or measuring, but of moving 
[déplacer]” (MP, 484/ TP, 389). It constitutes a geography instead, a mapping out of a 
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gathering, whose cartography is constantly changing as the experiment goes along. This 
number, or “numbering number” as Deleuze and Guattari also call it, participates “in a 
dynamic relation with geographical directions” (MP, 485/ TP, 390), and does not 
function as an index of formal or structural growth, or of historical progress as in State-
communities or community-states. The multiplicity of smooth space hence speaks of a 
mass that is always moving, always breaking away, if not always disappearing, from 
striated social arrangements – “masses do not cease to leak [couler] or flow [s’écouler] 
from classes” (MP, 260/ TP, 213), and is strictly not countable either as a singular or 
combinative crowd. 219 The geographic “numbering number” is more a question of n-1 
as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, the fragmenting -1 projectile resisting, rejecting, 
dispersing, or walking away from any form of quantitative and formal totality. It is like 
the supernumerary in Rancière’s terms: that which is not only uncounted (especially by 
State), but also more critically, that which refuses to enter into an economy of the 
counted of homogenizing structures such as conventional communities. 
 
When numbers do not matter, in the sense that they are not accumulative supplements to 
previous quantified constructions, then there is also the possibility of opening up to the 
outside. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the “numbering number” makes it 
necessary also “to take into account arithmetic relations that are external” (MP, 487/ TP, 
391). The smooth space of the nomadological war machine hence articulates difference 
or alterity, and exteriority. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, the nomadological war 
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219 I note here too that for Deleuze and Guattari, the mass is not insistently or necessarily a numerous 
assemblage; it may be a “‘mass’ individual” (MP, 263/ TP, 215). In any case, it is inherently “neither 
attributable to individuals nor overcodable by collective signifiers” (MP, 267-268/ TP, 219); but, 
individual or a multitude, the multiplicity of smooth space, or the smooth space of the mass, is already, in 
a word, communitarian. 
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machine “produces its effect of immensity by its fine articulation, in other words by its 
distribution of heterogeneity in free space” (MP, 486/ TP, 391). The rhythmics of the 
nomadological war machine is therefore also, to wit, “not harmonic” (MP, 485/ TP, 
390), contra the myth of harmonious relations within conventional communities. With 
the nomadic war machine, there is always the possibility or the freedom of a dissonant 
line rupturing the stability of a melodious line of conventional communities, if not to 
break away with its own other trajectory. What matters here then is the freedom of 
trajectory of bodies and thought, the free variation or deviation of the matter of bodies 
and thought: a question of “materiality instead of imposing a form upon a matter” (MP, 
508/ TP, 408), in other words, a question of the expressive materiality of what gathers 
and deviates, rather than imposing an enclosing form that is often too hastily called 
“community.”  
 
Put another way, nomadology concerns l’in-forme, that which is without form or even 
that which de-forms, if not that which forms by deforming. Any striating grasp of 
community cannot contain the nomadological war machine, and it is as such that the 
latter appears to be anti-community, because while community tries to hold (on to) 
everything together in a compact fashion, the nomadological war machine, as “an entire 
energetic materiality in movement,” and which “combine[s] with processes of 
deformation” (MP, 508/ TP, 408), gives place to the risk of things breaking down. But 
that “deformation,” along with other “discontinuities” (MP, 506/ TP, 406) that the 
nomadological war machine brings about, is in fact critical to nomadology if it is to 
prevent the smooth space of multiplicity from becoming like the circuitous flow of the 
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striated community. To return to the architectural rhetoric used earlier, one may say too 
that the smooth space of multiplicity created by the nomadic war machine, as it attaches 
itself to at times threateningly and possibly fragmenting elements of heterogeneity or 
alterity, is not of a bunker architecture. Instead, it is more a bridge architecture, if not an 
architecture of moving bridges, or “movable bridges” as Deleuze and Guattari would 
say in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, which are always constructing towards a future 
community. Put another way: if there is any architecture of community that the 
nomadological war machine projects, it will only be an undefined architecture. It will 
not be a finished, enclosed architecture, but an architecture that always undoes itself, 
only to begin again differently: “It is not a question of this or that place on earth […]. It 
is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a 
process that does not cease to prolong itself [s’allonger], to break itself apart [se 
rompre], and to start again [reprendre]” (MP, 31/ TP, 20). With the nomadological war 
machine, the architecture of community is always a question of “relaying” these 
architectures-to-come or architectures-on-the-way: “only relays, intermezzos, restarts 
[relances]” (MP, 468/ TP, 377). 
 
It is with such architecture that Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadological war machine is 
always maintaining a thought of community, maintaining the free space of thought of 
community or the freedom of another thought of community. At the end, it is more of 
community rather than anti-community in the nihilistic sense. Once again, the nomadic 
war machine clears a smooth space only for a “movement of people in that space” (MP, 
526/ TP, 422) a people or movement that “is a very special distribution, without 
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division [sans partage], in a space without borders or enclosure” (MP, 472/ TP, 380). 
Or to recall the mobile architectural image: it is “an ambulant people of relayers” that 
the nomadological war machine awaits and clears a path for, “rather than a model 
society [une cité modèle]” (MP, 468/ TP, 377) or a model (of) community. And even if 
it insists on an “absolute solitude,” Deleuze and Guattari will nonetheless qualify that 
“it is an extremely populous solitude [une solitude extrêmement peuplée], like the desert 
itself, a solitude already interlaced with a people to come, one that invokes and awaits 
that people, existing only through it, though it is not yet here” (MP, 467/ TP, 377). In 
other words, the nomadological war machine smashes present communities from within 
only to seek another future communitarian multiplicity where there is the freedom of 
coming and leaving, where there is no politics or economics of counting, and where the 
possibilities of and to the outside are always open. That is to say too that the 
nomadological war machine conducts war against striated spaces like the State and 
overcodified communities only “on the condition of creating something else at the same 
time, which would only be new nonorganic social relations” (MP, 527/ TP, 423). This 
other social relation is “nonorganic” perhaps because it will be a nonhuman community, 
nonhuman because it is freed from the anxieties of subjectivity, representation, and 
consciousness of the metaphysical human Being – Being that thinks limitedly and 
inclusively only in-itself and for-itself, or else only in the image of itself, and Being that 
only looks towards a One of totality of community. One may also say that it will be 
“nonorganic” because it will no longer be anthropocentric: everything that exists in this 
“new nonorganic social relations” can be, or is, shared by nonhuman animals too. In 
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that sense, the nomadological war machine and the “people to come” may even be 
intensive expressions of what Nancy has called “singular plural” beings.  
 
With Deleuze and Guattari, we are therefore always arriving at, or moving towards, a 
community, a community that is as indefinite as its linguistic article, and indefinite not 
because it is not able to decide itself (as community) or because it is not sure of itself, 
but because it is always open to something new, always forming itself anew. It is in this 
way that a community guarantees its future, which includes a radical future unrestricted 
to its present form. It is a community that is decisively (an) undecidability, an 
indecision that is properly in-decision, deciding on its openness to futures and not 
closures. As shown, this communitarian trajectory or horizon is traced by the apparently 
paradoxical anti-community force of the nomadological war machine, a force that goes 
beyond the sense of désœuvrement according to Nancy, veering closer to the radical 
violence of Bataille’s philosophy. In fact, it even seems to go further than Bataille, since 
it involves not just the silencing of the subject or knowledge as is the case with Bataille, 
but also the disarticulation of community. As mentioned at the very beginning of this 
entire section on friendship, love, and community, Bataille does not seek the 
disarticulation of community, but is committed to articulate its presence where its 
existence, or rather its form of existence, is repressed or threatened. That is why Bataille 
will remain to speak of a “community of those who have no community.” With Deleuze 
and Guattari, one does not find any articulation of a community of those who have left 
community, of those who have rejected striated, insular, closed-off, bunker, State-like 
communities. What is put forth more forcefully instead is anti-“community,” if not anti-
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community, through the nomadological war machine, which is no doubt a figure of the 
active reject acting against communities that have become overcodified, rigid, closed, 
and State-like.  
 
To what ends does one articulate anti-“community” or even anti-community? As this 
section on Deleuze and Guattari has tried to show, community has become an 
appellation like friendship in contemporary network-centric sociality, that is to say, a 
term that is excessively invoked without ever submitting its uses to critical reflection, if 
not excessively invoked only to smother any critical thought on community itself. If the 
section on Derrida’s philosophy of friendship suggests that a sustained rejection of 
friendship can wrest the concept of friendship back from its abuse, perhaps the anti-
“community” or even anti-community trajectory of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic war 
machine can serve a similar purpose: to disarticulate all uncritical enunciations of 
“community” in order to re-open a space for the rethinking of community. And even 
though Deleuze and Guattari do not speak of a community of those who reject or depart 
from striated communities, this does not imply at all any absence of a sense of 
community. One will always find that sense in “the shadow of ‘the people to come’” in 
them, and this section has tried to demonstrate that the “people to come” is no less of 
community. I do not think it unreasonable to even call this “people to come” a 
community of rejects, a community of those who are not only refused by totalizing 
communities but also of those who refuse the latter. Such a community of rejects would 
include those of “nonorganic social relations” that I have suggested above to not 
exclude human and nonhuman assemblages, and those, such as the nomadological war 
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machine itself, who auto-reject themselves in the sense of betraying all new 
communitarian forms that they have paved the way for, only to open those forms to 
newer forms, so as to keep the question of community always open.       
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 2. 
 The Reject and the “Post-Secular,” or Who’s Afraid of Religion 
 
Having elicited the figure of the reject at work in the rethinking of friendship, love, and 
community in Derrida, Clément, and Deleuze in the preceding section, I will now 
proceed to demonstrate that the reject is no less mobilized when contemporary French 
thinkers take on, or rather problematize, the question of religion. As stated previously, a 
theory of the reject cannot just remain a work of textual elucidation: it must go beyond 
conceptual rhetoric and suggest potential empirical applications. That was at least the 
endeavor of the previous section, when it did not contend itself with just drawing out 
the reject in the engagements with friendship, love, and community in Nancy, 
Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze, and Clément, but situated the question of the reject within 
the contemporary context of network-centric sociality in order to resist the present dox! 
concerning those concepts. In doing so, it also had the additional force of maintaining, 
or even pushing further, the radical horizon of those concepts that has been opened by 
the abovementioned thinkers. The present section follows a similar trajectory. At the 
textual level, it is particularly interested in contemporary French thinkers who, as said, 
problematize religion almost to the point of abandoning, if not rejecting – I will clarify 
this in a while, religion.1 Once again then, thinkers such as Nancy, Derrida, and 
Deleuze, are generally the companions of this chapter, with particular focus here on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In that case, this chapter leaves aside philosophers who remain explicitly and faithfully religious such as 
Emmanuel Lévinas and Jean-Luc Marion. With regard to the latter, Adam Miller has noted that critics 
“[have] often charged [Marion] with trying to sneak God back into philosophy through a 
phenomenological backdoor” (Badiou, Marion and St Paul: Immanent Grace, London: Continuum, 2008, 
17). 
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Derrida and, this time, Hélène Cixous too. It will show how the reject is put into 
circulation when these thinkers question the limits of religion. At the same time, the 
section, going beyond textual limits, is also committed to explore the empirical 
implications of a theory of the reject in relation to the question of religion, inquiring 
into how the reject can make a critical intervention in our contemporary negotiations 
with (the rise of) religion in our so-called secular or atheist present. 
 
By saying that the abovementioned thinkers put into question the limits of religion, it 
qualifies any rejecting at work in their texts as never precipitating towards an absolute 
negation of religion. Rather, one could borrow the words of John Caputo in his study of 
the religious contour of Derrida’s work and say that thinkers such as Derrida, Nancy, 
and Cixous have religion, except they are without religion’s God, especially if the latter 
is to stand for a symbol of masculine, phallogocentric law or authority.2 It would also be 
inaccurate therefore to label any of them a pure atheist (if there is any one such) or even 
“radical atheist,” especially if one understands atheism as a condition whereby one’s 
thinking and being in this world is supposedly devoid of any trace of the religious.3 
According to Nancy in his work on rethinking religion in the two volumes of La !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997, xviii. 
3 On the complexity of atheism in French thought, especially its transition from humanist atheism, i.e. the 
turn to the human after the 19th century proclamation of the death of God, to one that is antihumanist from 
the 1930s to 1950s, see the nuanced study of Stephanos Geroulanos in An Atheism That Is Not Humanist 
Emerges in French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). With regard to “radical 
atheism,” I am clearly referring to Martin Hägglund’s book of the same title (see his Radical Atheism: 
Derrida and the Time of Life, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Hägglund barely treats the 
complexity of the term “atheism.” He is more concerned with opposing readings of a “religious turn” in 
Derrida. He argues, by reiterating Derrida’s thesis of a structural iterability that gives every mortal mark 
(being, trace, writing, signature, voice, etc.) its quasi-immortal dimension precisely by its repeatability 
beyond its own time and space, that that thesis implies a secular gesture emptied of any religiosity. 
However, Hägglund cannot explain the religious references that nonetheless remain in Derrida’s works. I 
will make note of Hägglund’s work again in the subsequent discussion of Derrida in this present section.    
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déconstruction du christianisme, there is no atheism as such.4 However, if one insists on 
describing our contemporary condition as atheist, through which one “declares the 
principle of a negation of the divine principle,”5 one must then recognize at the same 
time, Nancy argues, that “the possibility of atheism […] is [already] inscribed at the 
source of Christianism.”6 To be sure, “at the source of Christianism” does not equate to 
Christianism itself. That only means that there is a source more originary than 
Christianism that makes “atheism” possible, a source that is not solely attributable to 
Christianism. That is why Nancy will make clear that “there is indeed a sort of vector of 
atheism that traverses the great religions” and not just Christianity, because “these 
religions have been witnesses to a complete overhaul [une refonte intégrale] of the 
‘divine,’ the profound movement of which goes towards the suppression if not of the 
‘divine,’ at least of ‘God’.”7 This “profound movement,” according to Nancy, is more 
evident in Christianism, since it is there where one finds “God who withdraws 
[s’efface], not only God who walks away [s’absente], as he does for Job, or God who 
ceaselessly refuses all analogy in this world, as for Mohammed, but also God who 
makes himself Man [Dieu qui se fait homme], forsaking [délaissant] his divinity to the 
point of plunging it into the mortal condition.”8 Atheism, in that case, must be more 
precisely understood not as a condition that is free from any trace of the religious, but as 
the “auto-deconstruction” according to Nancy, or auto-rejection as I would see it, of 
religion, i.e. the letting go of its divinity and its simultaneous openness to admit into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See especially Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Adoration: Déconstruction du christianisme, 2, Paris: Galilée, 2010, 
48. 
5 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Déclosion: La déconstruction du christianimse, 1, Paris: Galilée, 2005, 29. My 
translation. 
6 L’Adoration, 43. My translation. 
7 L’Adoration, 44, 45. 
8 L’Adoration, 45. 
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itself something other than itself, something other than a God-like entity, something like 
the human or mortal condition.9 It is through such understanding of the “auto-
deconstruction” of religion that Nancy prefers, in place of atheism, to think of the 
contemporary secular condition in terms of an “absentheism.”10 
 
Recognizing atheism’s religious or even “Christian derivation” [la provenance 
chrétienne] does not, however, mean any “return to the religious,” “to save religion,” or 
“to revive [ressusciter] religion.”11 In fact, one must resist those gestures, especially if 
they mean regressing to a world whereby a particular God, along with a singular 
religious belief in this One God, determines the guiding principle of being in this world, 
a principle that evacuates all other forms of reasoning. It is in view of the risk of such a 
regression that Nancy would even say he “desire[s] to approach the erasure of the name 
[of Christianism] and of the entire body of references that follow after it.”12 However, 
“refusing all forms of ‘return,’ and more than anything else ‘the ‘return of the religious’ 
[…],” and to think of a “world without God,” do not, as Nancy will remind us, place us 
outside of religion.13 We remain within the movement of religion’s “auto-
deconstruction” or auto-rejection, which is a movement, as said, towards openness, if 
not an open world.14 And the critical lesson of that movement is that, “without negating 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 With regard to the notion of openness, Nancy will point once again to Christian religion’s “assurance of 
another life opened in the very [present] life” [assurance de l’autre vie ouverte dans la vie même] 
(L’Adoration, 40) as a derivative source.  
10 La Déclosion, 32. 
11 La Déclosion, 205, 9. 
12 L’Adoration, 35. 
13 L’Adoration, 42, 43. 
14 As Nancy explicates, this open world “is a world without myths and idols, a world without religion, if 
this word must be understood as the observation of ways [conduites] and representations that respond to a 
demand of meaning as a demand for assurance, for an end-point [destination], and for fulfillment 
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Christianism but without returning to it,” it allows us to approach that more originary 
source than Christianism, which has not only brought us to our so-called atheism, but 
can also bring us further than that. Or, in Nancy’s words, it is through the movement of 
“auto-deconstruction” of religion that we can “ask ourselves anew what […] could lead 
us towards a point – towards a resource – buried under Christianism, monotheism, and 
Occidentalism, of which it would be necessary from then on to bring to light: for this 
point would open, in sum, on a future of the world that would no longer be Christian 
nor anti-Christian, neither monotheistic nor atheistic nor polytheistic, but would go 
forth precisely beyond all these categories (after having rendered all of them 
possible).”15  
 
Such openness will not be attained if, by claiming to be atheists, we absolutely reject 
religion and place our belief in our humanism as the origin and end of everything 
possible in the world. That would only be replacing a principle (of the divine) with 
another (of the human). Through such atheism, we only return to a world closed off by a 
certain horizon – previously by a divine horizon, now by an all too human one: it 
“continues […] to close the horizon. Or perhaps it is more precise to say that it 
continues to form a horizon, precisely where something else should arise.”16 For Nancy, 
instituting a horizon signals nothing but a “limit, [an] impasse, and [an] end of the 
world,” and therefore an atheism that is bounded by anthropocentric and/ or 
anthropomorphic horizons “is nihilism” – a nihilism where nothing remains, or where 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[accomplissement]” (L’Adoration, 58). Clearly, this world will not be possible if we allow a “return to the 
religious” such that we re-enclose ourselves within divine principles. 
15 La Déclosion, 54. 
16 La Déclosion, 32. 
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nothing else can go forth.17 We therefore need a “thought of alterity opened by and 
exposed to the outside of sameness [e.g. anthropocentrism/ anthropomorphism], which 
exceeds [sameness] infinitely without being as much its principle [la pensée de l’altérité 
ouverte par et exposée hors de la mêmeté, comme ce qui l’excède infiniment sans pour 
autant lui être en quoi que ce soit principielle].”18 Simply put, we need a thought of an 
“opening [ouverture], the Open [l’Ouvert] as horizon of sense and as the tearing 
[déchirure] of the horizon,” a point, in other words, that “the human, all to human, 
cannot even imagine and to which no philosophical essence of the human can 
compare.”19 Put another way, when thought begins to delimit itself with or within a 
humanist or anthropomorphic and anthropocentric horizon, thought must reject itself or 
“auto-deconstruct” in ways similar to how religion has done so for itself.20 The point 
here, in short, is to not deny the critical role of religion’s “auto-deconstruction” in 
pointing us towards a way through which thought can be free(d) to move towards 
infinite possibilities.21  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 La Déclosion, 32. 
18 La Déclosion, 41 
19 La Déclosion, 226, 43. 
20 If Nancy is indeed suggesting an “auto-deconstruction” of thought or reason, he comes close to 
Derrida’s claim in Voyous (Paris: Galilée, 2003) that reason reasons with itself. The proximity between 
Nancy and Derrida here can be further affirmed in Nancy’s reading of the Kantian notion of “the critique 
of pure reason.” According to Nancy, what the latter points to is that “a critique of reason, that is to say an 
exigent and non-complacent examination of reason by itself, renders unconditionally necessary, in reason 
itself, an opening and a leaping-outside [ex-hauusement] of reason. It is not a question of ‘religion’ here, 
but one well of ‘faith’ as reason’s sign of fidelity to that which from itself exceeds the phantasm of 
completely explicating [rendre raison] oneself as much as the world and man” (La Déclosion, 44-45).  
21 Or in Nancy’s words: “deconstructing itself, [Christianism] uncloses [déclôt] our thinking: where 
Enlightenment’s reason, followed by the world of complete progress [progrès intégral], judged necessary 
to close itself off from every dimension of the ‘outside’ [e.g. non-logical or non-scientific spiritual, 
religious faith], it is necessary to break the closure in order to understand that the push, the drive [la 
pulsion] for a relation, at this very point here, with the infinite outside comes from reason itself. 
Deconstructing Christianism means: opening reason to its very reason, even to its unreason [déraison]” 
(L’Adoration, 39). See note above for reason reasoning with itself. 
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In a less philosophical register, that is to say, where the question of the future of thought 
is not the primary concern, Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, similarly resists allowing 
the contemporary world to be understood or determined solely according to humanist or 
anthropocentric terms. Not unlike Nancy, but again, to a less philosophical extent, 
Taylor acknowledges that the contemporary world is one that is heavily inflected with a 
post-Nietzschean spirit, that is to say, a world in which many are convinced that God is 
dead, and that almost everything is humanly possible. It is with this “possibility of 
exclusive humanism” that one can describe the contemporary world as a world of 
secularity.22 However, Taylor, in a move that Nancy does not make, concerns himself 
with the fact that this contemporary world is at the same time punctuated by societies 
still inclined towards religious or spiritual beliefs. For Taylor, the difference between 
one society and another, and the difference with regard to spiritual belief or unbelief of 
one and another, are critical elements that one must consider in order to understand the 
question of religion in the contemporary world. Such differences are to be respected and 
affirmed, and not to be dispelled or negated. According to Taylor, there exists “a global 
context in a society which contains different milieu, within each of which the default 
option [of spiritual belief or unbelief] may be different from others, although the 
dwellers within each are very aware of the options favored by others, and cannot just 
dismiss them as inexplicable exotic error.”23 In other words, the contemporary world of 
secularity, in Taylor’s view, is where spiritual belief and unbelief intersect each other.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007, 19. 
23 A Secular Age, 21. 
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Of course, it has to be acknowledged, as Taylor does in his work, that the coming 
together of spiritual belief and unbelief has not been an easy process. In fact, it has been 
fraught with violence, and to keep in mind this violent history, it is perhaps helpful to 
deploy the term “post-secular.” Scholars such as José Casanova, Hent de Vries, and 
more recently Jürgen Habermas, have mobilized the term “post-secular” for quite some 
time now, but it still remains without a fixed, comprehensive, and authoritative 
definition.24 If this present section inclines towards this term, unlike Nancy and Taylor 
who resist it,25 it is not seeking, though, to arrive at such a definition, or to trace the 
history or genealogy of the “post-secular.” The “post-secular” here would simply be 
taken to mean what scholars who have deployed that term generally agree on as its 
primary characteristic: the “post-secular” gestures towards the militant articulation, in a 
supposedly secular world, of local religions on the one hand, and the reactionary re-
articulation of institutionalized religions on the other. These articulations and re-
articulations, however, as these same scholars have not failed to note either, have 
brought with them not only symbolic or rhetorical violence, but also real, physical ones. 
These violence generally manifest themselves in the following: violence between local !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See especially José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994); Hent de Vries, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), and Political Theologies: Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World (Co-edited with Lawrence E. Sullivan, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2006); Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society” (NPQ 25: 17-29, Fall 2008), An 
Awareness of What is Missing (Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity, 2010), and Between Naturalism 
and Religion (Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity, 2008); and Ananda Abeysekara, The Politics of 
Postsecular Religion: Mourning Secular Futures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
25 As will be evident, the “post-secular” is not that distant from Taylor’s “secularity.” The difference 
between them, as I would argue, is the emphasis on violence by the former. In any case, if Taylor finds 
the term “post-secular” adding little to his study, it is because, according to him, we continue to live 
amidst the secularity in which spiritual belief and unbelief intersect with each other. In other words, we 
are not beyond that secularity, not beyond belief and unbelief, and hence have no need for the term “post-
secular.” For Nancy, the term would also be redundant, because the contemporary world, as he argues, is 
but the opening up of the world beyond the horizons of a divine principle or of an all-powerful and 
singular God, an “absentheism” in other words as noted above earlier. Hence, Nancy will say that “there 
is no post-Christianism nor whatsoever ‘revival’ [renouveau],” “not even ‘atheism’” (L’Adoration, 48).  
 ! 157 
religions, each fighting for its legitimate place in society; violence between local 
religions and institutionalized religions, as the former contest the latter’s position as the 
dominant religion, or as the latter seek to oppress or repress the former; and of course, 
the age-old violence between the claim to faith or religion and the claim to knowledge 
or reason. In any case, what the “post-secular” underscores, just as Taylor’s “secularity” 
does, is that the strangeness of others, more specifically the foreignness of other 
religions, spirituality, and beliefs, cannot be simply ignored. To take a now banal 
example, 9/11 has shown us how the rise of militant, fundamentalist Islamism can have 
real, undeniable, and even traumatic impact on almost all of us, regardless if we are of 
the Christian or Islamic faith, regardless in other words of our religious faith or the 
putative absence thereof.  
 
In the above characterization of the “post-secular,” what also becomes evident is that 
difference is at stake in the “post-secular.” However, one should not rest with just 
saying that the “post-secular” is a testimony to a marked rise of religious differences 
(including differences between inclinations towards the sacred and those towards the 
secular) that cut across both social groups at the communitarian or nation-state level and 
civilizations across nation-state lines. In a more critical or even constructive vein, one 
should also add that the “post-secular” poses to us the question of how to affirm those 
differences, and how to allow them to co-exist without resorting to physical violence. 
As seen above, this is also no doubt what Taylor calls for too. He would also argue: “in 
order to place the discussion between belief and unbelief in our day and age, we have to 
put it in the context of this lived experience [of real, particular differences], and the 
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construals that shape this experience. And this means not only seeing this as more than 
a matter of different ‘theories’ to explain the same experiences. It also means 
understanding the differential position of different construals; […] how one or another 
can become the default option [of belief and unbelief] for many people or milieu.”26 No 
less than Taylor’s project, contemporary French thought, especially that of a 
“(post)structuralist” trajectory, can equally make a critical intervention in the “post-
secular,” given that the overall aim of the “(post)structuralist” project has been, to put it 
very simply here, to elucidate and affirm differences.27 Nancy’s work on the 
“(auto)deconstruction” of religion, as seen, is a case in point, through its emphasis on 
the constant openness towards that which is different from oneself, and its rejection of 
any return to sameness. Hence, instead of proclaiming the “ends” of the 
“(post)structuralist” endeavor, which has been resounding for decades now, one could 
say, given the contemporary problematic of the “post-secular,” and if one seeks a more 
peaceful “post-secular,” there remains the unfinished project of “(post)structuralism.” In 
other words, there lies in “(post)structuralism” that promise of leading us to that future 
“post-secular” world where each religious and/ or non-religious difference can affirm 
itself and co-exist with other differences. “(Post)structuralism” can open us to that 
world, I argue, with the articulation of the figure of the reject that subtends it.  
 
In contextualizing the reject within the “post-secular,” the stakes of theorizing the reject 
are also raised, since a theory of the reject now goes beyond the rather intimate and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 A Secular Age, 13. 
27 I am highlighting the “(post)structuralist” aspect of contemporary French thought here in view of my 
disagreement with Alain Badiou in this section. Badiou is no doubt a primary figure in contemporary 
French thought today, but he distances himself from all “(post)structuralist” leanings. 
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largely personal spheres of friendship, love, and community. Within those latter 
boundaries, the gestures of the reject as discussed in the previous section, such as 
walking away, or refraining from an initial encounter or making subsequent contact, 
have relatively little real, physical violent consequences. In the context of the “post-
secular,” however, which has a global dimension and trajectory, as Hent de Vries 
reminds us,28 every gesture therefore has an almost global effect, touching even those 
who are geographically, culturally, or ideologically distant, if not stranger, to the 
immediate religious or secular nature of that gesture (as the case, again, of 9/11 has 
shown). In other words, any gesture of the reject in the “post-secular” context is more 
than a personal act; it goes beyond affecting one’s circle of friends, lover(s), and 
community. The challenge of a theory of the reject in the “post-secular” then is to 
encourage differences to emerge and affirm themselves, while discouraging such 
emergence or affirmation from taking place at the price of violence against other 
differences. That challenge can be met, as I will argue here, through the turn, once 
again, of the auto-reject. 
 
I have mentioned previously that the reject in the context of contemporary network-
centric sociability is faced with the obstacle of a hyper-gregarious mass. The challenges 
for the reject are different in the context of the “post-secular.” I would say that the 
reject here is first challenged by the resurrection of the subject, particularly in the guise 
of the Pauline Subject according to Alain Badiou. As it will be noted shortly, Badiou’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See especially Hent de Vries, “The Two Sources of the ‘Theological Machine’: Jacques Derrida and 
Henri Bergson on Religion, Technicity, War, and Terror,” in Theology and the Political: The New Debate, 
eds. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj !i"ek, intro. Rowan Williams, Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2005, 366-389. 
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Saint Paul – La fondation de l’universalisme can bear the implicit suggestion that the 
Pauline Subject can lead us out of the present “post-secular” situation. However, I will 
argue that that optimistic horizon is really not the case with the Badiou’s Pauline 
Subject. The latter, as I will show, somewhat returns us to the Schmittian sovereign, 
decisional subject, which risks leaving, in the wake of its sovereign decisions, a trail of 
destruction against others. In that sense, there is instead a danger – and Badiou in fact 
acknowledges this potential danger – in staying with the subject for the “post-secular.” 
It is this problematic Badiou’s subject, especially his Pauline Subject, that this section 
will deal with in a while. It will then proceed to suggest that, in order to break with the 
return or resurrection of the subject that at the end of it all only admits the perpetuation 
of “post-secular” violence, thinking the reject might be a better alternative, one that is 
already implicitly offered, as I will demonstrate, by Derrida’s Foi et savoir. In the 
previous section, I have argued that Derrida did not go far enough with the reject, in 
particular with the auto-reject, in his thinking of friendship, love, and community. It 
would appear that this is once again the case in Derrida’s problematization of the 
question of religion for the “post-secular,” especially at the point where I pose the 
question if there is an auto-reject that can open us to a “post-secular” that is not 
anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic. I recall Nancy’s point here that an 
anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic mode of thought, be it with regard to a 
thought of the “post-secular” or of “absentheism,” not only pulls thought back within 
the limited horizons of the human subject, but also barely touches on difference. For 
Nancy, in order that thought avoids that regressive movement, and that it is always 
opened to infinite trajectories, thought must, learning from the “auto-deconstruction” of 
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religion, “welcome [saluer] a man other than the son of God or even his double, the son 
of man, the man of humanism.”29 Thought must be open to “an other, yes, opened in the 
midst of the same, an other of the same man [un autre même homme],” if not “an other 
otherwise of man [un autre que l’homme].”30 According to Nancy, these others, “these 
other open bodies [les autres corps ouverts],” can be constituted by animals.31 For a 
“post-secular” future that is open affirmatively to difference, perhaps the (human) reject 
must also thence learn to auto-reject its anthropocentrism and/ or anthropomorphism, 
and from there, welcome the animal-reject. This movement from the (human) auto-
reject to the animal-reject would seem to be missing in Foi et savoir. And yet, as I will 
elucidate later in this section, a careful reading that brings into relation Foi et savoir and 
the later L’animal que donc je suis will show that an (auto-)reject or animal-reject is not 
totally absent in Foi et savoir. It is already there, without being present. But that also 
means that the explicit presence and articulation of an animal-reject will not be found in 
Derrida. For that, one must turn to what Verena Conley has rightly prophesized as the 
“messianic” texts of Cixous, and that is what this section will do, following the 







29 L’Adoration, 43. 
30 L’Adoration, 43. 
31 L’Adoration, 43. 
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2.1 The Resurrection and Persistence of the Subject: Badiou’s St. Paul 
In beginning the discussion with Badiou, it must be said though that Badiou in fact 
makes a strange addition to the company of contemporary French thinkers that this 
work is engaged with. This is because, philosophically, Badiou is always determined to 
stand apart from the inclinations and trajectories of thinkers such as Deleuze, Derrida, 
and Nancy. For example, in the early Théorie du sujet (1982), in opposition to the 
structuralist wave of anti-Hegelianism of which Deleuze was particularly a strong 
proponent, Badiou will declare, “neither Hegel nor us are structuralist.”32 More recently, 
in his Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie (2009), he reiterates that his “target” of 
philosophical critique in his first Manifeste pour la philosophie (1989) had been “the 
surpassing [dépassement] of Metaphysics in the guise of its deconstruction.”33 Or, as he 
puts it in another way, “the philosophical position that [he] combated twenty years ago 
was principally the Heideggerian position in its French variants (Derrida, Lacoue-
Labarthe, Nancy, but also Lyotard).”34 In place of the deconstruction of being, the 
subject, and truth, which is characteristic of post-68 structuralist French thought, 
Badiou’s self-proclaimed “Platonic gesture” seeks to “reaffirm the possibility of 
philosophy in its original sense [sens], that is to say, the articulation – transformed 
certainly but still recognizable – of the major categorical trinity [triplet catégoriel 
majeur] of being, the subject, and truth.”35 It is not surprising then that in his response 
to Nancy’s project on “who comes after the subject,” Badiou – not to mention that 
Nancy’s project (c.1986) comes just a few years after the publication of Badiou’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Théorie du sujet, Paris : Seuil, 1982, 28, my translation. 
33 Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie, Paris : Fayard, 2009, 132, my translation. 
34 Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie, 131. 
35 Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie, 131-132. 
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Théorie du sujet (1982) – would insist on the persistence of the subject, an endeavor to 
which he remains faithful till today. In other words, and to turn Badiou’s rhetoric on 
himself, Badiou pledges absolutely no fidelity to the break or even event of the 
“deconstruction” of the subject, which has ruptured the latter’s epistemic foundation or 
development36; he resists, rather reactively, the void in the fabric of the situated or 
situationized discourse on the subject that has henceforth been opened by “structuralist” 
or “deconstructive” thought, resisting thinking a new figure of thought otherwise of the 
subject, resisting pursuing what Nancy has called “who comes before/ after the subject.” 
 
Despite the distance that Badiou takes from “(post)structuralist” thinkers, a diversion to 
Badiou, especially the Badiou of Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme, is 
necessary for any critical discussion of the “post-secular.” To do otherwise is to ignore 
the surge in interest in the Pauline figure following the publication of Badiou’s Saint 
Paul,37 including the counter-reading by Agamben in The Time that Remains. It would 
also be to ignore the fact that Badiou in the Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie has 
admitted that “[his] philosophy was a disguised Christianism,”38 which makes it 
somewhat necessary to reread his claim in Saint Paul that “Paul for [him] is neither an 
apostle nor a saint.”39 Given such a confession, one may quickly highlight at this point 
that Badiou’s philosophy may be described in similar terms as how John Caputo 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Peter Hallward has also written, “Badiou […] salvage[s] […] the subject from deconstruction […]” 
(Badiou: A Subject to Truth, foreword by Slavoj !i"ek, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003, xxviii-xxix). 
37 See especially St. Paul Among the Philosophers, eds. John D. Caputo and Linda Martin Alcoff, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. See also the special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly on 
“Global Christianity, Global Critique” (109 (4): Fall, 2009) on the influence or impact of Badiou’s Saint 
Paul on contemporary debates on contemporary religion in the world. 
38 Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie, 149 n.4. 
39 Saint Paul : La fondation de l’universalisme, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 1. 
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described Derrida’s (and Cixous’s, as I would add), that is to say, it has religion without 
having religion’s God. 40 The religious contour in Badiou’s philosophy may be 
discerned by its emphasis and predication on fidelity, specifically a fidelity to an event, 
which is the rupturing and now undeniable appearing of what previously did or could 
not exist in the world. Uncannily, faith, as we will see in Derrida and Cixous, also plays 
a critical role in their “deconstruction” of religion, even though faith in Derrida and 
Cixous, unlike Badiou’s fidelity, is not something fixed or monolithic, adamantly or 
unwaveringly attached to a singular object: faith in Derrida and Cixous is more open-
ended, never knowing what or who it is faithful to.41 The uncanny proximity between 
Badiou and Derrida and Cixous may be further enhanced if one begins to consider the 
Badiouian event, at least in its evangelical trajectory since it always seeks to announce 
to the world the element of the new, in messianic terms, terms that Derrida and Cixous, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The religious trace, not just in Saint Paul but also in Badiou’s philosophy in general, is hardly missed 
by scholars. Bruno Bosteels has discerned that besides the four conditions of science, politics, art, and 
love that Badiou predicates as the sites through which the event will arise, there is also “the eternal 
shadow condition of religion” (Badiou and Politics, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011, 
104). And “the essence of the Badiouian event,” in the eyes of Frédéric Neyrat, is “marked by a 
theological excess” (Aux bords du vide: événement et sujet dans la philosophie d’Alain Badiou, Paris: 
Éditions è®e numérique, 2011, 4), an excess that Neyrat will later consider a “strange religious 
supplement” (23, my translation). According to Amy Hollywood, there is a “turn to theology” in Badiou 
especially in Saint Paul, which “is an attempt to use theology as a political tool” (“St Paul and the New 
Man,” Critical Inquiry 35 (4), Summer 2009, 869). Less critical of the religious trace is Adam Miller, 
who interprets the Badiouian event as grace, which Miller defines as “an immanent novelty that is 
actually infinite” (Badiou, Marion and St Paul, 16).  
41 One finds a more in-depth analysis or interpretation of faith as opening in Nancy. In Noli me tangere 
(Paris : Bayard, 2003), Nancy makes the distinction between faith and belief. The latter has a definitive 
object in mind (and belief as such is perhaps more in line with Badiou’s fidelity), while faith is, to wit, 
somewhat blind. It is open to anyone, to anything. In other words, faith is a pure opening to others. In the 
later L’Adoration (2010), Nancy argues that the verb “to adore [adorer]” bears the trace of such faith, 
given that “to adore,” especially in the more archaic French, which is always adorer à, suggests a 
movement towards someone or something (a suggestion granted by the preposition à), and hence is 
always open to whoever, whatever. This archaic French would also say aimer à, which Irigaray deploys 
in her J’aime à toi :esquisse d’une félicité dans l’histoire (Paris : Grasset, 1992). According to Irigaray, 
by saying j’aime à toi, rather than je t’aime, “I reserve a relation of indirection with respect to you [je 
garde à toi un rapport d’indirection]. I neither subjugate [soumets] you nor consume you. I respect you as 
irreducible” (J’aime à toi, 171, my translation). She goes to say that “the ‘to’ [à] is the guarantee of the 
indirection. The ‘to’ prevents the relation of transitivity without the irreducibility of the other”; “the ‘to’ 
is the sign of non-immediacy, of the mediation between us” (ibid, 171). And further on: “The ‘to’ is the 
place [lieu] of non-reduction of the person to an object” (ibid, 172).     
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as will be seen, reconfigure in their own ways but nonetheless do not shy away from. 
According to Adrian Johnston, there is a “weak messianism” to the “revolutionary 
ruptures” that the Badiouian event brings with it.42 However, Ed Pluth is right to insist 
that Badiou is not a “messianic thinker,”43 in the sense that Derrida might be when 
Derrida speaks of the event that always arrives in or from the future in its complete 
surprise. As Pluth points out, “events,” for Badiou, “are not things to come.”44 The 
Badiouian event, to reiterate, is the rupturing exposition of things previously denied of 
their existences, an appearing with such a force that the existence of the latter can no 
longer be denied or ignored. 
 
But to return to Badiou’s acknowledgement that his philosophy is “a disguised 
Christianism”: what this implies is that if we take the “post-secular” to be a secular 
negotiation with religions, Badiou’s philosophy as “a disguised Christianism,” and 
along with it, his Pauline Subject, which he has claimed to be “a subjective figure of 
first importance,”45 and whose Christian resonances far exceed any “disguised 
Christianism,” can perhaps have a role in contributing to the “post-secular” debate. To 
be sure, Badiou does not deploy the term “post-secular” in his book or in any of his 
works so far (neither, in fact, do the other “(post)structuralist” thinkers in question 
here). However, in the conclusion of Saint Paul, Badiou does seem to gesture towards 
something like a future “post-secular” condition (and I mean “condition” in Badiou’s 
sense – which is to say the empirical and supposedly logical steps put in place, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Badiou, !i"ek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2009, xviii. 
43 Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, Cambridge: Polity, 2010, 141. 
44 Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 141. 
45 Badiou, Saint Paul, 1. 
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supplement to the existing “situation” or dispositif of people, things, and ideas in the 
world, following an event, such as a more peaceful “post-secular” world, that ruptures 
the present dispositif), when the Pauline Subject seems to renounce all present secular 
situations of the contemporary world. There, Badiou writes: “For the subject, [the] 
subjective logic culminates in an indifference to secular nominations […].”46 As I 
would read it, that “indifference to secular nominations” is nothing less than a 
dissatisfaction with present secular or even “post-secular” situations. The “subjective 
logic” that surpasses “secular nominations” is then a trajectory towards other 
configurations of the contemporary world, and this is where I think Badiou’s Pauline 
Subject is suggestive of positing itself as a figure of thought for another “post-secular” 
world.  
 
A qualification is necessary here, however: even if Badiou’s Pauline Subject traces a 
“post-secular” trajectory different from our present one, it would very much disagree 
with the future “post-secular” world that I have postulated earlier, particularly the one 
that affirms the articulation of differences. Now, in Saint Paul, the work of the Pauline 
Subject is defined as nothing less than the declaration of his or her fidelity to the truth 
of the Christ-event that is the resurrection of Christ, and the continued labor to 
guarantee the affirmation of such truth in the world. According to Badiou, this is also a 
project of universalism, since the declaration involves promising salvation to all 
regardless if one is Jewish or not. This project of universalism, at first glance, seems 
promising for a future less violent “post-secular” world, since, as suggested especially !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 See Saint Paul, 118. Here, I follow, with slight modifications, Ray Brassier’s translation (Saint Paul: 
The Foundation of Universalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, 110). 
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by the chapter “Universality and the Traversing of Differences” in Saint Paul, it 
potentially ends all violence between particular differences by demonstrating that it is 
beyond all particular differences. Badiou even makes sure to say there that particular 
differences are not to be ignored, disdained, or negated,47 and that if the “Christian 
militantism” of Paul “must be a trajectory [traversée] indifferent to worldly differences 
[différences mondaines],”48 then this “indifference” must be “an indifference tolerant of 
differences.”49 However, there is the sense that an irreducible (and at least symbolic) 
violence against differences nevertheless remains with Badiou’s Pauline Subject. One 
can probably sense this from the “militant tonality” of the Pauline Subject, which 
includes “the appropriation of particularities,” the consideration of “the empirical 
existence of differences” as “essential inexistence,” and the too forceful will to 
“transcend differences.”50 This is not to mention that there is hardly any consideration if 
particular differences actually welcome the traversing of the Pauline Subject’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 See Saint Paul, 105, 118. 
48 Saint Paul, 107. 
49 Saint Paul, 106. 
50 Saint Paul, 106. It is in L’Éthique, written in 1993, where Badiou’s critique of any philosophy of 
difference(s) is more forceful, if not less tolerant. Badiou might be correct in saying that today’s claims to 
“multiculturalism” or “the right to differences” are superficial, as they accept only “good” differences, 
that is to say, differences that are passive and integrate themselves into the perspective or ideology of the 
dominant group or majority. Pluth has also observed in Badiou that “behind calls to respect others, 
respect life, and respect difference, Badiou finds a basically de-humanizing tendency. […] Significant 
here is Badiou’s claim that this seemingly very humanistic ethics is actually a practical anti-humanism” 
(Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 139). “Practical anti-humanism” occurs when radical differences, or 
differences that apparently pose an affront to others, are repressed. Certainly, there are superficial claims 
to “multiculturalism” or to “the right to differences.” However, that does not mean that there are no 
endeavors to affirm, accept, or let be the other who is not only different, but also disagrees with, or is 
incommensurable to oneself. The recent “post-secular” texts of Habermas, and Derrida’s Foi et savoir, 
are at least works that testify to that endeavor. Unconvinced by Badiou’s claim, and opposed to Badiou’s 
critique of differences in both L’Éthique and Saint Paul, Hollywood marks her intellectual distance from 
Badiou based “on the critical difference that difference (religious, ethnic, and, most pointedly perhaps 
sexual) continues to make” (“St Paul and the New Man,” 871) significant changes in one’s relations with 
others. Neyrat, on his part, has noted that Badiou’s indifference to differences especially in Saint Paul 
risks “troubling political consequences” (Aux bords du vide, 21). 
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“universalist militantism” “across them, in them.”51 In that sense, Badiou’s Pauline 
Subject does not really resolve “post-secular” violence. One could even say that in the 
subject’s “indifference” to differences, it is still not that distant from the existing “post-
secular” intolerance of differences. In other words, the “post-secular” world that 
logically entails from Badiou’s Pauline Subject is unfortunately not one that is less 
violent. And that is so because, I would argue, of the (re)turn, precisely, to the figure of 
the subject. Put another way, resurrecting the subject can be another form of “post-
secular” violence. 
 
Badiou’s Pauline Subject functions more or less in line with his general theory of the 
subject. In other words, St. Paul as a subject is not given a priori; the subject is not 
given in the sense that it has always inhered in an existent, waiting only for the latter to 
discover it and eventually assume for himself or herself the status of a subject. To put 
the point in another way, the subject according to Badiou is not constructed out of a 
conscious decision to found one’s individual being as such, and this is where Badiou 
claims to break with the Cartesian subject. As he says in Théorie du sujet, “the post-
Cartesian character of our enterprise” is premised on the claim that “a subject is 
nowhere given (to or like knowledge)” [un sujet n’est nulle part donné (à la 
connaissance)].52 “Knowledge” in this case, as we know from Badiou’s philosophy, is 
the state of understanding that claims to have a stable grasp of an object as if in its 
epistemic entirety, while effacing parts that this “encyclopedic” understanding cannot 
account for. In that case, “knowledge” is always a situation in which gaps or voids !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Saint Paul, 106. 
52 Théorie du sujet, 294. 
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regarding certain objects, or even regarding the current state of knowing, transpierce. 
“Knowledge,” however, refuses to acknowledge these gaps or voids, and would seek 
only to repress them. According to Badiou then, “knowledge” as such is contrary to 
“truth,” which acknowledges those repressed gaps or voids, and subsequently works 
from them or elucidates them through what Badiou calls “truth procedures” in order to 
articulate what is “generic” or generative of something new in them. In Badiou’s 
perspective then, as long as “truth” is out there, unaccounted for or disregarded by 
“knowledge,” the subject, which takes itself to be responsible for working out those 
“truth procedures,” thanks to an event that first grants it to see the “truth” of those gaps 
or voids, is not only never a given with regard to “knowledge,” but also remains a rare 
occurrence. Hence, if a subject claims to exist under the aegis of “knowledge,” then it is 
barely a veritable subject.  
 
It is by keeping in mind the “truth” of the real, that is to say, to acknowledge that there 
are always gaps or voids in how we see or know the world, and therefore accepting that 
there are always “truth procedures” to work out in order to articulate what has been left 
out or repressed through these gaps or voids, that motivates Badiou to respond to 
Nancy’s question of “who comes after the subject” by saying that this “truth” “allows 
[him] to deny that it is necessary […] to suppress the category ‘subject’.”53 And the 
subject according to Badiou there, is defined as such: 
I call the subject the local or finite status of a truth. A subject is what is locally 
born out. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” in Who Comes After the Subject?, 25. 
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The ‘subject’ thus ceases to be the inaugural or conditioning point of legitimate 
statements. It is no longer […] that for which there is truth, nor even the desirous 
eclipse of its surrection. A truth always precedes it. Not that a truth exists 
‘before’ it, for a truth is forever suspended upon an indiscernible future. The 
subject is woven out of a truth, it is what exists of truth in limited fragments. A 
subject is that which a truth passes through, or this finite point through which, in 
its infinite being, truth itself passes.54 
 
In this passage, and in fact in this response (c. 1986) in general to Nancy, it is clear that 
Badiou has yet to mobilize the term “event,” which he will soon do in L’Être et 
l’événement (1988), and which he will argue is that which instantiates a subject. Here, 
prior to the introduction of the term “event,” Badiou deploys the term “truth.” In any 
case, be it “truth” as is the case of this response to Nancy and also in Théorie du sujet, 
or “event” as will be the case in works subsequent to L’Être et l’événement, Badiou 
makes it clear that if there were to be a subject, it would not be decided by any 
individual being. It is never the subject that decides on its subjectivity. For Badiou, the 
subject is inaugurated by “truth” – at least in Théorie du sujet and in this response to 
Nancy, and strictly or distinctly by “event” from L’Être et l’événement onwards.55 Be it 
“truth” or “event,” it is something that the subject has no control of, something that the 
subject does not decide on, and that is why Badiou will also call such a “truth” or event 
“the undecidable” [l’indécidable],56 which nonetheless brings about the “subjectivation” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 25. 
55 I certainly keep in mind that Badiou gradually kept “truth” separate from “event.” In an interview with 
Peter Hallward and Bruno Bosteels, Badiou will resist any “confusion between event and truth,” a 
confusion that “reduces the considerable difficulties involved [in truth] in maintaining fidelity to an event 
to a matter of pure insurrection [in event]” (“Beyond Formalization: An Interview with Alain Badiou 
Conducted by Peter Hallward and Bruno Bosteels, Paris, July 2, 2002” in Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 
323). In an earlier interview with Bosteels, Badiou also states that “truth, for me, is not the name of the 
event, even though that is how it is often interpreted. Truth is what unfolds as a system of consequences, 
secured by an unheard-of figure of the subject as consequence of the rupture of the event” (“Can Change 
Be Thought? Paris, June 20, 1999” in Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 307). In Bosteels’ reading, “An 
event is a sudden commencement, but only a recommencement produces the truth of this event” (Badiou 
and Politics, 173). 
56 See Théorie du sujet, 301-302. 
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of the subject. It is the “truth”/ event that decides on the subject, therefore. Without the 
“truth”/ event, there is no subject, or, there is no subject without a preceding “truth”/ 
event. As Badiou would say much later in an interview of 2002, when Badiou has 
decided on the event as that which engenders the subject, “the subject is identified by a 
type of marking, a postevental effect.”57 Preceding the subject, the event gives itself, or 
rather, traces of itself, so that the “subjectivation” of a subject can take place. That is to 
say too that the event is not from then on encapsulated within the subject itself. The 
event remains free from the subject: the subject bears only traces of the event, and is 
never the absolute expression of the entirety of the event that engenders it.58  
 
In the context of Saint Paul, the event, as said, is the Christ-event or the resurrection of 
Christ, the revelation of which strikes Paul on his way to Damascus. The Pauline 
Subject is “locally born out” or “woven out” of that event, replacing Paul’s former 
existence as a persecutor of Christians. According to Badiou, it is Paul as subject as 
such, through his “subjectivation” by the Christ-event, that he will begin to learn to live, 
to experience real living, as opposed to living out an automaton-like, if not dead, 
existence, which simply follows the dead (Roman) laws of the practical world. 
However, this new life will be in place only if Paul, following his “subjectivation,” 
enacts the subsequent “subject-process” (according to the rhetoric of Théorie du sujet), 
which is a sustained commitment to declare both the Christ-event and his fidelity to that 
event. In other words, the subject cannot be a pure and simple acceptation of the “truth” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 “Beyond Formalization” in Badiou and Politics, 348. 
58 According to Miller, “one never ‘experiences’ the event per se” (Badiou, Marion and St Paul, 134). 
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or event. There is work to do, or “labor,”59 in the service of the “truth” of the event. 
This “labor” is seemingly endless, given that the entirety of the “truth” or event is never 
given to the subject, but only parts of it. The subject then, on his or her part, will have to 
make sense of these parts gradually because, as Badiou explicates in L’Être et 
l’événement, these parts have no material referents as yet in the world. Beyond the 
linguistic and cognitive matrixes of the present world, they barely exist as concepts that 
can be formulated. The subject then is left with the sole resort of naming, of giving a 
name to that which has yet to have a referent in the world; and this process or procedure 
of naming will extend throughout the life of the subject, since each naming can only 
articulate (part of) a part of the “truth” of the event. That is not to mention that Badiou 
in L’Être et l’événement will explicate that the event is essentially “unnamable” or 
“indiscernible,”60 which only reinforces the idea that the “labor” of the subject is 
nothing but infinite, “uncompletable.”61   
 
In spite of the claims of a new life, one could say, on a negative note, that life after 
“subjectivation,” which is also life under a “subject-process” if it concerns the life of a 
subject according to Badiou, is rather short of freedom. The subject cannot be 
considered to be a master of his or her own existence. Under the interpellation – and I 
mean this in the ideological sense following Althusser62 – of the “truth” or event, after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Saint Paul, 96. 
60 L’Être et l’événement, Paris : Seuil, 1988, 23, my translation. 
61 “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 31. 
62 The quarrel between Althusser and Badiou has been well analyzed by Bruno Bosteels in his Badiou 
and Politics. In Bosteels’ words, it is the delimiting conceptualization of the subject by Althusser as a 
subject of ideological interpellation that precludes any recognition of the appearance of the new in the 
world: “Because the efficacy of overdetermination in producing situations for a subject is now perceived 
to be profoundly ideological, Althusser’s philosophy can no longer register any true historical event, not 
even in principle let alone in actual fact […]. Conversely, we can surmise what will be needed to think 
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which the subject must declare his or her fidelity to the latter, and also commit himself 
or herself to the latter’s “truth procedures,” one could say that the subject enters into an 
almost (non-Hegelian) master-slave relation with it. Of course, Badiou will deny any 
such relation between the subject and the “truth” or event. So in Saint Paul, he argues 
that the Christ-event is universal or equally “offered to all,” and any subject that is 
formed by and is subsequently faithful to this event partakes but in an experience of 
“equality.”63 Equality between subjects certainly does not remove the suspicion of a 
master-slave relation between subject and the “truth” or event, but it is via this claim to 
“equality” that Badiou seeks to dispel any sense of a master in his philosophy of the 
event. According to Badiou, in the work of declaring fidelity to the Christ-event, “we 
are all […] co-workers of God”; but where there is “conjoined the worker and equality,” 
there will be the “undoing [défaillir] [of] the figure of the master.”64 Granted that there 
will be no God-the-master in Badiou’s rhetoric, it remains undeniable (at least to 
someone without fidelity to the event), however, that the “truth” or event lords over the 
subject. That can be elicited furthermore from the beginning of Saint Paul, as one pays 
particular attention to the rhetoric there concerning the task of the book: “to re-found a 
theory of the Subject that subordinates existence to the aleatory dimension of the 
event.”65 The subordinated subject, or even a subject under subjection (in both senses of 
“subjectivation” and “subject-process”), can also be read in the earlier “On a Finally 
Objectless Subject,” where the subject there is considered as a “fidelity operator” of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
through the possibility of a situation’s becoming historicized by virtue of an event, namely, a theory of 
the subject that is no longer reduced to a strictly ideological function but accounts for the specificity of 
various subjective figures and different types of truth procedure. This is exactly the double task that 
Badiou ascribes to a formal theory of the subject in all his later philosophy” (Badiou and Politics, 65). 
63 Saint Paul, 15, 63. 
64 Saint Paul, 63. 
65 Saint Paul, 5, my emphasis.  
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truth.66 It is not difficult to sense that the term “operator” renders the subject something 
of a mechanical, if not mere, functionary of “truth,” something like an automaton even, 
contrary to what Badiou claims the subject to be.  
 
Now, some might argue that such servitude is a small price to pay for the new that the 
event promises, or that such sacrifice is worthwhile. But what if sacrifice is not simply 
the choice of the subject, but is in fact a logic already built into the subject-event 
relation, from which the subject cannot escape? To discern this sacrificial logic, one 
must begin with the essential inequality between the subject and the event or “truth” 
that Badiou underscores. In L’Être et l’événement, Badiou writes: “Only a truth is 
infinite, but the subject is not coextensive [with that infinity].”67 The difference between 
subject and event, predicated on the attribute of infinity, would be articulated in harsher 
terms in the earlier “On a Finally Objectless Subject”: “being the local moment of the 
truth, the subject fails to sustain its global adjunction.”68 Given this harsh statement, and 
given that Badiou in that same essay calls subjects “fragments,”69 it is not difficult to 
sense that subjects are but ultimately mere remains (not, however, in the potentially 
radical sense of Agamben’s remnant70) of the “truth” or event. That these remains can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 30. 
67 L’Être et l’événement, 433. 
68 “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 30. 
69 Badiou’s rendering of the subject as a fragment sets up another counterpoint to Descartes’ endeavor to 
construct a subject that is of a holistic constitution. As Badiou says in L’Être et l’événement, “we are […] 
contemporaries of a second epoch of the doctrine of the Subject, which is no longer the centered, 
reflexive, founding subject,” “not as support or origin, but as fragment of the process of a truth” (9, 22) 
70 The “remnant” is of course Agamben’s reading of Paul, a reading that, as Agamben declares, seeks “to 
restore Paul’s Letters to the status of the fundamental messianic text for the Western tradition” (The Time 
That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. Trans. Patricia Dailey. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005, 1). According to Agamben, what is properly messianic, or what is proper to the 
“messianic vocation” or calling [kl!sis] is “the revocation of every vocation” (ibid, 23). That is to say that 
the messianic calling calls for the rejection (or even auto-rejection) of the current state of affairs: “an 
urgency that works [the current vocation or ‘factical condition’] from within and hollows it out, nullifying 
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even be dispensed with can be elicited from Logiques des mondes. According to the 
latter, the fragment that a subject declares at a particular present can always be taken up 
by another subject at a later time,71 which implies that each subject is really replaceable, 
an entity that can be sacrificed in other words without much concern. This is also 
perhaps why Badiou will emphasize the notion of “resurrection” in Logiques des 
mondes, which, in order to see to the infinite trajectory of the event or the “truth,” 
allows the “re-embodiment” [réincorporation] of the event in another subject.72 With 
this almost religious faith in the “resurrection” of the event or “truth,” it is almost 
undeniable that it is the master, eternal “truth” or event (or “Master-Signifier” as !i"ek 
calls it) that must be upheld over and above the subservient, transient subject. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
it in the very gesture of maintaining and dwelling in it” (ibid, 24). The messianic “remnant” is therefore 
the “as not” (ibid, 23) that remains, in relation to all existing vocations, after the revocation of the latter. 
And as “as not,” it will always remain an “excess” (ibid, 56) to every totalizing teleology: it is “neither 
the all, nor a part of the all but the impossibility for the part and the all to coincide with themselves or 
with each other” (ibid, 55). It is through the messianic remnant’s aspect of “as not,” of that which never 
adds up, that Agamben disagrees with Badiou’s reading of Paul as a thought of the universal. Beyond the 
Jews or the Greeks, there remains the “non non-Jews,” who are “something like a remnant between every 
people and itself, between every identity and itself. At this point one can measure the distance that 
separates the Pauline operation from modern universalism – when something like the humanity of man, 
for example, is taken as the principle that abolishes all difference or as the ultimate difference, beyond 
which further division is impossible” (ibid, 52). That “modern universalism,” as Agamben does not fail to 
point out, is the universalism of Paul according to Badiou, one that traverses, or is indifferent to, all 
differences. Counter-arguing Badiou, Agamben says, “For Paul, it is not a matter of ‘tolerating’ or getting 
past differences in order to pinpoint a sameness or a universal lurking beyond. The universal is not a 
transcendent principle through which differences may be perceived – such a perspective of transcendence 
is not available to Paul. Rather, this ‘transcendental’ involves an operation that divides the divisions of 
law themselves and renders them inoperative, without ever reaching any final ground. No universal man, 
no Christian can be found in the depths of the Jew or the Greek, neither as a principle nor as an end; all 
that is left is a remnant and the impossibility of the Jew or the Greek to coincide with himself” (ibid, 52-
53). It is also through the fact that the messianic remnant does not add up that Agamben locates the 
“political legacy” of Paul with regard to the question of democracy and “a people”: “it allows for a new 
perspective that dislodges our anticipated notions of a people and a democracy, however impossible it 
may be to completely renounce them. The people is neither the all nor the part, neither the majority nor 
the minority. Instead, it is that which can never coincide with itself, as all or as part, that which infinitely 
remains or resists in each division, and, with all due respect to those who govern us, never allows us to be 
reduced to a majority or a minority” (ibid, 57).   
71 On this point, see Logiques des mondes, Paris : Seuil, 2006, 75. 
72 Logiques des mondes, 75, my translation. 
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Conversely, as Miller has observed, “the subject is itself [also] never the master of that 
which is being assembled through it.”73 
 
Despite the preeminence of “truth” or event over the subject, event and subject 
nonetheless share a quality between them, which is that of exceptionality. In Logiques 
des mondes, Badiou will say that “truths” or events are “exceptions to what there is”; 
and as long as the subject declares his or her fidelity to the event, the subject is equally 
endowed with “the exception that truths inflict to what there is by the interpolated 
clause [as articulated by the subject] of ‘there is what there is not’.”74 The exceptional 
quality of the subject can even be elicited from earlier works where Badiou says, “the 
subject is rare.”75 In that case, to go back to Saint Paul, the subject of the Christ-event 
is no less rare or exceptional, even though Badiou, as noted, claims that the Christ-event 
is “offered to all.” Now, upon any mobilization of the terms “exception” or “rare,” our 
contemporary sensibility would no doubt quickly associate such terms with Schmittian 
sovereignty. And under our contemporary critique, the Schmittian sovereign subject is 
he or she who possesses the exceptional right, at any time, to make new laws or 
exceptional decisions; and while he or she singularly embodies the law as its highest 
authority, the decisive move to institute a new law paradoxically renders him or her 
outside the law. Badiou certainly may argue that there is really no sovereign 
decidability or decision on the side of the subject in matters of “subjectivation,” even 
though the faithful subject cannot escape deciding on his or her fidelity to the event and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Badiou, Marion and St Paul, 144. 
74 Logiques des mondes, 12, 13. In Peter Hallward’s words: “Both truth and subject are occasional, 
exceptional” (Badiou: A Subject to Truth, xxv). 
75 See “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” 27; and L’Être et l’événement, 429. 
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to the commitment to the “truth procedures” in the service of the event.76 However, 
Badiou’s subject, after its “subjectivation” by the event, practices no less the sovereign 
act of instituting new laws while being outside existing laws, and hence one could say 
that at least some form of second-order sovereignty is undoubtedly at work in Badiou’s 
subject.77 This is the case when Paul declares the applicability of salvation to all, which 
effectively makes him “illegal” with regard to the old Jewish discourse that demands 
access to salvation to be granted only to believers who have undergone traditional 
Jewish religious rites or practices (such as circumcision).78 Badiou’s reading of Paul 
even goes further to say that Paul is not just outside or beyond the law with regard to 
traditional Jewish religious discourse, but also with regard to worldly laws. The latter 
“orders a predicative worldly multiplicity, giving to each part of the whole what is due 
to it.”79 Paul, however, refuses to accept such distribution of certain peoples to certain 
stations in life or society as a given or immutable situation in the world. According to 
Badiou, Paul’s declaration of the universality of salvation, which is also the work of 
love in the rhetoric of Saint Paul, then breaks with this worldly law. It creates an 
“interruption” within the latter,80 exceeding, if not violently supplementing, it: “For the 
new man [i.e. the Pauline Subject or a Christian subject], love is the fulfillment of the 
rupture that he accomplishes [consomme] with the law, the law of the rupture with the 
law, the law of the truth of the law.”81 In all, “the Christ-event is heterogeneous to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 As Miller has observed, “One must decide in favor of an event’s occurrence because […] an event’s 
implications must be actively pursued, tested and extended in order for the event to have existed. Initially, 
an event ‘is’ only for those who have decided its existence” (Badiou, Marion and St Paul, 135, my italics). 
77 Miller also argues that fidelity, as Badiou treats it, “like the state, has an institutional quality” (Badiou, 
Marion and St Paul, 140). 
78 Saint Paul, 45. 
79 Saint Paul, 82. 
80 Saint Paul, 6. 
81 Saint Paul, 94, translation modified. 
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law, pure excess over every [legal] prescription”82; and as long as the subject is faithful 
to that event, he or she will share, as noted, that exceptional condition of being 
“heterogeneous to the law” or exceeding “every [legal] prescription.” Or as Badiou will 
say in Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie with regard to the event and the subject 
that is faithful to it, “every exception to the laws is the result of a law of exception.” 
 
Given that the Pauline Subject’s second-order sovereignty exposes the fiction, if not 
“mystical foundation,” of every institutionalization of every law,83 and that it questions 
and challenges the status quo such that another way of living or managing our lives is 
possible beyond the determination of State laws, one may be tempted not only to 
advocate the mobilization of the Badiouian subject but also to justify its counter-
sovereign force. However, secondary sovereignty is still sovereignty, and in that sense, 
it bears consequences similar to those that follow from all other acts or figures of 
sovereignty.84 There is therefore always call for caution when the Schmittian sovereign 
subject that decides on the law in an outside-the-law condition rears its head, even if it 
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82 Saint Paul, 60. 
83 I would argue that Badiou’s rhetoric, in speaking of the Pauline Subject’s rupture with worldly laws, in 
the sense of exposing “the law of the truth of the law” as nothing but a rupturing rather than an 
institutionalization of what has always existed, is not distant from Derrida’s elucidation of the “auto-
deconstruction” of laws as fiction or predicated on mystical rather than substantive foundations in 
Préjugé – devant la loi and Force de loi. See also Bosteels (Badiou and Politics, 95-100) for a 
comparison between Badiou and Derrida on this question of law. And while one may speak of a 
“deconstruction” of the law with Badiou’s Pauline Subject, one finds something more excessive in 
Agamben’s reading of Paul in relation to the law. For Agamben, “the messianic is not the destruction but 
the deactivation of the law, rendering the law inexecutable” (The Time that Remains, 98). However, under 
the messianic logic of the revocation of all “juridical-factical” (ibid, 26) condition, this would only open 
the way for another justice, if not a “messianic pl!r"ma [overflowing] of the law” (ibid, 108), which is 
neither appropriable by the whole nor reducible to parts of the whole. According to Agamben, “Justice 
without law is not the negation of the law, but the realization and fulfillment, the pl!r"ma, of the law” 
(ibid, 107). 
84 I believe this is also Peter Hallward’s suspicion in his « Sujet et volonté dans la philosophie d’Alain 
Badiou » (trad. Isabelle Vodoz, in Autour d’Alain Badiou, textes réunis par Isabelle Vodoz et Fabien 
Tarby, Paris : Germina, 2011, 303-331).  
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is in a second-order form, as it seems to be the case with the Badiouian subject. This is 
because what typically follows from a Schmittian sovereign figure is an imperialist will 
to disseminate the new laws he or she desires to put in place, while negating all existing 
ones, and this dissemination might take on not just a national but a transnational or even 
universal scope. Badiou seems to have a sense that the universal dimension of the 
fidelity to declare “truths” or events across cultures, differences, nationalities, and 
political factions or parties, indeed risks such imperialist contours. This can be elicited 
from Logiques des mondes, when Badiou has the suspicion that the universality of 
“truth” or event is “perhaps an imperialist fiction.”85 Of course, Badiou would argue the 
contrary. However, the fact that Badiou himself has raised the question betrays the 
sense that an unconscious but nonetheless very real imperialist possibility exists with 
regard to the subject’s work of fidelity to an event or “truth.” Posing the question then 
only appears to be an attempt to exorcise that unconscious impulse, not to say that it 
also appears like a defensive, preemptive move to deflect any charge of sovereign 
imperialism. I would say, however, that this self-reflexive meditation comes a little 
belatedly. This is because a quasi-imperialist desire has already emerged in Saint Paul. 
The text seems to betray this desire when it discusses the Pauline Subject’s work of 
love, where a certain imperialist intrusiveness and insistence can be drawn from the 
text’s rhetoric. I point to two examples: 1) “The new law [i.e. the declared fidelity to the 
event, and the process or procedure of putting in place conditions for that event] is […] 
the deployment in the direction of others”; 2) “It remains that […] fictive beings [i.e. 
beings that are not struck by the event], […] opinions, […] customs, and […] 
differences are those to which universality addresses, those towards which love is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Logiques des mondes, 20. 
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oriented, and finally, through which it must traverse such that universality itself is 
edified.”86 As I read it, the centrifugal force (but Badiou will say it is a “diagonal”87 
vector) of Pauline love or universality, as it projects itself “in the direction of others” or 
“traverse[s] through” others, is precisely suggestive of an imperialist impulse, since 
there is no consideration at all if others wish the eradication of their differences, or their 
being traversed through, in the service of edifying a universality that might be 
essentially foreign or even undesirable, and hence not universal at all, to them. 
 
One cannot therefore deny that there is a certain sovereign violence in the Pauline 
Subject’s universalist perspective and ambition, which rejects all actual and particular 
differences as they exist in the present world, and not just the violence, according to 
Badiou, of “the polemic against ‘what is due,’ against the logic of rights [droit] and of 
duty [devoir], [which] is at the heart of the Pauline refusal of works [œuvres] and the 
law.”88 To be sure, violence is in fact not particular to the Pauline Subject; it is 
consistent with Badiou’s theory of the subject. Already in the early Théorie du subject, 
there is no lack of violence in Badiou’s explication of the subject’s entry into the world. 
The “truth” that inaugurates the subject (and I make a reminder here that Badiou has not 
deployed the term “event” yet in that work), and the trace of the “truth” that the subject 
bears, as highlighted earlier, are always elements that the present world has not yet seen, 
known, or heard of. The radical newness of the subject and the trace of “truth” it bears 
will therefore not only shock the world, but also disrupt it, since, for there to be the 
subject and its declaration of the “truth,” the subject needs to create a space for itself in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Saint Paul, 95, 105. 
87 Saint Paul, 15. 
88 Saint Paul, 81. 
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the world, which would inevitably involve clearing away certain parts of the previous 
dispositif or order of things. This is why in Théorie du sujet, “destruction” is intricately 
linked to the “establishment [enracinement] of the subject” in the world.89 Badiou also 
calls this “destruction” forçage or forcing there,90 which describes how the subject 
enacts its “subject-process” in the world, creating conditions that allow elements of the 
“truth” to come to presence amidst the normalized situation of the present world. Now, 
Bruno Bosteels in his Badiou and Politics has argued that the violence of “destruction” 
in Badiou’s philosophy dissipates when one arrives at L’Être et événement (1988), 
which would imply that it would be inaccurate to attribute violence to Badiou’s Pauline 
Subject in Saint Paul (1997). However, in an interview conducted by Bosteels and Peter 
Hallward in 2002, just some years before the publication of Logiques des mondes 
(2006), Badiou will suggest that violence is always an underlying motif in his 
philosophy, and it is only inevitable that it will resurface. Hence, at a point where 
Badiou speaks of the articulation or appearance of the subject in the world, after having 
undergone the “subjectivation” by an event that previously had no chance to articulate 
itself, and now appearing as a bearer of the event’s “truth,” where previously it could 
not exist as such, Badiou will say, “All of a sudden the question of destruction 
reappears, ineluctably.” He goes on: “I am obliged here to reintroduce the theme of 
destruction, whereas in Being and Event I thought I could make do with 
supplementation alone. In order for that which does not appear in a world to suddenly 
appear within it (and appear, most often, with the maximal value of appearance), there 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Théorie du sujet, 158. 
90 Théorie du sujet, 280. 
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is a price to pay. Something must disappear. In other words, something must die, or at 
least die to the world in question.”91   
 
One could say then that it is always a question of degree of violence, at various stages 
of Badiou’s philosophy, that Badiou’s subject projects or expresses. In any case, “a 
romance with destruction,” as Pluth has commented, “remains a key temptation for any 
faithful subject.”92 In the later Logiques des mondes and Seconde manifeste pour la 
philosophie, Badiou will bring further nuances to this question of violence in discussing 
the rare or exceptional appearance of the subject in the world. In those texts, Badiou 
will argue that it is not simply via “destruction” or forçage that a subject comes into 
existence in the world, or through which one can recognize a subject. According to 
Badiou now, there are other subjects – subjects that are no less cut from the same cloth 
of the event – that will counter the subject faithful to the event such as the Pauline 
Subject. There are now, in contestation with the faithful subject [le sujet fidèle], on the 
one hand, the reactive subject [le sujet réactif], who resists radical change as introduced 
by the event and insists on the old world order; and, on the other, the obscurant subject 
[le sujet obscur], which is similar to the reactive subject in opposing the introduction of 
radical change, but goes further than the reactive subject by absolutely negating all 
bodies or subjects that bear that change, conjuring up at the same time a myth of another 
void in history, the complete embodiment of which, it claims, is only attainable by its 
subjectivity.93 In the face of opposition from either the reactive or obscurant subject, or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 See “Beyond Formalization” in Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 346. 
92 Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 7. 
93 For Badiou’s discussion of the obscurant subject as the Fascist or Nazi subject, see Seconde manifeste 
pour la philosophie, 109-112. 
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both, the faithful subject must not abdicate, however. The latter must not waver in his or 
her faith in the event and its “truth” or “truth procedures” (and neither must he or she 
ever question or doubt them), but soldier on with courage to bring justice to the event.94 
This is where the sacrificial logic becomes critical for Badiou’s theory of the subject. In 
the struggle against the reactive and obscurant subjects, it just might be a fight to the 
death for the faithful subject. And should this faithful subject lose in this fight to death, 
there is always hope that another faithful subject will carry on the fight. As Badiou 
argues, “every faithful subject,” which is to say too any faithful subject that comes after 
the defeated one, “can also re-embody [réincorporer] at the evental present [présent 
événementiel] the fragment of truth” that was suppressed especially by the obscurant 
subject.95 
 
To be precise, “re-embodiment” [réincorporation] here is also “resurrection” for 
Badiou, not so much of the particular individual human body that assumes the 
“subjectivation” of the event, but of the event itself, and the impersonal subject-forms 
that it engenders. In Badiou’s words, resurrection here “concerns a supplemental 
destination of subjective forms.”96 Again, to say that it concerns “subjective forms [my 
emphasis]” ultimately implies a certain indifference to the particular individual human 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Pluth elicits a higher degree of violence in Badiou’s philosophy of the subject. Picking up on the notion 
of terror in Badiou’s Logiques des mondes, Pluth identifies “a terroristic component” in this soldiering on 
by the faithful subject, or to put in Badiou’s rhetoric, in “pushing the ‘decisive discontinuity’ between the 
truth procedure and its world, such that the subject in question is fully ‘achieved’ and the truth procedure 
brought to completion quickly” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 152). For Pluth, this implies that “any 
significant social movement,” following Badiou’s philosophy of the subject, “is going to have its hard 
edge” (ibid, 152). Pluth certainly qualifies his observations by saying that such terror “is not necessarily a 
will-to-death” (ibid, 152), but that does not eradicate the possibility of a violent, nihilistic trajectory or 
end in the subject’s fidelity to the event. 
95 Logiques des mondes, 75. 
96 Logiques des mondes, 75. 
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body that bears the “subjectivation” and “subject-process” of the event. Of course, the 
event and the subject that it gives rise to need a corporeal body. It is after all the latter 
that facilitates the subject’s work of declaring the “truth” of the event: “borne by a real 
body, [the subject] proceeds according to the inaugural determinations of a truth.”97 But 
again, the corporeal body is at the end of it all a dispensable functional support. As 
Badiou writes, what the subject seeks is ultimately to be “indifferent to corporeal 
particularities.”98 That indifference, for Badiou, will even be constitutive of immortality 
for his subject: “being only form, and as form – in the sense of the Platonic idea, the 
subject is immortal.”99 This quest for immortality, as I see it, is tinged with a certain 
hubris, a hubris that is rather evident in the final sentences of Badiou’s Seconde 
manifeste pour la philosophie: “I call ‘eternity’ of truths this unbreakable [inentamable] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Logiques des mondes, 78. Or as Pluth puts it: “The subject is not a thinking being, it is not identical to 
consciousness – it is not even identical to an individual or a group of individuals. Yet it does depend on 
the existence of human individuals in an important fashion” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 120). 
98 Logiques des mondes, 55. At work here, as I would read it, is another sacrificial logic regarding the 
corporeal body underlying Badiou’s philosophy of the subject. The subordination and even denigration of 
the corporeal body to the event and truth procedures to elucidate the event is also hinted at by Johnston: 
“a Badiouian body […] is an ‘agent’ operating within a world on behalf of an eventual truth” (Badiou, 
!i"ek, and Political Transformations, 64, my emphasis). Johnston will also underscore that “the body” in 
Badiou’s philosophy has “no necessary relation to the common meaning of this word,” but “Badiou might 
allow that the physical bodies of people, insofar as they give themselves over to appropriation by more-
than-physical event-subject-truth sequences, can be transubstantiated from bodies as mere organic entities 
to bodies as material bearers of trans-world truths made immanent to worlds” (ibid, 65, my emphases).  
99 Logiques des mondes, 57. One could say that there is a somewhat “post-human” inclination in Badiou’s 
move here. As he writes slightly further in Logiques des mondes, and I quote here at length, “a procedure 
of truth has nothing to do with the limits of the human species, our ‘consciousness,’ our ‘finitude,’ our 
‘faculties’ […]. If one thinks of such a procedure according to solely formal determinations – as one 
thinks of the laws of the world according to mathematical formalism, one finds […] [that] it is never 
necessary to pass through the ‘real-life’ human [le « vécu » humain]. In fact, a truth is that by which ‘we,’ 
humankind, are engaged in a trans-specific procedure, a procedure that opens us to the possibility of 
being Immortals, so that a truth is certainly an experience of the inhuman [l’inhumain]” (Logiques des 
mondes, 78-80). In a different vein, Neyrat has observed that “the Badiouian subject […] is more and 
more like a humanist, if not over-humanist [surhumaniste], subject” (Aux bords du vide, 4). The humanist 
charge against Badiou certainly goes against Badiou’s aversion towards all humanist modes of thinking. 
Pluth, in contrast to Neyrat, presents a more measured perspective with regard to the question of 
humanism in Badiou. He elicits the “presence of a philosophical and theoretical anti-humanism in 
Badiou’s work” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 104). This “theoretical anti-humanism,” however, 
allows Badiou “to lead to, and to support, what is in effect his practical humanism” (ibid, 105), that is to 
say, Badiou’s faith in the human “as a practical possibility, as a possible way of living” (ibid, 12), a way, 
to be more specific, yet unthought of. 
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availability that renders them being able to be resurrected, reactivated in worlds that are 
heterogeneous to it where [truths] are created, therefore crossing over unknown oceans 
and dark millennia. Theory [of the subject] must absolutely render possible this 
migration. […] Descartes spoke of this ‘creation of eternal truths.’ I take up this 
program once again, but without the help of God…”100 
 
What little price to pay then, in submitting oneself to the sacrificial logic as a “militant 
subject-of-event”101 for the chance of immortality, or for the chance to attain eternal 
truths without God. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine that such hubris will 
only intensify the subject’s sense of exceptionality,102 which in turn will only encourage 
him or her to assert his or her law without concession, and to disseminate that law 
across others, across differences, with greater imperialist indifference. That, in all, is the 
danger of remaining with Badiou’s Pauline Subject, if not any subject under his theory, 
for the “post-secular.” As I have tried to suggest above, to go with Badiou’s Pauline 
Subject is not simply going with a passive, benign faithful subject. In its tendency for 
hubris, exceptionality, and an unconscious desire for “imperialist fiction,” the faithful 
subject can even reveal itself to be both a reactive and obscurant subject. This is 
because, in the context of the “post-secular,” the Pauline Subject, in his unwavering 
faith in the Christ-event, may just reactively deny another event that is of a non-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Seconde manifeste pour la philosophie, 144. 
101 Johnston, Badiou, !i"ek, and Political Transformations, 15.   
102 Or as Pluth puts it: “Subjects may well be immortal, then, insofar as they are linked to the creation of 
eternal truths: sadly, we individuals who work on them remain mortal” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 
179). 
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Christian religion103; he risks obscuring the advent of the latter too, when in denying it, 
he transfers or projects the “destruction” or forçage of his “subjectivation” against those 
who declare the other event, while insisting, in a mythologizing manner, on the 
supposed universal dimension of the Christ-event. With the Pauline Subject, or with any 
Badiouian subject, one is therefore distant from a “post-secular” future where 
differences are affirmed and respected. That is to say too that what the Pauline Subject 
and/ or Badiouian subject offers is barely anything new with regard to our existing 
violent “post-secular” situation.104  
 
 
2.2 After Derrida’s Foi et savoir: Towards the Animal-Reject 
Given the problems inherent in raising the issue of the subject, especially Badiou’s 
Pauline Subject, for the “post-secular,” I will now turn to Derrida’s Foi et savoir to 
elicit the reject there and suggest how it is a more adequate figure of thought for a less 
violent, future “post-secular.” Before turning to Derrida, I would like to point out that 
one may no doubt find several instances of the reject in Badiou’s philosophy of the 
subject. In fact, one may even say that a theory of the subject according to Badiou 
begins with a question of the reject. As mentioned above, it is the event that engenders 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 According to Pluth’s analysis of the subject deciding on its militant fidelity to the event and to the 
“truth procedures” to elucidate the latter, he says, “here we find Badiou using language according to 
which the subject is, precisely, deciding and forcing” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the New, 125). 
104 Amy Hollywood also puts in question the veracity of the new in Badiou’s Pauline Subject: “I see in 
[…] Badiou […] the formation of a new (how new really?) counter-fantasy to global capitalism’s 
endlessly desiring, consuming, and producing subject – that of a potent, active, implicitly male subject 
generated through an encounter with an unprecedented, absolutely singular Event” (“St Paul and the New 
Man,” 870). In place of a not-so-new “new masculine subject” (ibid, 870), Hollywood argues for “some 
new configuration of subjectivity in nonphallic, perhaps even, dare I say it, multiply sexed/ gendered or 
nonsexed/ gendered terms” (ibid, 875). 
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the Badiouian subject, but the event, as Badiou tells us, bears elements the existence of 
which has been previously denied or negated in the world. In other words, the event 
concerns elements that are essentially rejects in the face of the status quo of the present 
world. Consequently, the arrival of the event, when its advent or appearance becomes 
undeniable, if not irresistible, followed by the faithful work of the subject in declaring 
the event’s “truth” and “truth procedures,” marks nothing less than the rise of rejects. 
And after their appearances in the world, event and subject will in fact remain as rejects 
for some time, a condition that Badiou recognizes through his use of the term horlieu or 
“out-of-place” or “outside place” in Théorie du sujet to describe the subject in the 
world, or through his definition of his theory of the subject as “the emergence of the 
force where the “out-of-place” [horlieu] includes itself destructively in the space that 
excludes it.”105 But the subject faces another more sustained form of rejection, 
ironically in the face of the event, because, despite being faithful to the event in 
declaring its “truth” and despite putting in place its “truth procedures” in the world, the 
subject, as noted earlier, is always refused the entirety of the event and its “truth.”  
 
Furthermore, in bearing the “subjectivation” and the “subject-process” by the event, the 
corporeal body that the subject ineluctably inhabits is disdained, even though, as already 
noted too, a body is nevertheless required for “subjectivation” and “subject-process.” 
The corporeal body is essentially a reject in Badiou’s theory of the subject. This is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Théorie du sujet, 28, 107. On another note, that Paul is initially somewhat a reject, or horlieu in 
Badiou’s rhetoric, to Jesus’s other “original” apostles (i.e. apostles who have been personally taught by 
Jesus), is not missed by Badiou. For Badiou, Paul’s anticipation that he will not be readily accepted by 
the other apostles probably motivated his sojourn in Arabia first rather than going to Jerusalem directly 
after his “subjectivation” by the Christ-event. See also Saint Paul, 19-20, for Badiou’s reading of the 
irreducible setting-apart of Paul from the rest of the apostles.  
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exceptionally clear in Saint Paul. In speaking of the Christian subject formed by being 
struck by the Christ-event, Badiou argues that the Christian subject, struck as such, is 
also a divided subject, as the subject maintains on the one hand his or her old corporeal 
body, while, on the other hand, on a spiritual or rather, as Badiou would have it, formal 
or “ideational” plane, the subject experiences a whole new existence.106 The latter is of 
a new, veritable life, unlike the existence that the corporeal body experiences, which is 
always already conditioned or delimited by the dead, particular laws of the world, and 
therefore is not really living according to Badiou. That real, bodily aspect of the subject 
is what Badiou would really like to get rid of, as testified by his disdain for it in saying 
that “the real proves itself […] to be the trash [déchet] of every place,” and that in the 
subject’s irreducible need for a corporeal support for its material “subjectivation” and 
“subject-process” by an event, it “must assume therefore the subjectivity of trash [la 
subjectivité du déchet].”107 It seems that Badiou finds his solution to dispense with the 
corporeal body through the sacrificial logic in his theory of the subject, a logic whereby 
a subject in its corporeal form can always be given up for another since the re-
embodiment [ré-incorporation] of the event can always be taken up or resurrected by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 See chapter 5, « La division du Sujet » of Saint Paul for Badiou’s elaboration on the split between 
spirit and flesh in the subject. 
107 Saint Paul, 60. I note too that in the passage concerning both the real as “trash” and the corporeal body 
as embodying a “subjectivity of trash,” Badiou also quotes from 1 Cor. 4:13: “We have become like the 
rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day.” Badiou, of course, seeks to lift the human 
condition out of this state of trash, if not the state of being a reject, through his theory of the subject. I 
further note that this verse from Corinthians is also taken up by Agamben in his reading of Paul. Once 
again, Agamben’s reading takes on a different trajectory from Badiou’s. As Agamben reads it, there is no 
lifting of oneself out of the state of trash, the state of being lost, abandoned and forgotten. There is no 
movement from being a reject to becoming-subject here. In fact, Agamben even suggests that there is no 
more subject once the messianic calling is made, and especially when a response to that call is in place: 
“The messianic vocation dislocates and, above all, nullifies the entire subject” (The Time that Remains, 
41). The “as not” of the reject or trash here “has nothing to do with an ideal” (ibid, 41). Paradoxically, 
according to Agamben, it is by remaining as rejects, as trash, as the lost or forgotten, that one’s existence 
as such may be remembered: “The exigency of the lost does not entail being remembered and 
commemorated; rather, it entails remaining in us and with us as forgotten, and in this way and only in this 
way, remaining unforgettable” (ibid, 40).  
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another subject at another place and time. As I read it, this sacrificial logic only 
reinforces the sense that the subject is irreducibly a reject, as the preeminence of the 
eternity of the event and its “truth” is held above and over everything else.  
 
To break with the denigrating subordination to the event, Neyrat has suggested thinking 
the Badiouian subject in terms of a subject to [sujet à], rather than subject of [sujet de], 
the event.108 I believe that Neyrat’s move here is very close to Nancy’s philosophical 
inclination towards the preposition à, for example, when Nancy rethinks being or l’être 
specifically in terms of être-à or “being-to” in order to signal being’s always openness 
to others, or when Nancy rethinks faith in terms of adoring or adorer à, also in order to 
signal a movement of openness towards the unknown, unanticipated other.109 It is 
probably with a similar understanding of the preposition à or “to” that Neyrat proposes 
to think the Badiouian subject in terms of a subject-to-the-event so as to disentangle the 
subject from always being restricted to a retroactive movement with regard to the event. 
The retroactive trajectory of the Badiouian subject, or “the fidelity to the past” as Neyrat 
calls it, “would be […] a betrayal of the event,”110 especially of the newness, or even the 
present condition, of the event, since, as Badiou himself also states, the event is 
something that hovers over the present and projects itself into the future as well. 
Reformulating the Badiouian subject as a subject-to-the-event then, according to 
Neyrat, would place the subject in greater proximity with the event in its present or 
future trajectory. Changing the preposition from “of” [de] to “to” [à] may perhaps free 
the subject from a delimiting retroactive orientation in relation to the event. However, I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Aux bords du vide, 29. 
109 See note 41. 
110 Aux bords du vide, 28. 
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suspect it still will not free the subject from a closed, monolithic fidelity to a singular 
event, or moderate its militant or even imperialist force against those who do not share 
the same faith in that particular event. For that, I would argue that one must drop the 
subject altogether.111 It would even take more than a reject. It would require an auto-
reject, that third turn of the reject that is prepared to question, self-critique, rethink, and 
even at times abandon its insistent fidelity to a particular event and the “truth 
procedures” that it puts in place in equally insistent manner. It would only be in this 
manner that the auto-reject is also always open to other events, and not fixed by a 
singular event.  
 
As seen, Badiou, however, is not prepared to lose the subject, and his persistence in 
remaining with the subject, as I have shown, can be problematic not only for our present 
“post-secular” situation but also for thinking another future, less violent “post-secular” 
world. For the latter, I have said that the reject can be a more adequate figure of 
thought. And to see how a (nascent or latent) figure of the reject can work towards that 
less violent “post-secular” future, we have to return to (post-)structuralist thinkers, 
thinkers who are invested in the “deconstruction” of being, the truth, and the subject, so 
as to unveil what remains unthought or marginalized in the foundation of that 
metaphysical trinity. We have to return to thinkers such as Derrida and Cixous 
therefore. As said, this section will be on Derrida’ Foi et savoir, where I will elicit the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Pluth has noted that Badiou, as he “persist[s] in using the term subject” (Badiou: A Philosophy of the 
New, 105), potentially runs the risk of developing a theory of a humanist subject, something that Badiou 
rejects. On that note, Pluth poses the question that I posed above, albeit in a different vein and with a 
different response in sight: “if Badiou is after a philosophy that contests the classical humanist subject’s 
privilege, and if it is the case that the subject for him is not something or someone who knows the truth, 
or perhaps anything in particular, then why is one of Badiou’s primary objectives nevertheless the 
development of a theory of the subject? Why not drop the topic altogether […]?” (ibid, 105)  
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figure of the reject for the “post-secular.” In doing so, I am also suggesting that there is 
a certain force in reintroducing Derrida’s text, written in the 90s, into the discourse on 
the “post-secular,” and to rethink it for a future “post-secular” world. Derrida’s Foi et 
savoir remains relevant to our contemporary “post-secular” world because the spirit of 
the “post-secular” can be said to be an echo, if not an extension, of the context in which 
Foi et savoir situates itself, that is to say, a world witnessing a “return to religion” or 
even the “a war of religions.”112 And if we are seeing the extension of “a war of 
religions” into contemporary “post-secular” violence, this is, according to Habermas, 
but a consequence of us having felt that there is something missing in our contemporary 
state of knowledge to account for the undeniable or even irreducible desire for the 
religious, for “what cries out to heaven,”113 in a world that has seemingly become-
reason.114  
 
In a way, Derrida’s Foi et savoir has already provided a response to account for what 
Habermas has stated to be “missing.” For Derrida, it is not so much about adding to 
existing knowledge to explain or understand the rise or resurrection of religion in the 
secularized world, but to recognize that despite their differences (which need to be 
affirmed and respected), religion and reason, or faith and knowledge, proceed via 
similar ways. In Derrida’s terms, religion and reason, faith and knowledge, proceed via 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Derrida, Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la « religion » aux limites de la simple raison, Paris: Seuil, 
1996, §29: 45/ §23: 33. Translations from this text are mine. Future references to this text will be 
indicated, in parentheses, by section number followed by page number.   
113 Habermas, “An Awareness of What Is Missing,” An Awareness of What Is Missing, 19. 
114 That something is missing also in the contemporary world of secularity as Taylor understands it is 
evident when Taylor writes, not so much in a negative or even frustrated sense as Habermas does, that 
this secularity “is a condition in which our experience of and search for fullness occurs; and this is 
something we all share, believers and unbelievers alike” (A Secular Age, 19). 
 ! 192 
a certain paradoxical autoimmune reiterability.115 In other words, each begins by 
maintaining a vigilant will to preserve the sanctity or purity of itself, guarding against 
any contamination from what each believes to be foreign to itself; at the same time, 
each projects a desire to disseminate itself as widely as possible, so as to assure itself of 
its vitality or life-force, and in order for not only its practitioners or believers, but also 
for others, especially other new believers or practitioners, to bear witness and testify to 
its force and power.116 It is the latter desire to reiterate itself elsewhere where the 
paradoxical notion of auto-immunity is located, since in desiring to spread its word – be 
it the word of religion or science – to a greater multitude, it would need to go to the 
outside, opening itself to what it had perceived as antagonistically distinct from itself, 
risking therefore the desired immunity of its inner sanctity or purity.117 This auto-
dissemination into the outside puts in effect the process of autoimmunity, since it 
precisely destroys all immunity from the outside. And yet, this paradoxical autoimmune 
operation does not at all halt the projection of violence against what it had deemed to be 
markedly alien from itself, a violence that stems from its incessant will to immunity. In 
autoimmunity, there is also “autoimmune aggression” as Derrida tells us elsewhere, an 
aggression that “terrorizes most”118: against the supplemental need to be hospitable to 
others, there remains the force of rejection against others, a force that has even become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 To return to Nancy a little here, what is shared in common between faith and reason, for Nancy, is the 
drive for the infinite. As Nancy argues, “all religion, to be sure, is traversed by a motion, a leap [élan]” 
under “the sign of the infinite [l’infini], itself infinite, spurred from itself [s’envoie de lui-même].” And 
not just all religion, but also, as Nancy goes on to say, “all types of knowledge [savoir], science or 
philosophy: for we will not even be in the movement of whatever knowledge [connaissance] if the desire 
for infinity [le désir de l’infini] did not [first] push us there” (L’Adoration, 61).    
116 See Foi et savoir, §29: 46. 
117 See Foi et savoir, §37: 67 n.23. 
118 “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,” interview with Giovanna Borradori, trans. Pascale-
Anne Brault and Michael Nass, in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 95. 
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structural to religion (and knowledge). It is because of such “autoimmune aggression” 
in religion that “rejection, as well as an apparent appropriation,” according to Derrida in 
Foi et savoir, can take the form of a structural and invasive [envahissante] religiosity” 
(§45: 86).119 
 
What is missing therefore – in a “post-secular” world where the articulations and re-
articulations of religions are met with resistances not only from within religion itself but 
also from the world of science and reason, not forgetting too that “post-secular” 
religions are likewise militantly contesting the world of science and reason – is perhaps 
the recognition of the aggressive autoimmune reiterability, the structure of rejection, in 
both faith and reason. This structure of rejection needs to be critiqued, if we are to move 
from a violent “post-secular” that does not know how to accept differences – differences 
between religions, differences between faith and knowledge, etc., to a “post-secular” 
world where differences are affirmed and respected. We must also be vigilant that the 
latter is not achieved only in a superficial manner, where we accept differences only if 
they are passive differences, that is to say, differences that play down their distinctive or 
rather potentially conflicting edges and integrate or homogenize themselves to us.120 
This would not only be a superficial but even hegemonic “post-secular” world. The 
future “post-secular” world that we must work towards must be one where differences 
do not need to smooth out their edges, where differences as such can coexist without 
destructively negating or denigrating one another. I have tried to demonstrate in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 See also §46: 87, where Derrida states that “religious reaction” is constituted by “rejection and 
assimilation, introjections and incorporation, indemnity and mourning […].”  
120 In the earlier section on Badiou, I have noted his critique in his L’Éthique of such superficial “right to 
difference” or claims to “multiculturalism.”  
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section above on Badiou that a figure of thought such as the subject does not really help 
us move from the structure of rejection to this future, less violent “post-secular” world. I 
will now try to argue here that it is with the reject that we can make that transition, a 
figure that I find intimated by Derrida in Foi et savoir. I will proceed by showing how 
Derrida’s critique of the structure and force of rejection in religion allows the figure of 
the reject to emerge. 
 
Religion/ (Auto-)Rejection 
If there is a structure of rejection in religion (and I focus here on religion, and not on 
reason or knowledge, since the question of religion is the concern of Foi et savoir, and 
since what is also at stake in the question of the “post-secular” is more the role and 
place, and force, of religion than that of science), it stems, as said, from its will to keep 
its supposed “essence” or inner life sacred and pure, untouched or uncontaminated by 
what it regards or decides as its outside. In other words, it is religion’s militant claim to 
the sole right and authority to speak about religion in religion’s own name that it takes 
on a force of rejection. As Derrida has noted, non-Christians tend to be precluded from 
partaking in any discourse on the Christian religion: their responses would not count in 
any discussion on what the Christian faith means or could mean for the present and the 
future.121 Religion has also protected itself with respect to the medium through which its 
discourse is transmitted and through which it disseminates itself. In that regard, it is 
only until very recently, as Derrida observes in Foi et savoir, that religion has come to 
no longer resist tele-technologies and their electronic and networked dimension as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Cf. §34: 56: “the history of the word “religion” had to prohibit, in principle, all non-Christians to name 
“religion” […].” 
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potential spaces where religion can spread its word and where its discourse can be kept 
alive. In short, it is in the stubborn insistence, or what Derrida will call bêtise,122 on the 
supposed authority of its own voice to speak about itself, and on the tradition of how it 
addresses itself or how it is addressed, that rejection – particularly rejection against 
others – becomes something structural in religion. 
 
But Derrida will underscore that what eventually plays out in religion is auto-rejection, 
even though religion might not be conscious of this or acknowledge it. Auto-rejection 
plays out in that very process of spreading its word in order to keep its inner sacred 
“essence” alive, in the process of transmitting its word to a greater number of people, 
seeking to convert former non-believers into witnesses of its life-force not only for the 
present time but also for the future. It is in that process that religion takes on the risk of 
introducing someone or something into its domain that might undermine it from 
within.123 In this respect, it risks losing, if not auto-rejects, its claim to indemnity.124 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 In Derrida’s seminars collected as La bête et le souverain, he argues that the supposed sovereign claim 
to speak for oneself, in one’s own voice and in one’s own name, in a language he or she determines to be 
the only authoritative means to address or respond to oneself, does not really establish the sovereign 
status of the human proper or what is proper to human. Instead, there is something bête about it, not just 
something stubborn or even stupid, but also something beastly or bestial. Following Deleuze, he would 
say that what follows from such sovereign claims would usually be tyranny and cruelty. This animal side 
of things, as it will be seen, will have bearings for the relevance of Derrida’s Foi et savoir to a “post-
secular” future. 
123 Call this “radical atheism” if you will, as Martin Hägglund has done, defining “radical atheism” as an 
“unconditional affirmation of survival,” and arguing that “the so-called desire for immortality [in 
conventional atheism] dissimulates a desire for survival that precedes it and contradicts from within” 
(Radical Atheism, 2, 1). Given such definition of “radical atheism,” I do not think, however, that the 
definition exists outside of religion or the religious – as Hägglund apparently suggests, since he bases his 
argument about “radical atheism” on refuting any “religious ‘turn’ in Derrida’s thinking” (ibid, 1). In 
other words, his argument operates alongside religion or the religious, even if it is in order to negate it. As 
such, I ask if there can be atheism that is absolutely evacuated of the religious. In the opening to this 
section, I have addressed Nancy’s argument that any so-called atheism is but an extension of the “auto-
deconstruction” of religion. I would think too that Derrida would also agree that one cannot clearly define 
what is atheistic and what is religious. There is no clear frontier between the two, and each finds aspects 
of oneself in the other and vice versa. What is one to make of “radical atheism” then? Does one “save” 
Derrida from any “religious turn” by adding the adjective “radical” to “atheism”? Does the adjective 
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According to Derrida, such auto-rejection is something of a quasi-suicidal 
autoimmunity, a gesture that implies taking out its own force of rejection: “all auto-
protection of the unscathed [l’indemne], the saintly and the uncontaminated [sain(t)], 
the unharmed [sauf], the sacred (heilig, holy) must protect itself against its own 
protection, its own policing [son propre police], its own power of rejection, its own in 
short [son propre tout court], that is to say its own immunity” (§37: 67). In that sense, 
and as Derrida has also instructed us in La Voix et le phénomène on the question of 
“auto-affection,”125 the auto in auto-rejection does not concern only the self, but the 
other too: the other partakes as well, if not more than the self, in the undoing of the 
supposed sovereignty, or sovereign ipseity, of the self. But it is this distribution of the 
auto with the other that religion refuses to abdicate completely its power or force of 
rejection. Religion might accept auto-rejection in method, in service of its 
dissemination, but it hardly accepts it in principle, especially, as said, that part of 
sharing auto-rejection with the other. Realizing that it loses all sovereign claims to the 
monolithic indemnity of itself in autoimmunity, religion from then on builds for itself a 
defensive narrative of being under the threat of violation from the outside, which 
becomes an alibi, justification, and pretext for the (preemptive) resurrection of its initial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
really allow a reading of Derrida to go beyond religion or the religious? I doubt it, since, as Hägglund’s 
work itself makes evident too, there is no avoiding the irreducible religious references or traces of 
religious thinking in Derrida, which is not to deny Derrida’s endeavor to prevent them from being 
regulating or determining horizons for a future thought of religion.   
124 It loses too its claim to any spiritual organicity or organic spirituality, in contradistinction to all 
inorganic and mechanical aspects of the world of hard, technical sciences, as it proceeds almost 
automatically and mechanically with its autoimmune trajectory, according to Derrida (see especially §37 
through §40).  
125 See La Voix et le phénomène, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, 92. 
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power of rejection with greater force, if not in more terrifying manifestations. In 
Derrida’s terms, this is the “perversion” of autoimmunity.126 
 
Derrida of course does not agree with religion’s violent rejection and counter-rejection 
emerging from its “autoimmune aggression” against others. In fact, for Derrida, what 
would have been critical for religion is for religion to stay, if not go further, with auto-
rejection, except without the reactionary counter-rejection against others. One must 
recognize that there is no religion in itself per se, no sacrosanct essence of religion,127 
since, in Derrida’s analysis, religion’s desire to preserve its sacredness, its desire to 
maintain sole authority to address, respond, or partake in a discourse on religion itself, 
and its desire to see itself trace itself over time and space in a manner as infinite as 
possible, are already gestures mobilized by systems of thought otherwise of religion, 
systems of thought such as science or philosophy. It makes no sense then for religion to 
insist on its own way of thinking about itself, to insist on certain determined ways of 
speaking about itself, and to insist on the prohibition of interventions from others. These 
are just phantasms of the institution of religion. For Derrida, these bring nothing new to 
religion: there is no future for or of religion, if religion holds on to the phantasm of its 
sovereign ipseity. This is where Derrida insists on auto-rejection in religion, an auto-
rejection that always opens to the other, an auto-rejection that does not pervert itself into 
a reactionary violence against others. As Derrida says in Foi et savoir, “one would not 
speak of [religion] if one spoke in its name, if one was contented to reflect on religion 
speculatively, religiously” (§27: 38-39). One must “break with [religion],” “to suspend !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 “Autoimmunity,” 108. 
127 According to Derrida, too, it will be an “error” to think that one knows what religion “is” or to know 
much about religion (see §33: 53 and §35: 61). 
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for an instant religious belonging [l’appartenance religieuse]”; “it would be necessary 
in any case to take into account, in an a-religious or even irreligious manner, if possible, 
of what religion presently may be, and of what is said or done, of what arrives at this 
very moment, in the world, in history, in its name. There where religion no longer 
reflects nor at times assumes or bears its name” (§27: 39). It is also there where a figure 
of the reject may be elicited from Derrida’s text.    
 
Rejects 
As I would argue, the reject is no stranger to religion, especially Christian religion. One 
can immediately think of Adam and Eve as rejects when they were banished from Eden 
after eating the fruit of the tree of Knowledge. In my understanding of the reject, they 
would constitute the first turn of the reject, figures that are abandoned, exiled, or 
banished. But even before Adam and Eve come to be regarded as rejects, one could 
even be audacious to think that God was some kind of reject too when Adam and Eve 
defied his commandment to not eat the forbidden fruit. One can also turn to chapter 14 
of Luke and see the mobilization of the active reject when it is said that only those who 
reject their families and reject even their own lives can be true followers of Christ.128 
These would very much be rejects of the second turn, figures that first exercise a force !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 See Derrida’s Donner la mort, Paris : Galilée, 1999, 92-93, for his take, following Kierkegaard’s 
reading, on this particular chapter of Luke. In Derrida’s reading, hating or rejecting one’s loved ones is 
but the strongest proof of love. Or, as Derrida puts it, under the rubric of sacrifice – especially Abraham’s 
sacrifice of Isaac – in obeisance to God: “If I put to death [donne la mort] what I hate, this is not a 
sacrifice. I must sacrifice what I love. I must come to hate what I love, in the very moment, at the instance 
of putting it to death [donner la mort]. I must hate and betray my own, that is to say, put them to death 
through sacrifice [leur donner la mort dans le sacrifice], not because I hate them – that would be too easy, 
but because I love them. I must hate them as I love them. Hate would not be hate – this would be too easy, 
if it hates the hateful. It is necessary for hate to hate and betray the most loved. Hate can only be hate as 
the sacrifice of love to love [La haine ne peut être la haine, ce ne peut être que le sacrifice de l’amour à 
l’amour]. What one does not love, one has nothing to hate it for, to betray it in perjury, to put it to death 
[à lui donner la mort]” (Donner la mort, 92-93).  
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of renunciation so overwhelming and overbearing that they are subsequently rendered 
rejects by others around them. And one may find a combination of the passive reject 
and auto-reject in the figure of the homo tantum at the heart of the psalms of David, the 
figure that recognizes that he is rejected by all around him, and is left alone 
existentially, as only human, just human, to cry out to God. In short, one could argue 
that the reject figures in the Bible. But the pertinent question here is if the reject or any 
aspect of the reject is at work in Derrida’s deconstructive understanding of religion in 
Foi et savoir.  
 
Perhaps a quick candidate would be the figure of “radical evil” that Derrida mentions in 
that text. “Radical evil” there is not so much that which Kant speaks about in Religion 
within the Limits of Reason, which is a question of the inner heart of oneself and its 
fidelity to what Kant calls the universal categorical imperative to act morally. For Kant, 
“radical evil” manifests itself when the inclination towards that imperative is perverted. 
In Derrida’s text, “radical evil” takes on a more contemporary meaning, naming certain 
fundamentalist religious groups that deploy extreme violence such as terrorism in order 
to declare their rejection of other religions. One finds echoes of such “radical evil” in 
our contemporary post-9/11 world, echoes that are made to resound no less by the Bush 
Administration’s appellation, immediately after 9/11, of “the axis of evil” with regard to 
enemies of the American State. “Radical evil” in that sense quickly became a term to 
label terrorist groups predicated on militant or jihadist Islamism. But what the State did 
not and does not readily acknowledge is that the term “radical evil” is also a means to 
politically define other states or religious groups not aligned to the Christian faith that 
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resist the global hegemony of American political economy, especially that under the 
Bush Administration, underlying which has been a no less hegemonic, fundamentalist 
Christian faith or ideology.  
 
“Radical evil” as such would seem to be a manifestation of the second turn of the reject, 
i.e. the reject that either initiates an extreme force of rejection against others or 
retaliates with a similar force against an oppressive or repressive hegemonic entity. That 
might be the case, but I bring to mind again the aim or stakes of rereading Derrida’s Foi 
et savoir and theorizing the reject today, which is to think of a future “post-secular” 
world of reduced violence. To that end, I would say that one should hold back 
projecting the active force of the reject. I do not mean that one should repress that 
aspect of the reject. That aspect remains necessary, especially when a certain religion or 
mode of thought is targeted to be suppressed or repressed by a dominant force. Except it 
must not be expressed in such violent or terroristic ways that certain fundamentalist 
religious groups no doubt mobilize, ways that bring along with it the fatal cost, 
collateral or not, of innocent civilian lives. In that case, I would say that the reject that is 
needed for a less violent “post-secular” world is one that hinges more on its passive 
turn, one that rejects any impulse to (counter-) violence. Weak as the force of such a 
reject may be, I would posit that it is more critical, for that future “post-secular” world, 
to just articulate the existence or presence of (passive) rejects in the world, rejects that 
are rendered so by sovereign, dominant, hegemonic forces.129 This would raise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 On the “weak force,” i.e. one without the militant, police, or legal force of the sovereign State and 
juridical institutions, but is nonetheless critical for providing a glimpse, or opening up all possibilities, to 
a future world of peace and justice according to all in their respective heterogeneity, see the concluding 
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awareness of the oppressive actions of the latter and pressure them, just by the 
exposition of rejects, to abdicate such actions.130 
 
I would argue that passive rejects are articulated in Foi et savoir, and they are figures 
articulated by Derrida before the reference to “radical evil” – two figures that stand 
before “radical evil” then, and which are in effect not so different from each other. They 
are the messianic figure, or more precisely, the messianic figure that is of “messianicity 
without messianism,” and khôra. According to Derrida, if religion wants to have a 
chance at a future, that is to say, for its discourse to continue into the future, or for it to 
be constantly thought about or thought through anew, it must have an element of the 
event. The event, in Derridean terms, as is well known now, is that which arrives, in and 
of the future, in its complete surprise, not programmed, unanticipated, and 
incalculable.131 For religion (and, I would add, the “post-secular” world) to have a 
future then, religion (and the “post-secular” world) must be open to such an event. For 
Derrida, it is the messianic figure without messianism that will lead religion (and the 
“post-secular” world) towards an opening to the event. It is with this messianic figure 
without messianism opening itself to the event that one could speak of a passive reject 
here, since its opening to the event in the event’s complete incalculable nature would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
part of Derrida’s interview with the BRussells Tribunal, « Pour une justice à venir », the foreword to 
Voyous (Paris : Galilée, 2003), and more generally Force de loi [1994] (Paris : Galilée, 2005).   
130 I have italicized “just” in order to underscore a form of justice that is immanent and without delay, that 
is to say, the justice rendered to anyone or anything by the fact of its immanent existence, regardless if it 
expresses itself or not through a rationalized logos. In other words, justice here is not dependent on the 
anthropocentric and anthropologic linguistic performativity that governs all present jurisprudence, and 
which only delays and sometimes denies justice to some, especially those who do not share or do not 
have access to that linguistic performativity.  
131 That aspect of the event as coming from the future distinguishes the event according to Derrida from 
that of Badiou’s, which, as mentioned in the previous section, bears aspects of the past or the present, 
aspects whose existences were previously refused but are now, as an event, undeniable. 
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mean that it (auto-)rejects all subjective determination or decision as to what is to 
come.132 It neither selects nor denies what or who arrives, but just lets be what or who 
arrives. Underlying this figure hence is a mode of justice that opens to “a 
universalizable culture of singularities” (§22: 31). In this passivity to the event, the 
messianic figure without messianism also has to accept the risk that it is something or 
someone of “radical evil” that arrives, which can consequently precipitate into the 
complete, denigrating rejection of the messianic figure by that “radical evil.”133 That 
would be the suffering, the passion, that the messianic figure without messianism as 
(auto-)reject will have to bear, in both its passivity before, and passion for, the event.  
 
What is to be done with this “radical evil” that arrives then? In a sense, there is nothing 
to be done on the part of the messianic figure without messianism. He or she can only 
have faith that the trajectory of who or what comes is traced by peace and justice.134 He 
or she will just/ just have to have faith that the other who comes bears likewise the 
passive reject or even auto-reject in himself, herself, or itself, such that it will not 
project any aggressive force of rejection against its host. In this case, one could question 
if thinking the reject becomes something programmatic, seeking to determine the 
contour of the encounter between the messianic figure without messianism and the 
future. In a way, the very thinking of the reject admittedly has a programmatic contour, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 In Spectres de Marx, Derrida will say further that this messianic figure will not “pre-determine, pre-
figure, [and] pre-name” what or who arrives (Spectres de Marx : l’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la 
nouvelle Internationale. Paris : Galilée, 1993, 266). On the impossibility of knowing or even speculating 
the latter, that is to say the rejection of all forms of knowledge granted to the messianic figure regarding 
the latter, see also Derrida’s Voyous, 123. 
133 One could perhaps say that this opening to “radical evil” in Derrida’s event makes it more radical than 
Badiou’s, which generally refuses to think the event, if it is an event, as evil. This refusal has been noted 
and critiqued by Mehdi Belhaj Kacem in his Après Badiou (Paris: Grasset, 2011). 
134 See §21: 30. 
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just as Derrida’s thought of a “messianicity without messianism” is in certain ways 
undoubtedly programmatic too (in the sense of rejecting all messianism, for example). 
But the thinking of the reject, like the thought of “messianicity without messianism,” 
does not preclude the possibility that the future or the other that arrives is not a reject in 
any way. And even if it is, there is no telling how the encounter will play out between 
two rejects or auto-rejects. The question, with regard to a theory of the reject, will 
always remain: what will happen in an encounter or meeting between two rejects, when 
each of them, in their own heterogeneous ways, rejects any move that will decidedly 
determine the outcome of the encounter? This question, which can only follow from the 
suspension of decision, if not from hesitation, taken differently from both sides of both 
rejects when they encounter each other, will open the thinking of the reject to what 
remains unforeseen or unforeseeable in any present theorization of the reject.  
 
In its opening to the event, I have said that the messianic figure without messianism 
takes on a contour of a passive reject. However, a certain active force of rejection in this 
reject must not be ignored, which is its rejection of any appurtenance to any religion, 
especially to any Abrahamic religion: it is “without prophetic prefiguration” and “does 
not depend on any messianism, [it] does not follow any determined revelation, it does 
not properly belong to any Abrahamic religion” (§21: 30; §21: 31).135 And yet, its 
rejection of any allegiance, alliance, or affiliation with any religion does not imply any 
negation or denigration of religion. What this rejection seeks is simply walking away !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 I refer to Spectres de Marx again, where Derrida explicates that the emphasis on the adjectival 
“messianic” is meant to “designate a structure of experience rather than a religion” (Spectres de Marx 
266). In an earlier passage there, Derrida would also link the “messianic” to “a certain emancipating 
affirmation […], a certain experience of the promise that one can try to free it from all dogmatic and even 
all metaphysico-religious determination, from all messianism” (ibid, 146-148). 
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from the dogmatic or even doctrinal force of religious institutions and their systems of 
thought. Put another way, what the messianic figure without messianism as reject seeks 
is its freedom to depart from the delimiting dimensions of religious thought. And in its 
departure, it seeks, in turn, another place, another space, free from the delimitations of 
dogmatic or doctrinal religious thinking, or even evacuated from the latter, so as to 
think through religion anew differently. It is on this question of seeking another space 
that the messianic figure without messianicity turns toward khôra.  
 
Khôra, according to Derrida, will be that place where new thoughts or new ways of 
thinking (about religion) receive, in their instants of articulation or arrival, what Derrida 
calls “unconditional hospitality,” which is hospitality that does not discriminate or 
calculate what or who arrives. In other words, it is a space that rejects past or existing 
thoughts or ways of thinking as obstacles to the new. And again, like the messianic 
figure without messianism, rejection here does not involve denigrating or negating past 
or existing thoughts and ways of thinking. Khôra rejects them only in a way that it does 
not allow them to become its defining traits or horizons, not allowing them to become 
regulating ideas that would discourage the arrival of the new in its complete alterity or 
heterogeneity.136 And it should be said too that it does not allow what arrives as new to 
eradicate the old or the existing, or to allow it to become a new force of resistance 
against what comes to disagree with it. To that end, in order to be neutral – rather than 
to be immune or to claim to a sacrosanct indemnity – to all that arrives, Derrida will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 At this point, I note that khôra, once again, finds its affinity with the messianic figure without 
messianicity, since, as Derrida says in the earlier Khôra text, it takes on a contour of an abyssal “gaping 
opening” (Khôra, Paris : Galilée, 1993, 45), which means that it willingly risks the arrival of something 
like “radical evil.” 
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state that khôra can never be defined, determined, or identified as this or that place. 
Khôra rejects localizing itself: it rejects determining a place of or for itself. It is no 
place or a non-place.137 It is almost an impossible place, and yet always necessary to 
claim a proximity to it, or an approximation of it, in order to give voice or place to the 
new.  
 
This impossible but necessary place, to deploy Derrida’s rhetoric, is played out in the 
philosophical personage of Socrates in Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Timaeus in Khôra, 
and it is perhaps in this personage where khôra takes on a clearer contour of a reject or 
even auto-reject. According to Derrida, Socrates assumes a semblance of khôra when 
he acknowledges that he in fact does not occupy, own, or has the right to access the 
authorized space to speak, for example, about politics, or even philosophy. If he speaks 
on politics or philosophy, then he does so by pretending to assume such a space. For 
Derrida, at play here is an “auto-exclusion.”138 But by doing so, another form of 
rejection is also in place since, in Derrida’s analysis, Socrates also points to the 
phantasm of the institutionalized space from which politicians exercise their presumed 
authority to determine the discourse and practice of politics. In other words, khôra 
unveils that there is no one place – plus d’un lieu – where the supposed “essence” of a 
subject – be it politics, religion, or philosophy – finds its place, a place where a 
supposed right way to conduct a discourse on it can take place.139 For a future thinking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 Non-lieu, as Derrida puts it in Khôra. 
138 Khôra, 57.  
139 See Khôra, 55-58. Michael Naas, not forgetting that khôra is a feminine maternal or nursing figure, 
has also noted that for Derrida in Foi et savoir, “Khôra is precisely that which or she who, while opening 
up the space for all phantasm, for the phenomena of the phantasm, constantly eludes and interrupts the 
phantasm of phenomena, including every anthropomorphic or theological phantasm” (“Comme si, 
comme ça,” in Derrida From Now On, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 202). Naas’s study 
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of religion, or even for a future of religion, one must therefore reject (without 
eradicating) any adherence to or grounding on any particular site of religion or religious 
institution, but move towards the non-place or opening of khôra, which is that 
“spacing” that does not let itself be “dominated by any theological, ontological, or 
anthropological instant,” that “remains absolutely impassible and heterogeneous to all 
the processes of historical revelation or anthropo-theological experience” (§24: 34).  
 
But perhaps the most radical figure of the reject that can be found in Foi et savoir is the 
figure of Abraham that Derrida invokes there. This Abraham is not the Abraham that 
Derrida discusses in Donner la mort, that is to say, the Abraham that obeys without 
questioning God’s commandment to sacrifice Isaac. The Abraham of Foi et savoir says 
no to God’s commandment: “an Abraham who would from then on refuse to sacrifice 
his son […]” (§37: 65). As such, this Abraham breaks with, if not rejects, in the 
language of Donner la mort, the “absolute alliance” with God.140 This Abraham refuses 
to respond responsibly to God’s test of not only his obeisance but also his maintenance 
of the secret link between himself and God as “the absolute singularity.”141 But 
Abraham’s response and responsibility in the original story is in fact, as Derrida has 
argued following his reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, an irresponsibility !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of Foi et savoir has also picked out the feminine figures of Gradiva and Persephone. In many ways, 
feminine figures are no doubt figures of the reject. As Derrida himself will note at the presentation of his 
text at Capri, not only are Muslim interveners absent, but female philosophers or intellectuals are also 
seemingly excluded from the discussion on religion. In Naas’s reading, Gradiva and Persephone come to 
symbolize the rejection of any acknowledgement of the real lives of females by male figures, especially 
those who claim to a phantasmatic sovereign power over others, anxious at the same time to eradicate the 
imaginary threat posed by others, especially the symbolic threat of castration posed by feminine figures, 
an anxiety that precipitates too often into senseless violence against women.   
140 Donner la mort, 172. 
141 See especially Donner la mort, 165: “the secret of the secret […] does not consist in hiding something, 
in revealing the truth, but to respect the absolute singularity, the infinite separation of what links me or 
exposes me to the unique, to the one as to the other, to the One as to the Other.” 
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in the face of a general ethics toward Isaac and the rest of the human(e) world when 
Abraham takes up the role of the executioner or even murderer in what could or would 
be “the worst sacrifice” [le pire sacrifice]. Instead of going with this responsible-
irresponsible Abraham, the Abraham of Foi et savoir puts in suspension any response or 
responsibility to God’s commandment and God’s “absolute singularity.” I would even 
say that this Abraham puts in suspension the différance between the responsibility to 
God and the irresponsibility to mortal beings and the mortal world. This time, he refuses 
the subjectivity given by God through God’s secret call to respond to the commandment 
to sacrifice Isaac in refusing to respond “here I am” [me voici]. However, this does not 
mean that this Abraham falls back to the arms of Isaac and the ethical human world: 
there is no telling if he would do that. There is another secret at work in Abraham this 
time therefore, a secret more radical perhaps than the secret he has with God when he 
accepted the commandment to sacrifice Isaac, a secret that is no longer “unilaterally 
assigned by God,”142 a secret that perhaps God does not even know. That is not to say 
however that a decision of a sovereign subjective type is at work here, since there is 
essentially no Kierkegaardian “mad decision” on Abraham’s part to go either with God 
or with the human world.143 Decision, and therefore subjectivity as well, is effectively 
put in suspension here. I would refrain therefore from saying that a subject is at work 
here. As I would put it, a reject is in place instead: a reject that rejects any alliance with 
the “absolute singularity” of God and any allegiance to one’s mortal community; an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 Donner la mort, 164. 
143 On subjectivity that is given by God, or in assuming it through God, when one partakes in a secret pact 
with God, see Donner la mort, 147. See also Donner la mort, 126, on the difference of this subjectivity 
with “the (Kantian) autonomy of what I see myself do in complete freedom [toute liberté] and of a law 
that I give myself.” 
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auto-reject as well, since it refuses the force of subjectivity to decide to go with one or 
the other, or one and the other, but remains in the undecidability between the two.  
 
At this point, one could perhaps let this Abraham resonate with another figure that also 
appears to be something of the reject (even though I will demonstrate in the next 
chapter that this figure is somewhat far from the reject as I understand it): Melville’s 
literary figure, Bartleby the scrivener, who states quite simply but enigmatically: “I 
would prefer not to.” This is not an arbitrary invocation since Derrida does relate this 
Bartleby to Abraham in Donner la mort. In the context of Foi et savoir, it would 
however not be Abraham who says “I would prefer not to” after having accepted God’s 
commandment, but another Abraham-Bartleby who says to himself “I would prefer not 
to” when given the commandment. In this case, one (including God) really “does not 
know what [this other Abraham] wants or means, one is ignorant of what he does not 
want to do or what he does not mean or want to say.”144 The “I would prefer not to” of 
this other Abraham-Bartleby then “evokes the future without prediction or promise; it 
enunciates nothing that was hypostasized [arrêté], determinable, positive or 
negative.”145 This Abraham is no longer “the unique Abraham in a singular relation 
with a unique God,”146 nor Abraham who would choose to restore all ethical or 
communitarian relation with his fellow human beings at the cost of disobeying God. 
Here, “we no longer know who Abraham is, and he can no longer tell us even [Nous ne 
savons pas qui s’appelle Abraham, et il ne peut même pas nous le dire].”147 An auto-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Donner la mort, 106. 
145 Donner la mort, 106. 
146 Donner la mort, 105. 
147 Donner la mort, 111. 
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reject hence, and perhaps a silent one too, who no longer has to respond either to God, 
and hence sacrifice all human ethics, or to turn to his fellow human beings, sacrificing 
in this case the absolute duty to God.148  
 
From the Auto-Reject to Divinanimalité 
I have already suggested above that for a less violent “post-secular” world, that is to 
say, where differences between religions and difference between faith and reason can 
coexist, and where each difference does not compromise its alterity while not letting its 
radical edge destructively negate or denigrate other differences, one should not put forth 
vehemently the active reject. For a less violent “post-secular” world where differences 
will withhold projecting their defensive or preemptive violence against others, one 
would need to foreground the auto-reject instead. At this point, I would like to go 
further with the thought of the auto-reject whereby the reject rejects its own 
anthropocentric or anthropomorphic aspect. I do this, on the one hand, in keeping with 
Nancy’s argument that an anthropocentric or anthropomorphic horizon presents a 
closure, instead of an openness, for thought. On the other hand, I do this also because it 
seems that a non-anthropologic, non-anthropocentric, and non-anthropomorphic figure 
of thought is also missing in the question of the “post-secular,” and I would like to 
address this gap in “post-secular” thought. Now, for Habermas, if one is to resolve 
“post-secular” violence, a communicative dialogue between religious sectors and 
secular socio-governmental institutions must be in place. The aim of such 
communicative action is for the latter to come to accept that religious discourse can put 
in effect as well a certain reasoning that could enable the public to understand what is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 On the sacrificial economy in response and responsibility, see especially Donner la mort, 95-99. 
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happening with regard to the surge in religious activism. It is also for religious sectors 
to understand that for the peaceful and respectful coexistence between citizens of 
different cultures and races in society, there must put in place certain secular, normative 
laws to guide society along this process. Rather evidently, this communicative action is 
anthropologic and anthropocentric. It is based on human language, or what an 
interlocutor to Habermas in the debate on “post-secular society” calls “the use of an 
understandable language,” a language that in turn works toward “an inclusive 
community to which all those belong […] are capable of understanding” the difference 
between faith and knowledge, religion and reason.149 In other words, it is based on a 
language and a communitarian teleology that exclude nonhuman animals and their 
voices and silences. What is therefore also missing in the present “post-secular” 
discourse, and in the discourse of a future “post-secular,” is the consideration of 
animals. However, if a future “post-secular” world where no difference is discriminated 
against or rejected is to be desired, then this future “post-secular” world must also 
include the difference of animals rather than exclude it. For that future, perhaps one 
must also think the auto-reject in relation to animals, if not shift thought from the auto-
reject to animal-rejects. 
 
In a way, animals are missing in Derrida’s Foi et savoir, more absent than the visible 
absence, as Derrida notes, of Muslim and female interlocutors in the debate on religion 
at Capri (since Derrida did not even mention animals at that point).150 Put another way, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 See Josef Schmidt S.J, “A Dialogue in Which There Can Only Be Winners,” An Awareness of What is 
Missing, 60, 59. 
150 Can one say that Derrida here has sacrificed all consideration of animals in relation to the thinking of 
religion for the anthropocentric ethical duty to mention non-Christian and female interlocutors? I note 
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animals are some sort of rejects in Derrida’s text: Derrida there never puts animals in 
explicit relation to the messianic figure without messianism, khôra, and the other 
Abraham.151 However, I would say that animals there are not rejects in the sense of 
beings that are abandoned or denigrated. Animals are rejects in Foi et savoir only in the 
sense that their coming to explicit presence is somewhat veiled. That means to say too 
that the thought of animals is not absolutely detached or rejected from Derrida’s 
“deconstruction” of religion in Foi et savoir. In fact, I would argue that the thought of 
animals is at the heart of the question of religion in Foi et savoir. This is because, if, 
according to Derrida there, the thinking of religion is not so much about what religion 
“is” but “the question of the question” (§35: 61),152 it is then also the question of the 
animal since, as Derrida puts it in the later L’Animal que donc je suis, the question of 
the animal is also “the question of the question.”153 And “the question of the question,” 
for Derrida, is a question of what is presupposed and entailed in the naturalized 
understanding of a response: the question of what constitutes or counts as a response; 
the consequent question of who or what can or cannot be considered to respond; and to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
however, that Derrida does bring up the issue of the treatment of animals in industrial farming and 
scientific experiment, and the related issue of vegetarianism (see §40: 78). 
151 I note here that Derrida makes the explicit relation between khôra and animals only in a discussion 
with architects around the topic of “anyplace.” It appears at the beginning of his intervention, titled 
“Faxitecture,” where he reflects on the transhumance of translation and quotation, stating that it is a 
“setting in motion to transfer, deport, and export from one place to another” and “consists in migrating, 
changing land or terrain, going from one land to another, […] – used primarily for a migrating animal 
population, more precisely, a herd accompanied or led by a shepherd” (“Faxitexture,” trans. Laura 
Bourland, Anywhere, ed. Cynthia C. Davidson, New York: Rizzoli, 1992, 20). The proximity between 
transhumance and khôra becomes clear later when he speaks of the latter as a space that is “nothing other 
than the possibility, chance, or threat of replacement” (ibid, 24). In the spacing between one place and 
another that is at stake in transhumance and/ or khôra, Derrida will also say that there lies “a certain 
relationship […] to animality,” since the movement or “organizing of man’s habitat” is “regulated by the 
change of seasons, […] [by] the life of nature, breeding, that is to say, the life and death of animals” (ibid, 
20). For Derrida, the question of animality in the between space of khôra and/ or transhumance is 
occasion to think what can be done for a hospitality to animals (see ibid, 20). 
152 Derrida would also say, “If there is a question of religion, it must no longer be a “question-of-
religion.” Nor simply a response to this question” (§35: 61). 
153 L’Animal que donc je suis, Paris : Galilée, 2006, 27. 
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whom one responds. With regard to religious and/ or “post-secular” discourse, what 
counts almost absolutely as response is human language, as seen in the invocation of 
“understandable language” in the discussion with Habermas on the “post-secular” as the 
regulative idea of what constitutes a response. In other words, a response is predicated 
on human language enunciated by a human subject, a subject having mastery over 
language, a mastery that becomes evident to others by impressing it upon them, who are 
then made to recognize or acknowledge this subject’s subjectivity. Derrida in L’animal 
que donc je suis will remind us that Lacan goes further to say that the constitution of a 
response must be supplemented by the ability to erase the trace of one’s response, and 
to not only feign a response but to pretend to give a false response or to “feign to feign.” 
Lacan claims that animals are incapable of these supplementary gestures, and that they 
are neither capable of responding in the way described above whereby a relation with 
another is established, whereby another can recognize animals as “subjects of 
enunciation” just as humans are. The denial of the animal as a “subject of enunciation” 
or a subject tout court, and therefore the denial of its capacity or even right to respond, 
can be said to account for their exclusion in much thought about religion (except as 
sacrificial objects or metaphors, for example, “lamb of God”) and/ or the “post-secular.” 
Animals lie outside, or are totally other or tout autre, of what many have judged to be 
norms of “proper” respondents and responses in discourses on religion and/ or the 
“post-secular.” In the domains of those discourses, animals are, in a word, rejects.154 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 I note here that this is the case with Badiou’s theory of the subject. As Badiou has remarked in several 
places, the subject, in his or her response to the event, by declaring its truth and by working out the 
conditions that maintain the existence of the event, not only lifts the subject from all normal human 
existence, but also marks his or her difference from animals. Animals are clearly subordinated in 
Badiou’s philosophy. Or, as Neyrat has observed, “Badiouian morality is under the condition of a 
principle of anthropological humanist distinction, which passes [transite] without mediation to the great 
relegation of everything that is not human to the level of the sacrificeable” (Aux bords du vide, 33).    
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However, as the discussion above on Derrida’s messianic figure without messianism 
has underscored, the future of religion needs to let something or someone totally other 
arrive, something or someone that responds to religion or its discourse in a way yet 
unthought of, or in an uncalculated manner, in its own unique or even secret way. This 
other may even reject responding at all, like the other-Abraham in Foi et savoir: an 
other who says, “I decline all responsibility. I no longer respond, I am no longer 
responsible for what I say [je ne réponds plus de ce que je dis]. I respond that I no 
longer respond.”155 Religion needs a totally other or a tout autre that is beyond the 
horizon of its past and present thought. For Derrida in Donner la mort, one must open 
oneself to the tout autre that is “human or not,”156 and respect it in its absolute 
singularity, to continue the rhetoric of Donner la mort, as much as the “other other” or 
“other others” [l’autre autre, les autres autres].157 In L’Animal que donc je suis, this 
tout autre must be “an instance of the animal, of the animal-other, of the other as 
animal, of the other-mortal-life [l’autre-vivant-mortel], of the non-similar in any case, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 L’Animal que donc je suis, 84. 
156 Donner la mort, 116. 
157 Donner la mort, 98. This is also where everything turns around the phrase tout autre est tout autre as 
Derrida puts it, where every other is totally other, that is to say, the absolute singularity of each must not 
be privileged over that of the next. For the discussion of tout autre est tout autre in Foi et savoir, see §32: 
52-53. This is not the space for a critique of the concept of the tout autre. For that, see especially the 
critiques of Agamben and Derrida in Dominick LaCapra. LaCapra argues that the danger of the tout autre 
lies in leaving the other at such an extreme (unreachable) distance, and in a form that approaches the 
sublime to the point of emptiness, such that it becomes easy to either forget about the other or to negate or 
eliminate it as if without consequences. While I do maintain that a certain distance is necessary between 
one and the other, the ethics of which I have tried to elucidate in the previous section on friendship, love, 
and community, I would say, in light of LaCapra’s precaution of the tout autre, that the reject is not an 
entity in some untouchable out-there existing as an empty category. I try to reduce any suggestion of the 
latter in the reject in the conclusion, when I consider clinamen, which is the communication of molecules 
between everything in the world (and therefore the irreducible concrete contact between one and another) 
beyond the determination of any single entity, in relation to the reject.   
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of the non-fraternal [non-frère] […].”158 It is at this point where Derrida brings the 
absolute alterity or the absolute singularity of the divine in proximity with that of the 
animal, claiming that the instance of the divine and that of the animal are “inseparable” 
or are linked [s’allient] to each other.159 And this is where Derrida will invoke the word 
“divinanimality” or divinanimalité, in order “to break [rompre] with […] the similar, to 
situate oneself at least in a place of alterity radical enough whereby one must break with 
all identification with an image of oneself, with all similar living beings, and therefore 
with all fraternity or all human proximity, with all humanity.”160 
 
The thought of animality is therefore not absent in Derrida’s thinking of religion. The 
question of animals and the question of religion are interlaced in Derrida, as L’animal 
que donc je suis demonstrates. However, as said, any explicit articulation of the animal-
other, or divinanimalité, is missing in Foi et savoir. The animal-other seems to be a 
reject there. If it is a real forgetting of animals in Foi et savoir, then the text risks 
repeating the rejection of animals in Christian religion, a rejection that manifests itself 
not only in terms of treating animals only as sacrificial objects, of discriminating against 
certain animals as impure and therefore prohibited to human contact and consumption 
as pronounced in chapter 11 of Leviticus, but also of marginalizing them the moment 
biblical narratives proceed to underscore the imperative to obey divine commandments 
as Cixous has noted. But Cixous has also reminded us that without animals, religion or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 L’Animal que donc je suis, 180. 
159 L’Animal que donc je suis, 180. 
160 L’Animal que donc je suis, 181. I note here that this radical space will not only be one that is of a 
quasi-divine or quasi-religious trace, but also something of an animal-space. One can certainly recall 
khôra here as animal-space, which I have treated in the above note 151. But once again, Derrida does not 
develop this in either Foi et savoir or L’Animal que donc je suis.   
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religious experience will not have seen itself through. According to Cixous, Abraham’s 
journey up Mount Moriah to obey God’s commandment to sacrifice Isaac would have 
been infernal and impossible without his donkey.161 And, as Dominick LaCapra would 
remind me, without the ram, which is so often passed over as a mere “extra” not only in 
the biblical narrative but also in critical discourses on the narrative,162 Isaac would have 
ended up as the sacrificial object; and one cannot imagine, if that were indeed the case, 
what kind of relations would entail between Abraham and the rest of humanity, and 
between Abraham and God. In other words, religion and/ or the “post-secular,” if they 
are to see themselves and their respective futures through, will continue to need the 
animal. Or to put it in the rhetoric of this study, the reject or auto-reject, if it is to lead 
religion and/ or the “post-secular” to their futures, must follow after the animal.  
 
I have italicized “follow after” above because these words are in fact of critical 
significance in Derrida’s L’Animal que donc je suis, words that may offer us a way to 
better understand in what particular way the animal-other or divinanimalité is missing 
in Foi et savoir. According to Derrida in L’Animal que donc je suis, the gesture of 
following after, or the move that chases after (another) [démarche suivie], is something 
of the animal: it “will have to resemble that of an animal seeking either to hunt or to 
escape.”163 Derrida will go on to say that following after will also resemble “an animal 
trail [la course d’un animal], which, orienting itself by scenting [au flair] or by hearing, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 See Cixous, « Conversation avec l’âne », in L’amour du loup (Paris : Galilée, 2003), which I discuss 
in the next section. But I will just note here first that a non-anthropocentric and non-anthropomorphic 
“messiniancity without messianism” plays out in that text, and in Cixous’s Messie too, where Cixous 
inscribes the messianic figure, which is always free to come and go, in a female cat [la chatte].   
162 See especially the chapter “Reopening the Question of the Human and the Animal” in LaCapra’s 
History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
163 L’Animal que donc je suis, 82. 
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goes over more than once [repasse plus d’une fois] the same path to retrace tracks 
[relever des traces], either to scent the trace of another there, or to efface its own by 
multiplying it there, precisely as that of an other, scenting [flairant], as this trail makes 
evident to it, that the trace is always of an other [la trace est toujours d’un autre].”164 
Given this passage from L’Animal que donc je suis, one can perhaps say then that, if 
any trace of the animal-other or divinanimalité is missing or effaced in Foi et savoir, it 
is because Derrida is already following after the animal, if not already approximated 
himself beside an animal that is already erasing its traces, already placing himself 
without place, i.e. without fixed visible localization à la khôra, following after this 
disappearing animal. Perhaps the animal-other or divinanimalité is already escaping the 
restrictive limits of existing religions and religious discourse, and already seeking 
another space where the discourse on religion can take place in a totally different way 
and involve nonhuman animal participants or interveners. Is this not the same move that 
Derrida makes with regard to the apparently absent discussion of the sacrificial ram in 
the Abraham story in Donner la mort, only to say later, as recounted by Michael Naas, 
that that is because he has (already) taken the “side of the sacrificed ram”?165  
 
In that sense, can one say that there is already in Foi et savoir an auto-rejection of all 
traces of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, a figure of the reject that also rejects 
its own presence, as it follows after the animal-other that is effacing its traces? Has Foi !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 L’Animal que donc je suis, 82. 
165 See the concluding chapter “The World Over” in Derrida From Now On, 229. According to the date 
of the original version of this chapter, Derrida’s remark would have been made in spring of 2004. I note 
here that Derrida’s elision of any discussion of the sacrificial ram in the Abraham story in Donner la mort 
is a point of critique for LaCapra in the chapter “Reopening the Question of the Human and the Animal” 
in his History and Its Limits. Derrida certainly does not discuss that ram in Donner la mort, but the issue 
of animal sacrifice is nonetheless raised in that text (see Donner la mort, 99). 
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et savoir in fact advanced “into the risk of absolute night” (§22: 31), the night where 
animal eyes may open, as Derrida writes in « De l’économie restreinte à l’économie 
générale: un hégélianisme sans réserve »? I would think so, and any rereading or 
rethinking of Foi et savoir must follow after such a trail too. That would be the sense of 
the after in the title to this section (“After Derrida’s Foi et savoir”). Any reinvestment 
in Foi et savoir for the “post-secular,” which comes after the publication of Foi et 
savoir, must follow after the animal. To reiterate then, the reject or auto-reject for the 
“post-secular” must follow after the animal. It is only then that the reject or auto-reject 
can open religion and/ or the “post-secular” to a future where differences not only 
between anthropocentric and anthropomorphic religions and reason are affirmed and 
respected, but also those between humans and animals; that is to say too, a future where 
animals are no longer excluded or rejected from the domain of religious or “post-
secular” discourse, no longer judged to be incapable of bringing something critical to 
that discourse. 
 
To see at work an auto-reject that follows after the animal, we need not, in fact, wait till 
an unforeseeable or unanticipated future. As the rest of this section will suggest, the 
critical function of such an auto-reject for a non-anthropologic, non-anthropocentric, 
and non-anthropomorphic “post-secular” future is in fact already understood by Cixous, 
especially in her texts of the 90s. In other words, it is from Cixous that one can elicit 
that auto-reject that follows the animal. To be more precise, Cixous shows us how we 
can move from auto-rejection, i.e. rejecting certain anthropologic, anthropocentric and/ 
or anthropomorphic aspects of ourselves, particularly human vision, human knowledge, 
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and finally our human selves, towards an animal perspective for, or on, the “post-




2.3 Divinanimalité, or the Animal-Messiah in Cixous 
I begin this section by recalling the remark John Caputo made in relation to the question 
of religion in Derrida: “Jacques Derrida has religion, a certain religion, his religion, and 
he speaks of God all the time. The point of view of Derrida’s work as an author is 
religious – but without religion and without religion’s God.”166 Perhaps the same could 
be said of Cixous: the religious is never absent in Cixous’s works. As Hugh Pyper has 
observed, “the range of [Cixous’s] engagement with the bible is considerable,” and that 
“scattered throughout her writings are […] often quite sustained engagements with 
particular biblical texts.”167 Or as Sal Renshaw puts it, “it would be hard to find a 
Cixousian text that does not in some way refer to the religious.”168 And yet, as in 
Derrida, one would not find in Cixous “religion’s God.” In the words of Charlotte 
Berkowitz, “For Hélène Cixous, […] God embodies the sacred. But in Cixous’s lexicon, 
God is not the Father.”169 To be “without religion’s God,” however, especially in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, xviii. 
167 “‘Job the Dog’: Wounds, Scars and the Biblical Text,” parallax 13 (3), 2007, 83.  
168 “The Thealogy of Hélène Cixous,” Religion in French Feminist Thought: Critical Perspectives, eds. 
Morny Joy, Kathleen O’Grady and Judith L. Poxon, intro. Luce Irigaray, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003, 173. See also Renshaw’s The Subject of Love: Hélène Cixous and the Feminine Divine 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2009).  
169 “Paradise Reconsidered: Hélène Cixous and the Bible’s Other Voice,” Religion in French Feminist 
Thought: Critical Perspectives, 176. In fact, Cixous would say in her own words, “I have never written 
without God,” but “God is not that of religions” (« Conversation avec l’âne » [1997], In L’amour du loup 
et autres remords, 101. My translations). I will discuss this phrase much later in the main text.  
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Cixous’s early works, is not just refusing to acknowledge God as “the Father.” Like 
many Cixous scholars, Berkowitz will point out that Cixous “disdains those parts of the 
Bible that represent Paternal Law,”170 and explicitly challenges “religion’s God,” or the 
masculine, prohibitive law that it has come to represent.171 Claude Cohen-Safir goes 
further to suggest that Cixous in this way inscribes a “counter-Bible” [contre-Bible], 
where “the known metaphors: the tree, virile elevation, and the fall, are subtly hijacked 
of their original meaning into a resolutely humanistic and feminine perspective.”172 For 
Cohen-Safir also, the consequence of Eve eating from the tree of knowledge in Cixous 
is no longer the apocalyptic “millennial deprivation of knowledge,” but something 
creative, whose “conquering” and “exploratory” spirit ought to be celebrated.173 The 
affirmation of such “humanistic and feminine” transgression against “religion’s God” 
has also been noted by Susan Sellers. Reading Cixous’s La jeune née (1973), Sellers 
notes a “feminine willingness to risk [God’s] prohibition.”174 “Eve,” Sellers continues, 
“follows her desire and defies God’s incomprehensible prohibition not to eat from the 
Tree of Knowledge. Eve’s refusal, Cixous writes, creates for herself and the world the 
opportunity for knowledge, innovation and uncensored choice.”175 To put it in the 
rhetoric of this current work, it could also be said that Cixous, especially in her works of 
the late 60s and 70s, reverses the judgment of Eve as a reject – a reject from the 
perspective of God who banishes her (and Adam) from the Garden of Eden, and a reject !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 “Paradise Reconsidered,” 177. 
171!For example, in the almost blasphemous “The Whale of Jonas” (in Le Prénom de Dieu, Paris: Grasset, 
1967), there is not only the (feminine) disdain and doubt of the power and existence of a hidden god, but 
also the narrator’s quest to place himself in the position of the “me” [moi] of the hidden god. !
172 Claude Cohen-Safir, « La serpente et l’or : bible et contre-bible dans l’œuvre d’Hélène Cixous », In 
Hélène Cixous : croisées d’une œuvre, ed. Mireille Calle-Gruber, Paris : Galilée, 2000, 361. My 
translation. 
173 « La serpente et l’or », 361. 
174 Susan Sellers, Hélène Cixous: Authorship, Autobiography and Love, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, 3. 
175 Susan Sellers, Hélène Cixous: Authorship, Autobiography and Love, 3. 
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from the perspective of those who blame her for the Fall of Man.176 In other words too, 
Eve in Cixous is no longer a passive reject (the first turn of the reject); Eve can be an 
active reject (the second turn) no less in affirmatively rejecting God’s authority.   
 
Can the above be said of Cixous’s treatment of the question of religion in her later 
works?177 Cixous’s works that appeared in the 90s become interesting in this case. I 
would argue that they remain no doubt “without religion’s God,” but they cannot be 
said unequivocally that they are “without religion.” In fact, it can even be said – 
especially if one follows Verena Conley’s observation, if not prophecy, that Cixous’s 
works of the 90s would bear “messianic tones”178 – that the point of view there takes on 
a religious turn, a turn from “without religion” to within religion. Texts such as 
Beethoven à jamais (1993), Messie (1996), « Savoir » (1997/ 1998), and « Conversation 
avec l’âne » (1997) will indeed suggest a slight religious shift or conversion in Cixous’s 
writing, as they trace a messianic trajectory rather than religious defiance. To be sure, 
the conversion is not one that acquiesces or abdicates to “religion’s God” or to dogmatic 
religion or religious dogmas. There is no nostalgic or regressive “return to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 I note here that the notion of the reject in general, and not only in religion, is not alien to Cixous. As 
she writes in an essay: “Each one of us – the whole of mankind, irrespective of sexual difference – must 
deal with the feeling of things being taken away from us. What is interesting is that birds, writings, and 
many women are considered abominable, threatening, and are rejected, because others, the rejectors, feel 
something is taken away from them” (“Birds, Women and Writing,” in Animal Philosophy: Essential 
Readings in Continental Thought, eds. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton, London: Continuum, 2004, 
170). 
177 I do not presume that the term “religion” is unproblematic in Cixous. I recognize that “religion” is an 
equivocal, if not difficult, terrain in Cixous’s works. In fact, Cixous herself will say, “The word religion 
doesn’t work, I don’t know how it’s said” (“This Strangejew Body,” in Judeities: Questions for Jacques 
Derrida, eds. Bettrina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and Raphael Zagury-Orly, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 70). The objective here is not to define “religion” in Cixous. What I want to highlight in this 
section instead is the apparent shift from being “without religion and without religion’s God” in Cixous’s 
early works to something like being “without religion’s God” but now remaining within religion in the 
works of the 90s. This shift, as I will suggest, involves the playing down of the second turn of the active 
reject, i.e. the forceful rejection of religion and religion’s God, to the third turn of the auto-reject. 
178 Verena Andermatt Conley, Hélène Cixous, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, 130. 
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religious,” of which Nancy warns us against. Or, as Cixous says elsewhere, there is “no 
Christian repentance.”179 In this particular conversion, Cixous’s writing does not 
abandon the endeavor to undo or go beyond the masculine and prohibitive biblical law. 
That endeavor remains, except, unlike in the early works, there is no outright 
celebration of religious transgression, no explicit renunciation of religion, no open 
declaration of being “without religion.” In other words, as I would put it, the active 
force of rejection against religion is played down in her works of the 90s. A subtler 
strategy is adopted instead, which involves remaining, as suggested above, within 
religion. And this is because there is the realization – and the personages in Cixous’s 
narratives would come to display this – that it is from within religion that one can 
sidestep or surpass the masculine, prohibitive biblical law and its apocalyptic effects. It 
is a strategy that perhaps recalls Derrida’s endeavor to think beyond metaphysics in the 
1967 essay, « La structure, le signe et le jeu », where Derrida argues that “to have done 
with metaphysics, there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics,” or 
that “the passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy 
[…] but to continue to read philosophers in a certain manner,”180 a particular manner 
not bound by the need to absolutely negate or reject the thing that one seeks to go 
beyond. I argue that such a strategy is indeed deployed in Cixous’s “messianic” works 
of the 90s. They certainly do not seek to do “without religion,” or to inscribe a radical 
“counter-Bible” as Cohen-Safir argues. Instead, they remain within the pages of the 
Bible, even within the pages where the Paternal Law is at work. In other words, just as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 Hélène Cixous, “Without end, no, State of drawingness, no, rather: The Executioner’s taking off,” 
trans. Catherine A.F. MacGillivray, Stigmata: Escaping Texts, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 
29. 
180 Jacques Derrida, « La structure, le signe et le jeu », L’écriture et la différance, Paris : Seuil, 1967, 412,  
421-422, my translation. 
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Derrida does not turn the pages of metaphysics or philosophy, Cixous’s “messianic” 
works do not turn the pages of religion either, but read them “in a certain manner,” such 
that what can perhaps be called an other Bible – Cixous after all speaks of an “other 
book [autre livre]” or “the Bible that is mine [la Bible à moi]” that writes itself from 
within « Conversation avec l’âne »181 – unfolds from within those pages.  
 
If this other Bible is to be “without religion’s God,” sidestepping the prohibitions and 
apocalyptic effects of biblical law, and yet not “without religion” per se, it would need 
to be structured around a particular point of view. It would need a point of view 
radically different from those that have determined every authoritative (and masculine) 
reading of the Bible, but which nevertheless remains within religion’s Genesis. As the 
abovementioned “messianic” texts of Cixous will suggest, the unfolding of an other 
Bible is not hinged upon any anthropocentric or anthropomorphic point of view, not 
even the “resolutely humanistic and feminine perspective” of the earlier works as 
Cohen-Safir has noted, but an animal point of view. An animal point of view can be 
considered to be within religion and “without religion’s God” at the same time. This is 
because, on the one hand, it is a point of view that accompanies the human at the 
moment of his and her transgression of religious law (and therefore treads on the edge 
of the desire to be “without religion’s God”). On the other hand, it remains free from the 
malediction of the knowledge of shame of nakedness, indifferent to that death by 
knowledge from which Adam and Eve suffer after eating from the tree of knowledge. In 
this case, the animal point of view sidesteps divine prohibitions and the damning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Cixous, « Conversation avec l’âne » ([1997], in L’amour du loup et autres remords, 95, 104. This 
translation and subsequent ones from this text are mine unless indicated. Subsequent citations from this 
text will also be indicated by page numbers from the French text in parentheses.   
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consequences when divine commandments are transgressed. One notes from the 
Genesis story that animals after all were never given the commandment to not eat from 
the tree of knowledge; and whether the human eats from the tree of knowledge or not, 
the animal is that which never knows the divine damnation of “religion’s God,” it never 
knows shame nor knows how to have shame.182 In that sense, one could say that the 
animal point of view is always within religion and never outside it. 
 
The animal point of view can be further said to be within religion in the sense that even 
though the animal follows the human in his and her subsequent Fall from Eden, it has 
never in effect been banished from Paradise. Perhaps the animal has never known the 
loss of Paradise, and remains to keep sight of it. Without this sense of loss, an other 
Bible with an animal point of view may even be said to be free from a certain work of 
mourning that bears on the human point of view. Having eaten from the tree of 
knowledge, death by knowledge of shame and nakedness is what human vision sees or 
what their eyes are opened to. In other words, as long as the human sees, every living 
moment is a work of mourning with regard to that death by knowledge. To exacerbate 
the problem of human vision, one notes from Genesis 3 that the human, after his or her 
eyes are opened, does not, however, see everything, despite his or her vision of good 
and evil, a vision that places the human in a parallel position with the godly. According 
to the narrative of Genesis 3, there remains a blinding effect to this human vision, which 
comes from humans’ anxiety to conceal themselves from God, as if wanting to blind 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 As Derrida has noted in L’Animal que donc je suis, the “peculiarity of animals […] is to be naked 
without knowing it,” and the animal “does not feel itself nor see itself nude [ni se sent ni se voit nu]” 
(L’Animal que donc je suis, 19, 20). 
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themselves from the presence of God.183 In that sense, humans have opened their eyes 
only to lose sight of divine presence. The animal, on the other hand, not only has no 
cause to mourn for any death by knowledge of shame, but has never needed to blind 
itself to divine presence either, and hence also no cause to mourn for the lost vision of 
divine presence. The animal point of view therefore, with regard to the question of 
religion or even the “post-secular,” is essentially indifferent to the human work of 
mourning; and an other Bible with an animal point of view will be one that is done with 
mourning the fall of Man, the loss of sight of God or the divine, the loss of Eden, and 
the damnation of Eve. In that respect, one may also postulate that in this other Bible, 
there is no longer an Eve who defends and lays claim to her right to desire knowledge. 
Neither is there an Eve who justifies her eating from the tree of knowledge as an 
ultimately creative act that paves the way for humankind’s wondrous discovery of 
knowledge. There is also no longer the desire to construct another Garden of Eden, as is 
the case with Le Vrai jardin (1971), in explicit opposition to the Garden of Eden in 
Genesis. (Can we thence speak of an auto-reject in Eve here?) It is important, however, 
to state that there is no supplication to any return to the original garden here, as if 
remorseful for one’s previous rebellious or transgressive gestures. One keeps in mind 
that there is “no Christian repentance.” But to get back to the animal point of view: free 
from the preoccupation with such human work of mourning, the animal might even be 
said to veritably inhabit every instant of living. Every instant for the animal is a moment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Cf. Gen 3: 6-9: “So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to 
the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took its fruit and ate; and she also gave 
some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew 
that they were naked […]. They heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden at the time of the 
evening breeze, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God among the 
trees of the garden.” 
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of intense living, going into the very heart of living or the interiority of life. As such, 
this other Bible might even accomplish Cixous’s project of writing without mourning, 
as declared in her essay « De la scène de l’Inconscient à la scène de l’Histoire » (1987), 
where she articulates her wish “to arrive at an epoch where one will write not to mourn 
the past, but to become the prophet of the present.”184  
 
An animal point of view therefore plays a critical role in the unfolding or inscription of 
an other Bible that remains within religion but is “without religion’s God” and without 
mourning. Unfortunately, the animal point of view, as Cixous notes, is not something 
valued but oftentimes ignored or forgotten. In Messie and « Conversation avec l’âne », 
Cixous observes that the animal perspective has hardly been taken into account by the 
Bible. Instead, it is always abandoned at the margins as the narratives proceed to make 
manifest divine law and power, and male obeisance to divine commandment.185 In the 
Bible, animals are more or less rejects. However, in order to allow an other Bible to 
unfold, one must follow the animal-reject; one must write with, or towards, an animal 
point of view, rather than to marginalize or denigrate it. That is what Cixous’s 
“messianic” texts do. The question that remains then is how Cixous’s texts arrive at that 
animal point of view. Among the “messianic” texts of the 90s, « Conversation avec 
l’âne », in my view, provides comprehensive steps towards such a point of view. To !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 Cixous, « De la scène de l’Inconscient à la scène de l’Histoire », in Hélène Cixous, chemins d’une 
écriture, sous la direction de François van Rossum-Guyon et Myriam Diaz-Diocaretz, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de Vincennes; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990, 22, my translation.  
185 In Messie, Cixous will speak of the dog Uzi, which will guide, alongside the angel Raphael, Tobias to 
Media. But, as Cixous points out, “having made its appearance at the beginning of chapter six, one sees 
that the narrative will no longer give it attention” (Messie, Paris: Des femmes, 1996, 12. Translations 
from this text are mine). And in « Conversation avec l’âne », Cixous will speak of Abraham’s donkey, 
without which, Cixous argues, Abraham’s journey up to Mount Moria in order to carry out God’s 
commandment to sacrifice his son Isaac would have been “infernal.” However, as Cixous chides, “The 
Bible does not recount the conversation Abraham had with the donkey” (« Conversation avec l’âne », 87). 
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elucidate those steps, which are no less steps of auto-rejection, I propose then a close 
reading of « Conversation » in the following pages.  
 
Blindness, or the Rejection of Human Vision 
What I love is: the proximity of the invisible 186 
 
An animal point of view is not an immediate given. As « Conversation » demonstrates, 
the passage towards an animal point of view, which is also the passage towards an other 
Bible, first requires the rejection of human vision, and that is precisely what 
« Conversation » puts to work before it moves into, or attains, an animal point of 
view.187 I have suggested above that human vision after the Fall can be read as always a 
work of mourning, and so perhaps it is not surprising that one finds in a text such as 
« Conversation » a move to reject human vision in order to arrive at a writing that is 
done with mourning. However, the rejection of sight, at first glance, seems to contradict 
the beginning of « Conversation », since it opens with an apparent jubilation of 
recovering from a myopic malediction. The experience of gaining uninterrupted vision 
in fact parallels the narrative of Cixous’s « Savoir », which is precisely about being able 
to see with the naked eye following a laser surgery to rectify a myopic condition. The 
jubilant proclamation to see is even executed in a similar rhetoric of unveiling deployed 
in « Savoir »: “I lift the visor from my eyes, I turn my naked eyes towards the world. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Cixous. “Bathsheba or the interior Bible” [1993], trans. Catherine A.F. MacGillivray, Stigmata: 
Escaping Texts, 14. 
187 If, as I am arguing, an other Bible that is “without religion’s God” and yet remains within religion, and 
also beyond any work of mourning, can be attained only via the movement from the rejection of human 
sight to an animal point of view, this movement is singularly found or completed in « Conversation » and 
not in « Savoir », Messie, or Beethoven à jamais, and hence my focus on « Conversation » here. 
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And I see. I am seeing! With the naked eye, and this is exaltation itself. I pass from non-
seeing to seeing-the-world” (82). As in « Savoir » too, the sensation of seeing the world 
with the naked eye in « Conversation » is likened to receiving a miraculous gift.188 And 
yet this gift seems to be ultimately refused. This is because, even though one has gained 
the ability to see with the naked eye, the myopic condition remains to be articulated in 
the present, as if the ability to see with the naked eye is at the end of it all denounced or 
disdained: shortly after the beginning of « Conversation », the narrator writes, “By 
misfortune or secret chance I am [my italics] born very myopic,” and that “before being 
a woman I am [my italics] myopic” (81). In other words, if « Conversation », as in 
« Savoir », is written after the surgical operation to correct the myopic condition (given 
the passage of exalted seeing that echoes « Savoir »), myopia then seems to be affirmed 
and reinstated here instead. This is reinforced towards the end of « Conversation », 
where the narrator calls for the removal of any shame in inscribing bespectacled or 
myopic literary heroes, no matter how ridiculous that image may seem. By the end of 
« Conversation » then, the text’s opening passage of exalted seeing is undoubtedly 
problematized, and it is clear that Cixous here inclines towards non-seeing if not 
blindness, rather than vision. 
 
But the rejection of human vision goes further than simply sidestepping or merely 
renouncing the work of mourning that post-Fall human vision bears. It in fact plays a 
critical role in the commencement of writing an other Bible, and in order to “see” that, 
it is necessary to return to the passage of exalted seeing. That passage ends with the 
narrator stating that vision is a gift given to her by the world. What follows is a space, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 Cf. « Conversation »: “a gift of the world […] which is given to me” (83). 
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or gap, in the text. As I read it, this spacing is deliberate, or strategically placed, as if to 
suggest that there is nothing more to be said or written with the return of sight, as if the 
narrator has no desire to say or write anything else after possessing vision. If this 
spacing seems to suggest an implicit disdain for seeing, this hypothesis can be 
confirmed by the passage that follows the spacing, which begins, “Now I write” (83). It 
is important to note that vision, however, is not in play in this writing, for an earlier 
passage in « Conversation » will have already stated that when the narrator writes, 
writing takes place not in the realm of sight or vision, but in darkness or in the blindness 
of night. According to the narrator there, “I write the night. I write: the Night [J’écris la 
nuit. J’écris: la Nuit]” (80). She turns to night because the immediacy of the world 
brought about by seeing in the light of day, which swarms vision with a hurtling 
“appearance-ing [l’apparitionnement]” or “abrupt appearance [brusque apparition]”189 
according to « Savoir », only interrupts and obstructs writing. Under the capture 
[captation] of such immediacy in the world of sight, writing becomes impossible. As it 
is said at the beginning of « Conversation », daylight vision blinds instead, and there is 
no knowledge to be gained from such an illuminated world, and hence there is nothing 
to write about under such optical condition: 
What we call day prevents me from seeing. The solar day [le jour solaire] 
blinds me to the visionary day. The glaring day prevents me from hearing 
[entendre].190 From seeing-hearing [voirentendre]. From hearing myself 
[m’entendre]. With me. With you. With the mysteries. 
 
For me to go towards writing, I must escape from the broad daylight that 
catches (me by) my eyes [j’échappe au gros jour qui me prend (par) les yeux] 
and fills it with crude grand visions. I do not want to see what is shown. I want !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 Cixous, « Savoir », in Hélène Cixous et Jacques Derrida, Voiles, Paris : Galilée, 1998, 16. This 
translation and subsequent ones from this text are mine. 
190 I follow Eric Prenowitz here to translate entendre as hearing. 
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to see what is secret. What is hidden among the visible. I want to see the skin 
of light (79).  
 
Once again, whatever joy in seeing the world or in touching the world through vision in 
« Conversation » is more or less renounced here. Instead, what is affirmed is to 
disappear from the light of day that enables vision, or to seek the unseen or “what is 
hidden among the visible.” This seeking to see “what is hidden among the visible” can 
be compared to the notion of l’invu or the unseen in « Savoir ». L’invu, as the narrator 
in « Savoir » will slowly come to recognize, is the miracle given to the myopic, his or 
her creative privilege of seeing “the not yet [le pas encore]”: “There had never been the 
unseen. It was an invention.”191 She will also realize that she herself was an “unseen” in 
her previous myopic state, since her inability to see properly everything around her also 
entails an inability to see herself being seen by others. And she will understand that 
being an invue herself has in fact been a blissful condition: “Not seeing, she did not see 
herself being seen, this was her lightness of blindness that was given to her, the great 
freedom of the effacement of the self.”192 This is a clear contrast to the chaotic “war of 
faces” she confronts in the world when she sees with the naked eye after the laser 
surgery.193 This yearning for l’invu or “the nostalgia of the secret non-seeing,” that is to 
say, the “unexpected mourning” for “her ‘my-myopia’ [sa ‘ma-myopie’],” will suggest 
that in both « Savoir » and « Conversation », the myopic condition, if not blindness, 
will be affirmed, rather than the attainment of vision.194 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 « Savoir », 18. 
192 « Savoir », 18. 
193 « Savoir », 18. 
194 « Savoir », 19, 17, 18. My reading of Savoir above certainly runs counter to Frédéric Regard’s. Regard 
not only argues that « Savoir » is an unequivocal celebration of vision, but that as such, it also inscribes 
something like an other Bible, “another story or history [histoire], another genesis” (« Faite d’yeux : 
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But to go back to « Conversation »: to write, one must not only “slip away from the 
world and from diurnal sociality” (79), but one must also slip into the night. And one 
slips into this night – and one can do this in spite of the glaring day, by shutting one’s 
eyes: “I close my eyes” (79), and “behind my eyelids I am elsewhere” (80). It is as such 
that writing begins, not with vision but with blindness: “I write without seeing that I am 
writing and what I write” (99). The desire for blindness will be further affirmed when 
the narrator even regrets that myopia is not adequate to the blindness of the night of 
writing: “myopia is not sufficient to make night” (81). Thus, when the narrator begins 
again to say that writing resumes after the passage of exalted seeing, it will not be 
writing with vision but “writing blind” [écrire aveugle] according to the sub-title of 
« Conversation ». “Now she writes,” the narrator says, and “in my dark [my italics] 
interior softness, the rapid steps of a book that arrives imprint themselves” (83). 
 
Writing the Passage of Instants, or Writing Beyond Mourning 
But what takes place in a writing that proceeds in the night or in the blindness of night, 
such that an other Bible “without religion’s God” and beyond mourning begins to 
imprint itself? According to the narrator, writing as such passes into the very interior of 
the body of words.195 It is a writing that traces the birth of words, at the very moment of 
their genesis, engendered by other existing words in a phrase. This will be a writing that 
inscribes the temporal “before” or l’avant before things manifest themselves. As the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
genèse sans généalogie », in Genèses Généalogies Genres : Autour de l’œuvre de Hélène Cixous, sous la 
direction de Mireille Calle-Gruber et Marie Odile Germain, Paris : Galilée, 2006, 216, my translation) in 
explicit opposition to the apocalyptic narrative of sight in Genesis 3. Evidently, I disagree with Regard’s 
reading.         
195 Cf. « Conversation », 81. 
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narrator says in « Conversation », “I want to write, before, at a time still in fusion before 
the frozen time of the narrative [je veux écrire, avant, au temps encore en fusion d’avant 
le temps refroidi du récit]” (84). In this case, “I write the genesis that befalls [survient] 
before [avant] the author” (86). And to ensure that this avant is not a nostalgic 
investment in the past, for example, a seeking to return to the moment before the Fall, 
the text will quickly state that a certain instantaneity or now-ness instead is at stake in 
this avant. This is articulated in « Conversation » when it states that writing the 
“before” is a question of living, which “takes place like life arriving to us” (86), and 
which in this case is “to grasp [prendre] the living instant with the closest and most 
delicate words” (93). The sense of urgency in needing to take hold the living instant in 
the “before” or l’avant of « Conversation » resonates no doubt with the myopic 
experience of the “not yet” or the “pas encore” in « Savoir ». The latter is a mode of 
seeing where “everything is perhaps,” but it is precisely because of that that living 
becomes more intense or urgent: with regard to living as a myopic, the narrator in 
« Savoir » would say that “to live was in a state of alert.”196 That “state of alert” is 
surely no less called for in writing the avant in « Conversation ». Writing in this manner 
would after all also mean to write with a certain speed – “I write to touch the body of 
the instant with the ends of words” (94),197 and it is “all now” (85), with no time for 
knowledge acquisition: “this is an attempt [essai] to write down what goes quicker than 
my consciousness and my hand. But – the passage, by chance, leaves traces. One must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
196 « Savoir », 14. 
197 Besides an other Bible that is in the process of being inscribed here, perhaps what emerges in this 
traversing towards “the very interior of the body of words” is also what Cixous calls an “interior Bible.” 
Cixous has regarded the “interior Bible” as a world where one disappears to by turning away from 
looking (as in the process of night-writing in « Conversation »). But this turning away from looking is put 
in place only in order to be attentive to living, and because of that, the “interior Bible” is a world of 
“immense limitless life” (“Bathsheba or the interior Bible,” 18).  
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act quickly. And no time to learn” (88). There is no time to master the knowledge 
transpiring at any passing instant – “I do not order, I do not conceptualize, I pursue what 
has overtaken me” (88).   
 
Inscribing such instants is a delicate, if not paradoxical negotiation, however. That is 
because these instants cannot be inscribed with an immediacy that recalls the violent 
immediacy that characterizes vision or seeing-with-the-naked-eye. Rather, it is a 
question of inscribing a passage, the passage of one instant unfolding to another. 
Specifically, it is the inscription of the passage “between night and day” (82) at the 
moment when one writes in the darkness or blindness of night. In the context of the 
beginning of « Conversation », this passage is experienced in a state of myopia. And 
myopia, as one understands from « Savoir », is no less an experience of a passage, akin 
to “swimming across the channel between the blind continent and the seeing 
continent.”198 Vision, or seeing with the naked eye, on the other hand, lacks this sense 
of passage. Vision, as noted earlier from « Savoir », implies instead an “abrupt 
appearance,” and so seeing in « Conversation » is never associated with the word 
passage. The closest it gets – and this is speaking strictly in orthographic terms only – is 
paysage (83), which is landscape, and does not suggest any sense of passage.199 For the 
narrator of « Conversation », however, “What is important to me is not appearance, it is 
the passage. I like the word Passage. All the words of passage or passing [passe], all the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 « Savoir », 18. 
199 I refer to “Bathsheba or the interior Bible” again to note that landscape is not something Cixous favors. 
Of her notion of “interior Bible,” she will say, “it is a land without landscape [my emphasis], without 
monuments. But not without form and without inhabitants” (“Bathsheba or the interior Bible, 5). As to 
what these “inhabitants” would be in this “interior Bible,” I will soon argue that they are something other 
than human subjects. 
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passing and traversing words [les mots passants et passeurs]” (81). Devoid of any sense 
of passage, seeing serves little to grasp the unfolding of one instant into another: it does 
not help writing move towards an animal point of view, and therefore, an other Bible.  
 
According to « Conversation », a mode of writing that inscribes a passage, particularly 
the passage of unfolding instants, following the renunciation of human vision and 
knowledge, is critical in bringing one closer to a writing that is done with mourning 
(and hence closer to an other Bible). In « Conversation », to be done with mourning is 
after all to accept the fact that everything is passage, or that everything passes (on) – or, 
as I would put it, everything is auto-rejection; and that there is no future, no new instant 
without the passing of a previous one: “what just arrived will perish. Strange and 
exalting meeting of the living [le vif] and its end. One advances in leaving behind 
oneself. Human destiny: to be of the flesh of forgetfulness [être de la chair à oubli]” 
(93). Once that fact is accepted, the “combat with mourning” (93) can begin, and one 
can begin anew without the past (e.g. the Fall, the damnation of Eve, the loss of Eden, 
etc.) haunting or violently supplementing the present. That re-beginning is a question of 
letting go,200 if not a question of forgetting: “one must forget in order to re-present 
oneself as virginal [se re-présenter vierge], to offer oneself as virginal [s’offrir vierge] 
to the new year” (93). Writing the passage, or writing without mourning, is then a 
question of writing that rejects holding on to things obsessively: “I do not write to keep” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
200 Ian Blyth and Susan Sellers have noted that Cixous’s early theoretical trajectory “stresses the need for 
writing to ‘let go’” in order for the text to have “a sense of ease, assurance and open-handedness” (Hélène 
Cixous: Live Theory, New York: Continuum, 2004, 113, 114). As I will soon point out in the main text, I 
agree with Blyth and Sellers that letting-go is “to make room for the other” (ibid, 113). But I am 
suggesting here too that letting-go in the inscription of the other Bible or “interior Bible” would mean an 
indifference to Man’s Fallen state, an indifference to the anxious need to defend, justify, and even glorify 
Eve’s eating from the tree of knowledge. 
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(93).201 But as it is hinted in « Conversation », this will require something other than 




In « Conversation », it is the animal condition that facilitates writing the passage, and 
that is why « Conversation » in general can be said to be preoccupied with sliding into 
an animal perspective. I note that when the text insists that one approaches the passage 
by not tarrying with a word, by not seeking “to learn” or “conceptualize” it, it is 
preceded by the passage where the narrator speaks of Abraham’s donkey. In 
conventional wisdom, the donkey is hardly an intelligent animal. However, in 
« Conversation », both the donkey and its apparent ignorance are not to be slighted. 
Placing the image of a donkey before the passage on the insistence to not tarry with 
words in fact suggests that the animal, without the human desire to conceptually master 
or comprehend every word that arrives, hears [entendre] and receives every word. It is 
the animal condition of being apparently ignorant, of being without human learning and 
intelligence, that will precisely facilitate a writing that registers every word of every 
instant, facilitating, in other words, writing’s approach towards the passage. Such 
understanding of the animal is no doubt grasped by the narrator when she compares 
herself to a donkey as she undertakes the writing of the passage: “I am only an ideal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 The question of forgetting or not holding on in « Conversation » provides an interesting counter-point 
to « De la scène de l’Inconscient à la scène de l’Histoire ». In the latter, there is the project similar to 
« Conversation » of writing a Paradise of the passage of living instants: “Paradise is this, it is to arrive at 
living the present. It is to accept the present that occurs [advient], in its mystery, in its fragility. It is to 
know that the present passes, and to accept not mastering it” (« De la scène de l’Inconscient à la scène de 
l’Histoire », 22, my translation). And yet it will be said there too that writing essentially is an “anti-
forgetfulness” [anti-oubli] (ibid, 22).   
 ! 235 
donkey, I bear and I hear, I admit it [je l’avoue], mine is a work of acceptation [mon 
travail est d’acceptation]” (85). To write the passage of the instant without stopping to 
learn or conceptualize, one must abandon the human condition and follow the animal, or 
pass into an animal point of view or condition instead. As the text says, “with the 
donkey, one goes immediately to the essential” (88). The proximity, if not non-
distinction, between writing and the animal or animal condition can be further 
established in the following phrase, where the narrator writes, “I write on the donkey 
[J’écris sur l’âne]” (88), if one recalls that the narrator, some moments before, had 
written, in a similar syntactic structure, that “I write on writing [J’écris sur écrire]” 
(86).  
 
To use a term from « Conversation », writing for Cixous here, which is writing the 
passage or writing that unfolds an other Bible, is a matter of animots202 or “animal-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 Cf. « Conversation », 81. Perhaps the term animot is more recognizable in Derrida’s L’Animal que 
donc je suis (2006). The first time the term appears in Derrida’s writing is in the summer of 1997 – the 
same year when Cixous’s « Conversation » was published – when Derrida presented his paper of the 
same title as the abovementioned book at the Cerisy-la-Salle colloquium on “Animal Autobiography.” 
The published collection of papers from that colloquium does not feature any contribution from Cixous, 
and there is no certainty that she was present at Derrida’s talk. On the term animot, Derrida does not 
make reference to Cixous, and neither does Cixous in « Conversation » make reference to Derrida. Based 
on the above information, it is difficult to attribute the first usage of animot to either Derrida or Cixous. In 
a 2000 colloquium, “Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida,” Cixous’s contribution, « Le corps 
étranjuif », interestingly would point to a knowledge of « L’Animal que donc je suis », when she writes 
of a scene of conversation with a cat, a clear reference to the opening of Derrida’s text of 1997, where he 
speaks of the displacing situation where he sees himself being seen naked by his (naked) cat. This of 
course still does not resolve the problem as to who the first use of animot can be attributed. In any case, 
Derrida’s animot has a very different sense from Cixous’s. For Derrida in L’Animal que donc je suis, 
animot is deployed to counteract the phrase “the animal,” which tends to reduce the multiplicity of 
animals into the singular. As Derrida will say, “there is no the Animal in the general singular, separated 
from Man by a sole indivisible limit” (L’Animal que donc je suis, 73). Animot, which is homophonous to 
animaux (the French word for animals in the plural), must then be allowed to resound, not only to 
(re)affirm “the plurality of animals in the singular” (ibid, 73), but also to undo the false anthropologic and 
anthropocentric opposition between humans and animals. In fact, as Derrida will continue to say, “the 
plurality [of the “living” (des « vivants »)] does not let itself be gathered into the sole figure of animality 
simply opposed to humanity” (ibid, 73). Animot, for Derrida then, is “neither a species, nor a genre, nor 
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words” as Eric Prenowitz translates it. It is a matter of following or chasing after the 
animal, of assuming an animal perspective. Or else, to use a word akin to the word 
“passage,” it is a matter of smuggling oneself into an animal point of view or condition 
(I note here that the word passeur, one of the “passage” words or les mots passants et 
passeurs that the narrator likes, can also have the sense of a smuggler or smuggling203). 
It is as such that the book to be actualized, according to « Conversation », is not only 
“an anarchic thing” but also “an untamed animal” (100). It is as such too that the 
narrator, in response to her own question as to “how does a book arrive,” will say, “like 
a cat” (103). At this point, the rejection of human sight in the writing of an other Bible 
is no less forgotten, for these animots are inscribed under the cloak of nocturnal or 
myopic blindness. As the narrator says, “when I am in pursuit of a thought that runs 
away before me like a wonderful game [gibier], my eyes no longer see” (80). Vice 
versa, the experience of writing in blindness or darkness is no less an animal condition: 
it is an experience, according to the narrator, that takes place “barely at the break of 
dawn […] still on all fours” (82).  
 
With animots, that is to say, with the rejection of human sight and human savoir, and 
with the passage towards the passing moments where words are engendered, one can 
perhaps finally speak more affirmatively of a mode of writing which lets unfold an 
other Bible beyond or done with mourning. I stress again that this other Bible remains 
within the pages of the religious Bible; elements of the latter, like the Fall, are neither !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
an individual: it is an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals [une irréductible multiplicité vivante de 
mortels]” (ibid, 65).     
203 Le grand Robert de la langue française (2nd ed, Paris: Parmentier, 1986) records that passeur can 
mean “a person who illegally crosses a frontier or a prohibited zone in order to get to someone or 
something.” 
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repressed nor denied here. With regard to the Fall, the narrator in « Conversation » does 
not fail to write that she has been “driven out of paradise” (104). In other words, we are 
still dealing with some form of a reject here – very likely one that bears traces of that 
Eve who was banished from the Garden of Eden. And yet the Fall is accepted almost 
indifferently, without bitterness, guilt, or remorse. Instead, in the writing of 
« Conversation », there will in fact be joy or even jouissance (85). But I argue that there 
can be such indifference and jouissance only because one has smuggled oneself from 
the human subject to the animal point of view, which, as noted, does not see what 
humans see, does not know what humans know, and therefore does not mourn that 
death by human knowledge. Simply put, one must auto-reject one’s anthropocentrism 
and/ or anthropomorphism, so that one can first approach the animal, and then attain 
that indifference and jouissance. This point is no doubt well-grasped by the narrator, 
and the understanding of the animal as being free from the work of mourning can even 
be said to form the underlying motivation of « Conversation ». This is because the 
smuggling into an animal condition can in fact be elicited right at the beginning of 
« Conversation ». I bring to mind again that writing there is a question of writing in the 
realm of night, of writing with eyes shut, with myopia, or which in short rejects human 
vision. I now add the observation of something like a Fall that accompanies this 
rejection of human sight there, although it is not a Fall that seeks to play out the biblical 
Fall, which could serve to expiate the latter, but one that is a passage towards the animal 
condition: “When I close my eyes, the passage is opened, the dark gorge, I descend. Or 
rather it [the passage] descends: I trust myself to the primitive space, I do not resist the 
forces that overwhelms me. There is no more gender [my italics] [Il n’y a plus de 
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genre]. I become a thing with raised ears” (80). Having already mentioned the donkey 
in « Conversation », I do not think it unreasonable to say that the “thing with raised 
ears” that one becomes in this Fall is in the image of that animal.204 But to explicate 
how the animal condition opens the way towards an other Bible where the Fall is 
received and accepted with indifference or jouissance, it is necessary to explicate the 
phrase il n’y a plus de genre.  
 
I have translated il n’y a plus de genre as there is no more gender. Certainly, genre can 
be translated as “genus,” or “genre” in the sense associated with types of writing such as 
the essay genre or the genre of the novel. The French genre can also mean gender 
though, and I tend to see it as the case here. I would argue that gender here also refers to 
human gender or sexual difference, or if one prefers, the genre of gender difference that 
befalls and afflicts humans in Genesis after eating from the tree of knowledge. I am 
certainly not saying that the notion of gender does not exist for animals, but gender for 
animals certainly does not bear the accompanying human vision and knowledge of 
shame when one animal sees another animal naked, or when one is seen naked by 
another animal. In short, gender in animals is not supplemented by the human 
knowledge of shame in the face of gender difference. In « Conversation », il n’y a plus 
de genre can be translated as no more (human) gender because a shift towards animal 
gender can be said to be occurring there, a shift that wants to renounce human gender 
difference. I proceed slowly to demonstrate this. I first note that the question of writing 
in « Conversation » is also a question of “receiving the message,” the message that is of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204!I note that the passage here leads towards an animal condition as much as the animal condition, as 
discussed earlier, will later in (re)turn facilitate the movement towards the passage.!
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“paradisiacal nudity” and “without censure” (82). The narrator further elaborates that to 
receive that message, “one can only receive it nude [nue]. No, not undressed. The 
nudity of before all clothing [La nudité d’avant tout vêtement]” (82). Such that 
« Conversation » does not regress to a work of mourning sustained by a post-Fall 
human sense of shame, “paradisiacal nudity” cannot be nostalgic of human nakedness 
before the Fall. Cixous ensures this by saying that “paradisiacal nudity” is to be with 
“neither pride nor shame” (104). A “paradisiacal nudity” that is with “neither pride nor 
shame,” that is to say, without the human pride of defying divine commandment to eat 
from the tree of knowledge, and without the sense of human shame that comes after that 
defiance,205 is more an animal point of view rather than a human condition. 
“Paradisiacal nudity” therefore cannot be human nakedness here. Instead, it inclines 
towards animal nakedness where a human perspective of gender does not come into 
play. It is only as animal nakedness, or via an animal perspective, that “paradisiacal 
nudity” can participate freely – “knowing neither limit nor hesitation” (82) – in the 
jouissance, guided by a “law of life,” which enables an “erotic and fertile genius” to see 
to the “couplings,” “hybridizations,” or “crossings” of words (96). In this jouissance, 
there is no human shame of nakedness, no mourning for the Fall through the human 
knowledge of shame and nakedness. And to be sure that this other garden206 of 
“paradisiacal nudity” is strictly of animal nakedness and perspective, the Adamic or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 With reference to an earlier work of Cixous, this “paradisiacal nudity” can be said to be a post-Fall 
jouissance. In that earlier piece, Cixous speaks of a “second innocence,” which is “the force of simplicity 
or of nudity,” and which is also “that which no longer knows, that which knows not to know” (« Le 
dernier tableau ou le portrait de Dieu » [1983], in Entre l’écriture, Paris: Des femmes, 1986, 182, my 
translation). I will discuss “second innocence” in the text proper soon. I will also argue that this “second 
innocence” is attained in « Conversation », when writing makes the passage towards the animal, and 
which takes nakedness simply, that is to say, without the human knowledge of shame. It is through the 
passage to the animal that one arrives at the condition of no longer knowing the human knowledge of 
shame, and of knowing better to renounce such human knowledge.   
206 Cf. « Conversation », 96. 
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human act of naming will not be at work here.207 In this other garden or other Bible, 
only words are received, in the way animals, such as the animals that accompany 
humans in the Bible, receive every word that is said, muttered, and even unsaid. Here, 
there will only be the witnessing of the birth of words, witnessing every living instant of 
the birth of every word.   
 
Now, the jouissance in « Conversation », which is without the denial or bitterness of the 
biblical Fall of Man, and which immerses itself within the instants of living by not 
seeking to conceptualize or retain what passes, might seem to echo what Cixous has 
called “second innocence” in one of her seminars given in the 80s.208 According to 
Cixous there, “second innocence” has nothing to do with that “pregiven [and] 
paradisiacal” Edenic innocence.209 In other words, it does not yearn to regain or return 
to the latter. It keeps the biblical Fall well in mind, but at the same time, it also 
understands that if the guilt inherited from that Fall is pursued to its extreme limit, that 
is to say, by developing a discourse that incessantly plays out this guilt, by projecting it 
ad infinitum, there will reach a point where this guilt becomes almost meaningless and 
is transformed into innocence. As Cixous puts it, “at the end of infinite guilt, one can 
become innocent.”210 One must therefore work towards this “second innocence”: it is 
“to be earned” and “should be our goal, our ambition.”211 But this work is nothing but a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207 Cf. « Conversation », 84. 
208 See especially “Grace and Innocence,” in Readings: The Poetics of Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, Kleist, 
Lispector, and Tsvetayeva, ed., trans., and intro. Verena Andermatt Conley, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991. On the question of innocence, it would also be interesting to look at Cixous’s 
With ou l’art de l’innocence (Paris: Des Femmes, 1981). However, since innocence is not a primary focus 
here, and the main concern is Cixous’s works of the 90s, I will leave aside any discussion of this text. 
209 “Grace and Innocence,” 31. 
210 “Grace and Innocence,” 68. 
211 “Grace and Innocence,” 70. 
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question of living, a living that is “a very delicate movement of detachment” where “we 
know something but we do not hold on to it.”212 In other words, it is a question of living 
that does not hold on to any particular knowledge, especially that knowledge of shame 
or guilt. Such living is also called “grace” in Cixous’s terms, and it is through such 
grace that one achieves “second innocence” since, according to Cixous, “second 
innocence is precisely the grace one gives to oneself.”213  
 
As will be seen later, there is also something of grace in the jouissance in 
« Conversation », which further gives the impression of its close proximity to “second 
innocence.” However, I am inclined to think that that jouissance is more, if not less, 
than the “second innocence” that Cixous speaks of in her seminar. As I have been 
arguing, Cixous’s “messianic” works of the 90s such as « Conversation » move away 
from outright religious defiance and make a turn towards being within religion. 
Jouissance in « Conversation », as said, involves such a turn. “Second innocence,” 
however, is consistent with the trajectories of Cixous’s works before the 90s in relation 
to the question of religion, which means that it retains a tinge of religious contestation. 
The contestation of Man’s condemnation through the biblical Fall is almost evident 
when Cixous writes, “We are not free falling because we do not want to fall.”214 And 
the quest for “second innocence,” which deploys no doubt a rhetoric that advocates 
“feminine curiousity,”215 since it is predicated on Clarice Lispector’s notion of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
212 “Grace and Innocence,” 67. 
213 “Grace and Innocence,” 67. 
214 “Grace and Innocence,” 37. 
215 “Writing the Law: Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, and Lispector,” in Readings, 23. 
 ! 242 
“wanting” or “thirst,”216 seems to be another rebellious celebration of Eve as the 
creative seeker of knowledge. To add to the “humanistic and feminine” – or in a word, 
anthropocentric – “second innocence,” Cixous also makes a distinction between humans 
and animals in this innocence. Through a reading of Heinrich von Kleist’s “Marionette 
Theater,” particularly with reference to the figure of the bear there, Cixous makes a 
marked separation between humans and animals, stating that animals continue to 
possess a “status of purity” while post-Fall humans have lost theirs.217 Jouissance in 
« Conversation », however, does not, as discussed, make that demarcation between 
humans and animals. In fact, for there to be a veritable indifference to the biblical Fall, 
and for there to be jouissance in « Conversation », it has been shown that there is a 
smuggling of oneself to the animal point of view. And with this passage to the animal 
condition, it would seem that one leaves the terrain of an anthropocentric and/ or 
anthropomorphic “second innocence,” and enters perhaps what may be called instead a 
“third innocence,” an innocence not foreign to the animal.  
 
From Jouissance to Messianicité sans messianisme 
The jouissance of experiencing the passage where every engendered word is received, 
the jouissance in other words of writing in “paradisiacal nudity,” without shame and 
therefore beyond mourning that death by human savoir, may be articulated as the 
passion of the animal.218 Passion, according to Derrida in Demeure, is not only “the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
216 See “Grace and Innocence,” 35-37. 
217 “Grace and Innocence,” 57. 
218 I note that Derrida also uses the phrase “passion of the animal” in L’Animal que donc je suis, which he 
uses to describe the “naked passivity” (L’Animal que donc je suis, 29) of an unclothed human standing 
before the gaze of the animal. As it will be explicated in the text proper, I am certainly not using “the 
passion of the animal” in this sense here.  
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experience of love,” but also “witnessing” or “testimony [témoignage].”219 Derrida’s 
understanding of “passion” can be applied to the animal condition in « Conversation », 
since love, and complete receiving or acceptation (of the engendering of words) – and 
therefore testimony too, are at play with regard to the animal there. One example, 
mentioned before in the section on Derrida, of the passion of the animal in terms of 
bearing witness in « Conversation » is perhaps the untold dialogue Cixous believes to 
take place between Abraham and his donkey on their way up to Mount Moria. It would 
be the dialogue in which, one might assume, Abraham confides in his donkey his 
despair at obeying God’s commandment to put Isaac up for sacrifice, the dialogue 
without which, Cixous believes, the journey would be unbearably “infernal” (87). In 
terms of the loving passion of the animal in « Conversation », there is no less the loving 
touch between the narrator and the animal. This touch does more than establish a 
physical connection between them, for the touch or passion of a cat is in fact 
instrumental in giving the narrator access to “touch the body of the instant” in her 
writing of the passage. The latter is after all preceded by a passage on the touch of an 
animal: “I touch the soft and wild touch of my cat, my female cat [ma chatte], my 
female cat that I follow and am [la chatte dont je suis la chatte], and nothing of 
appropriation between us except moments of grace, without guarantee, without security, 
without a glance [sans regard] thrown to the following moment” (84-85).220  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 Derrida, Demeure: Maurice Blanchot, Paris: Galilée, 1998, 26, 28, my translation. 
220 This is where grace is also at work in the jouissance of the passage to the animal condition in 
« Conversation ». In contrast to “Grace and Innocence,” grace here is not something to be worked for by 
the human alone. Instead, it is shared between humans and animals. This is another reason why I think 
jouissance in « Conversation » is beyond the “second innocence” Cixous talks about in “Grace and 
Innocence.” 
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With regard to the word passion, I do not ignore the fact that it has borne overtly 
religious senses in the history of its usage. With that in mind, and having stated that 
« Conversation » is traced by a passion of the animal, perhaps the discussion can return 
to the question of whether « Conversation » is “without religion and without religion’s 
God.” At first glance, “religion’s God” still seems to figure in « Conversation », 
especially when the narrator says, “I have never written without God” (101). And yet, it 
has to be noted that when the narrator speaks about God, she is not speaking about God 
per se but “the word God [le mot Dieu]” (100). From this marked distinction between 
word and concept or thing, perhaps it is not difficult to discern a distancing from 
“religion’s God,” a distancing that manifests itself further when the narrator lets 
reverberate the word(s) d’yeux [“of eyes”], which is homophonic to Dieu [“God”], in 
the proximity of the latter: “Le mot Dieu: le mot d’yeux” – “The word God: the word of 
eyes” (100). As discussed already, things regarding eyes that see are generally 
renounced in « Conversation », and so if God is the word of eyes, it will not be 
surprising that “religion’s God” is similarly set up only to be undone.221 The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
221 The negative association between God and the power of seeing is also evident in Cixous’s Beethoven à 
jamais: ou l’existence de Dieu (Paris: Des femmes, 1993. Following translations from this text are mine). 
Right at the beginning of that text, the narrator compares the respective points of view of mortals and of 
God on living. Mortals “live in the midst [au milieu] of life,” while God looks at life from the sides. In 
terms of the mortal’s point of view of life, “life appears to us without end and hence it is that” (Beethoven 
à jamais, 11). However, from God’s point of view, a point of view akin to being “perched very high up 
on an ancient tree of the earth” (ibid, 11), life is not only chaotic strife but deathly too. And this will lead 
the narrator to say it is “better to never arrive at the side” where God sees. But if it happens that one does 
arrive at such an apparently vantage point, it is “better to not look, better to close one’s eyes” (ibid, 11). 
To have had access to such a point of view, the text suggests that it would be better, to borrow a phrase 
that occurs just slightly later in the text, to blind oneself by having an “arrow in the eye” (ibid, 15). Like 
« Conversation » then, the act of seeing, particularly the divine power of seeing, is renounced here. This 
motif of the arrow is worth taking up a little further here, since it turns up in « Conversation » too. In 
« Conversation », the passage towards writing the “interior body of words” will bear the image of the 
trajectory of an arrow, a sacred arrow, a “pfeilige” [a word which combines the German word for arrow, 
Pfeil, and the German word for the sacred, heilig] (96), “an arrow […] [that] is going to plant itself at the 
heart of internity [l’internité]” (94). To relate to what I have been trying to argue in the section on 
« Conversation », I would say that this “pfeilige” is shot through with the trajectory that first blinds 
human vision, which then traverses towards an animal vision whose perspective bears no traces of the 
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renunciation of “religion’s God” in « Conversation » in fact takes place quickly when 
the narrator proclaims that “God is not that of religions” (100). Instead, God is but a 
word or another word in the process or passage of writing, a word that articulates and 
temporarily provides hospitality to all the future words that will arrive: “God is the 
name of everything that has not yet been said,” and “the word God [functions] to give 
lodging to the infinite multiplicity of everything that would be said” (101). Further, not 
only will God in « Conversation » be “not the Father” (as Charlotte Berkowitz has 
noted), but even the monotheistic dimension of “religion’s [Christian] God” will be 
done away with, as the narrator goes on to say that the unfolding of an other Bible will 
reveal that there are gods rather than a single god: “This page writes itself [s’écrit] all 
by itself, this is the proof of the existence of gods [my emphasis]” (100).  
 
That « Conversation » is “without religion’s God” can be established then. But is it 
absolutely “without religion”? I bring to mind that I have suggested that an other Bible 
is not inscribed outside of religion’s Bible, but within it. The endeavor to create an 
outside does not lead one beyond the work of mourning. Instead, with the outside, there 
is in fact no “forgetting” or no letting-go of the trauma suffered on the other side of the 
boundaries of the outside: the outside itself will always mark the work of mourning with 
regard to that trauma. (I also bring to mind again Derrida’s point that to get beyond 
metaphysics is not to do without metaphysics but to remain within it and (re)read it “in 
a certain manner.”) In my reading of « Conversation » above, I have tried to 
demonstrate that to get round the problem of the outside is to smuggle or slide into an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“ancient tree” of knowledge, towards an animal that has its eyes closed to human knowledge and 
therefore is blind to a life that mourns the human death by knowledge.       
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animal point of view or condition. Now, the animal may be considered to be “without 
religion” since, receiving no injunction against eating from the tree of knowledge, it was 
never subject to divine law and commandment, and hence it is beyond religion in this 
sense. However, in another sense, the animal is not absolutely outside of religion, for it 
has never been in fact banished from Eden, and therefore remains within religion. The 
animal then occupies an equivocal region where all the turns of being without religion 
and being within religion are at play. It is the limit, the frontier, the passage between 
within-religion and without-religion, or better, the point where one is beyond (and not 
outside) religion but remains within religion. Perhaps Derrida’s notion of “messianicity 
without messianism” may be useful to better express this animal perspective or 
condition of being beyond/ within religion. I have discussed “messiancity without 
messianism” in the section on Derrida, but I reiterate here that “messiancity without 
messianism,” according to Derrida in Spectres de Marx, is a question of allowing the 
future to arrive in its full surprise as a true event, in other words, a condition that does 
not exclude opening oneself to the complete risk of what arrives from the future.222 In a 
way, this “emancipatory [émancipatoire] affirmation”223 can also be said to be an 
intense living-in-the-instant, akin to Cixous’s notion of a passage, because it does not 
cast any headlong vision in order to anticipate what is to come. Derrida will argue that 
such a “structure of experience” is a secular one, “a certain experience of the promise 
that one can attempt to liberate from all dogmatic and even metaphysical-religious 
determination, from all messianism.”224 For that reason, Derrida chooses to underscore 
the adjective “messianic, […] rather than messianism, in order to designate a structure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 See for example Spectres de Marx, 148. 
223 Spectres de Marx, 146. 
224 Spectres de Marx, 266, 147. 
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of experience rather than a religion.”225 However, Derrida makes clear that this 
“messianicity without messianism,” despite being without, or beyond, religion, does not 
absolutely exclude the religious. As Derrida argues, the religious, along with the 
messianic, will form the “injunction” for us to affirm and respond to the emancipatory 
“messianic spirit.”226 The critical point is to not let “messianicity without messianism” 
be guided or (pre)determined by any religious figure or commandment. It is only in that 
sense that “messiancity without messianism” is “without religion,” or as Derrida says in 
Foi et savoir, that “in itself, [messianicity without messianism] does not belong to any 
Abrahamic religion,” or that it is “older than every religion.”227  
 
Such “messianicity without messianism” presents itself in « Conversation ». There is 
after all no lack of a messianic force in inscribing the passage that welcomes the 
“infinite multiplicity” of instants to-come. Accompanying the narrator is “the always 
unforeseen Messiah,” which she avows to be “the force that makes me write” (101). 
Like Derrida’s “messianicity without messianism,” which detaches itself from all 
appurtenances to any religion, the messianic force in « Conversation » cannot be 
identified with a religious messiah or religious messianism. The narrator in 
« Conversation » refers to “the always unforeseen Messiah” as “you” (101), a “you” 
that comes and goes freely, and which leaves the narrator no certitude as to whether it 
will return or not, but nonetheless gives the narrator an unwavering belief that it will. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
225 Spectres de Marx, 266. 
226 Spectres de Marx, 264, 148. The link between the messianic and religion will not be denied too when 
Derrida further writes that the “quasi atheistic dryness [sécheresse] of the messianic can be taken to be 
the condition of religions of the Book,” or that one can “always recognize [in the messianic] the dry 
ground on which the living figures of every messiah, be they announced, recognized, or always expected, 
have emerged and passed” (ibid, 267).   
227 Foi et savoir, 31, 72. 
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This “you,” unlike all religious messiahs or messianism, is not a human messiah, 
though. Instead, this “you” points to an animal, if not a cat, to be specific. This 
postulation of a messianic cat in « Conversation » can be derived via a reference to 
Cixous’s Messie (1996). The messianic figure in Messie is none other than a cat, which 
the narrator there will say not only accompanies the trajectory of the text, but also the 
characters in the text. This cat nonetheless remains free to come and go as it wishes, but 
always returns miraculously. Such characterization of the messianic cat in Messie surely 
foreshadows the description of the messianic “you” in « Conversation », and therefore 
brings the two messianic figures into an uncanny proximity, not to mention that the 
narrator in Messie also addresses the cat as “you.” The messianic “you” in 
« Conversation » is no less a cat than the messianic cat in Messie then. And if the 
messianic cat in Messie is always that which leads one to the future, the cat in 
« Conversation » plays a similar critical role: it is with the “female cat” that “moments 
of grace, without guarantee, without security, without a glance thrown to the following 
moment” arise. Such rhetoric, which resonates rather clearly with the Derridean rhetoric 
of the “to-come” or the “eventness” of the future, surely places the “female cat” in 
« Conversation » (and Messie) within Derrida’s “messianicity without messianism” in 
terms of its “structure of experience” which, being absolutely invested in the instant, 
allows the future to arrive in its “absolute surprise.”228 In this case, it would even seem 
that « Conversation » (and Messie), more than the works of Derrida perhaps, 
demonstrate how one succeeds, by recognizing the messianic force in the passion of the 
animal or in an animal condition or perspective, in approaching that “messianicity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
228 Cf. Derrida, Foi et savoir, 30. In Foi et savoir, Derrida would also say that the messianic is what 
makes such a future possible: “No to-come [à-venir] without […] some messianic promise” (ibid, 72). 
 ! 249 
without messianism” where there “would be the opening to the to-come [l’avenir] […] 
without prophetic prefiguration.”229  
 
The “messianicity without messianism” in « Conversation », borne by the passion of the 
animal, or by the animal point of view or condition, then consolidates the unfolding of 
an other Bible that is “without religion’s God,” without mourning, and without 
appurtenance to any religion, while not needing to be outside of religion. I would now 
like to conclude this section on Cixous by returning to the question of the “post-
secular.” To reiterate, “post-secular” thought, while still lacking definition, can be 
described as the attempt to recognize the trace of the religious in our contemporary 
world, despite our belief that we have been living through secular times. I have also 
suggested that there can be a future “post-secular” thought too that acknowledges the 
rise of local religions without laying claim to any existing dominant or primary religion 
(e.g. Christianity) to which those religions must defer. This future “post-secular” 
thought can be said to have similar horizons to those of Cixous’s “messianic” other 
Bible. I have also said that “post-secular” thought at present remains largely 
anthropocentric and anthropomorphic, which risks privileging, or inclining towards, the 
perspective of a certain group of people or human community. Actual “post-secular” 
violence, such as the militant assertion of a local religion in opposition to its being 
appropriated or homogenized by a dominant religion, has already shown us the 
precarious outcome of such anthropocentric or anthropomorphic “post-secularism.” If 
“post-secular” thought is to be sincere in welcoming the articulations of a multiplicity 
of religions where no one religion dominates another, it should take a page from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
229 Foi et savoir, 30.  
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Cixous’s “messianic” texts. In other words, it would be in need of an other Bible similar 
to that which unfolds in Cixous’s “messianic” works: it is in need of an other Bible that 
opens a space of thought not predicated on any religious law or dogma, or any 
prohibitive law of any “religion’s God.” As I have tried to suggest in this section, such 
an other Bible for “post-secular” thought can be attainable not by a limited “humanistic 
and feminine” perspective as advocated by Cohen-Safir. It needs a turn – a turn that is 
no less the auto-rejection of anthropocentric or anthropomorphic vision, knowledge, and 
selfhood – towards the animal-reject (to keep in mind that animals are still largely 
marginalized or disregarded in religious and “post-secular” discourse), towards its point 
of view. 
 
The Animal-(Auto)-Reject: Balaam’s Donkey 
To conclude this section, I would like to turn to, just as Cixous has done in 
« Conversation », or rather follow after, following the rhetoric towards the end of the 
section on Derrida, another donkey. It concerns a donkey in the Bible: not Abraham’s 
donkey though, but Balaam’s donkey in chapter 22 of Numbers in the Old Testament. 
Numbers 22 begins with Balak, king of Moab, finding his territory surrounded by the 
Israelites. Fearing that the latter will swarm his land, Balak summons Balaam, known to 
be successful in his blessings and curses, to curse the Israelites in order to keep them out 
of his land. Balaam did not agree immediately to the invitation to Moab, but said he 
would seek counsel with God first. God tells Balaam that the Israelites are blessed and 
that Balaam shall not curse them or go with Balak’s messengers. Balaam heeds God’s 
counsel and refuses the invitation. But the insistent Balak sends more messengers with 
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more promises of greater honor to convince Balaam to take up the invitation. Balaam 
again seeks counsel with God, and this time, not without irony no doubt, God says go 
with the messengers if they call to him, but also “do only what [God] tell[s] [him] to 
do.” God’s irony being completely lost to Balaam, Balaam follows Balak’s messengers 
and sets out on the journey to Moab on his donkey. Furious, God puts a sword-wielding 
angel before the path of Balaam and his donkey. Balaam does not see this angel, but his 
donkey does, which then swerves off the intended but now fatal path. Balaam strikes his 
donkey to get back onto the correct route, but this time the angel stands before them in a 
vineyard path with a wall on each side. The donkey crashes into one of the walls in 
order to escape the imminent wrath of the angel, and in this process crushes Balaam’s 
foot against the wall, and consequently suffers Balaam’s second wrath. The angel then 
appears where there is no longer any way to turn; and so the donkey falls to the ground, 
falling on Balaam this time round. For the third time then, Balaam strikes his donkey 
and cries out that if he had a sword he would kill it. God then opens Balaam’s eyes and 
now Balaam sees the deathly angel and knows he is wrong. 
 
Many things can be said about this passage, for example the quasi-(auto)-sacrificial 
gesture of the donkey, and perhaps especially the part where God gives voice to the 
donkey (which I omit above). However, what I would like to highlight here is that the 
donkey does respond in its way. It responds to the deathly angel standing before it and 
Balaam, responding in a way that Balaam is too stubborn, stupid, or bête to understand. 
In any case, Balaam’s donkey responds in a way that preserves the respective lives of its 
own and Balaam’s. (Contrary to what Heidegger would claim, Balaam’s donkey knows 
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what is to die.) And in order to save itself and Balaam, to save in other words 
differences – the difference of humans and the difference of animals, or to preserve the 
respective life-force of these differences, Balaam’s donkey is willing to auto-reject 
itself, in the sense of willingly suffer Balaam’s strikes, and accepting Balaam’s 
treatment of it as a reject when Balaam claims to kill it were he in possession of a 
sword. For a less violent “post-secular” world, that is to say, a future “post-secular” 
world where not only differences are affirmed and respected, but also where life-forces 
of these differences are maintained, perhaps it is this animal-(auto)-reject that will lead 
us there. And as I have been trying to suggest throughout this section, perhaps it is the 
figure of the reject, particularly the auto-reject that renounces all anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism, that will help us follow after, in turn, that animal-(auto)-reject.     
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3. 
 Prolegomenon to Reject Politics: From Voyous to Becoming-Animal 
 
Plus d’une démocratie, plus d’une égaliberté 
In unveiling and mobilizing the reject or auto-reject in contemporary French thought’s 
rethinking of friendship, love, community, and religion in the previous sections, I have 
also suggested that what is at stake is the affirmation of the opening, or what Nancy 
would call the “dis-closing” [déclosion], of differences. One may go further to say that 
this affirmation is an affirmation of radical differences, if not a radical affirmation of 
radical differences, since this affirmation never has the intention to assimilate those 
differences within its discursive space. The objective cannot be the neutralizing or the 
taming of rejects (though it would launch a critique or counter-rejection against rejects 
that express or project their differences at the cost of others). Affirmation here must 
leave rejects free to remain as rejects or auto-rejects, such as the “friend” who walks 
away and who might never return to any existing friendship, the lover who puts in 
suspension or syncope all existing love, or the other-Abraham or even animal-messiah 
that prefers not to respond to any particular religious injunction. This is only how any 
affirmation is constantly a “dis-closing,” constantly undoing all attempts to close the 
other – regardless if this other is a reject or not – in or within a homogenizing space or 
thought. In the course of eliciting and affirming the rejects or auto-rejects in 
contemporary French thought, the preceding sections have also raised several notions 
that have political import, if not, are already political in themselves. An example of the 
latter is Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic war machine, which I have discussed in the 
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section on friendship, love, and community. As I made clear there, the primary target of 
the nomadic war machine is typically not so much community, but the State, which has 
come to embody that which is absolutely organized, and from which hardly anyone can 
deviate or escape. Community comes under attack by the nomadic war machine only 
when it takes on such State-like striating structure. In that same section, I have also 
raised the question of love. Love can also have political potential, if we are to follow 
Hardt and Negri’s argument in Commonwealth, where, according to them, love can be a 
force that ruptures the appropriating network of global capital.1  
 
And in speaking of “messiancity without messianism” in the section on the “post-
secular,” one is also no doubt in the proximity of political thought, especially when one 
refers not only to Derrida’s Foi et savoir but also to his Spectres de Marx. As Derrida 
argues in Spectres de Marx, “messianicity without messianism” has everything to do 
with the thought of a démocratie à venir or “democracy to come.” And yet, one needs to 
be precise to note that what is critical in the phrase démocratie à venir, as Derrida 
underscores in an earlier interview with Michael Sprinker, is not so much démocratie 
but the à venir.2 L’à-venir, which is undeniably something of the future, is markedly 
different, however, from the future [le futur] according to Derrida. The future [le futur] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Love here, for Hardt and Negri, is of course not of the romantic kind. Instead, it concerns “solidarity, 
care for others, creating community, and cooperating in common project” (Commonwealth, Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, 180) within the multitude that is deprived of the 
riches of those who control, manage, and perpetuate the global capital Empire. It is from those acts of 
love that spring forth a Spinozean joy, that is to say, an “increase of [their] power to act and think,” which 
potentially “marks a rupture with what exists” and which sees to “the creation of the new” (ibid, 181). As 
I have suggested in a note in the section on friendship, love, and community, I find such community-
creation, driven by an “external cause” (ibid, 181) such as Empire, or driven by a “common” deprivation 
of wealth and resources, too conditional. It is as if the thought of community is only a consequence of 
Empire (the global dissemination of which has left behind it what Hardt and Negri call “a multitude of the 
poor”) and not something worthy to think of in itself.   
2 See Politique et amitié: entretiens avec Michael Sprinker sur Marx et Althusser, Paris: Galilée, 2011. 
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for Derrida is something programmed, the arrival of which is most oftentimes already 
expected or anticipated, and is always something of the order of the possible. There is 
nothing of the event therefore of the future, in the eyes of Derrida. The promise of the 
event lies instead with the à venir, since the latter arrives in complete surprise, or rather 
in its complete surprise, as Nancy would say with greater precision, since he argues that 
the event is the surprise itself.3 Derrida will go on to explicate that what is at stake in the 
à venir is the arrival of the other, the other that we have no, and will not have, 
knowledge of, the other that we were not expecting or anticipating. Derrida will also 
regard this other as anyone, that is to say, it does not matter who he or she is, or what it 
is. The anyone is the one “before [its] metaphysical determination […] in the subject, 
the human person, and consciousness, before all juridical determination in the similar 
[le semblable], the compatriot, fellow creature [congénère], brother, neighbor, fellow-
believer [coreligionnaire] or citizen,” or, more simply, the “anonymous ‘anyone’,” 
“whoever,” the “undetermined ‘each one’.”4 In a démocratie à venir, this other or 
anyone arrives without the need to identify himself, herself, or itself: there would be no 
such demand in exchange for hospitality within this space. As Derrida would have it, 
that would be the unconditional hospitality of a démocratie à venir. That is to say too 
that in the space of the latter, the other or anyone has the right to reject disclosing 
himself, herself, or itself, the right to also reject all belonging, appurtenance, and 
subscription to any – if there are indeed any – community, ideology, and political 
inclination there. In other words, there is always the chance that this other or anyone is 
nothing less than a reject to any existing communitarian construct or political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See Nancy’s « Surprise de l’événement » in Être singulier pluriel, Paris : Galilée, 1996.  
4 Voyous : deux essais sur la raison, Paris : Galilée, 2003, 126, 35, my translation. 
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configuration; but it is the ethical task of this démocratie à venir, or it is within the 
ethical contour of its unconditional hospitality, to receive without question and without 
prejudice this other-anyone-reject. Put another way, démocratie à venir concerns more 
the reject than the subject.5  
 
To be precise, a démocratie à venir does not only receive the other-anyone-reject 
coming from the future; in a retroactive manner, it is also committed to open itself to the 
other-anyone-reject that has come before, but has been repressed, oppressed, silenced, 
eradicated, or made to be erased from memory by a previous or existing political regime 
or ideology. A démocratie à venir recalls these others who have been violently rejected; 
it allows their voices or traces to resurface, resound, and disseminate anew and into the 
future. According to Derrida in Spectres de Marx, this is the “hauntology” [hantologie] 
that subtends the “messiancity without messianism” of a démocratie à venir. And to 
remain with one of the motivations behind the writing of Spectres de Marx, the 
“hauntology” of “messianicity without messianism” would also mean the chance for a 
different take on Marxism, not only one that has been marginalized or even discounted 
from the dominant and conventional mode of reading Marx, but also one that deviates 
from orthodox Marxism or even practices a certain infidelity to Marx’s writings. A 
“hauntology” must allow the exposition of this different take, and the different political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, in their introduction to Derrida and the Time of the Political, argue 
likewise that what is at stake in démocratie à venir is not the subject. They write: “[the] imminence [of 
démocratie à venir] is not something that can be predicted or anticipated precisely because the coming is 
that of the other. Indeed, the other is this coming and should therefore not be regarded as another subject, 
substance, or presence” (Derrida and the Time of the Political, Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2009, 14). In the same volume of essays, one will find Rancière’s contribution, which critiques 
Derrida’s démocratie à venir as too ethical and not political enough. 
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trajectory that can be drawn from it.6 This is why Derrida stresses that it is the à venir 
that is more important than démocratie in the phrase démocratie à venir. This is also 
why, for Derrida, democracy, in place of other modes of political practice, is written in 
simply because it is the better one at the moment: Derrida is prepared to abandon it 
when something better than democracy comes along.7 At this point, I would like to say 
that what is at work in démocratie à venir is also a mechanism of auto-rejection, that is 
to say, démocratie à venir does not hypostasize itself on a particular political thought, 
not even democracy, despite “democracy” being inscribed in the phrase itself. To put it 
in Derrida’s rhetoric, there is no one mode of thinking and practicing democracy that 
démocratie à venir predicates itself on; rather, it is open to more than one mode of 
thinking and practicing that this démocratie à venir can assume: in short, in démocratie 
à venir, there is plus d’une démocratie. And there is plus d’une démocratie because, 
according to Derrida, democracy is structured around autoimmunity,8 which, as already 
discussed in the previous section, lets in something foreign and even potentially fatal 
within its internal coherence or holism, only in view of perpetuating itself beyond its 
own spatio-temporal context. That is to say too that autoimmunity, before being a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 That is what I think the contributors, which include Nancy, Rancière, and Badiou, in L’Idée de 
communisme (Paris: Lignes, 2010), attempt to do with the term “communism,” after its disastrous 
perversion in the course of history, by Stalin in the ex-Soviet Union and by Mao in China, for example.  
7 He reiterates this in Voyous, recalling what he has already said in Politiques de l’amitié, that there is 
always “the possibility, perhaps, one day, and the right, to abandon the heritage of the name [of 
democracy], of changing the name” (Voyous, 130). On an inquiry into Derrida’s comparative (“better”) or 
superlative (“the best”) rhetoric surrounding democracy and especially in relation to violence (“lesser” or 
“the least,” which seems to be in question in “Violence and Metaphysics”), see Samir Haddad, “A 
Genealogy of Violence: From Light to the Autoimmune,” diacritics 38 (1-2): 121-142, spring-summer 
2008.    
8 Perhaps auto-rejection can be another way of saying “auto-critique,” which Derrida associates with 
autoimmunity: “the expression ‘démocratie à venir’ takes into account the absolute and intrinsic 
historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its concept, the formula of autoimmunity that one 
call the right to auto-critique or to perfectibility. Democracy is the only system, the only constitutional 
paradigm in which, in principle, one has or one exercises [prend] the right to publicly critique everything, 
including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name, including also the idea of the 
constitutional paradigm and the absolute authority of law” (Voyous, 126-127). 
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calculated move undertaken by present so-called democratic states, and perhaps even 
before it is properly of the biological sciences, is ethical in the sense that it concerns the 
affirmation of the other, since it involves a body opening itself up to what it would 
normally reject, at the same time putting in place, in a highly risky or even suicidal 
fashion, an auto-rejection within itself. 
 
Affirmation, however, as Nancy tells us, is not political, or it does not belong to the 
order of politics: (philosophical) affirmation and politics are distinct, and are not to be 
confused with each other. This does not, however, prevent politics from having any link 
with affirmation. According to Nancy, politics has to do with space or spatiality, and in 
that case, politics can task itself to create a place [lieu] to maintain or guarantee the 
affirmation of the “dis-closing” of others or differences.9 Put another way, Nancy seeks 
a politics that can foreground or give place to the fact of every being existing and living 
alongside another (a politics that surely is not so distant from Derrida’s “unconditional 
hospitality”). The place of politics must therefore be a place of openness foremost, and 
not a place of exclusion. It must be open to those who have been excluded by previous 
or existing political practices and ideologies. And having done this, the place of politics 
must not entail any holding of all these beings within a particular space in a totalizing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 For the distinction that Nancy makes between affirmation as philosophical and politics as the creation of 
place or space for this affirmation, see especially Vérité de la démocratie, Paris: Galilée, 2008, 46-50. 
The emphasis on politics as a question of place or space is also shared by other French thinkers. Thus, we 
find the notion of khôra, as place without fixed grounding or foundation, or spacing so as to 
accommodate or welcome the other, in Derrida’s discussion of politics in Spectres de Marx and Voyous. 
In Badiou, there is always the “evental site” [site événementiel] as a critical element, if not even necessary 
condition, for the political event. And in Rancière, we will find him saying, “Politics exists always as a 
repartition [re-division] of the policed space [l’espace policier] [which is the control by the State of the 
public sphere by determining and distributing those who have political voice and whose who do not], as a 
rethinking of the structuration of the space of community […]” (« Politiques de la mésentente » [2008], in 
Moments politiques: interventions 1977-2009, Paris: La Fabrique, 2009, 178, my translation).   
!! 259 
manner: it must not seek any fusion of all these beings into a unitary communitarian 
sociability, of which politics will manage or govern. In other words, politics here must 
acknowledge that relations between beings are always undergoing transformation all the 
time, which includes some beings walking away from existing relations. Politics must 
accept such dynamics of dispersion, and not force any rapprochement or reconciliation. 
That is to say that politics must maintain every being’s liberty to free itself from any 
present relation and to form new ones beyond the determination of politics, and that 
would entail that politics must even ensure each being’s liberty to free itself from the 
very place of politics.  
 
Politics, in other words, must not violently supplement every space, or delimit every 
being or thing within its determination and contours. Otherwise, as Nancy notes, one 
ends up with the fascist notion of “everything is politics/ political.”10 When every space 
is captured by politics, or when politics begins to determine every space, demanding 
that every being within that space presents itself as adhering to its political ideology, it 
is necessary, according to Blanchot, following Foucault’s caution in Surveiller et punir 
(1975) that visibility is a trap, to think “the right to disappear” [le droit de 
disparaître].11 Or, as Nancy has suggested, for a place of politics that is always open to 
the other or to radical differences, that is to say, a flexible place of politics that adjusts 
itself to transformations in relations between beings, and never founds or hypostasizes 
itself as exceptionally the place of affirmation, which might then tempt it to disseminate 
itself in a totalizing and imperialistic manner, one must put in place a thought of politics !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Nancy’s interview with Spriale, « Politique tout court et très au-delà », in Spirale 239, hiver 2012, 
35, my translation.  
11 Michel Foucault tel que je l’imagine, Paris: Fata Morgana, 1986, 36, my translation 
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without the subject. The place of politics that assures the affirmation of the “dis-
closing” of radical differences must be wary of the subject, not so much the subject that 
develops a conscious certainty as to how he or she singularly determines his or her 
thought, action, and existence, but the subject that extends that certainty with a 
sovereign ambition, in other words, the subject who decidedly positions his or her 
existence as the foundation of an exceptional worldview, to which all must accede and 
not resist.12 The place of politics, as Nancy argues, need not be occupied by such a 
Schmittian sovereign subject.13 A renunciation of a sovereign subject does not equate to 
a renunciation of sovereignty, however. A minimum sovereignty remains, or even must 
remain, with politics. This is because a certain force, a certain power even, is required to 
effectively put in place a space of affirmation; and with force or power, or even with the 
moment of affirmation, there is irreducibly sovereignty at work.14 The question then, for 
Nancy, is to think of another sovereignty that sidesteps a Schmittian imperialist 
sovereignty: as Nancy says, one can be “sovereign otherwise” [souverain autrement].15 
And since Schmittian sovereignty is largely predicated on a thinking of the subject, or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Here, I am close to Nancy’s thought on sovereignty when he says, in his contribution to the Cerisy-la-
salle colloquium, La Démocratie à venir: Autour de Jacques Derrida (sous la direction de Marie-Louise 
Mallet, Paris: Galilée, 2004), that “sovereignty as a modern concept of politics is a concept of the subject” 
( , 348). I am aware of the “deconstructive” critique of sovereignty of the Schmittian 
form especially in the works of Bataille, Derrida, Agamben, Nancy, Bennington, and Sam Weber, among 
many others. This is, however, not the space to rehearse all those arguments.  
13 In « De la souveraineté », Nancy would argue for a separation of politics from sovereignty. In this case, 
“politics” will no longer “designate the presumption of a subject or in a subject (be it an individual or a 
collective)” (La création du monde ou la mondialisation, Paris : Galilée, 2002, 165, my translation). “The 
political order,” Nancy continues, “would define its regulation by an equality and a justice that does not 
postulate a subjective presumption. In this case, politics would be without subject […]” (ibid, 165). 
14 As Derrida states, “There is no sovereignty without force […]” (Voyous, 144). And as he argues a little 
later, sovereignty secures itself through the exploitation of power: “The abuse of power is constitutive of 
sovereignty itself” (Voyous, 145). In other words, sovereignty is always nascent as long there is some 
manifestation of force, power, and affirmation. The form of sovereignty that results – whether it is 
imperialist or not – then depends on the degree and the manner of use of that force, power, and 
affirmation. 
15 Le sens du monde, Paris: Galilée, 1993, 143, my translation. 
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else, because thinking with the subject tends more often than not to precipitate into a 
thought of Schmittian sovereignty, it seems that a thought of an other sovereignty must 
depart from any thinking of the subject. As I would argue, for this other sovereignty, if 
not for a place of politics that maintains the affirmation of “dis-closing” radical 
differences, the thinking of politics must be accompanied by the thought of the reject.   
  
For several contemporary French thinkers, politics in fact begins with the reject (even 
though they do not articulate it as such). That is even the case for Badiou who, as 
mentioned in the preceding section, always insists on taking some distance with the 
“post-structuralist” or “deconstructive” thinkers such as Derrida, Deleuze, and Nancy. 
The political event arrives, for Badiou, when the presence or force of those who have 
always been disregarded or denigrated by the existing ruling political regime as 
“inexistent” – or rejects, as I would put it – is no longer deniable. However, as seen too 
previously, Badiou would disdain to allow the “inexistents” to remain as rejects. 
According to Badiou, once the force and presence of the latter is undeniable or 
irresistible, that is to say, following the uprising that is the political event, the 
“inexistents” must also raise themselves from mere rejects to the status of subjects of 
that political event. And as we have already seen in Badiou’s theory of the subject, it is 
the subject must will be faithful to that political event, and do whatever it takes in order 
that the event and the “inexistents” can no longer be repressed or suppressed by the 
ruling political regime. With Badiou’s militant political subject, violence proves 
oftentimes to be inevitable, if not critical even. The uprisings of the masses in the Arab 
Spring of 2011, for Badiou, is one manifestation of such violence, a violence that 
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Badiou in Le Réveil de l’histoire  (2011) considers to be constitutive of “historical 
riots,” in contrast to riots that do not change the course of things in the world but are 
only of frivolous violence. Badiou has also called for these movements to not lose 
momentum, or to abdicate to the democratic practice of elections, which only risks 
neutralizing the force of the movement.16 For Badiou, a sustained violence is therefore 
necessary at times, such that one does not compromise the sustained existence of the 
political event, or that there is no compromise with the current political regime. The 
subject must take courage to carry on with this violence, and this is why the soldier will 
be the exemplary figure for Badiou’s political subject.17 However, as discussed also in 
the section before, Badiou’s subject risks taking on an imperialist, sovereign contour, 
especially when it develops a deep conviction with regard to the universal dimension of 
the event to which it is faithful, and begins to disseminate it across all differences, 
indifferent to claims to other political trajectories that do not coincide with the supposed 
universality of the subject’s event. The rise of the subject in the place of politics then 
betrays any affirmation of “dis-closing” with regard to others or to differences. This is 
evident in Badiou’s political thought when he categorically rejects democratic thought, 
even if it is a thought of démocratie à venir, as a possible form of emancipatory politics 
[politique d’émancipation], but insists that the latter is possible only by being strictly 
faithful to the “communist hypothesis,” if not by following through the “Idea of 
communism.”18  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See Badiou’s Sarkozy: pire que prévu; Les autres: prévoir le pire (Paris: Lignes, 2012) for his total 
renunciation of electoral processes. 
17 See especially Badiou’s « La Figure du soldat » [2006] in La Relation énigmatique entre philosophie et 
politique, Paris : Germina, 2011. 
18 This strict fidelity to solely the “Idea of communism” is another distinguishing feature that marks the 
distance between Badiou and other contemporary French thinkers such as Nancy, Rancière, and Derrida, 
this time with regard to political thought. In an earlier note, I have underscored that Nancy and Rancière 
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Apart from Badiou, other contemporary French thinkers whose political thought can be 
said to begin with the reject include Jacques Rancière and Étienne Balibar. As 
explicated in key texts such as La Mésentente and Le Partage du sensible, politics, for 
Rancière, begins with what he calls “the part that has no part” or le sans part, that is to 
say, those who are discounted by State politics from being considered as those whose 
voice, works, and even existence count.19 In the eyes of the State, these sans parts do 
not add up to what it counts as its political subjects. Not counted as political subjects, 
the State further deems them incapable of, or rather prohibits them from, partaking in 
political participation and intervention. Their political exclusion has consequences for 
their existential condition, since being sans part, they are supernumerary to the 
calculation made by the State in its distribution of space to accommodate its subjects 
and its distribution of economic resources to those same subjects: in other words, they 
will not be accorded any hospitality with respect to those spaces, or the benefits that the 
State’s (recognized) political subjects receive. And the State will ensure that such unjust 
and unequal distribution remains in place, which is to say too that the State will do 
whatever it can to render the sans part silent and invisible, insensible to the rest of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in L’Idée de communisme, like Badiou, do not believe in any “end” of communism, and are committed to 
rethink communism. However, unlike Badiou, they do not reject democratic thought tout court, even 
though, like Derrida, they critique existing forms of State democracies. They remain open to the thought 
of democracy that goes beyond the latter (beside their contributions in Démocratie, dans quels états?, see 
also Nancy’s and Rancière’s respective engagements with democracy as a problematic concept in Vérite 
de la démocratie and La haine de la démocratie (Paris: La Fabrique, 2005). And after Voyous, Badiou’s 
singular fidelity to a “communist hypothesis” as the only “politics of emancipation” would very much 
strike Derrida as a Kantian monolithic, regulatory Idea, to which is opposed the thought of démocratie à 
venir, which is “a freedom of play [une liberté de jeu], an opening [ouverture] of indetermination and 
undecidability in the very concept of democracy, in the interpretation of democracy” (Voyous, 47), that is 
to say, as mentioned in the main text already, a thought that is also open to what is even contrary to 
existing democratic thought.   
19 See especially La Mésentente: politique et philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1995), Le Partage du sensible: 
esthétique et politique (Paris: La Fabrique, 2000), and Aux bords du politique (Paris: La Fabrique, 1998). 
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community. This art of State politics, which determines what is sensible or not, is, 
according to Rancière, not true politics; instead, it constitutes politics as a form of 
policing [la police], vigilantly guarding the frontiers between the sensible and the 
insensible, making sure that one domain does not cross to the other.  
 
In any case, the sans part is surely not distant from the reject. However, just as the 
“inexistents” in Badiou’s political thought must not remain in their state of rejection 
after the political event but must become subjects of the latter, the imperative in 
Rancière’s political thought is to not allow the sans part to passively remain insensible 
to the rest of the world. True politics therefore must first address the sans part, the 
“wrong” [le tort] constituted by the State’s policing practices. It must recognize and 
expose this “wrong,” or give exposition to the sans part, articulating or inscribing it as 
an exposé amidst current political discourse, so as to rupture any political practices that 
perpetuate that “wrong.” Such exposition/ exposure/ exposé marks the beginning of 
“disagreement” [mésentente] or “dissensus” in politics, which, according to Rancière, 
constitutes the veracity of politics. And it is in “dissensus” that the sans part is no 
longer simply sans part. As Rancière explicates in a piece on Derrida’s démocratie à 
venir, which is clearly in disagreement with the latter’s renunciation of the subject, it is 
in “dissensus” that the sans part inscribes itself as a political subject: 
 
A dissensus consist in putting two worlds, two heterogeneous logics on the same 
stage, in the same world. It is a form of commensurability of the 
incommensurables. This also means that the political subject acts in the mode of 
the as if. It acts as if it were the demos, that is, the whole made by those who are 
not countable as qualified parts of the community. This is what I see as the 
‘aesthetic dimension’ of politics: the staging of a dissensus – of a conflict of 
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sensory worlds – by subjects who act as if they were the people made up of the 
uncountable count of the anyone.20 
 
This is not the space to discuss Rancière’s work in detail because the present section is 
interested in dealing with works that engage the reject in a more sustained, albeit 
subterranean or implicit, manner. But let me say that in calling for the becoming-subject 
of the sans part, it seems that one risks the neutralization, if not end, of politics in its 
veritable sense according to Rancière. This is because – supposing that the sans part as 
political subject is able to make the existing ruling political regime acknowledge its 
presence and to accord it its rightful place and status in society, and to substitute itself 
into the political space and make itself count as a legitimate political subject, supposing 
further too that from then on it can co-exist with the State – it seems that one works 
teleologically toward the end of “wrong” or “dissensus” in politics. Even if there are 
numerous “wrongs” or “dissensus,” the sense is that, given time, the dissipation of all 
these “wrongs” and “dissensus” is perfectible. I wonder, however, if the neutralization 
of “wrong” and “dissensus” also neutralizes the singularity or radical difference of the 
sans part. When the State and the sans part claim to be able to co-exist, or to resolve 
the “dissensus” between them and therefore reconcile their differences, is this at the end 
of it all an assimilation of the sans part to the State, that is to say, an appropriation by 
the State of the sans part, under the cover of acceptation, which only sees to the 
reduction of the political force of the sans part? In the “commensurability of 
incommensurables,” is there not the risk of regressing towards “consensual” politics, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 “Should Democracy Come?” in Derrida and the Time of the Political, 278, my italics. Rancière’s 
resistance to part with the category of the subject is consistent with his response to Nancy (“After What” 
in Who Comes After the Subject?). See also his essay, “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” in 
South Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2/3): 297-310, Spring/ Summer 2004. 
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against which Rancière’s notion of “dissensus” was primarily raised? Furthermore, I am 
not sure if any State has ever transferred any responsibility of its governing body (or 
part of it) to former sans parts, or if any governing body of the State has adopted the 
political vision of the sans parts. I doubt it. If Rancière’s political thought here 
degenerates into a situation whereby the radical difference of the sans part is 
compromised in relation to the existing political organization, Badiou would argue that 
this is because of the democratic trace that is inscribed in the negotiation between the 
sans part and the State. I might disagree with Rancière’s raising of the subject, but 
unlike Badiou, I do not believe that there is no trace of hope in democratic thought for 
an emancipatory politics; neither do I hypostasize my thoughts on politics on any 
particular or singular Idea, be it the Idea of communism as Badiou insists on, or the Idea 
of democracy. (And in that sense, it could be said that I align myself more with 
Derrida’s démocratie à venir.) On my part then, I would say that Rancière’s political 
thought risks blunting the political edge of the sans part when it articulates the latter in 
terms of the subject.21 
 
While the reject as sans part has been rather consistent in Rancière’s œuvre, the more 
explicit surfacing of the reject in Balibar’s political thought comes only recently. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 I am not suggesting though that the sans part must always remain as sans part in the sense of always 
being deprived of its political voice, or its juridico-legal rights, or even its share of economic resources 
and wealth. What I am resisting is the becoming-subject of the sans part. The sans part must fight for and 
(re)gain his or her voice, rights, and shares, but, in order to maintain the political edge of the sans part, 
such that the latter does not compromise any aspect of itself with the status quo, the sans part must also 
learn how to walk away from all measures to assimilate it into some sort of “commensurability” with a 
dominant group. It is in that sense that I am more sympathetic to the Rancière of La nuit des prolétaires 
(Paris: Fayard, 1981), where he celebrates not only 19th century workers who dream of being poets and 
artists after their day at work instead of organizing themselves for the next proletarian movement, but also 
those who, precisely because of such dreams in the previous evening, fail to turn up for the political 
march the next day.    
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mark of the reject in Balibar’s political thought becomes more evident in his recent 
explication on “anthropological differences.”22 Not that different from the “post-
structuralist” project to affirm differences, Balibar’s “anthropological differences” have 
the objectives of acknowledging the differences that traverse each human being in 
himself or herself and the other, and to not allow these differences to become 
psychological, physiological, ideological, and legal frontiers between one human being 
and the other. These differences include gender and transgender differences, legalistic 
differences that label, in a decimating way, criminals, and, picking it up from Foucault, 
pathological differences that demarcate supposedly mad, abnormal beings [les 
anormaux] from the supposedly normal. What Balibar wants us to recognize is that the 
differences that we relegate to or even condemn in others, such that we render these 
different others rejects, may be found within ourselves too. According to Balibar, we, in 
all our irreducible and sometimes unavowable differences, and in our misdemeanors 
too, no matter how great or small, are all irreducibly, if not always already, malêtre or 
“mis-beings” in one way or another. We might want to repress our malêtre, but it 
always remains something undeniable and inevitable that we share, something we bear 
in our being-with or existence with others. In other words, we, and the world, are traced 
and traversed by the malêtre of ourselves and others, and this is why Balibar will also 
say that malêtre is the “subject of relation” [le sujet du rapport].23 Reconstituting, or 
rather acknowledging, being [être] as mis-being [malêtre], as I see it, is no less saying !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See especially his “Civic Universalism and Its Internal Inclusions: The Issue of Anthropological 
Differences” (boundary2, 39(1): 207-229, 2012) and the final section, « Malêtre du sujet », in his Citoyen 
sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, Paris : PUF, 2011. 
23 As Balibar explicates, malêtre concerns “a subject intrinsically affected by ‘discontent’ [malaise] or 
‘malformation’ not in a moral or psychological interiority, but in the exteriority and the very immanence 
of the social relation that it entertains with all other subjects […]” (Citoyen sujet et autres essais 
d’anthropologie philosophique, 513). 
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that we are all undeniably rejects in some ways. Following through a Foucauldian 
trajectory of thought in rethinking malêtres, Balibar has also called for the rethinking of 
Foucault’s heterotopia in order to acknowledge and affirm these malêtres and their 
“anthropological differences.” In contrast to utopias, which tend to be ideal places set or 
imagined in another world and time, heterotopias are existing places here and now, 
except they have been marginalized or tucked away in the design of city-spaces because 
they accommodate beings (living or not) bearing differences markedly distinct from so-
called “normal” human beings such that the latter are only anxious to exclude from their 
everyday lives.24 For heterotopias today to aid in articulating positively the 
“anthropological differences” of all of us malêtres, they must no longer be marginalized 
but disseminate themselves into the consciousness or sensibilities of public spaces. In 
that sense, heterotopia according to Balibar is close to Nancy’s thought of politics as 
place, as heterotopias become critical spaces that allow the affirmation of malêtres. 
However, contra Nancy, and more like Rancière in his thinking of the sans part, the 
thought of the subject is also not distant from Balibar’s malêtre. Like Badiou, Balibar 
has never aspired to depart from any thought of the subject, despite the “deconstruction” 
of the subject by (post)structuralist thought, and despite Nancy’s invitation to think 
“who comes after the subject.”  
 
In his response to Nancy, Balibar has stated that one must not be so quick to relinquish 
the category of the subject. As Balibar cautions, when it comes to thinking or even 
critiquing the subject, there are in fact two aspects to the subject that one must keep in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See Foucault’s « Les hétérotopies » [1966] in Le Corps utopique suivi de Les Hétérotopies, 
présentation et postface de Daniel Defert, Paris : Lignes, 2009).  
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mind. The first concerns the subject as subjectum, which allows the subject to define 
itself through its consciousness of its ability to singularly think, affirm, and found its 
existence or self, apparently without the intervention of another. There is not much 
disagreement from Balibar with regard to the critique of the subject as subjectum. There 
is, however, the second aspect, which concerns the subject as subjectus, and it is this 
aspect that Balibar seeks to preserve against all critique of the subject. According to 
Balibar, the experience of the subject as subjectus has a longer history than the subject 
as subjectum: the subject as subjectus recalls its relation, or rather subjection [sujétion/ 
assujetissement], to a sovereign master, human or divine, before the subject attains its 
subjectivation as a self-determining subjectum. Balibar argues that one must never erase 
from memory “the long history” of the subject as subjectus,25 because it is from the 
thought of oneself as subjectus that one begins to think about one’s liberty, to seek to be 
free from being subjected to another (sovereign) entity. As Balibar suggests in his 
response to Nancy, “liberty in effect can only be thought as that of the subject, of 
subjected being [l’être assujetti].”26 For the freedom of one and all then, one must not 
abandon the thought of the subject, particularly the subject as subjectus.  
 
And yet, recalling the subject as subjectus is not sufficient. Going back to Rousseau’s 
thought on the collective sovereignty of citizenship, Balibar insists, as is consistently 
the case throughout his political philosophy, that the figure of the citizen must 
accompany the thought of the subject-subjectus on its way to freedom or liberty. 
According to Balibar, the figure of the citizen and its constitution  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 5.  
26 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 2. 
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“put into operation a reduction of verticality that brought the instruments of 
power and law to the level of the community (ideally at least, but this ideality 
[idéalité] can ‘grip the masses,’ as Marx would say, and therefore engender 
material effects). More precisely, they transform [power and the law] into 
instruments immanent to “co-citizenship” [concitoyenneté] (and into offensive 
or defensive arms, when the need arises): because, conflicting as this community 
of citizens is […], it is always by an essentially horizontal fashion, through the 
effect of a reciprocal procedure, that individuals and the collective of which it is 
composed mutually ‘confer’ upon themselves an equal freedom [une égale 
liberté].”27  
 
In other words, for Balibar, it is in the figure of the citizen wherein lies the political 
potentiality to break with any sovereignty monopolized or appropriated by any singular 
person; with the figure of the citizen, one sees to a sharing or redistribution of 
sovereignty with other citizens, ensuring at the same time that one and the other are 
equally free or freely equal (a condition that Balibar elsewhere calls égaliberté or 
“equaliberty,” 28 where equality and liberty must be thought simultaneously and not one 
without, or even less than, the other, which only results in neither equality nor liberty). 
Taking the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as his point of 
reference, Balibar argues that what is at stake there is “the constitution of citizenship – 
in a radically new sense,” and “what is new is the sovereignty of the citizen,” which 
challenges “the idea of sovereignty [as] always been inseparable from a hierarchy, an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 6. 
28 See especially the essay « « Droits de l’homme » et « droits du citoyen » : La dialectique moderne de 
l’égalité et de la liberté » for Balibar’s explication of égaliberté. I quote here a passage from that essay to 
recall that the affirmation of differences, if not the affirmation of both the liberty and equality of all 
differences, is at stake in égaliberté: “to seek […] liberation as a ‘right to difference in equality,’ that is to 
say not as the restoration of an original identity or as the neutralization of differences in the equality of 
rights, but as the production of an equality without precedent and model, which is difference itself, the 
complementarity and reciprocity of singularities. In a sense, one such reciprocity is already virtually 
included in the proposition of égaliberté, but it can – paradoxically – claim to it only on the condition of 
reopening the question of identity between ‘man’ and ‘citizen’: not to regress to the idea of a citizenship 
subordinated to anthropological differences (as in the understanding of citizenship in antiquity), but to 
progress toward a citizenship overdetermined by anthropological difference, explicitly drawn to its 
transformation, distinct simultaneously from institutional naturalization and from a denial or formal 
neutralization (which functions in fact as a permanent means of its neutralization)” (Les frontières de la 
démocratie, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, 145).    
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eminence.”29 What citizenship posits is an “egalitarian sovereignty [souveraineté 
égalitaire]” predicated on “the equality in human nature,” which is nothing but the fact 
of “equality ‘by birth’,” that is to say, based on the fact that all “humans ‘are born’ not 
as ‘subjects’ [in the sense of subjectus] but ‘free and equal in rights’.”30 According to 
Balibar, it is with citizenship that “the concepts of sovereignty and equality need not 
contradict each other.”31 
 
The political potentiality of the figure of the citizen to let emerge such “egalitarian 
sovereignty” is what motivates Balibar to respond to Nancy’s question in the following 
manner: “the citizen comes after the subject. The citizen (defined by his rights and 
duties [devoirs]) is the non subject that comes after the subject, and his constitution and 
recognition puts an end (in principle) the subjugation [l’assujetissement] of the 
subject.”32 However, as stated above, there is no dropping of the subject in Balibar’s 
thinking of the figure of the citizen: “after the passage from the subject (subjectus) to 
the citizen,” there remains “the passage from the citizen to the subject (subjectum),”33 
that is to say, to the subject that is conscious not only of his or her self-representation as 
a being existing freely and equally as the next being, but also of the “equaliberty” of 
others to exist likewise too. This subject is conscious of maintaining a thought of an 
“infinite liberty” [liberté illimitée], a liberty that is equally extended to all, which is also 
a “self-regulated” [autolimitée] liberty, in the sense that it has “no other limits except 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 51. 
30 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 52, 43. 
31 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 52. 
32 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 43. 
33 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 64. 
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that which assigns itself to be able to respect the rule of equality.”34 This is “the 
becoming-subject of the citizen,” and the subject “will be the new ‘subject,’ the citizen 
subject.”35 At this point, I wonder if the reject, or even auto-reject, more than the 
subject or citizen subject, is a more adequate figure for Balibar’s thinking of “egalitarian 
sovereignty” and égaliberté, or that “egalitarian sovereignty” and égaliberté are traced 
more by the (auto-)reject than the (citizen) subject. Firstly, if the thought of liberty 
begins with the subjectus, the subjectus is no less a (passive) reject, deprived of the 
liberty to be equal with his or her sovereign master, deprived of the power that allows 
the sovereign being to lord over him or her, and deprived of the freedom to free himself 
or herself from that subordination. And when it does take up enough courage to 
challenge sovereign authority, does it not also involve its expression as an active reject 
counteracting against all external forces that are oppressing it? The aspect of an active 
reject in fact extends well to its assuming the figure of the citizen. According to Balibar, 
this can be found in the citizen-figure’s civic disobedience, which he argues is exigent 
from time to time, since it is through which the citizen-figure reaffirms or re-creates the 
notion of citizenship each time.36 A passive citizen, who does not fight for the 
institutional recognition of the changes or expansion in citizenship, or who does not 
reject the institutional delimitation and determination of citizenship, only abdicates 
“egalitarian sovereignty” to the State. Acts of civic disobedience, as Balibar makes 
clear, are not nihilistic with regard to laws, however. Instead, “they re-create the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 52. 
35 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 52, 57. 
36 See especially Balibar’s « Sur la désobéissance civique » in Droit de cité, Paris : PUF, 2002, 17.  
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conditions of a legislation or of the ‘general will.’ They do not attack the concept of 
law, they defend it.”37  
 
Aspects of the active reject and of the auto-reject become clearer in Balibar’s notion of 
the “becoming subject of the citizen.” In the latter’s putting in place of égaliberté for 
all, it seems that there is nonetheless some form of auto-rejection at stake, for Balibar 
will underscore the meticulous care needed to articulate “infinite liberty” [liberté 
illimité] more precisely as liberty that is self-checked [autolimitée], so that one’s liberty 
does not violently supplement another’s: what is at stake here therefore is an auto-
rejection that keeps in check one’s liberty so that it is not excessive to the point of 
compromising another’s. Furthermore, Balibar has also said that in relation to equality, 
especially equality that admits differences without allowing certain differences to be 
privileged over others or to dominate others, there is a certain “non-determination” to 
the figure of the citizen.38 This is no doubt in contrast to the subject, because the subject 
never fails to determine itself through certain predicates or by some auto-foundation. 
The “non-determination” of the figure of the citizen, as Balibar explicates, involves it 
being “neither the individual nor the collective,”39 which only means that no particular 
person or group stands for the model of the figure of the citizen, according to which 
others must identify themselves with in order to partake in an “egalitarian sovereignty.” 
Neither individual nor group, any being in all his or her “anthropological differences” or 
even maltêre (which I have suggested can be articulated in terms of a reject as well) can 
therefore, theoretically, become a citizen. In this “non-determination,” it seems that, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Droit de cité, 18. 
38 See Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 61-64. 
39 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 61. 
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more than the subject as subjectum, that is to say, a subject conscious of his or her 
possibility of self-representation, it is the auto-reject that underlies the figure of the 
citizen. Still with the notion of “non-determination,” Balibar will say further that “the 
non-determination of the citizen […] manifests itself also as the opening [ouverture] of 
a possibility: the possibility for all given realization of the citizen to be put in question 
and to be destroyed [détruite] by a struggle for equality.”40 In other words, the figure of 
the citizen, or the thought of citizenship, must auto-reject itself the moment it inclines 
towards any naturalized figure, or when it hypostasizes on the latter. It must auto-reject 
itself the moment when the thought of a different figure of the citizen is at risk of not 
having an equal affirmation. Balibar will put this in another way, and here we see the 
return of the active reject at work: the figure of the citizen is “the author of a permanent 
revolution,”41 especially in its dialectical relation with institutions to which the thought 
of citizenship according to Balibar always remains tied to, as it negotiates on the one 
hand with them for its “institutional definitions” or affirmation and legitimation,42 and 
on the other contests them, in its “insurrectional moment,”43 when institutions do not 
accommodate the transformation, evolution, or expansion of citizenship with regard to 
other “anthropological differences.” In all, the (auto-)reject, instead of the subject, 
seems to better capture the sense and force of the movement from subjugation (as 
subjectus) to égaliberté or the sharing of “egalitarian sovereignty” (as citizen), up to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 63. Or, as Balibar says in the essay « Les 
habits neufs de la citoyenneté », the concept of citizenship “has no definition that is fixed once and for all. 
It has always been the stake of struggles and the object of transformations” (Les frontières de la 
démocratie, 100). Or further, in « Propositions sur la citoyenneté », he would attribute an “essential 
mobility” to the concept of citizenship, which is “the incessant transformation of its contents and its 
functions” (Les frontières de la démocratie, 111). 
41 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 65. 
42 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 64. 
43 La proposition de l’égaliberté: essais politiques 1989-2009, Paris: PUF, 2010, 24. 
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maintaining the opening of the latter to both existing non-citizens or malêtres, and to 
the malêtres to come. This is not to mention a moment in Balibar’s writing where he is 
willing to do away with the subject too: “I prefer,” he says, “the terminology of the 
political actor (hybrid, collective, transitory [transitoire] to that of the subject of politics 
[…].”44 
 
My critique of Balibar’s “citizen subject” does not only touch on the latter term. The 
notion of “citizen” or “citizenship,” for me at least, is equally problematic. Of course, 
Balibar endeavors to open up the thinking of “citizenship” beyond all past and existing 
understanding of the term. He therefore seeks an “extended citizenship,”45 one that 
extends beyond national frontiers, “beyond the sacrosanct equation: 
citizenship=nationality,”46 or a “trans-national or post-national citizenship.” 47 Or, as he 
puts it another way, “extended citizenship” must be an open and in-complete 
[inachevable] citizenship.48 Nonetheless, one cannot deny that “citizenship” is very 
much an Occidental concept, which goes back to the Greeks. The Occidental trace of 
“citizenship” is not unmarked in Balibar either. However, instead of going back to the 
Greeks, Balibar aligns his notion of “citizenship” or the figure of the citizen to the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, which is undeniably 
grounded in French history. And so, on the citizen that “comes after the subject,” 
Balibar will say that that “is already given and we have it all in our memory. We can 
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44 This is in the essay « L’antinomie de la citoyenneté » in La proposition de l’égaliberté, 14. 
45 Les frontières de la démocratie, 66. 
46 Les frontières de la démocratie, 107. 
47 Droit de cité, 203. 
48 See Les frontières de la démocratie, 100; Droit de cité, 178. 
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even date it: 1789.”49 But one has to ask who this “we” that Balibar speaks of is. Is the 
non-French, who does not share the French history of 1789, and therefore cannot 
properly claim to have 1789 in his or her memory, included in this “we”? Given this 
Occidental or French trace of “citizenship,” one also has to question what happens when 
one extends this concept to those living in countries without any history of such a term. 
Does this trace, undeniably determined by a particular history and nation, risk being a 
violent supplement to the thinking of the liberty of all beings, including the equal liberty 
or égaliberté – without reducing this notion to the French trinity of égalité, liberté et 
fraternité – of the difference of each being? Does it paradoxically become a singular, 
regulatory “political ‘idea’”50 – in spite of Balibar’s attempts to radicalize it as open, in-
complete, trans-national, and post-national – upon which égaliberté is possible, as if 
égaliberté is ineluctable from a French-inflected thought of citizenship, and hence as if 
there is only one form of égaliberté, deriving itself from the thought of citizenship? If 
égaliberté is open to all differences, or if it does not practice within itself “differential 
inclusion” that essentially excludes certain differences,51 it seems to me then that 
égaliberté is not one, but rather, there is plus d’une égaliberté. As I would argue then, 
for plus d’une égaliberté, one must free égaliberté from being singularly predicated on 
the “political ‘idea’” of citizenship or on the figure of the citizen.  
 
Balibar, of course, does not fail to recognize that citizenship is a problematic term. As 
he notes of the French working-class society, citizenship more often than not 
perpetuates the marking of differences in a derogatory and negating way. It is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 43. 
50 La proposition de l’égaliberté, 18. 
51 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 508. 
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uncommon, according to Balibar, that citizenship quickly becomes “a second 
segregation” or “a supplemental segregation” [sur-ségrégation].”52 This is when the 
working-class immigrants, previously segregated from “native” citizens when they first 
arrived, but now living their existential conditions as “citizen workers” after being 
granted citizenship (which still does not immunize them from certain continued 
segregation by “native” citizens), segregate the next wave of non-citizen immigrants, 
i.e. illegal immigrants or the sans papiers, even though these later immigrants, through 
their labor, equally constitute the “working mass” [ouvrier-masse] and contribute to the 
country’s economy.53 Along with the “native” citizens, albeit without any true solidarity 
with them, the “citizen workers” make the new working but non-citizen workers the 
scapegoat of social insecurity.54 In this case, citizenship becomes an attribute (or even 
property) for a group of beings from which they reject others that are devoid of that 
attribute. At work here too is no doubt the raising of the subject in the citizen, in his or 
her self-representation as a citizen; and the citizen does this in a sovereign way too, in 
his or her auto-position as the more privileged being who is entitled to denigrate, 
negate, and reject the non-citizen other. The latter now becomes the subjectus subjected 
to the segregating practices of both “native” citizens and “citizen workers.” Within this 
political space then, there are “not only ‘citizens’ but also ‘subjects’,” subjects-subjectus 
that are “less foreign than foreigners [moins étrangers que des étrangers] and yet more 
different or more ‘foreign’ [étranger] than them,” subjects-subjectus that are prohibited !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Les frontières de la démocratie, 52. 
53 Les frontières de la démocratie, 52. And yet, as Balibar suggests in « Sujets ou citoyens ? (Pour 
l’égalité) » (also in Les frontières de la démocratie), the distance between “citizen workers” and non-
citizen immigrants, in times of economic crises, shows itself to be insignificant in effect. In other words, 
during such times, both groups face the similar situation of being at risk of unemployment when 
nationalistic companies try to first protect the livelihood of employees who are “native” citizens. In that 
case, one group is as much a reject as the other. 
54 Les frontières de la démocratie, 52. 
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to cross frontiers more than foreigners, subjects-subjectus therefore that are worse than 
citizens or “citizen workers.”55 According to Balibar, this is the situation where the 
“citizen-subject” has been appropriated as some form of norm that segregates those who 
have no claim to that category, if not as some form of “national normality” that is 
“interiorized by the individuals” such as the “citizen workers,” who make that norm “a 
condition, an essential reference of their collective or communitarian sentiment, and 
therefore, their renewed identity (or of the order, the hierarchy that they put in place in 
their multiple identities).”56 
 
To sidestep such appropriation or interiorization, which only degenerates into a 
negation of égaliberté, I would suggest, again, that it will be more helpful to think in 
terms of an (auto-)reject than the subject or even the citizen. In this case, one must 
auto-reject all claims to the status (or privilege) of a citizen or a subject that potentially 
place oneself above or in a more superior position to the non-citizen immigrant-worker. 
One must remind oneself, especially if one is a former-immigrant-turned-citizen-
worker, that one has been, or even remains to be, a reject in relation to the “native” 
citizens. This will help serve to recall the suffering that one has endured as a reject, 
which in turn will present a better chance that one will refrain from extending that 
injustice to the new immigrants, short-circuiting any reincarnation of that injustice that 
one might perpetuate in the event that one thinks oneself as a sovereign “citizen 
subject.” Recalling one’s experience as a reject (which might, as noted, still continue in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 La crainte des masses: politique et philosophie avant et après Marx, Paris: Galilée, 1997, 375. 
56 La crainte des masses, 374. Balibar will go on to say that from there, “frontiers cease to be purely 
exterior realities, they also become, and perhaps before everything, what Fichte […] had superbly called 
‘interior frontiers’ […], that is to say, […] invisible, situated ‘everywhere and nowhere’” (ibid, 374).  
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a limited way), and rethinking oneself as an auto-reject in the sense of refusing any 
preeminence, privilege, or superiority in one’s recently acquired label of “citizen 
subject, one might even be motivated to make a political intervention, alongside the new 
non-citizen immigrant rejects, as past and current fellow rejects, to end all existing 
injustices against them. I reiterate that one must be cautious here in such political 
intervention to not resurrect the subject (in oneself) once again. The danger is that with 
the subject, one may assume a position whereby one speaks in place of the non-subject 
non-citizen other, as if the latter is incapable of articulating his or her existential 
condition that is severely short of égaliberté. Furthermore, when this political subject 
decides to represent itself as a collective body, there is also the risk that each 
singularity, or else each reject in his or her own different degrees of being rejected and 
of auto-rejection, gets reduced to a homogenized body. Any sublimation toward a 
subject must therefore be interrupted. The multiplicity of rejects must manifest 
themselves as such, in other words, as plural and heterogeneous rejects.  
 
To take up Rancière’s rhetoric, this is where politics can begin again, through these 
rejects who are no less an exposition, exposure, and exposé of the “wrong” [le tort], or 
the sans part that currently exists in society in its denigrating distinction not only from 
“native” citizens but also from immigrant “citizen workers.” I do not wish to be so 
severe in my critique of the figure of the citizen as much as of the subject, since I am 
well aware that, unfortunately, there are many in various countries who still need 
citizenship before they are granted basic rights such as the right to live, the right to 
abode, the right to work, and even the right to medical assistance. And yet, I would call 
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for the practice whereby the appeal to rights, not even the “right to have rights” as 
Arendt would say, but just the right to exist, that is to say, to exist without being 
subjected to rejection or to a denigrating segregation, as long as one is an honest worker 
contributing to the economy and does not exert any real violence against others, need 
not be conditioned by citizenship. If égaliberté is a constant struggle as Balibar reminds 
us, and if it concerns as well the constant fight for the very basic right to existence, I 
would say that this fight or égaliberté comes before and after citizenship. Balibar has 
said that we are not born subjects,57 but I would add that we are neither born originarily, 
or rather ontologically, as citizens. Égaliberté lies in our fact of existence, in our fact of 
being born tout court, and not in our historically and nationally determined condition of 
being citizens, which really comes after our fact of being born. And given that we are 
still far from being “post-national” or even “trans-national,” Balibar’s dream of an 
“extended citizenship” still remains a distant future.58 In that case, such a dream can risk 
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57 Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique, 43. 
58 One must also pose to Balibar the question of what new frontiers must be in place in a “trans-national 
or post-national citizenship,” for Balibar, through the thought of “extended citizenship,” is not seeking a 
world without frontiers. As he says, “I would always hesitate […] to identify a radical democracy […] 
with the pursuit of a ‘world without frontiers’ in the juridico-political sense of the term. Such a ‘world’ 
would only risk to be a type of unchecked domination [domination sauvage] of private powers that 
monopolize capital, communication, and perhaps armaments […]” (La crainte des masses, 380). And 
keeping in mind that citizenship, for Balibar, is always the “antinomic” movement between its 
institutional constitution and its insurrection against institutions when the latter is inadequate to 
accommodate new forms of citizenship, one must also ask what institution, in a “trans-national or post-
national” world, is “extended citizenship” in constant negotiation with. Where would this institution be 
situated? Why should it be located in that particular place? What right or privilege does that place have to 
warrant the establishment of the institution there? According to which laws, or whose laws, will this 
institution be subjected? Having posed these questions, I am not suggesting that one does away with 
institutions tout court. If I am arguing for a turn away from the figure of the “citizen subject” to the 
reject, and even if the reject is already there before institutions and across national frontiers and that one 
must try to address or respond to the reject in a way that goes beyond relying on or waiting for 
institutional interventions that are usually regulated by national laws and restrictions, I do not mean that a 
theory of the reject envisions an institution-less world. Like Derrida’s démocratie à venir, the reject can 
be assisted by institutions, but these institutions must be those that are not tied to any national 
sovereignty, and at the same time have enough force to address in a timely manner and across national 
boundaries the injustices done to rejects everywhere. We have traces of such institutions in the UN or the 
BRussells Tribunal, but, as Derrida has observed, they are still limited in many ways to effectively 
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deferring to the future all endeavors to ensure égaliberté to all, as one becomes content 
to wait for an “extended citizenship” to be institutionalized before one acts to address 
existing injustices or “the wrong” in politics. In this indefinite wait for the 
institutionalization of “extended citizenship,” existing rejects can only despair at the 
fact that such citizenship remains absent in the here and now, and that its chances to 
exist in égaliberté are in fact really slim. In place of predicating political thought on the 
“citizen subject” and/ or on “extended citizenship,” I would argue then that a politics 
that begins with the reject – which is both a concept that really knows no boundaries 
whatsoever, indifferent therefore to all national frontiers and identity, and an existential 
condition that many of “the wrong,” the sans part, or the malêtre experience in real 
terms while the notion of the “citizen” largely remains an ideal to them – can address 
the question of égaliberté in a more urgent manner here and now, and no longer defer it 
to the future. In other words, a political intervention that seeks to be a veritable rupture 
in politics must recognize the fact that Man is not just born free but also not born as 
citizens, and hence not take recourse to but free itself from the historically determined 
and institutionally given term such as “citizen.” Certainly, one must not refuse 
intervention to help existing rejects such as illegal immigrants, refugees, stateless 
people, and sans papiers attain citizenship, especially in cases where they need it 
urgently; but one can also begin with their condition as rejects and, instead of waiting 
for institutions to grant them citizenship or legitimize them as citizens, work precisely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
address a démocratie à venir or, I would add, the reject. The reject, which does not need or seek 
institutional legitimation as the citizen or “citizen subject” does, is meant to orient thought to address 
such figures before institutions with adequate means to do so arrive. To be sure, I am not saying thought 
itself is an adequate measure, but at least there will be no delay, as the setting up of institutions 
undoubtedly has, in recognizing rejects and in thinking of ways to help affirm them and critique the 
forces that are negating them.  
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from their reject status and modulate or supplement without delay existing laws such 
that they will prevent their further denigration and negation, and the denial of basic 
rights to them, including the right, or rather freedom, to exist. The latter course, I would 
argue, is how one lets the other who comes in or from the future in a démocratie à venir 
be free as anyone, and not by compelling the other to identify with either “native” 
citizens or “citizen workers.”   
 
 
3.1 From Voyous to an Uncommon Bartleby 
As shown above, predicating the thought of égaliberté, if not plus d’une égaliberté, on 
the “citizen subject” or even citizenship is problematic. The limits of both the figure of 
the citizen and citizenship are also certainly well-registered by Derrida, and that is why 
for démocratie à venir, cosmopolitism, and unconditional hospitality, Derrida would 
say that they are “beyond citizenship.”59 In other words, in the thoughts of démocratie à 
venir, unconditional hospitality, and the veritable sharing of sovereignty, instead of 
allowing its appropriation and monopoly by a single entity – a sharing that Derrida has 
noted as impossible but necessary,60 one will find a figure of thought otherwise than 
then “citizen subject,” if not a figure that is neither “citizen” nor “subject.” As I will try 
to show, it is the figure of the reject that subtends those thoughts instead, a figure that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 See especially Derrida’s Voyous, De l’hospitalité: Anne Dufourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida à 
répondre (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1997), Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort! (Paris: Galilée, 
1997). Likewise in the interview in Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Derrida has also called for “the 
coming of a universal alliance or solidarity that extends beyond the internationality of nation-states and 
thus beyond citizenship” (“Autoimmunity,” 124).  
60 Besides Voyous, see also Derrida’s « Le souverain bien – ou l’Europe en mal de souveraineté », la 
conférence de Strasbourg, 8 juin 2004. In Cités 30 « Derrida politique », éd. Yves Charles Zarka, 2007, 
110.  
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will problematize as well the category of the citizen and/ or the “citizen subject.” The 
figure of the reject in Derrida’s political thought can be said to be surfacing since 
Spectres de Marx (1991) and Politiques de l’amitié (1994). In both texts, the reject 
takes on either a spectral dimension, that is to say, coming (back) from the past, or a 
messianic one, where it comes from (or as) the future: either the revenant or the 
messianic friend-to-come, both of whom, in any case, are dissimilar, or do not 
(cor)respond, to any existing political configuration or ideology. It is only in the later 
Voyous (2003) that Derrida’s reject takes on a more actual, more present, or more 
corporeal contour. It is this reject that I will want to highlight here, because it has a 
certain resonance with, and also perhaps implications for, a recent political movement 
that has touched our contemporary world. This reject is the one named in the title of 
Derrida’s text: voyou, or “rogue” as it has been translated.61 
 
The term voyou or “rogue,” especially after the Bush administration that witnessed the 
9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and that retaliated with the global and indefinite “war on 
terror,” has come to signify, on the global stage of international politics, states that are 
against the “war on terror” or pose a potential threat to international peace and security. 
However, as Derrida reminds us, voyou, before its political appropriation by the Bush 
(and Clinton) administration, can also be a non-state actor, or can have a more local, 
more quotidian meaning. “The voyou,” Derrida tells us, “is idle [inoccupé], sometimes 
unemployed, and at the same time actively occupied to occupy [occupé à occuper] the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 As Derrida acknowledges in the text, the engagement with voyous in fact derives from the proliferation 
in American politics, especially from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration that 
inaugurated the “war on terror,” of the word “rogue” to label states that not only deviate from, but also go 
against, American political ideology. Voyous therefore is more properly the translation into French of 
“rogues.”  
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street, either to do nothing there but to ‘roam the streets’ [courir les rues], to lay about 
[traîner], or to do what one must not do normally in the streets according to the norms, 
the law, and the police […].”62 It is because of such idleness that the voyou is regarded, 
or rather disdained, by others as some sort of reject: “they are labeled [désigné], 
denounced, judged, condemned, pointed out, as actual or virtual delinquents, by the 
State or civil or good society [bonne société], by the police, sometimes by international 
law and by armed police that watches over the law and morals, over politics and civility 
[politesse], over all traffic routes – pedestrian zones, vehicular, maritime, and aerial 
zones, computer network [l’informatique], the e-mail, and the Web.”63 Consequently, 
they are commonly categorized as “those apart, the excluded or the strays [égarés], the 
marginalized [excentrés] who roam the streets, especially those of the suburbs 
[banlieues],” even though they “are sometimes brothers [frères], citizens and fellows 
[semblables].”64 Here, one can no doubt hear echoes of Balibar’s malêtre or Rancière’s 
sans part. 
 
In general, the “rogue-being” [être-voyou] is one that is preoccupied with occupying 
space,65 especially public spaces, to an extent that it violates the hospitality that such 
spaces grant to anyone. In a way, we have recently witnessed the gathering and 
uprising, largely on a massive scale, of such voyous, starting with the indignés in Spain, 
which then mutated into the Occupy movement, with Occupy Wall Street as the pivotal 
event before spreading to other cities in the US and then to other major cities in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Voyous, 98. 
63 Voyous, 96. 
64 Voyous, 95. 
65 Voyous, 100. 
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world. Declaring themselves as the 99%, that is to say, the (global) majority that are 
denied the wealth or financial resources of the rich 1%, declaring themselves no less as 
rejects therefore, they refuse to no longer passively or silently accept this economic 
inequality, or banking policies that favor the rich, or the irresponsible banking practices 
that have resulted not only in that unequal wealth distribution but also in financial crises 
that have degenerated into housing foreclosures, unemployment, and poverty for many 
of this 99%, while banking CEOs continue to receive extravagant bonuses. Such active 
rejection on their part manifested itself in their occupying of public spaces, especially 
those in proximity with key financial districts such as Zuccoti Park in New York City or 
La Défense in Paris. In doing so, one can say that they took on the form of a multitude 
of voyous. The term “multitude” will no doubt recall the recent works of Hardt and 
Negri. From Empire and Multitude to the more recent Commonwealth, the endeavor of 
Hardt and Negri has been to articulate a “multitude of the poor,” whose poverty is not 
merely limited by “misery or deprivation” but is also constituted by a resistance to “the 
individualism and the exclusive, unified, social body of property.”66 In fact, Hardt and 
Negri do not hesitate to associate the Occupy movement with their concept of 
“multitude,” as they write in the wake of the movement in the journal Foreign Affairs 
that the latter has precisely “developed according to what [they] call a ‘multitude 
form’.”67 Incidentally, the force of active rejection is not missing in Hardt and Negri’s 
“multitude.” As they argue in Empire, the “multitude” bears the force of refusal, and 
this refusal can be found in Bartleby (Melville’s literary figure that I have mentioned a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Commonwealth, 39-40. 
67 See Hardt and Negri, “The Fight for ‘Real Democracy’ at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street: The 




little in relation to Derrida’s thought in the previous section on the “post-secular”), who 
they call the “figure of absolute refusal.”68 Hardt and Negri read in Bartleby’s I would 
prefer not to, in response to his employer’s demand to copy legal documents, to carry 
out other odd jobs, and later in the narrative to leave the premises, “the refusal of work 
and authority, or really the refusal of voluntary servitude,” which, for Hardt and Negri, 
“is the beginning of liberatory politics.”69 They will underscore, however, that 
Bartleby’s enunciation “is only a beginning,”70 and it cannot remain as such, resonating 
only within the personage of Bartleby. If so, it will only remain an inadequate voice, 
“empty” in the eyes of Hardt and Negri, and also too solitary, which “leads only to a 
kind of social suicide.”71 According to Hardt and Negri, the enunciation of refusal must 
disseminate itself and be embodied by a larger collective, a “common” as they would 
say. In other words, something more is needed from the moment of an enunciation of 
refusal: “what we need is to create a new social body, which is a project that goes well 
beyond refusal. […] [We] need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new 
community.”72 (With references to Nancy, Derrida, and Deleuze, I have provided a 
critique of such construction of community in an earlier section of this work, so I will 
not comment on the question of community in Hardt and Negri’s quote here.) Put 
another way, there must be, for Hardt and Negri, a becoming-common of the figure of 
Bartleby; it must be embodied by a multitude, or, Bartleby’s force of rejection must 
disseminate within a multitude.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Hardt and Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000, 203. 
69 Empire, 204. 
70 Empire, 204. 
71 Empire, 204. Cf. also Derrida’s reading of Bartleby in Donner la mort, even though Bartleby’s 
solitariness is not Derrida’s point of critique: “a sacrificial passion that led [Bartleby] to death, a death 
given by the law, by society that does not know why it acts as such” (Donner la mort, 107). 
72 Empire, 204. 
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The multitude of the Occupy movement would seem constitutive of that “new social 
body” that Hardt and Negri find lacking in Bartleby, since it claims to represent “the 
99%.” Even though Hardt and Negri in their Foreign Affairs contribution do not 
mention Bartleby in their discussion of the Occupy movement, one could nonetheless 
argue that there are certain resonances between the movement and Bartleby, not to 
mention that Bartleby was in fact mobilized as a figure of thought for the Occupy 
Toronto movement.73 For example, while we find in the movement, in its refusal to 
accept the present financial management of society, the preference to occupy key public 
spaces or financial centers rather than mobilizing potentially violent general strikes, we 
find in Bartleby a similar insistence, according to the narrator, “to keep occupying my 
chambers, and denying my authority; […] scandalizing my professional reputation; […] 
and in the end perhaps outlive me, and claim possession of my office by right of his 
perpetual occupancy.”74 Like the Occupy movement then, Bartleby, in his “immobile 
[…] pure passivity,”75 displaces all senses of sovereign property and propriety of 
authority.76 And yet, I would like to question if Bartleby is really the literary figure of 
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73 The invocation of Bartleby for Occupy Toronto appeared in a post dated October 19, 2011 on the 
movement’s website (www.occupyto.org). The post has now strangely disappeared. 
74 Herman Melville, Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street [1853], in The Complete Shorter 
Fiction, intro. John Updike, New York: Knopf, 1997, 43, my emphases. 
75 Empire, 203. 
76 While Hardt and Negri have so far explicitly resisted identifying Bartleby as the political figure of the 
Occupy movement, that link is clearer in !i"ek. For !i"ek, what is of importance to the movement is their 
“first gesture,” which is that of “pure negativity,” and which consists in “occupying a place and 
displaying the firm conviction of remaining there” (“!i"ek and the Occupy Wall Street Movement: ‘That 
This Movement Has a Trace of Violence Is What I Approve of’.” Interview with Philosophie Magazine. 
October 18, 2011. My translation. http://www.philomag.com/fiche-philinfo.php?id=275). Politics as a 
question of place or space is once again at stake here, but what I would like to highlight here is “pure 
negativity,” which resonates strongly with how !i"ek describes Bartleby in another text. According to 
!i"ek, Bartleby’s I would prefer not to “is the gesture of subtraction at its purest” (The Parallax View, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, 382). It is very probable then that !i"ek would not hesitate to take 
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thought, or “conceptual personage” as Deleuze and Guattari prefer to say, of the Occupy 
movement. Or, to put it inversely, is the “multitude” of the Occupy movement the 
“people to come,” to use another of Deleuze and Guattari’s formula, that Bartleby 
prefigures? 
 
I would say that there are undoubtedly resonances between Bartleby and the Occupy 
movement, but the resonances may be limited. I would even say that what is shared by 
them is but the gesture of occupying spaces that are not actually or rightfully theirs, 
occupying spaces in ways that violate the notion of hospitality. Otherwise, there is 
nothing much in common between them. Now, if, for Hardt and Negri, something 
common is shared within the multitude, there is nothing common about Bartleby, or that 
there is nothing about him, or in him, that is desirable to be shared by others. When 
Bartleby refuses to verify his copy, the narrator notes that Bartleby refuses “a request 
made according to common usage and common sense” of the norms or normativity of 
the copyist vocation.77 And when Bartleby refuses the collective verification with other 
colleagues of the multiple copies he has made, and the other odd jobs that the narrator 
asks of him, the narrator will remark that Bartleby’s refusals are “strange peculiarities, 
privileges, and unheard of exemption.”78 Furthermore, there is hardly any solidary 
between Bartleby and his colleagues. Upon hearing Bartleby’s refusal to verify his own 
copies, Nippers, one of Bartleby’s colleagues, wanted “to kick him out of the office.”79 
Given such relation with colleagues, the figure of Bartleby, contrary to Hardt and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Bartleby as the literary antecedent that prefigures the political figure of subtraction that the Occupy 
movement has seemed to embody in a collective dimension, or in a dimension of the multitude.    
77 Bartleby, 27, my emphases. 
78 Bartleby, 31. 
79 Bartleby, 27. 
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Negri’s aspiration for him, will always remain estranged from any common, collective 
spirit. Bartleby can never count as part of the common workforce: he is not of the 
common; he is “the unaccountable.”80 In other words, Bartleby is the uncommon.81 The 
common is what Bartleby cannot bear in fact; it is against which Bartleby projects his 
enunciation of I would prefer not to. And it is perhaps because he ends up in the 
“common jail,”82 after being removed by the police for refusing to evacuate the 
premises, that Bartleby finally meets his end there. But even in that “common jail,” one 
notes that he nonetheless has the rights to haunt a section of the prison that is “not 
accessible to the common prisoners,” a section where it is said too that he sleeps not 
among other prisoners but among “kings and counselors.”83 
 
Now, if there is “a refusal of work” in Bartleby, as Hardt and Negri sees it, it must be 
noted that it is not a refusal of work tout court. In fact, Bartleby has no resistance to 
work initially. Upon his arrival, contrary to his half-competent and near redundant 
colleagues, he did an immense amount of copying. He “ran a day and night line,” 
“wrote on silently, palely, mechanically,” with “incessant industry,” to the point where 
the narrator acknowledged Bartleby to be a “valuable acquisition” and that he “felt [his] 
most precious papers perfectly safe in [Bartleby’s] hands.”84 In short, Bartleby works, 
and his work is exceptional with respect to the rest of his colleagues. Bartleby’s “refusal 
to work” comes into effect only when something common inflects his working !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Bartleby, 42. In a way, I echo Deleuze’s reading of Bartleby. According to Deleuze, Bartleby “can 
survive only in a swirling suspense that puts the world at a distance” (« Bartleby, ou la formule », in 
Gilles Deleuze, Critique et clinique, Paris : Minuit, 1993, 92, my translation). 
81 In Deleuze’s terms, Bartleby “has nothing particular, nothing general either, about him: he is an 
Original” (« Bartleby, ou la formule », 106). 
82 Bartleby, 44, my emphasis. 
83 Bartleby, 50. 
84 Bartleby, 24, 30-31, 31. 
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condition. To be specific, it is when the word “prefer” becomes a common office lingo, 
when “it involuntarily rolled from [Nippers’] tongue,”85 and that is when Bartleby 
prefers to stop copying altogether.86 Bartleby has an anathema for that becoming-
common of the word “prefer” probably because – even though Nippers “did not in the 
least roguishly accent the word prefer”87 – Nippers’ reiteration manifests itself as a 
travesty of the force of refusal in Bartleby’s enunciation. There is no refusal in Nippers’ 
usage at all. What resounds in Nippers is but an unconditional ascension or 
subservience to the request of his employer: “Oh certainly, sir, if you prefer that I 
should.”88 
 
The uncritical acceptance of the employer’s sovereignty is what Bartleby resists. That is 
to say, Bartleby will work, efficiently, serving the purposes of the company; but he will 
work only if working does not entail sacrificing the integrity of the manner by which he 
carries out his task. In other words, he will not allow his subjectivity as an individual, 
unique copyist to be violently supplemented or suppressed by the sovereignty of his 
employer; he will not allow himself to be reduced to yet another invisible, anonymous 
cog in the production machine. This is perhaps why Bartleby refuses the work that was 
handed to him by his employer via “a high green folding screen, which might entirely 
isolate Bartleby from [his employer’s] sight, though not remove him from [his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Bartleby, 36. 
86 I differ from Deleuze’s reading here. In Deleuze’s interpretation, work becomes impossible for 
Bartleby because – and this is what Deleuze argues as an essential point – of the effect the phrase I would 
prefer not to has on Bartleby too: “the moment he says I PREFER NOT TO (compare copies), he can no 
longer copy either” (« Bartleby, ou la formule », 91). 
87 Bartleby, 36. 
88 Bartleby, 36. 
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employer’s] voice,”89 a screen that might recall that which Pythagoras, the sovereign 
master-teacher, put between himself and his disciples during his acousmatic lessons. 
Bartleby simply would not submit to a condition whereby those in a sovereign position 
render others invisible or to be without presence. This is also perhaps why Bartleby 
refuses any task that falls outside his job-scope as a copyist, preferring “never on 
account to be dispatched on the most trivial errand of any sort” such as going to the 
post-office to collect his employer’s mail.90  
 
In Bartleby’s refusal to work or to become-common, there is certainly no lack of an 
affirmative subjectivity in him that serves as a counterpoint to his employer’s sovereign 
subjectivity. There is no doubt that that subjectivity manifests itself most forcefully in 
Bartleby’s “persisting in occupying” his employer’s premises.91 As a subject that 
knows, or is conscious of, what he prefers (not to), that is to say, as a subject that holds 
his ground and not leave, it can even be said that there is also something sovereign in 
Bartleby’s will to remain or occupy, not forgetting that the term “occupy” does take on 
an imperialistic connotation in the context of war, carried out by a sovereign state of 
greater military power in relation to another weaker state. The imperial force of 
Bartleby’s subjectivity is undeniable as it makes the narrator-employer gradually 
abdicate his sovereignty. That sovereignty was already threatened when the narrator-
employer first discovered Bartleby occupying the premises on a Sunday. Being told that 
Bartleby was “occupied” and to come back later, the narrator-employer “incontinently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Bartleby, 24.  
90 Bartleby, 30. 
91 Bartleby, 46. 
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[…] slunk away from [his] own door, and did as desired.”92 Upon further reflection that 
it was a subordinate who dictated to him what to do and who sent him away from his 
own premises, all the narrator-employer could summon up in himself were only “sundry 
twinges of impotent rebellion,” beside his sense of being “unmanned.”93 And 
eventually, it will be the narrator-employer who first budges, who first gives up his 
sovereign position: “Since he will not quit me, I must quit him. I will change my 
offices; I will move elsewhere; and give him fair notice, that if I find him on my new 
premises I will then proceed against him as a common trespasser.”94 
 
In “persisting to occupy,” which is really nothing less than a violation of an ethics of 
hospitality on the side of the guest, Bartleby renders himself what Agamben has called 
“the ungrateful guest.”95 He is no less some sort of voyou since, as already noted from 
Derrida, a “rogue-being” [être-voyou] is preoccupied with occupying spaces in ways 
that violate the hospitality conferred by those spaces. Certainly, Bartleby is not 
occupied with occupying the streets; that preoccupation is in fact a more accurate 
description of the participants of the Occupy movement. However, if one follows 
Derrida’s “deconstructive” analysis of the term voyou, it is not so unreasonable to call 
Bartleby a “rogue-being.” According to Derrida, “to speak of a rogue [voyou], one 
makes a call to order [on rappelle à l’ordre], one has begun to denounce [someone else 
as] a suspect, one makes an interpellation, even an arrest, a summoning [convocation], a 
writ [assignation], an investigation: the rogue must appear [comparaître] before the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Bartleby, 32. 
93 Bartleby, 32. 
94 Bartleby, 44. 
95 “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed., trans., and intro. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, 259. 
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law.”96 And indeed, not too long after the narrator-employer has quit his premises, one 
finds Bartleby, in refusing to leave those same premises, being arrested by the police 
and sent to the “common jail.” “When one speaks of rogues, the police is never far,”97 
as Derrida reminds us. This is also what the participants of the Occupy movement 
eventually find out or even experience. Bartleby and the Occupy movement then, even 
though they diverge on the question of the common, nonetheless share certain aspects of 
a “rogue-being.” 
 
As evident in Bartleby’s displacement of his employer and in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement’s disruption of the normal functioning of Wall Street, there is a certain 
counter-sovereign force in the voyou. Or, there is a politics of “rogue-being.” Derrida 
will even say that politics could begin with the latter: “The question of a democratic 
politics of the city must always begin by the serious question” of “what is a voyou,” if 
not “under what conditions is a voyoucratie possible.”98 Derrida has also suggested that 
the voyou can even be the figure following which one may begin to rethink existing 
democratic thought and practices; or more precisely, the question of hospitality that 
surrounds a “rogue-being” can have implications for the question of democracy. 
According to Derrida, democratic practices so far, while seeking “to offer hospitality to 
all the excluded,” have paradoxically excluded, within their spaces, “in particular bad 
citizens – rogues, non-citizens, and all sorts of dissimilar and unrecognizable others.”99 
Welcoming the voyou, alongside the thought of an “unconditional hospitality,” may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Voyous, 96. 
97 Voyous, 99. 
98 Voyous, 99. 
99 Voyous, 95. 
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pave the way towards a démocratie à venir, where sovereignty will not only be 
something of the State’s monopoly and hegemony,100 but shared by anyone.101 In this 
case, a dissociation between sovereignty and “unconditionality” may even become 
possible,102 that is to say, a situation in which whoever or whatever that is welcomed is 
not subjected or indebted to the gesture of the host, a gesture that typically marks not 
simply the hospitality of the host, but also the latter’s sovereignty as displayed by his or 
her power or authority to either offer or deny hospitality. 
 
In that regard, Derrida has also argued for the consideration of rogues or voyous and 
their counter-sovereign gestures, such as the simple act of occupying public spaces, as 
potentially playing a critical role in questioning the State’s supposed right to “retain and 
assure of itself the monopoly of violence.”103 As witnessed in the police actions in 
Oakland and in the University of California campuses in Berkeley and Davis against the 
Occupy movement’s peaceful encampment, and in the New York Police Department’s 
eviction of the occupiers at Zuccoti Park, it is evident that the State today still has no 
intention to abdicate that monopoly. However, the questioning or critique of that 
monopoly can nevertheless begin with the “rogue-being.” There is a certain “counter-
power,” or even a “criminal and transgressive counter-sovereignty,” which “defies” the 
sovereignty of the State, and therefore with which the State must reckon.104 This is 
especially so when there is more than one rogue (plus d’un voyou) or when there is a 
multitude of rogues, such as the participants of the Occupy movement seem to be. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 See Voyous, 101. 
101 See Voyous, 13. 
102 See Voyous, 13. 
103 Voyous, 101. 
104 Voyous, 98, 100, 101. 
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These participants in their sheer mass, in their gathering as an assemblage or demos, and 
even though they were “not destroying anything”105 in occupying the streets or public 
parks or squares but were committed to the legal act of civil disobedience through 
“nonviolent protest,”106 can take on a semblance of an entity or even a cratie, a 
“voyoucratie” as Derrida would say (following Flaubert).107 It is this potentiality of a 
voyoucratie that the State finds voyous threatening to its sovereignty, since voyoucratie, 
as Derrida has also noted, can “give itself the power to render less viable or weaker” the 
police,108 the laws, and norms. Derrida will go on to say, “voyoucratie is also a 
corrupted and corrupting power of the street, an illegal power that is outside the law 
regrouping in a voyoucratic regime, and therefore in a more or less clandestine 
organized formation, in a virtual State, all those that represent a principle of disorder – 
not of anarchical chaos but of structured disorder, […] of plot [complot], of conspiracy 
[conjuration], of offense or premeditated offensive against public order.”109 Such a 
description of voyoucratie is certainly not far from the profile, the mode of organization, 
and trajectory characterizing the Occupy movement, and this can explain the 
reactionary and oftentimes violent actions taken by the State and its police force against 
the participants of the movement. 
 
But to return to the problematic link between sovereignty and hospitality: certainly, 
there is a critical need to call for an unconditional hospitality on the side of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 !i"ek, Transcript of “!i"ek Speaks at Occupy Wall Street,” October 25, 2011. 
http://www.imposemagazine.com/bytes/slavoj-zizek-at-occupy-wall-street-transcript   
106 From the statement of the organizers of the Occupy Wall Street movement, “Occupy Together.” 
http://www.occupytogether.org/occupy-wall-st/ 
107 Voyous, 98. 
108 Voyous, 98. 
109 Voyous, 98. 
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(sovereign) host – and this is in the order of Derrida’s ethical philosophy – not only to 
the voyou but also to anyone, in order to attempt to dissociate sovereignty and 
hospitality. One can in fact argue that this was practiced in some sense by Bartleby’s 
employer, since he accepted Bartleby even though the latter “had declined telling who 
he was, or whence he came,”110 allowing Bartleby even to violently supplement his 
sovereign right to the office space.111 However, surely the guest must also have some 
respect for the host and not usurp or appropriate the latter’s place and even drive the 
latter away. Otherwise, what follows is nothing but a return to a conditional hospitality, 
in other words, a hospitality predicated on the sovereignty of the new host and his or her 
new laws, where not everyone or anyone feels welcome or at ease. That is no doubt the 
sense that Bartleby gives to the people who work in the office or even in the building, to 
the people too who are just passing by the offices there. There is also therefore, for the 
voyou, a part to play, such that his or her “counter-sovereignty” or “counter-power” 
does not violently supplement that of the host to the point where what changes is but the 
sovereign figure, while the new sovereign subject continues to act in ways that are 
indifferent to the perspectives of others. I note that the latter does not happen only when 
the voyou takes on the (“legitimate”) sovereign position. It can also occur prior to that, 
when the voyou assumes a subject position, that is to say, when it insistently decides to 
claim or appropriate public places to an extent that it becomes difficult or even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Bartleby, 34. 
111 On top of that, the narrator is not an employer who treats Bartleby unreasonably or unfairly. He is very 
patient and tolerant of Bartleby’s idiosyncrasies. And despite that, and despite Bartleby’s frequent 
refusals of his request, the narrator-employer always has the intention to help Bartleby. In Deleuze’s 
reading, he even seems to be a figure of “good fathers, of benevolent fathers or at least of protective elder 
brothers” (« Bartleby, ou la formule », 103-104). The main fault with him is that he is pressurized by the 
rest of Wall Street to not accept an uncommon figure such as Bartleby. He abandons Bartleby because the 
latter has become an anomalous sight or phenomenon, and he is afraid that this will result in him losing 
existing and potential clients. As Deleuze says, he is unable to protect the excluded, or what I would call 
the reject. 
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impossible for others to access these places, to the point where these places are no 
longer public spaces but become territories of the voyou. Such occupation surely 
infringes upon the peace and safety of neighboring locales, and it is at this point that 
one must question or critique this practice of the voyou, its practice of a politics of the 
streets,112 which sees to the degeneration of all sense of hospitality. One notes therefore, 
firstly, that such occupation can disturb and annoy neighbors, as the Occupy movements 
did, which did not assist them in garnering greater public or collective support for their 
causes.113 Now, if these voyous lose a certain sense of a commons with the rest of the 
world when they start to become a nuisance to those around them, the sense of a 
commons within the sphere of the voyous also risks weakening. Thus, when the voyous 
assume a sense of being sovereign subjects, just as many of the Occupy participants did 
in the course of the movement, a polemical divide can tear through them, as it occurred 
between the voyous of the Occupy movements and the voyous of the homeless and the 
poor, the former charging the latter of causing disorder within the encampment sites, 
even though the Occupy movements in part were to speak for them.114 Here, any sense 
of a multitude of commons and any possibility of a shared sovereignty begin to 
dissipate, as a faction of sovereign voyous-subjects proceed to reject the “original” 
homeless and poor voyous.  
 
I acknowledge that I am oversimplifying things with regard to the Occupy movement 
here, and have even ignored considerations that some of these homeless and the poor 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Voyous, 99. 
113 See the New York Times article, “For Annoyed Neighbors, the Beat Drags On,” November 13, 2011. 
114 See the New York Times article, “Dissenting, or Taking Shelter? Homeless Stake a Claim at Protests,” 
October 31, 2011. 
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were encouraged by the police to infiltrate encampment sites to create difficulties or to 
break down the growing solidarity amongst the participants. But let me say that I do not 
claim to offer any sophisticated or in-depth analysis of the movement or of the intricate 
developments that have taken place within it.115 My doubts and reservations raised here 
in relation to the movement are made based on my sense and observation that the 
movement, as it grew in number and voice and in its auto-positioning in strategic places 
(claiming even to own them too), and with its mode of ordering itself through “frequent 
assemblies and participatory decision-making structures” as Hardt and Negri have noted 
in their intervention in Foreign Affairs, was taking on a contour of a collective  
(counter-)sovereign body or subject.116 What I want to do here simply is to warn against 
the raising of such a subject, for reasons that I have suggested and those that I will 
mention later. To be sure, I am not at all in disagreement with the cause or aim of the 
movement. In fact, I am all for it, except I would like to be a little critical of its 
strategies or trajectories, especially when they take place at the price of the well-being 
of others or even at risk of the lives of the participants. It is with this critical slant that I 
suggest one must ask to what ends such a politics of the streets or politics of occupation 
move towards. As the cases of Bartleby and the Occupy movements show, it tends !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 For a more sympathetic coverage of the movement, see Occupy! Scenes from Occupied America, eds. 
Astra Taylor, Keith Gessen, and editors from n+1, Dissent, Triple Canopy and The New Inquiry. London 
and New York: Verso, 2011, or the supplement issue of Theory & Event 14 (4), 2011. 
116 The Occupy movement might not have made explicit claims to sovereignty. However, I bring to mind 
that Derrida in Voyous has argued that when voyous take to the streets, when they occupy them with their 
numbers, they then present themselves as some form of (counter-)sovereign force. Nancy has also argued 
that any form of ordering, even if it is self-ordering, is a pre-figuration of a sovereign subject (see « Un 
sujet ? », 61-62). 
On a related note, I would say, and I will say this again in the main text later, that it is the constitution of 
a (counter-)sovereign subject that undoes the movement from within. The raising of the subject in such 
revolutionary movements perhaps recalls what Peter Starr has called the “logics of failed revolt,” 
comprising of the “logic of recuperation,” where “to oppose the Master (in specific ways) is merely to 
consolidate the Master’s power,” and the “logic of substitution,” where “any figure that sets itself up as 
an alternative to the Master risks becoming a Master in its turn” (Logics of Failed Revolt: French Theory 
After May ’68, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 15).     
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unfortunately towards a nihilistic politics. Bartleby as a sovereign subject of occupation 
eventually gets reduced to a subject that is subordinated to the interpellation of the 
police and ends up in prison, a fate that most of the participants of the Occupy 
movements have also met with.  
 
As I would argue then, what the voyou must do then is to know when to walk away, and 
not to occupy a space to the extent where the voyou begins to exercise another 
monopoly or hegemony over that space. In other words, the voyou must stop short from 
grounding itself as a sovereign subject. It is not just that when Bartleby insists on 
standing his ground, he is reduced from a subject of occupation to a subject submitted to 
the interpellation of the police. It is also the case that from then on, there is no longer 
anything uncommon or “original” about Bartleby. The only thing that is left with 
Bartleby is that he remains a subject of occupation; and he is almost common as a 
subject of occupation, doing nothing but haunting the premises. As such, and after a 
while, he no longer makes any other moves that will shock the order. He becomes just 
another figure of a “politics of ‘resistance’ or ‘protestation,’ which parasitizes upon 
what it negates.”117 In other words, in occupying the former sovereign’s premises, 
Bartleby has also subsequently abdicated his freedom to move along another trajectory. 
Furthermore, in becoming easy to predict, as Bartleby grounds himself in the position of 
a subject of occupation, and therefore easy to manage too, one just awaits his arrest by 
law enforcement officers for being a “common trespasser.” In a way, this has also been 
the trajectory of the participants of the Occupy movement. Everything falls into ruins 
then, the moment Bartleby and the participants of the Occupy movements, or the voyous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 !i"ek, The Parallax View, 381, my emphasis.  
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in short, decide to ground their sovereign subjectivity by insisting on occupying their 
chosen premises and not walking away.  
 
How does one put in place a thought whereby the voyou – be it Bartleby or the 
participants of the Occupy movement – is encouraged to be perhaps more radical than it 
already is and walk away, and therefore prevent founding itself as a sovereign subject? I 
would argue that articulating the figure of the reject, in place of a “political subject of 
the poor” as Hardt and Negri would want it, can mobilize such a thought. I have already 
mentioned that the Occupy movement, consisting of the 99% that are refused adequate 
economic resources or economic equality because of unequal wealth distribution, 
implicitly claims itself to be a multitude of rejects. Bartleby is no less a reject either: as 
noted, he is largely sidelined by his fellow copyist.118 Already at first sight then, both 
Bartleby and the multitude that makes up the Occupy movement are rejects in the 
passive sense. But there is no doubt that they bear the second turn of the active reject 
too, when Bartleby projects his force of rejection through his enunciation of I would 
prefer not to, and when the 99% decide to occupy public places to manifest their 
discontent of being denied the wealth the 1% enjoy. At this point, I note that it is 
usually the over-projection of the active force of rejection, first against the oppressive 
forces, then against whoever or whatever is in the vicinity (just as Bartleby became a 
nuisance to the new proprietors of the premises), that one witnesses the claims to the 
foundation of a sovereign subject. This is why it is important to put in place the third 
turn of auto-rejection in order to prevent any (re)articulation of the subject. In other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Deleuze has also said, Bartleby is “a pure excluded to which no social situation can any longer be 
attributed” (« Bartleby, or la formule », 95).  
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words, in the case of Bartleby especially, after the first enunciation of I would prefer not 
to in the face of the demand to quit the premises, the reject must know how to auto-
reject by not allowing his or her gesture of occupation to become a single, monolithic, 
fixed strategy. He or she must know how to walk away from that strategy, and that is 
perhaps how the (auto-)reject will always be a shock to the system or to the political 
order, and also prevent its interpellation by the police. (I have also suggested that this 
walking away may be important or critical when the reject’s strategy becomes harmful 
or life-threatening not only for itself but also for other (fellow) rejects, and also when it 
begins to come at the cost of affirming and respecting the well-being of others). It is via 
such a movement that the reject can continue to carry out political rejection in ways 
unanticipated or incalculable.119 That means to say that the fight is not over for the 
reject: instead, it seeks out other, better, effective, and life-affirming means. At times, 
the ends might change or even appear to disappear, but that is only because the reject 
has managed to find for itself another horizon that can neutralize, if not surpass, that 
which has formerly limited or oppressed it.  
 
In any case, it is by walking away that Bartleby can be what !i"ek deems “a kind of 
arche,” whereby his force of rejection is never delimited to “the refusal of a determinate 
content as, rather, the formal gesture of refusal as such.”120 In Agamben’s reading of 
Bartleby, he has written that “the hardest thing […] is not the Nothing or its darkness, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 I note here that for Hardt and Negri, in following in some ways the 19th century notion of multitude 
according to Adolphe Thiers, movement is in fact critical for the radical politics of the multitude: it is 
because the multitude “is so mobile and impossible to grasp as a unified object of rule” that it “is 
dangerous and must be banished by law” (Commonwealth, 45). It is a little bewildering then that Hardt 
and Negri does not oppose the rather static occupational gesture of the Occupy movements but still 
consider them to be constitutive of a “multitude form.” 
120 The Parallax View, 384. 
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which many nevertheless remain imprisoned; the hardest thing is being capable of 
annihilating this Nothing and letting something from Nothing be.”121 I would like to 
think, however, that harder is the endeavor to return to the Nothing, in order, as 
Agamben would have it, “to save what was not.”122 The latter is what the auto-reject is 
potentially capable of, as it rejects all present predisposition to start everything anew 
again, constantly articulating an “each time” where “everything re-begins at zero,”123 
reaching (back) to the “what was not” that gets left out in all present actualizations. 
When Bartleby becomes a subject of occupation, he clearly is not able to return to the 
Nothing to begin again, since each moment from then on is filled with him, in a 
“motionless” manner,124 filling out the office space around him. In this regard, he loses 
“the mode of Being of potentiality that is purified of all reason.”125 
 
It is in the sense of being able to reject everything that one has built, to reject one’s 
subjectivity in other words too, in order to constantly re-begin at zero, that I suggest one 
must begin to mobilize the figure of the reject, especially the auto-reject, alongside the 
voyou. Now, Bartleby and the Occupy movement, as voyou and/ or reject, may seem to 
recall Marcuse’s “Great Refusal.” When Marcuse called for the “Great Refusal” in 1964 
in One-Dimensional Man, there were at least two phenomena against which the “Great 
Refusal” had to project itself. The first was the production by the State of a sense of 
imminent war, a war that only had as its horizon an absolute nuclear fallout between the 
US and the then Soviet Union. The production of such an apocalyptic vision only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” 253. 
122 “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” 270. 
123 Deleuze, « Bartleby, ou la formule », 93. 
124 Bartleby, 44. 
125 Agamben, “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” 259. 
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served to “justify” the accelerated research and development in the US State war 
machine, which also had implications for the future militarization of society, such as the 
translation of military technics (e.g. the Internet) into society. The second phenomenon 
was the technological advancement of society, which was increasingly capable of 
satisfying consumer material desires on a larger scale, which in turn produced the 
illusion that there was little that society could be dissatisfied with, hence discouraging 
any sort of resistance, or “dissensus” as Rancière would say, with the status quo. 
According to Marcuse, it is when society loses its capacity, or even its will, to resist 
both the domination of militarized thinking in society and the management of society 
via technological gratification, that society is flattened out, reduced to something that is 
“one-dimensional.” It is then that one must resurrect the “Great Refusal,” which is 
nothing less than a “protest against that which is,”126 and which Marcuse found its 
manifestations in 19th century workers’ movements and Marxism. And to project that 
“Great Refusal,” one must also seek a “new historical subject,”127 which Marcuse saw 
in characters or “conceptual personages” of literary works especially of the Romantic 
tradition.  
 
It is perhaps because of Marcuse’s inclination towards the Romantic tradition here that 
he does not make reference to Bartleby in relation to the “Great Refusal.” That does not, 
however, prevent one from discerning the proximity between Bartleby and the “Great 
Refusal.” One can argue that Bartleby’s I would prefer not to is a form of Marcusean 
refusal of “that which is.” Or, Bartleby’s “refusal to work” can be said to find its echo in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, intro. Douglas Kellner, London: Routledge, 1991, 63. 
127 One-Dimensional Man, 252. 
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Marcuse when the latter argues, following Valéry’s poetics that celebrates the poetic 
articulation of absent things, that the “Great Refusal” also concerns “that which is not 
seen, not touched, not heard,”128 and that to articulate the unseen, the untouched, and the 
unheard, the “Great Refusal” is willing to go as far as being “non-operational”129 (if not 
“inoperative,” to follow Blanchot’s or Nancy’s rhetoric). The proximity between 
Bartleby and the “Great Refusal” is clearly not missed by Hardt and Negri. When they 
speak of the “absolute refusal” of Bartleby, they do not fail to make the reference to 
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man. But Hardt and Negri would no doubt depart from 
Marcuse, for Marcuse ultimately does not renounce solitariness but celebrates it. As 
seen earlier, Hardt and Negri consider Bartleby’s solitariness “social suicide,” and argue 
that “absolute refusal” must be embodied by a “social body.” Marcuse, in contrast, takes 
solitariness as the mark of a “Great Refusal”: “Solitude [is] the very condition which 
sustained the individual against and beyond his society […].”130 Such solitude or 
solitariness is something Bartleby never surrenders throughout the narrative. To put it in 
Marcusean rhetoric, Bartleby resists the “desublimation”131 of solitude or solitariness 
and of his “refusal to work” into some aspect of the common. In that regard, Bartleby is 
truer to Marcuse’s “Great Refusal” than to Hardt and Negri’s “absolute refusal.”   
 
The Occupy movement, on its part, has seemed to actualize a particular form of a 
“Great Refusal,” one that Marcuse envisioned one year after the publication of One-
Dimensional Man. As he prophesized there, there will be an “opening of the one-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 One-Dimensional Man, 67. 
129 One-Dimensional Man, 142. 
130 One-Dimensional Man, 71. 
131 “Beyond One-Dimensional Man,” in Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse: Vol. 3: The New Left and 
the 1960s, ed. Douglas Kellner, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, 115. 
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dimensional society,” and “this prospect of a rupture with the continuum of domination 
exploitation has its material basis, its emerging basis in the aggravating economic stress 
of the global system of corporate capitalism, such as: inflation, international monetary 
crisis, intensified competition among the imperialist powers, escalation of waste 
[…].”132 The motivations for the Occupy movement are certainly not much different 
from the “material basis” that Marcuse has spoken about for a future “Great Refusal”: 
the Occupy movement in general has essentially been a refusal to accept that “global 
system of corporate capitalism.” The proximity between the Occupy movements and 
Marcuse’s “Great Refusal” can also be further elicited from !i"ek’s remarks on the 
movement. When he says that the movement in general has been nothing but “a 
stopping point [point d’arrêt] in the quotidian course of life, to sabotage the normal 
functioning of the system,”133 he echoes Marcuse no less, who had foretold that there 
will come a time “when man calls a halt to the rat race that has been his existence, […] 
and decides that instead of going with the rat race, instead of producing ever more and 
even bigger for those who can and must buy it, to subvert the very mode and direction 
of production, and thereby of their entire life.”134   
 
I certainly do not disagree with the necessity of a force of rejection against that which 
suppresses or represses “instinctual revolt.”135 I would like to think no less that there 
remains a critical pertinence to Marcuse’s “Great Refusal.” However, I question if the 
figure of the subject, as invoked by Marcuse when he calls for “a new historical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 “Beyond One-Dimensional Man,” 114. 
133 “!i"ek and the Occupy Wall Street Movement: ‘That This Movement Has a Trace of Violence Is What 
I Approve Of’.” 
134 “Beyond One-Dimensional Man,” 117. 
135 One-Dimensional Man, 77. 
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subject” for the “Great Refusal,” is an adequate figure of thought for an effective 
“dissensus” against “that which is.” Given the apparent failures of Bartleby and the 
Occupy movement as subjects of occupation, it seems rather futile to found a  
(counter-)sovereign subject that insists on an explicit but dangerously (auto)nihilistic 
“Great Refusal.” I would argue that a subtler, and certainly more life-affirming, strategy 
is needed today. For that, it is no longer the subject projecting a (counter-)sovereign 
force that one must look to, but a figure with a “weak force” perhaps, as Derrida would 
say,136 a figure that does not insist on, or is not preoccupied with, its sovereign 
subjectivity or subjective sovereignty. I have suggested above that the auto-reject may 
be that figure.137 With the auto-reject, perhaps it is also no longer adequate to speak of a 
“great” refusal. Instead, I would follow the organizers of the 2011 Marcuse conference 
at the University of Pennsylvania to call this subtler and life-affirming strategy “critical 
refusals.” With “critical refusals,” I would take it to mean that refusal takes on plural 
forms, rather than a fixed, singular program, and that “critical” would imply some sort 
of constant movement and self-critique, if not auto-rejection, where any enunciation of 
refusal does not become hypostasized, banal, or even common. More importantly, 




136 Voyous, 13. 
137 I note here that rejects are in fact no strangers to Marcuse’s “Great Refusal,” since he would speak of 
“outcasts and outsiders” (One-Dimensional Man, 256) with regard to that. 
138 And if one wants to keep with Bartleby as perhaps the literary representation of the reject, it must no 
longer be a Bartleby with a “sacrificial passion” as Derrida calls it (see earlier note 70). A sacrificial logic 
can be found in Marcuse’s theory too, since “it wants to remain loyal to those who, without hope, have 
given and give their life to the Great Refusal” (One-Dimensional One, 257). As stated above, a “critical 
refusal,” in my view, must be done with all sacrificial passions or logic.  
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3.2 Becoming-Animal, or Transversal Politics 
For the rest of the section, I would like to go further in considering how the auto-reject 
in walking away from its “insurrectional moment” (Balibar) against State politics, can 
ensure the non-return to the sovereign subject, that is to say, the subject that does not 
share sovereignty with others but monopolizes it and its hegemony of force, or else the 
subject that negates the affirmation of the opening towards anyone or the other in its 
complete difference. For that, I would argue that one must turn to a figure of the reject 
that seems impossible in the domain of political thought. The impossible, as Derrida 
would say, is necessary, however, and this also applies to démocratie à venir. As he 
says in the interview with Michael Sprinker, “Democracy, for me, if I can wager an 
aphorism, is the political experience of the impossible, the political experience of the 
opening to the other as possibility of the impossible.”139 This impossible figure would 
be the animal, since the animal has always been rejected as a possible figure of thought 
in politics or political philosophy, and so, this section, after the preceding section on the 
“post-secular,” will follow after the animal a little further. Derrida, of course, does not 
rule out thinking the voyou-reject in relation to animals. He notes of Charles Nisard’s 
suggestion that voyou can be derived from “loup-garou,” which translates into English 
as “werewolf.”140 However, Derrida has his suspicion on this link, and prefers to put his 
trust in the English rogue as having greater resonance with animals. As is common in 
English, rogue, beyond (and before) its appropriation by politics for political 
significations, also describes animals “whose behavior appears deviant or perverse,” 
such as “rogue elephants” or “rogue horses,” when they conduct themselves in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 Politique et amitié, 116, my translation. 
140 Voyous, 102. 
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“lawless” [hors-la-loi] or “devastating” [ravageurs] manner, contrary to what is 
expected of them, for example, to be a “disciplined racing or hunting horse.”141 In 
L’Animal que donc je suis, Derrida will also suggest that the animal has the political 
potentiality to leave all forms of politics predicated on fraternity and alliance or 
friendship (which he “deconstructs” in Politiques de l’amitié) suspended, undecided, or 
decidable, which then allows all existing forms of politics to be questioned or 
historicized, opening the thinking of politics to elements that political thought has 
always rejected, marginalized, or forgotten (again something Derrida does in Politiques 
de l’amitié and Spectres de Marx). Derrida intimates as much when he says that the 
animal is “like the every other that is every (bit) other in such intolerable proximity that 
I do not as yet feel I am justified or qualified to call it my fellow, even less my brother. 
For we shall have to ask ourselves, inevitably, what happens to the fraternity of brothers 
when an animal appears on the scene.”142 Derrida will also mobilize the figure of the 
animal in his La Bête et le souverain seminars in order to destabilize, to displace, and 
perhaps to discredit the concept of sovereignty, especially that which has been 
appropriated and monopolized either by a human individual or by an institution 
constituted by like-minded human subjects, in other words a sovereignty that 
presupposes and entails others as incapable of responding to the call to decisively 
assume a point of authority. I do not follow after Derrida’s animal-voyou here, however. 
Instead, I propose in the following to track Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
becoming-animal, which I will show to prove itself to be more voyou than Derrida’s 
animal-voyou, particularly in the context of our contemporary post-9/11 politics. In the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Voyous, 135. 
142 L’Animal que donc je suis, 12. 
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shadow of the latter, radical politics, especially that which resists State politics, can be 
an impossible task. Becoming-animal, on the other hand, as I will argue, can posit an 
effective radical politics that, to deploy Deleuze and Guattari’s rhetoric, smashes the 
State from within. What follows then is a sustained engagement with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s becoming-animal. It will not tire readers with a detailed explication of the 
turns of the passive, active, and auto-, reject in becoming-animal, but hopes those turns 
unfold themselves in an evident manner in the process of the discussion. The greater 
interest here instead will be to inquire into the implications of becoming-animal’s turns 
or forces of (auto-)rejection for political thought, not so much in relation to a theoretical 
démocratie à venir or égaliberté this time round, but, as said, to contemporary politics. 
 
From the outset, it can be said that becoming-animal constitutes some form of a reject 
with regard to political thought, even among Deleuze and Guattari scholars, since there 
remains a general hesitation in the latter in considering becoming-animal’s political 
potentiality. There are certainly those who explicate the concept of becoming-animal; 
and while they do not hesitate to extend its application to literary works, they do not 
discuss its political possibilities.143 Then there are those who are keen to define the 
ambiguous political terrain of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, and yet stop short at 
including becoming-animal within that political cartography.144 In other words, when it 
comes to elucidating the politics of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, becoming-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 See for example Gerald Bruns, “Becoming-Animal (Some Simple Ways),” New Literary History. 38: 
703-720, 2007; Claire Colebrook, Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, London: Continuum, 2010; and 
Laura Penny, “Parables and Politics: How Benjamin and Deleuze & Guattari Read Kafka,” Theory & 
Event, 12 (3), 2009. 
144 See especially Mark Bonta and John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004; Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn, Deleuze and 
Politics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008; and Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts: 
Philosophy, Colonization, Politics, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
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animal is very much a missing concept, if not a reject, in Deleuze and Guattari 
scholarship.145 The refusal to take into account becoming-animal may be said to be a 
humanist or anthropocentric reflex, even though Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming, if 
not Deleuze’s philosophy tout court, is explicitly mobilized against such a reflex. That 
reflex becomes evident when such scholarship makes appeals to “actualized or 
actualizable elements of democratic political normativity” or to “limits of what is 
possible under present [political] conditions.”146 Such appeals are undeniably 
anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic because “what is possible under present 
[political] conditions” tends to exclude things animals or the animal condition of life.147 
Only the (rational) voice of the human reverberates within the limits of “present 
political normativity.”148 Even when the issue of animal welfare turns up as an element 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 I am referring to scholarship published in English so far. In terms of non-English scholarship, the 
collection of French essays in Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari et le politique (éds., Manola Antonioli, 
Pierre-Antoine Chardel et Hervé Regnauld, Paris : Sandre, 2006) must not be ignored. But suffice to say 
that the question of becoming-animal and its political potentiality is not placed in the foreground there 
either. In another collection of French essays on the question of the animal, Paola Marrati’s « L’animal 
qui sait fuir » (in L’Animal autobiographique : Autour de Jacques Derrida, sous la direction de Marie-
Louise Mallet. Paris : Galilée, 1999) does explicitly deal with the politics of becoming-animal. Marrati 
focuses on the question of faciality, and argues that the contest of faciality constitutes the trans-historical 
politics of becoming-animal. The trans-historical perspective is where I depart from her work, since I will 
seek to contextualize becoming-animal here within contemporary global politics. 
146 Patton, “Becoming-Democratic,” in Buchanan and Thoburn, Deleuze and Politics, 190; “Utopian 
Political Philosophy: Deleuze and Rawls,” Deleuze Studies 1(1), 2007, 49-50. 
147 Patton’s vision of politics in Deleuze and Guattari is undeniably anthropocentric. For Patton, that 
politics holds the promise “to achieve […] improvements in the conditions of a given people,” by 
extending rights and justices to people who are denied them, and through “a more just distribution of 
material social goods” (“Utopian Political Philosophy,” 47, 51). This “given people” hardly includes 
animal beings, since the “political community” it forms is based on “rights [of this people] and duties 
[due them],” something to which animals are incommensurable (“Becoming-Democratic,” 192). 
Becoming-animal does turn up in Patton’s earlier Deleuze & the Political, but he does not explicitly 
suggest how becoming-animal can posit a potential political force, or how it can intervene or apply itself 
in a political context. In the more recent Deleuzian Concepts, Patton brings in becoming-animal in an 
essay on the literary treatment in JM Coetzee’s Disgrace of the politics of colonization or post-
colonization, but leaves it out in the section “Normative Political Philosophy.” 
148 “Utopian Political Philosophy,” 49. I note too that such political thought is a legacy of an 
anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic reading of Aristotle’s Politics throughout history. It reads in the 
latter a separation between humans and animals via the element of logos or rational speech, denying its 
presence in animals; consequently, deprived of logos, animals, unlike humans, are judged to be unable to 
organize their lives via the labor of jurisprudence, or demand or institutionalize a right to justice in the 
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in the latter, it can always be reduced to a gesture made in the name of human’s ethical 
progress; or when it concerns the protection of animal lives in relation to ecological 
sustainability, it is but in the name of perpetuating human habitation and alimentation in 
the world. In short, it is only in the image of the rational human, if not “the average 
adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language,”149 that 
development in political thought is recognized and put into practice. Any figure less 
than or in excess of this rational human being will not count in the space of such a 
thought, and so animal life will not form any part of “present political normativity,” 
especially becoming-animal, which, as Deleuze and Guattari say, makes the rational 
human figure reel. This explains the rejection of the question of becoming-animal in 
Deleuzo-Guattarian political thought as long as it predicates itself on “present political 
normativity,” since its inclination as such cannot or is unable to conceptually and 
empirically account for it. 
 
The anthropocentric limits that haunt Deleuzo-Guattarian political thought, however, 
must not prevent thinking becoming-animal as integral to the political force of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy. As they suggest in their book on Kafka, there is a politics of 
becoming-animal: “To the inhumanness of the ‘diabolical powers’ responds the sub-
human [le sub-humain] of a becoming-animal: become-beetle, become-dog, become-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
face of a wrong done to them. This canonized reading of the Politics has granted humans the category of 
“political animals” and not animals. Bennington’s deconstructive reading in his intervention in the special 
issue of diacritics on “negative politics” will show that in Aristotle, humans are only more political than 
animals, and that animals cans have logos, except they cannot transform the latter into rhetoric. See 
Bennington, “Political Animals,” diacritics 39 (2), summer 2009, 31-34. 
149 Mille plateaux, 133. As in this present work’s introduction, I am following Massumi’s translation here. 
I note further that Deleuze and Guattari identify this figure as underlying all existing political thought, 
and argue that it must be critiqued and combated. I am in agreement with Massumi’s translation in large 
part, except in a few instances, and so subsequent references to Mille plateaux will be made in 
parentheses, first indicating the pages in the French text (MP) then to those in the English version (TP).  
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ape, ‘head over heels and away,’ rather than lower one’s head and remain a bureaucrat, 
inspector, judge, or be judged.”150 In other words, becoming-animal, as Kafka’s stories 
have shown, can constitute a politics that serve as a counterpoint to the striating 
bureaucracy or oppressiveness of institutional politics. In Mille plateaux, they will go 
beyond a Kafkaesque context and say in more general terms, “There is an entire politics 
of becomings-animal, […] which is elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of 
the family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or 
groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized 
institutions, groups all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic” (MP, 
302/ TP, 247, my italics). I will return to a discussion of this quote later. For the 
moment, the point that I would like to make here is that the political potentiality of 
becoming-animal must no longer be marginalized or ignored. Instead, there is a certain 
urgency, if not necessity, to recognize or even put into effect the political force of 
becoming-animal in our contemporary world. This is because there exists, on the one 
hand, a certain trap in constructing political philosophies that remain within “present 
[democratic] political normativity,” and on the other, a certain impasse in contemporary 
radical politics that seeks to counter such normativity.  
 
A few notes on the trap in remaining within “present [democratic] political normativity” 
are in order: it is by now undeniable that the horizons of democratic thinking and 
practice in our early 21st century, i.e. the post-9/11 world, have been under siege. 
Exploiting the global anxiety for an international democratic peace and security, those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Deleuze et Guattari, Kafka: pour une litérrature mineure, Paris: Minuit, 1975, 22. The translation here 
follows, with modifications, Dana Polan’s in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986, 12. 
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horizons have been captured by the sovereign State war-machine, namely the American 
one, such that international democratic politics is thinkable only in terms of a total 
submission to a global “war on terror.” Every state in the world, and every democratic 
citizen of the world, must accede to support the “war on terror” and not resist it, no 
matter what form that war has taken, and no matter if its proceedings were adequately 
justified or not. Such politics has also demanded that every entity in the world presents 
itself as a singular, identifiable body, meaning that none must resist its exposure to the 
State’s globally prevalent technics of surveillance or identification (CCTVs, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), body scanners, biometric passports, etc.) that seek to contain 
that body within that politics. Nothing less of a politics of identifiability is at work here, 
and preemptive strikes will be “justified” not only against a territory but also against an 
individual body that has appeared to deviate from this politics. This condition, which 
echoes Deleuze’s fear of a “world State […] of absolute peace still more terrifying than 
that of total war,”151 has more or less institutionalized itself as the sole normative 
dimension of so-called democratic geopolitics today. Agamben has certainly put all 
these in more apocalyptic terms, arguing that all democratic principles in the world are 
“entirely lost,” and all that remains is the “state of exception” everywhere.152 Here, I 
would like to state that I do not follow Agamben so far as to think that the “state of 
exception” or a “politics of identifiability” will be an absolute condition or horizon 
without redemption for political thought in a post-9/11 world. However, if it seems that 
I allow the image of an absolutely delimiting State politics to overwhelmingly inflect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Deleuze et Parnet, Dialogues, Paris: Flammarion, 1977, 168, my translation. The English translation of 
this text also exist, and the quote can be found in Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberham, London: Athlone, 1987, 139. 
152 State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, 18.  
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my rhetoric here, I do so only to underscore that such State politics undeniably remains 
a very real condition today, of which radical politics or even a politics of the reject, in 
the guise of becoming-animal, cannot and must not ignore. It is the challenge or 
obstacle from which radical politics and/ or politics of the reject must not back down. In 
doing so, it can be a valuable or critical lesson for future radical politics, particularly in 
the case where future political apparatuses project a similar extreme or totalizing 
horizon.  
 
In opposition to a pessimistic view of contemporary politics, one could also point to the 
fact that the Obama administration replaced the Bush administration in 2009, which has 
also ended American military operations in Iraq. However, we still do not have a world 
completely free from the “war on terror.” In fact, one can still describe our 
contemporary situation as a time of war, and not without justification, since reports of 
UAVs taking out terror suspects in Pakistan or Afghanistan continue beyond the Bush 
administration, not to mention too that in early 2010, the United States and Britain still 
considered extending the “war on terror” to Yemen. Furthermore, one has not witnessed 
a reduced intervention by the State’s global military and surveillance technics in public 
spaces under the Obama Administration.153 The increasing affirmation, if not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 Obama’s politics arguably participates in a post-9/11 worldview that is always predicated on a war 
“against terror,” and therefore a worldview that is always anxious to arm the State against all possible 
scenarios of threat. Obama’s official campaign website has stated that his defense strategy will seek to 
further develop the “agility and lethality” of the American military complex, especially the “global reach 
in the air” by UAVs, in the face of conventional and non-conventional threats (see 
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/index_campaign.php#invest-century-military). In a 2008 
statement, Obama has also vowed to keep the US military “the strongest military on the planet” (see 
“Obama Vows US Will Maintain ‘Strongest Military on the Planet,” Agence France Presse, December 1, 
2008). As State military and surveillance technics continue to be the condition or norm of contemporary 
American democratic geopolitics, Virilio’s thesis that the militarization of the world by democratic 
powers such as the US, regardless of which administration is in power, holds true.  
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celebration, of security imaging as a highly competitive and therefore profitable 
enterprise only signals that neither the US nor other democratic countries are moving 
towards dismantling the politics of identifiability and its militarized surveillance 
structures. Instead, such politics and technics, to reiterate, are becoming naturalized as a 
norm in democratic states the world over, regardless of whether or not one is still in the 
“war on terror.” It is as such that there is a certain trap in deploying the rhetoric of 
“democratic political normativity”: either it risks limiting oneself to the horizon of the 
State’s politics of identifiability, or worse, risks implication in such State politics. In 
any case, it is evident that political thought, especially one that seeks to inscribe a 
veritable democracy, cannot go far by deferring to “the limits of what is possible under 
present condition,” especially when those limits are essentially captured or determined 
by a questionable State “democratic” geopolitics. 
 
In place of a political thought that defers to “democratic political normativity,” radical 
politics unfortunately does not present a real alternative. Under the militarized 
architecture of “democratic” geopolitics, radical politics, or in fact any politics that 
seeks to counter the ideology and technics of a State-determined “democracy,” appears 
more to be at an impasse, if not impossible. This is because, as said above, State 
surveillance apparatuses and preemptive strike machines will guard against any minimal 
political deviation. (And this is also why, if one desires to rethink Marcuse’s “Great 
Refusal” today, if not “the refusal to behave” according to norms or normativity 
dictated by the State (or even society),154 any contemporary refusal cannot in effect 
express itself with such explicit force as manifested by the Black Panther movement, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 One-Dimensional Man, 71. 
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the Vietnam War protests, and the revolutions of 1968, all of which Marcuse witnessed 
just slightly after the publication of One-Dimensional Man. As said earlier, one needs a 
subtler form or strategy otherwise than an explicit and forceful rejection.) This is not to 
say that one has stopped conceptualizing radical political thought in the post-9/11 
world. Contemporary theorists such as Hardt and Negri, Virno, Galloway and Thacker, 
and Casarino have taken up the task of constructing radical politics in and for the 21st 
century. Their point of attack, however, is not the highly militarized horizon of the post-
9/11 world. The imperative, for them, is to critique and undo the capitalist network 
empire (structurally not unrelated to the militarized world of surveillance technics), 
which has captured and controlled communicative discourses of people everywhere. In 
opposition to that empire, they have called for either a “multitude” or a “common,” with 
its idiosyncratic form of communication that both eludes the appropriation of the 
network empire and undoes the empire’s demand to convert all discourses into 
economically productive information.155 More radical is the strategy suggested by 
Galloway and Thacker, who call for “tactics of nonexistence,”156 which seek to smash 
that empire network from within by disappearing into that very network to create a 
counter-network. Such network-based radical politics face certain dangers, however, if 
not a certain nihilism, if the State’s advanced military and surveillance technics is not 
taken into consideration. For instance, one can sense how “tactics of nonexistence” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 See Hardt and Negri, Multitudes and Commonwealth; Casarino and Negri, In Praise of the Common: A 
Conversation in Philosophy and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); and Virno, 
A Grammar of the Multitude (trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, Andrea Casson, foreword Sylvère 
Lotringer, New York: Semiotext(e), 2004). Largely inspired by Deleuze’s philosophy, the question of 
becoming-animal is interestingly absent as well in their works. For example, instead of becoming-animal, 
Hardt and Negri will speak instead of a “becoming-Prince”, which is “the process of the multitude 
learning the art of self-rule and inventing lasting democratic forms of social organization” 
(Commonwealth, viii).      
156 The Exploit: A Theory of Networks, 135. 
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easily risk falling short, just by the reminder of the existence of the 8th Air Force, a 
combat-ready squadron created and tasked by the American State war-machine in 2006 
to locate and destroy such counter-networks in cyberspace.  
 
Present radical political thought is therefore quite inadequate or ineffective to sidestep 
the force of the State war-machine. However, that does not mean that one should then 
give up resisting the ideology of existing State-determined “democratic” geopolitics, no 
matter how impossible such resistance may seem today. Resistance remains necessary, a 
necessity that Deleuze and Guattari insist on via their lament that “we lack resistance to 
the present.”157 Becoming-animal, I would argue, is that trajectory of resistance, if not 
force of rejection, we need today: becoming-animal can resist or sidestep the force of 
the State war-machine, and hence lead us out of the impasse of contemporary radical 
political thought. One has to recognize the political potentiality of becoming-animal 
today, therefore. But before eliciting the political promise of becoming-animal, I note 
here that becoming-animal is not an exception to the preemptive violence of the State’s 
military and surveillance apparatuses, which would seek to obliterate it with force and 
acceleration the moment becoming-animal presents itself as an explicit affront to the 
State. Resistance needs a subtler strategy today; it must not give itself an explicitly 
defined political program or contour, or even project an explicit force of rejection or 
disagreement against State politics. Becoming-animal, as I understand it, does proceed 
with such a subtle strategy, one that auto-rejects all hypostasis on a particular political 
trajectory and all determinations that would give it a political profile. That is becoming-
animal’s critical political force in the face of our early 21st century “democratic” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Minuit, 1991, 104. 
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geopolitics, which, I will suggest in the following, helps avoid many of the risks borne 
by existing radical political thought defined by explicit programs, targets, and strategies 
in the face of the latter.158 
 
To take on board becoming-animal, one must be prepared to push existing political 
thought beyond its anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic limits. One must in fact be 
prepared to even depart from existing models of political thought, rather than to 
assimilate or even tame becoming-animal within their norms or normativity; it is this 
very departure that constitutes becoming-animal’s first steps in sidestepping the 
striation of State-determined “democratic” politics.159 According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, becoming-animal is a matter of spatiality – a zone of proximity with the 
animal – and the temporal immersion into that spatiality.160 It is an experience of being-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 This is where I deviate from Thacker’s take on becoming-animal. Thacker argues that becoming-
animal is a sort of swarming animality, and suggests that its potential for radical politics lies precisely in 
the faceless dimension of its very entity as a swarm. Without a facial profile to identify itself as friend or 
foe, becoming-animal as such unhinges the Schmittian definition of politics as the decisive determination 
of a friend-enemy distinction. In place is another politics, which poses “local actions and global patterns” 
and an “ambivalent, tensile topology” against sovereignty and control (“Swarming: Number versus 
Animal?” in Deleuze and New Technology, eds. Mark Poster and David Savat, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2009, 181). In my view, such politics presents itself too hastily as a too explicit affront 
against State politics, which only invites the violent intervention of the State’s surveillance and military 
apparatuses. 
159 Three notes here: Firstly, I use departure because becoming or becoming-animal, according to 
Deleuze, is never a form of derivative politics, as if it needs to refer to existing norms or normativity of 
political thought (see Deleuze et Parnet, Dialogues, 152). Secondly, I share in many ways Matthew 
Calarco’s vision of radical politics. Calarco has argued that it is “unrealistic and utopian” to continuing 
looking to existing democratic politics for an ethicopolitical project that will take into consideration 
nonhuman animals. A “form of politics beyond the present humanist, democratic, and juridical orders” is 
necessary (Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008, 97-98). While Calarco discusses Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-animal 
(Zoographies, 41-43), I find the discussion too brief, not allowing him to elucidate becoming-animal’s 
political potentialities, strategies, implications, and effects. Thirdly, I am using “striation” here in the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian sense, that is to say, the totalization of all thoughts and actions by the State, reducing 
or homogenizing them to State thought. 
160 Recognizing that becoming-animal occurs via a time- and locale-specific chance encounter, Thacker 
calls becoming-animal a “topological temporality” (“Swarming,” 173). On another note, becoming-
animal, or even the politics of becoming-animal, as of a spatial dimension corresponds to the 
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at-the-edge, a border experience, or “a phenomenon of bordering” (MP, 299/ TP, 245) 
opened up between the human and the animal. And this border experience of becoming-
animal is about sensing the animal, or the actualization of the force or affect of the 
animal within us, which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is 
the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and 
makes it reel. Who has not known the violence of these animal sequences, which 
uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant, making one scrape at one’s 
bread like a rodent or giving one the yellow eyes of a feline? A fearsome 
involution calling us toward unheard of becomings (MP, 294/ TP, 240). 
 
We must respond to those calls (and I will explicate this question of response in the 
following discussion on aisth!sis), and it is in responding to those animal affects, which 
is also to say, in rejecting one’s human or anthropomorphic forms and limits, which 
include the supposed propriety of behavior such as not scraping at one’s bread, that one 
can begin that traversing or “crossing [passage]”161 towards an animal space.  
 
In taking that step towards an animal space via becoming-animal, one in fact initiates 
the process of counteracting the militarized surveillance architectures of State politics. 
Now, “present political normativity,” or conventional anthropocentric politics, which 
also includes contemporary State “democratic” geopolitics, has hardly concerned itself 
with animals: it largely leaves them to be. In other words, as long as State politics reject 
taking into account animals within their sphere of control or influence, animals, as 
political rejects, are never subjected to the same political determinations, delimitations, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
consideration of politics as space or place, as seen, according to other philosophers dealt with in this 
chapter – Nancy, Badiou, Derrida, and Rancière. 
161 Marrati, « L’animal qui sait fuir», 203. 
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and obligations that humans experience as “political animals.”162 Put another way, 
animal spaces largely escape the gaze and capture of politics. This also means that it is 
by recovering the very space of exclusion that the animal occupies after it has been left 
aside by the frames of normative politics that critical thought has a space to slide into 
and sidestep State politics.163 One must however be meticulous to ensure that this 
animal space is not outside of the militarized s/State of contemporary global politics, or 
that it explicitly marks a space that tears away from the State – I make another 
precautionary reminder here that seeking such an outside is nothing short of a death 
wish today.164 Becoming-animal must be vigilant to auto-reject any such desire or even 
death-drive for an outside. Rather, it will be an adjacent space that escapes the gaze and 
capture of State military and surveillance apparatuses, where becoming-animal can posit 
a political resistance that counters and goes beyond the terror and limits of early 21st 
century “democratic” normativity.165  
 
But perhaps one must be further meticulous to say that this adjacent space would allow 
becoming-animal not only to slip towards a space that is the blind-spot of the gaze of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 See note 147 on “political animals.”  
163 The definition “political animal” would even suggest that such spaces are recoverable, since the term 
“animal” in the definition would seem to constantly retrace that which the definition, according to a long 
line of anthropocentric and/ or anthropomorphic political thought, puts aside. An animal space can be 
recuperated by rethinking the term “political animal,” by which the term must no longer be about the 
question of a human-animal separation or distinction, but how the human might cross over to the animal. 
For Bennington, the term “political animal” became anthropocentric through the exploitation of logos 
(which animals can have, in Bennington’s reading, following Labarrière) into rhetoric, which is to say, 
deliberative phrases that decide, in human terms and language, what is good and evil, just and unjust. But 
Bennington also argues that something always remains (recoverable) that is shared between humans and 
animals, which he calls “a residual phonè, a kind of persistent animality of language […]” (“Political 
Animals,” 34).   
164 Here, I diverge from Laurent Dubreuil’s call for an outside or to create “tears in the political fabric” 
(“Preamble to Apolitics,” diacritics 39 (2), summer 2009, 7). 
165 I am keeping in mind here Deleuze and Guattari’s point that one must not delimit counter-thought to 
the outside. When the outside is impossible, there is always the alternative to resist from within – and one 
can do that by creating an adjacent space. See MP, 437/ TP, 353. 
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State politics, but also to remain before all technics of identifiability, hence preserving 
itself from all State preemptive violence. As I would put it, this adjacent space is where 
becoming-animal can let play its doubling effect of I remain, I become. This subtle 
strategy, especially critical in the face of militarized surveillance architectures, and 
which is no less an artifice or ruse and not without humor,166 is suggested by Deleuze 
and Guattari themselves when they say, “becoming is always double” [que le devenir 
aille toujours par deux] (MP, 374/ TP, 305). As they will explicate, what that means is 
that in becoming-animal, the original entity, the human for example, remains as he or 
she is. This part of his or her entity can still present itself as a singular, identifiable body 
before any technics of identifiability, so as to preserve his or her life from the State’s 
deadly preemptive measures. However, something happens at the same time at the edge 
of his or her body: imperceptible molecular movements are taking place there, 
deterritorializing themselves from the human body and traversing towards an animal 
affect. In effect, becoming-animal here involves an almost literal disappearance, as it 
puts forth “an objective zone of indetermination or uncertainty” (MP, 355/ TP, 273), or 
tends towards the in-visible or “the imperceptible” (MP, 305/ TP, 249). In a way, the 
disappearing, if not dis-appearing, condition of becoming-animal disrupts the real, or it 
dislocates the perception of the real (MP, 292/ TP, 239). It makes itself difficult, almost 
impossible, to be located in the real, but it is nevertheless real and not the stuff of 
dreams or fantasies (MP, 335/ TP, 273). It is a problematic real therefore, a real that is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 I would not hesitate to say that there is something of “treason,” if not a “treacherous” humor (see 
Deleuze et Parnet, Dialogues, 83), in the doubling effect of I remain, I become before the technics of 
identifiability. It makes light of the latter, and is therefore an unbearable humor for the political 
apparatuses that are putting in place such technics. On the element of humor in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy as “a strategy of dissent,” see also O’Sullivan’s Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: 
Thought Beyond Representation, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006, 73. 
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non-deitic, non-definable, un-identifiable. In other words, one cannot capture in visual 
terms that aspect of human life that is becoming animal, that aspect that is in-visibly 
occurring at the edges of the human form: becoming-animal proceeds by being 
“something more secret, more subterranean” (MP, 291/ TP, 237) than what the real 
would like it to display to visibility.  
 
If traversing towards an animal space constitutes becoming-animal’s initial sidestepping 
of State politics, the dis-appearing part of becoming-animal is its challenge or resistance 
to the State’s technics of surveillance, while letting the visible human body remain 
before those same technics.167 In other words, it is the I become of becoming-animal 
that one may speak of a political trajectory of becoming-animal that counters or rejects 
State politics, for its dis-appearing aspect always remains difficult for any identifying 
technics of the State to trace or chart it at present or in advance. It always slips into an 
adjacent space that is the blind-spot of the gaze of State politics, where the body is not 
limited to a singular form but can fully and freely engage (with) its own multiplicity. In 
the face of a politics of identifiability, becoming-animal surreptitiously contests the 
demand for a totalizing coming to presence, and presents at best a haziness before all 
gazes of the State apparatus. In that sense, and in keeping in mind that the dis-
appearance of I become is a matter of molecular investment in an animal affect, one 
may also speak of a “molecular politics” (MP, 339/ TP, 277) or even “a revolutionary 
micropolitical action [une action révolutionnaire micropolitique]”168 of becoming-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 It is as such that becoming-animal, in the context of a militarized post-9/11 world, is the wiser strategy 
in relation to the tactics of existing radical politics of constructing a “multitude” or “common” via explicit 
“tactics of nonexistence.” 
168 Guattari, La Révolution moléculaire, Fontenay-sous-Bois: Recherches, 1977, 242, my translation. 
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animal. As Deleuze and Guattari will tell us, “molecular politics” or “micropolitics” 
resists any apparatus that attempts to striate or delimit a body to a singular entity 
according to codes determined by that apparatus; and “molecular politics” or 
“micropolitics” will counter such striating operation by setting free the “intensive 
multiplicities” or “diverse modalities” that a body desires to express – multiplicities and 
modalities that not just reject, but also exceed and escape all codifications by the 
apparatus.169   
 
But before one can put into effect “molecular politics” or “micropolitics,” there is 
always the question of how one becomes-animal, a question that readers of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy will constantly pose, since Deleuze and Guattari give us only a 
vague sense of the process. As Deleuzian scholars have never failed to underscore, 
becoming-animal is nothing like a mimetic repetition of the animal form, which means 
that to become-animal, one cannot rely on an image of a particular animal that the 
human form will gradually take on or resemble. And if there are no visual signposts to 
point one towards becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari will add to the difficulty of 
becoming-animal by insisting that there is no prescriptive methodology, “no preformed 
logical order” (MP, 307/ TP, 251) to it. In other words, one cannot refer to any 
foundation of reason, logos, norms, or normativity to become-animal. In becoming-
animal, “being expresses [the human and the animal] both in a single meaning in a 
language that is no longer that of words [my italics], in a matter that is no longer that of 
forms, in an affectability that is no longer that of subjects” (MP, 315/ TP, 258, my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 Guattari, La Révolution moléculaire, 245; Psychanalyse et transversalité: essais d’analyse 
institutionnelle, préface de Gilles Deleuze, Paris: François Maspero, 1972, 84, my translation. See also 
the section « Micropolitique et segmentarité » in Mille plateaux.  
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italics). To put it briefly, becoming-animal cannot be pinned down by rational human 
discourse. Common sense and intelligible sense serve no purpose here; they are 
powerless before becoming-animal. In a sense, becoming-animal just becomes; it rejects 
the linguistic and rationalizing performatives of logos. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, it can even be “done with enough feeling” [si on le fait avec assez de cœur] 
(MP, 337/ TP, 275), although they will be quick to underscore that this feeling is 
nothing subjective – “the affect is not a personal feeling” (MP, 294/ TP, 240). Instead, 
this particular affect or feeling opens one to a plural alterity or heterogeneity within and 
without. Becoming-animal, as said before, is then a question of being worthy of such 
affects, of opening oneself to the sensation of animal affects and responding to them 
affirmatively, (auto-)rejecting any anthropomorphism or anthropocentrism that blocks 
those responses.  
 
This particular “feeling” or sensation of animal affects may perhaps be found in the 
originary and communicative aisth!sis that humans and animals share. Aisth!sis, as 
Aristotle himself has observed, is the irreducible feeling of “pleasure and pain” that 
both humans and animals sense, and which enables both humans and animals to 
immediately “communicate” a wrong done to them.170 To cross to the adjacent space of 
the animal, it is perhaps a question of recovering that originary aisth!sis then, i.e. of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
170 See T.A Sinclair’s note 19 to aisth!sis in his translation of Aristotle’s Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair, 
London: Penguin, 1981. Daniel Heller-Roazen has also argued that the Aristotelian aisth!sis is that which 
reconnects the human and the animal, and that any endeavor to define, in sharp opposition to the animal, 
what is proper to the human (e.g. the faculty of reason, as it has been claimed throughout history) always 
“produces a remainder, which cannot be attributed with any exclusivity to either human or inhuman 
beings” (The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation, New York: Zone, 2007, 93). Heller-Roazen goes 
on to say that this remainder “testifies to a dimension of the living being in which the distinction between 
the human and the inhuman simply has no pertinence: a region common, by definition, to all animal life,” 
and this region is “sensation (aisth!sis)” (ibid, 93). Bennington’s “residual phonè” (see my note 162) is 
certainly close to Heller-Roazen’s aisth!sis here. 
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recovering a sensation of the milieu171 of aisth!sis that humans and animals originarily 
share.172 Originary aisth!sis has to be recovered because we have somehow lost it when 
Aristotle supplemented it with an anthropocentric and anthropologic logos in his 
political philosophy. Now, it could be argued that originary aisth!sis, in its immediate 
sensing and communication of pain or wrong done to a human or animal, is of political 
potentiality, i.e. aisth!sis in itself is already adequate to demand, without delay, an 
addressing of the wrong committed against a human or animal. Aristotle, however, 
refuses to recognize the political potentiality of aisth!sis as such. For aisth!sis to 
become politics “proper,” Aristotle insists on the supplement of rational speech (or 
logos as rational speech), which will transform aisth!sis into an all too human 
“perception of good and evil” and “a sense of justice” that “decides what is just” in an 
institutional or legalistic manner.173 From here, it could be said then that to recover 
aisth!sis – before it is supplemented by a form of logos that has been appropriated by, 
and reduced to, the human – is not only a way towards the adjacent space of becoming-
animal, but also an unveiling of becoming-animal’s potentiality for a future political 
project of justice. Participating in an affect “that is no longer of words,” becoming-
animal becomes invested in an immanent response, “here and now” in Deleuze and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 I deliberately use the word “milieu” here in thinking the spatiality of the animal and/or of becoming-
animal, avoiding the word “territory” because a territory always defines itself through several identifiable 
limits or boundaries. The point here is to think of a space that is unidentifiable or escapes identifiability, 
and the term “milieu” would suit such a space. As Elizabeth Grosz puts it, and she will do it with 
reference to the animal and to a non-identifiability, “a milieu […] is not yet a territory. A milieu is what 
the fly inhabits, an indeterminable but limited space” (Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of 
the Earth, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 46). She also goes on to contrast the milieu to 
territory, which she defines as “the delimitation of a milieu” (ibid, 47) 
172 Such re-sensing of aisth!sis shared between humans and animals is largely at work too in Heller-
Roazen’s Inner Touch (see my note 169). 
173 Politics, 60-61. 
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Guattari’s words,174 to the injustices enacted against any singularity with or without 
logos, without the delay entailing legal processes that translate injustices and 
corresponding legal actions into the linguistic performativities of institutional 
jurisprudence.175 Such a project of justice certainly departs from, if not displaces, the 
economy of illocutionary exchanges that sustains the spirit of democratic parliamentary 
discussion. However, as suggested, its immanent responsiveness might even be more 
effective than all existing political normativity based on some communicative action 
that is in turn conditioned by some preexisting common knowledge or linguistic idioms 
shared between speech actors.176  
 
The shift to originary aisth!sis, or the refusal to predicate itself on any logocentric 
system, gives becoming-animal a further radical political edge as well. Being an 
experience that is hardly rationalized or rationalizable (since it is an experience without 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 164. 
175 For Bennington, following Lyotard, all these would be a question of the “vocalization or a 
vociferation” of the “quasi-animal affect-phrase” or différend that cannot be articulated or represented in 
anthropocentric rhetoric (“Political Animals,” 9). As Bennington makes clear, the question of justice is 
also at stake with the Lyotardian différend, where justice is not decided on solely by the human and 
oftentimes manipulative rhetoric of institutional jurisprudence (see also Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, 
Au juste: conversations, Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1979). 
On another note, I would like to say again that the departure from the patient faith in institutions does not 
mean the total rejection of institutions. The point is to respond to, or address, in a manner without 
unnecessary bureaucratic delays, the injustices done to others, and this is what I mean by “immanent 
response.”     
176 In this sense, becoming-animal perhaps goes further than the radical politics proposed by Hardt and 
Negri, Virno, and Cesarino, or even the “dissensus” politics of Rancière. Discourse- or “communication”-
based counter-networks and “disagreements” not only risk being captured sooner or later by the logos-
based State apparatuses, but also delimit the extension of the project of immanent justice without delay to 
those who do not share the capability to articulate a disagreement, or the idioms of the “multitude” or 
“common.” I further note here that Rancière’s political philosophy hardly takes into account animals or 
animal beings. Rancière’s call for the exposition of political disagreements or “dissensus” especially from 
those who previously have not been counted or given the right to speak in the public sphere, remains 
predicated on some form of speech, and hardly considers animal silence or phonè. In an interview, 
Rancière extends his thesis on “dissensus” to state that politics proper must include the “struggle over 
words” (Démocratie, dans quel état? 97). Without “words” in the sense of those that are exchanged in 
present political domains, the animal or becoming-animal is once again rejected in this “struggle.”     
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method and without program as noted above) and therefore barely known or knowable, 
becoming-animal can be said to disrupt, in a word, biopolitics, a political condition that 
regulates life in a hegemonic manner, and which thinkers such as Agamben have 
considered the contemporary world to be in.177 Biopolitics, as Foucault has already 
analyzed it, is perfectible only if it has knowledge of its subjects, or if its subjects are 
always knowable; biopolitics cannot consolidate its management of its subjects if there 
exists a life, such as becoming-animal, which (auto-)rejects conceptualization.178 With 
becoming-animal’s refusal to be conceptualized, we are once again in the domain of 
“something more secret, more subterranean” of becoming-animal’s politics, which we 
have seen in its molecular trajectories. A certain posture of secrecy is no doubt at play 
here too in becoming-animal’s escape from any methodology that seeks to pin it under a 
rationalizing gaze. In fact, as Derrida has noted, there has always been a secret to the 
animal, the secret of what it thinks and whether it even thinks at all: in that respect, the 
animal can therefore never be the complete epistemic object of total knowledge, and its 
secret will always remain to be a madness for any economy of rational thought, which 
hence always troubles philosophers.179 Yet its secret is also precisely that radical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 For a critique of the too hasty translation of the contemporary political situation in terms of biopolitics, 
and especially Agamben’s hasty separation between bios and z!", see Dubreuil’s “Leaving Politics.”  
178 Biopolitics, for Agamben, is put in place by an “anthropological machine” that “functions by means of 
an exclusion” of those it deems unmanageable or unconceptualizable (e.g. the animal) within its domain 
(The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 37-38). To 
disrupt such biopolitics in the sense of displacing its foundation built on making every of its subject 
knowable or a known subject, Agamben argues that one must leap into a “zone of indeterminacy” where 
one enters into a relation with that which is unknowable (e.g. the animal), rather than to exclude it. For a 
critique of Agamben’s unconscious need to maintain the human-animal separation produced by the 
“anthropological machine” such that the leap into the “zone of indeterminacy” can take place, see once 
again Dominick LaCapra’s chapter, “Reopening the Question of the Human and the Animal” in History 
and Its Limits.  
179 See the opening of Derrida’s L’Animal que donc je suis. Resonating with Derrida’s and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s discussions of the animal’s secret, Agamben has written that there is in the animal a “zone of 
nonknowledge – or of a-knowledge – that […] is beyond both knowing and not knowing […]” (The 
Open, 91). And despite my suggestion so far that Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari share a sense of the 
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condition that allows it to be free from any conceptual capture that Man is subjected to, 
like his or her striating categorization as political-being or “political animal.” 
Becoming-animal, which reiterates the unconceptualizable secret of the animal, 
challenges any (State) politics that seeks to totalize and homogenize every human life as 
its knowable, singular, political subject.  
 
Speaking of the unconceptualizable contour of becoming-animal, one may perhaps 
transpose the aisth!sis of becoming-animal to an aesthetic modality, or more 
specifically, to the Kantian experience of aesthetic sensation, which is derived not only 
from art objects but also from things of nature.180 The proximity between the Kantian 
aesthetic sensation and the aisth!sis of becoming-animal is almost undeniable, since 
they share many similar traits. For one, if the originary aisth!sis that concerns 
becoming-animal is of an (immediate) communicable feeling of pleasure or pain, one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
political potentiality of the secret of the animal, I note that Derrida disagrees with Deleuze’s treatment of 
the animal, not so much with the question of becoming-animal, but with Deleuze’s suggestion in 
Différence et répétition that bêtise or stupidity, or even devenir-bête or “becoming-stupid,” is properly the 
essence of humans and not animals. See the 30 January 2002 seminar in Séminaire: La bête et le 
souverain, Vol. 1 (2001-2002) (édition établie par Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet et Ginette Michaud, 
Paris: Galilée, 2008). I further note that the question of secrecy, for Derrida, is important for a thought of 
democracy or démocratie à venir. As he says in several places, there is no democracy without secrecy, or 
rather the right to secrecy. Derrida does not fail to recognize that there are state secrets or secret 
diplomacies and actions in democratic states, and such right to secrecy by the State will need to be 
deconstructed. That is not in the interest of this chapter, however. On the topic of secrecy, see especially 
Pheng Cheah’s “The Untimely Secret of Democracy” in Derrida and the Time of the Political, and David 
Wills’ “Passionate Secrets and Democratic Dissidence” in the “Derrida and Democracy” special issue of 
diacritics. But to end this note, I add that the secret of the animal might also correspond to what Jonathan 
Culler calls “the right to absolute nonresponse,” which I see it as another way of walking away (from the 
demand to respond). “The right to respond,” Culler argues, following Derrida, “can be an essential feature 
of democracy, for it is totalitarian to require that one respond, to call one to answer for everything” (“The 
Most Interesting Thing in the World,” diacritics 38 (1-2), 2005, 8). 
180 When I say that becoming-animal is beyond conceptualization or rationalization, I do not mean to 
place it in the domain of something like a Hidden God, or to regard it as a totally blank category. I would 
say that becoming-animal is beyond conceptualization or rationalization because it escapes common or 
intelligible sense. But it still has sense, or that it makes sense, and we can sense it out there in the real 
world, except we do not have the rational or conceptual tools to logically articulate it.  
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finds a corresponding “universal communicability” in the Kantian aesthetic sensation.181 
And if aesthetic sensation, for Kant, escapes the grasp of human cognition,182 or is 
essentially and ultimately unknowable and contributes nothing to knowledge (The 
Critique of Judgment §1 [42], §15 [71]), or is without concept (§15 [70]), all these traits 
are certainly encapsulated by the unconceptualizable contour of becoming-animal. The 
aisth!sis of becoming-animal can be even said to be close to the Kantian sublime 
aesthetic sensation, considering that Kant has argued that we sense such sensation 
through things in nature that exceed what our existing knowledge of nature has prepared 
us for, or that exist beyond the limits of recognizable or humanly perceptible forms183 – 
and becoming-animal, as discussed above, is of such a thing. Now, Kant has also said 
that things of the sublime are of an immense magnitude beyond measure (§26 [99]). 
However, becoming-animal, as seen, proceeds at the molecular dimension, and hence, if 
there is a magnitude to becoming animal, it would be at a level of what Deleuze and 
Guattari would call an n-1 degree of magnitude. Despite this difference, what remains 
critical, for the attainment of either the Kantian sublime or the aisth!sis of the 
deleuzoguattarian becoming-animal, is an affirmative receptivity via an immanent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Kant, General Remark Upon the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgment, The Critique of 
Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon, 1952, 128-129. Subsequent references in the 
essay proper to this edition of The Critique of the Judgment will be indicated by section number followed 
by page numbers in square brackets. 
182 See Kant’s Preface to the 1790 First Edition of The Critique of Judgment, 5; and the introduction, 36.  
183 The Critique of Judgment §23 [90-91]. According to Kant, the formlessness of sublime things gives us 
a sensation of “negative pleasure” (§23 [91]) or “displeasure” (§27 [108]). Perhaps that is the pain of the 
sensation of becoming-animal that critics experience when they stand before it, not knowing how to 
conceptualize it within their political projects. 
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response,184 an enthusiasm,185 or the free play and movement of thought and 
imagination (§9 [58]).186 
 
Deleuze and Guattari themselves do not fail to inscribe the aesthetic dimension of the 
aisth!sis of becoming-animal.187 As they say in an instance in Mille plateaux, “it is 
through writing,” in the sense of literature such as Kafka’s writings or Melville’s Moby 
Dick, “that you become animal” (MP, 229/ TP, 187). There is no doubt that art is the 
site that Deleuze and Guattari frequently turn to in order to locate the nascence or 
emergence of becoming-animal. And if sensation is the critical mode of responding to 
animal affects in becoming-animal, they reiterate the importance of the role of art in 
relation to this aspect of becoming-animal when they say that “the aim of art” is but “to 
extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations.”188 But the question that I would 
like to pose here is if it necessary to turn to art in order to elicit and elucidate becoming-
animal and its political potential as a counterpoint to State politics. No doubt, art, for 
example the cinematic arts as Deleuze argues in L’Image-temps, has the political 
potentiality to articulate a “people to come” or a yet unthought-of assemblage such as 
the “intensive multiplicities” of becoming-animal, in opposition to the State’s 
proclamation that no other assemblages exist except those it had constructed and 
organized. However, Deleuze also warns us that such art risks being eventually 
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184 See my note 174 on what I mean by “immanent response.” 
185 General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgment, The Critique of Judgment, 124. 
186 See also General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic, 89. 
187 On the importance of art in the philosophy and/ or political thought of Deleuze and Guattari, see for 
example De Bloois et al., Discern(e)ment: Deleuzian Aesthetics/ Esthétiques deleuziennes (Amsterdam 
and New York: Rodopi, 2004); Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze and 
Guattari (New York and London, Routledge, 2005); O’Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari; 
and Bogue, Deleuze’s Way: Essays on Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007).  
188 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 158. 
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appropriated by the State too, which would then transform it into State apparatuses 
serving only to disseminate State politics.189 Furthermore, art is always in a way 
untimely: it comes too early in expressing or projecting sensations such as becoming-
animal before they are recognizable or acceptable by the world, which entails that any 
turn to art in order to finally pursue that trajectory of becoming-animal is at the same 
time always too late a gesture. In that sense, perhaps one must look elsewhere to be able 
to respond immanently to the sensation of becoming-animal, and hence put in effect an 
immanent political response to State politics. 
 
As Deleuze and Guattari will tell us elsewhere, this is none other than life itself, or 
rather the experience of the space of everyday life where perceptible and imperceptible 
matter or elements traverse one another. In that sense, one may perhaps regard the 
sensation of becoming-animal as an “ambient awareness” of the “intensive 
multiplicities” or “diverse modalities” around oneself.190 According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, this would be the sensation of “life lines” or “real becomings that are not [my 
emphasis] produced only in art, […] that do not consist in fleeing into art, taking refuge 
in art, […] [and] that never reterritorialize on art” (MP, 230/ TP, 187). Life itself, if not 
only life itself as Deleuze and Guattari will claim, contains enough creative force to 
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189 In this case, aesthetic endeavors imminently face a similar fate as the logos-based radical politics of 
the “multitude” or the “common,” where it is only a matter of time when the State captures these modes 
of expressions and neutralizes their radical political force. On the State appropriation of the cinematic 
arts, see Deleuze’s Cinéma 2: L’Image-temps, Paris: Minuit, 1985, 282. 
190 “Ambient awareness” is a term social scientists have recently used to describe the phenomenon where 
a person claims to be able to sense the mood or feelings of another whom he or she is connected with via 
virtual- or tele-technology. I am borrowing the term here to articulate the sensitivity to surrounding 
elements or matter existing in a virtual state in the Bergsonian/ Deleuzian sense, which is to say, things 
that really exist but do not yet or do not need to assume a physical, concrete, actual form. 
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engender those multiplicities or modalities.191 (As I will explicate later, I am not saying 
at all that life is political. I agree with Deleuze and Guattari that the contrary is true 
instead. What is suggested here is that certain elements of life itself can potentially have 
political force, without them having to serve solely political ends.) There is always 
already an aesthetic trajectory in life itself therefore, which is also to say that the 
sensation of these molecular multiplicities or modalities can already be found in life 
itself, prior to any fabrication of artworks seeking to express such a sensation.192 That is 
also why Deleuze and Guattari will say that “art is never an end in itself” (MP, 230/ TP, 
187) for becoming-animal or becoming tout court. It is more critical that one immerses 
oneself “in life, in real life” (MP, 229/ TP, 187), and be affirmatively receptive and 
responsive to the encounter with all the molecular animal affects there.   
 
As Deleuze would also suggest, there is always a political potentiality in the 
participation in such molecular dimensions of life, a certain power even or subversive 
contour in the molecular “art of encounter outside knowledge,” or in short, in “aesthetic 
existence.”193 As I would argue here, such encounters break with what may be called 
the politics of (dis-)friendship that underlies post-9/11 State geopolitics. In claiming to 
defend international democratic peace and security, State politics of (dis-)friendship has 
demanded that one should not offer friendship, support, or hospitality to forms of life 
that disagree with, or resist, the technics of identifiability. Otherwise, one would, like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 See Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 161-162. 
192 See note above. 
193 See Deleuze, « Le simulacre et philosophie antique », in Logiques du sens, Paris : Minuit, 1969, 279, 
298. It is at this point that one may note another difference between the sublime experience of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s becoming-animal and that of Kantian aesthetics. Deleuze and Guattari maintain the 
unconceptualizable or unknowable sublime out there, in nature, while Kant will eventually give it an 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric reduction by saying that “sublimity should, in strictness, be 
attributed merely to the attitude of thought” (The Critique of Judgment §30 [134]).   
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those who resisted the “war on terror,” be given the name of “rogue,” a name that would 
only announce a “justified” preemptive military force against the thus-named. Such 
State politics has the effect of ultimately discouraging one from building any affinity 
with anyone, even though the latter might be an advocate of the politics of “war on 
terror.” But even without the dictum to alienate deviant forms of life, even without the 
threat of labeling anyone who befriends the latter a “rogue,” the global military and 
civilian surveillance apparatus itself already has the force to discourage relations 
between one and another. After Foucault, one knows that the logical end of 
institutionalized surveillance would only be the translation of surveillance practices into 
the individual itself. In other words, it conditions the individual to adopt not only a 
consciousness of surveillance but also a surveillance-consciousness, whereby the 
individual begins to conduct surveillance on himself or herself and on other individuals, 
watching the next person beside him or her. Such individualization of surveillance 
surely hinders the construction of any friendship or trust, and such has been the politics 
of friendship of the early 21st century, where the State has been advising one – 
implicitly or not – to be wary of the next person, whom the State would conjure in the 
image of a possible terror-suspect, terror-perpetrator, terror-advocate, terror-
mastermind, or rogue-terrorist. 
 
Becoming-animal, in its molecular encounters with “intensive multiplicities” and 
“diverse modalities,” breaks with such State-conjured paranoid narratives of human 
interaction, or the State’s biopolitical will to manage its subjects by the relations they 
form. In contrast to the State’s determination to control and delimit relations between 
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beings, becoming-animal’s “transversal communications between heterogeneous 
populations” (MP, 292/ TP, 239) open a body to an unlimited relation with any (number 
of) living entities. In other words, becoming-animal invites unrestricted participations; it 
constructs its own milieu of friends, its own politics of friendship or assemblages: 
There is an entire politics of becomings-animal, […] which is elaborated in 
assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the State. 
Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, 
prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups 
all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic (MP, 302/ TP, 
247). 
 
The alliance with the “anomic” is indeed how becoming-animal sharply challenges the 
State’s politics of (dis-)friendship. The “anomic” is an “exceptional individual,” with 
whom “an alliance must be made in order to become-animal” (MP, 297/ TP, 243). But 
this “anomic” individual is not exceptional in the sense that it is outside the law, or “has 
no rules or goes against [contredit] the rules” (MP, 298/ TP, 244), in the manner in 
which one tends to think of the exception. The “anomic,” and the becoming-animal that 
follows it, are more subtle or discreet than to announce themselves as being outside the 
law or directly antithetical to the State. The “anomic” and becoming-animal understand 
that doing so will only invite their destruction by preemptive militarized politics. The 
“anomic” therefore remains within the boundaries of what is politically determined as 
normal, except it is always at the thresholds of those boundaries. It is like a shadow 
there, and one can never be sure if the shadow has already inclined towards the outside 
or adjacent spaces. One can never be sure which way the “anomic” is going to turn: 
back inside, outside, or beside? Like the animal and its secret, the “anomic” is the figure 
of uncertainty, “the unequal, the rough [le rugueux], the rugged [l’aspérité]” (MP, 198/ 
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TP, 244), the figure without conceptualization. It does not violate the law but it disturbs 
the stability or equilibrium of the law precisely because of its undefined or ambiguous 
political alignment.  
 
And yet one should note that an alliance is not a necessary condition for becoming-
animal. This is particularly helpful in the case when the “anomic” treads too close to 
being outside the law, which would then attract the attention of the State’s surveillance 
apparatuses and hence put becoming-animal at risk of a preemptive strike by the State. 
This non-dependence on an alliance for becoming-animal can be elicited in Deleuze and 
Guattari when they state that the sensation of animal affects within us does not require 
an actual, physical proximity with animals. In other words, the empirical presence of an 
animal is not a necessary condition for becoming-animal. The desire to exceed our 
singular anthropocentric and anthropomorphic selves can already be sufficient. Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest this when they question the necessity of an outside: “A fascination 
for the outside? Or is the multiplicity that fascinates us already related to a multiplicity 
dwelling within us [my italics]?” (MP, 298/ TP, 240). In Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 
they would add that the affect of becoming-animal “concerns ourselves here and now 
[my italics]; but what is animal, vegetable, mineral, or human in us is no longer distinct 
[…].”194 All these imply that an adjacent space, which is at stake in a politics of 
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194 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 164-165. At this point, one may question the focus on the animal side 
of things in becoming-animal: what about becoming-vegetable, becoming-mineral, and becoming-
woman? Thacker has even claimed that “becoming-animal has nothing to do with animals per se” 
(“Swarming,” 172). That may be true to a certain extent. Deleuze and Guattari in Mille plateaux have at 
times also gravitated towards becoming-woman as the most critical term in becoming (MP, 338-340/ TP, 
276-277). And yet there are instances where animals seem to be of equal, critical significance for 
becoming as becoming-woman. Before turning to becoming-woman, they would in fact have already 
stated that “becoming can and should be [my emphases] qualified as becoming-animal […]” (MP, 291/ 
TP, 238). It would also be becoming-animal that Deleuze would turn to when speaking about the 
!! 336 
becoming-animal, need not be one literally beside our bodily forms: it can also exist 
within us. In responding affirmatively to becoming-animal, i.e. to the sensation of 
animal affects within, an adjacent space can be created involutionarily within us:  
“Becoming is involutive [involutif], involution is creative” (MP, 292/ TP, 238). In this 
case, the “involutionary” creation of a free space from within one’s bodily form once 
again avoids the hasty determination to articulate an outside or to form an alliance with 
a rogue “anomic” in explicit opposition to State, evading thus the fatal intervention by 
the State’s preemptive military and surveillance apparatuses. 
 
To be sure, elucidating the political trajectories of becoming-animal today, which no 
doubt resist or challenge State politics, will not be about disseminating the ideologies or 
advocating the conductivity of terror as it is understood and executed in 
contemporaneous times. If becoming-animal assumes a combative anti-State posture, it 
is because it puts into question the supposed “democratic” normativity the State has 
claimed necessary for the defense of a global democratic peace and security. It is also 
because the State would have first delimited the freedom of becoming-animal in that 
process: it is when the State seeks to determine becoming-animal’s possibilities of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sensation or affect of paintings in Francis Bacon : Logique de la sensation, or about philosophy, as is the 
case in an interview in Pourparlers, where Deleuze associates the philosophical task of concept-creation 
with becoming-animal first before linking it to rhizomes. In that same interview, Deleuze goes as far to 
say too that becoming-animal is not so distinct from “relations with the animal” (Pourparlers, 197). The 
passage from A Thousand Plateaus quoted earlier in the main text on affect as that which motivates 
becoming-animal has also shown that Deleuze and Guattari’s preferred references are specifically 
animals: we scrape like “a rodent” or gaze with the yellow eyes of “a feline.” And since the question of 
politics is at the center of this paper’s inquiry, I recall the quote from Deleuze and Guattari’s Kakfa and 
highlight that politics for Deleuze and Guattari proceeds via becoming-animal more than other 
becomings. Here again, specific animals are named: “a beetle,” “a dog,” “an ape.” But Thacker’s caution 
about taking these animals as particularly specific is heeded, since Deleuze and Guattari will say that 
“every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack” (MP, 292/ TP, 239). The point might be about the 
multiplicity of a pack or a band, but I would argue that that multiplicity nonetheless is invoked, if not 
possible, only by passing through specific animals.            
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relations with other beings, and when it demands a totalizing singular presence from 
becoming-animal, that becoming-animal will adopt a different disposition from 
“organizations such as the institution of […] the State apparatus” and “continually work 
them from within and trouble them from without, with other forms of content, other 
forms of expression” (MP, 296/ TP, 242). In short, it is only when its freedom is at risk 
that becoming-animal “is accompanied, at its origins as in its undertaking, by a rupture 
with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become 
established” (MP, 302/ TP, 247). And yet, as it may already be evident throughout the 
discussion of the politics of becoming-animal, becoming-animal in fact does not launch 
an explicit combat with the State. The political force of becoming-animal is always 
more a matter of “uncertain combat,”195 if not “war without battle lines, with neither 
confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy” (MP, 436/ TP, 353). That 
also means that, unlike the radical politics mentioned earlier, there is never a clear 
political directive, program, or contour with becoming-animal, and that is how it will 
always escape the capture and destruction by 21st century State militarized “democratic” 
geopolitics. That is to say too that when becoming-animal does eventually put in place a 
political critique against the State, the State will only at best have a little (or hazy) 
suspicion as to where that critique comes from, little knowledge as to how it is done.  
 
At this point, I would also like to point out that becoming-animal does not reject 
democracy tout court. Like Patton in his essay “Becoming-Democratic,” I do believe 
that a spirit of democracy remains a backdrop to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, 
only if democracy is meant to be the constant project of recognizing the freedom of life, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 162. 
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or the right to life, of anyone or anything in its heterogeneous terms or voice. I have 
suggested that becoming-animal can further open the terrain of democratic thought 
when it goes beyond the boundaries of a rationalizing logos, which only serve to reduce 
existing democratic normativity to an anthropocentricism and/ or anthropomorphism. 
Becoming-animal, in departing not only from all anthropocentric and anthropomorphic 
political normativity but also from anthropocentric and anthropomorphic thinking in 
general, allows a non-logocentric terrain to emerge, which negotiates the freedom and 
justice due to each living entity – human or animal – via the fact of the entity’s 
singularity. In other words, this negotiation will not make acceding to logos (or 
“rhetoric” in Bennington’s reading) a condition for justice, a condition that only creates, 
as said, a delay, if not an obstacle, to the due address of a violation done against a 
singularity.  
 
One could perhaps say that above everything else, the question of a life free(d) from any 
form of striation is the ultimate concern of becoming-animal. It is the pursuit of such a 
life that becoming-animal will trace a “line of flight” towards an adjacent space that 
sidesteps a space of capture. The horizon that one must keep in sight, if there is one, 
when thinking about Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is therefore life, the freedom of life to 
be precise, and a Deleuzo-Guattarian political gesture would always be engaged in 
undoing apparatuses that delimit life.196 Todd May is only accurate to say that the 
premise of a Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy of life, or “what is most ‘vital’ 
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196 Deleuze would say likewise of philosophical literature too. As in the essay « La littérature et la vie » 
(in Critique et clinique, Paris : Minuit, 1993) or in his interview with Claire Parnet in Dialogues, he 
would argue that if philosophical literature engages itself with politics, it would only be a militant 
commitment to liberate life where it is captured, striated, restricted, or delimited. 
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about life is its capacity for disorganizing what is organizing and repressive.”197 
However, I am a little uncomfortable when May puts the question of politics and life in 
Deleuze as such: “life is what politics is about and, concomitantly, politics suffuses 
life.”198 I would like to think that life and politics do not necessarily turn around each 
other endlessly; that life is not always striated or reterritorialized by politics. One may 
recall Nancy here: things might pass through politics, but not everything is politics or 
political. I would therefore like to think instead that there is life beyond the frames of 
politics.  
 
Politics must not be the unsurpassable limit for life. To think life as only political 
through and through, not only because it is captured by State biopolitics, but also 
because it is absolutely committed to some political movement for the good of itself and 
others, would only risk letting life be striated by the domain of politics. In this case, one 
must then “tempt [life] into an uncertain combat” as Deleuze and Guattari say,199 and 
wrest it away from the confines of politics. I am not saying that the “question of freeing 
life” from political capture or from politics in general need not involve any political 
moves. On the contrary, I do recognize that certain political steps must be taken in order 
to “free life wherever it is imprisoned,”200 hence my endeavor so far to trace becoming-
animal’s political potentiality to critique and resist contemporary State “democratic” 
geopolitics, and to open up a terrain of political thought beyond the limits of 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. If I am arguing at this point for a life beyond 
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197 “The Politics of Life in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze,” SubStance 20 (3), 1991, 25. 
198 “The Politics of Life in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze,” 28. 
199 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 162. 
200 Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 162. 
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the frames of politics, or that a life free(d) from politics is the ultimate aim of 
becoming-animal, I am saying, without denying the political potentialities of becoming-
animal’s trajectory, that a political contour must not define the ends of becoming-
animal.201 Or put another way, becoming-animal must auto-reject, as it does, political 
horizons not only set by others or the State, but also those that might emerge in the 
course of its political trajectory. To be sure, I also do not mean any return to human or 
anthropocentric life here. Instead, I follow Deleuze’s definition of “a life” here, 
according to which, “the life of the individual has given way to an impersonal yet 
singular life, which unleashes [dégage] a pure event liberated from the accidents of 
interior and exterior life, that is to say, from the subjectivity and objectivity of that 
which arrives.”202 In other words, “a life,” in Deleuze’s terms, is also indifferent to the 
categories of the subject and object. 
 
One could indeed raise a disagreement here and cite Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille 
plateaux where they say that “before being, there is politics” (MP, 249/ TP, 203). That 
phrase in itself could suggest that politics does seem to be the first and last concern of 
Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy. But a careful reading of its context would indicate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 I argue that there is nothing bourgeois or idealistic about the notion of life free(d) from politics. It is 
not an idle sitting back that lets political struggles be fought by others. In fact, as my intervention here has 
tried to demonstrate, a certain political battle would have already been fought along the trajectory of 
becoming-animal. The question of a life free(d) from politics concerns the aftermath of such a battle. 
Rather than being sucked into the temptation to extend or even reify one’s political commitment into 
something of an eternal war, one must always keep in mind that there is life outside all ideological 
struggles. Deleuze has in fact warned us of the danger of a life wholly absorbed by one’s own politics, of 
not knowing how to depart from our politics: the danger of creating a personal “black hole” of “micro-
fascisms,” where “each sinks deeper [s’enfonce] in his black hole and becomes dangerous in that hole, 
dispensing an assurance about his case, his role and his mission, which is even more disturbing” (Deleuze 
et Parnet, Dialogues, 167).    
202 Deleuze, « L’Immanence : une vie », 361. See also Colebrook: “Rather than turning back to life, 
[becoming-animal] is the course away from various processes of social organization towards the 
confrontation of the machine of the socius as such that is at once the trajectory of capitalism and the goal 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s project” (Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, 152). 
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otherwise. That phrase follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of how 
schizoanalysis perceives the “lines of flight” traversing a living body (lines that can also 
pertain to the trajectory of becoming-animal, since there are also “animal lines of flight” 
(MP, 248/ TP, 202)). The fact that these “lines of flight” are read by schizoanalysis as 
political, however, could also mean that “lines of flight” in themselves are not 
necessarily political. They become so only under the interpretative lens of 
schizoanalysis. Put another way, their political disposition is only a supplemental aspect 
given by schizoanalysis. Following Fernand Deligny, Deleuze and Guattari will in fact 
state beforehand that “these lines mean nothing” (MP, 248/ TP, 203). They will also 
elaborate that these lines are essentially “without a model,” “have nothing to do with 
language,” “have nothing to do with a signifier, the determination of a subject by the 
signifier,” “nothing to do with a structure,” and without “imaginary figures [or] 
symbolic functions” (MP, 248-249/ TP, 202-203). In that case, they inherently do not 
articulate a “politics” that one can associate with any existing political thought, be it 
democratic or revolutionary. Or else, “lines of flight” do not essentially belong in any a 
priori way to politics. Like becoming-animal, they exceed politics or any endeavor to 
confine them within political frames. They are ultimately just “life lines,” which, 
however, can in fact be unbearable to any form of normative anthropocentric and 
anthropomorphic political thought because of their disavowal of all political norms (see 
MP, 248-251/ TP, 203-205). It is as such that normative political thought, finding these 
“life lines” an affront to existing political normativity, renders them as political or rather 
counter-political, which hence gives place to the false judgment that politics is at the 
beginning and end of these “life lines.”  
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The sense that becoming-animal is not ultimately delimited by politics can also be 
elicited when one brings to mind again the ends of becoming-animal. I have noted that 
for Deleuze and Guattari, the end of becoming-animal is becoming-imperceptible (MP, 
304/ TP, 248). The rejection of coming to presence surely has little use for politics as 
we know it, especially when it pertains to prescribing a political program.203 But it 
should be noted that this becoming-imperceptible is not a reductive, nihilistic gesture. 
On the contrary, it is something generative. In becoming-imperceptible, a body’s form 
loses its organized totality; it loses molecules at the edge of its form, but from then on, 
they come into contact with, or are exposed to, other molecules riding on a cosmic force 
that moves the world and that flows through the world. Becoming-animal, in becoming-
imperceptible, “brings into play the cosmos with its molecular components” (MP, 343/ 
TP, 280). And it is this active and affirmative interplay with the world’s molecules that 
the becoming-imperceptible of becoming-animal regenerates a thought of the world. In 
contrast to the apocalyptic teleology of 21st century State politics, the becoming-
imperceptible of becoming-animal “is to world, to make a world of worlds,” leading us 
“to be present at the dawn of the world” (MP, 343/ TP, 280), the dawn of life.204  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203 Philippe Mengue will argue against any politics of becoming-imperceptible, which can be considered 
the virtual in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense. According to Mengue, what is virtual or what is not grounded 
in actuality only “misses the central and proper object of politics” (“People and Fabulation,” trans. Anna 
Bostock, in Deleuze and Politics, 230). For Mengue then, “Politics has to deal with a people that is other 
than virtual, potential or yet to come. A people that fears for its safety, that has borders to defend, that 
hopes to improve its well-being, a people that is territorialized, such a people is the proper object of 
politics” (ibid, 231). Given Mengue’s resistance to what can become-imperceptible, it is not surprising 
that becoming-animal barely counts in his study of Deleuzo-Guattarian politics. 
204 This is in contrast to the highly militarized post-9/11 world, where the American State war-machine is 
prepared to take out anything in the world at all cost, to obliterate the slightest sign of terror. It has put in 
place space-based imaging machines in communication with unmanned combat vehicles to identify and 
eliminate such signs. It has built stores of thermobaric armament that can hit subterranean bunkers, 
making sure that no life or living condition is possible in the depths of the earth. In 2005, Donald 
Rumsfeld, then US defense secretary, had even said that earth-penetrating nukes made all the sense in the 
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To reiterate, there is a life to live beyond the frames or domains of politics. So far, 
human life in this early 21st century has almost been absolutely captured as political 
subjects of a global State politics driven by the perfectibility of an international 
democratic peace and security. To retrieve the freedom of life from the appropriation of 
the State, human life cannot do it on its own today but must approach the animal. In 
becoming-animal, one is also presented the possibility to create an adjacent space where 
life is free(d) from the capture of striating State politics. Such a process no doubt 
implicates becoming-animal in a certain political trajectory, as elucidated by this 
section, but the point, once again, is not to place politics as the horizon of such a life or 
its life-liberating strategies. One can put it simply by saying that politics must only be a 
means of liberating life but not an end in itself. If there is a politics to becoming-animal, 
as Deleuze and Guattari do not fail to acknowledge, this politics must be understood as 
something transitional or transversal, a political affect where affect here would mean 
“purely transitive, and not indicative or representative,” as Deleuze defines 
elsewhere.205 “Transversal” also implies perpetual, and even uncertain, movement. I 
would say that everything bears on the “transversal,” and this is the case for becoming-
animal, when it moves from taking on a political trajectory in order to resist State 
politics to freeing itself subsequently from politics in order to live life. Becoming-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
world. In short, for the perfectibility of global security, it can be said that the militarized world is 
prepared to take the world out as its logical conclusion. This apocalyptic horizon had already been 
foreseen by Paul Virilio. According to Virilio, the perspective of militarized logic is that “everything just 
has to be uninhabitable. That way there’s no more problem” (Crepuscular Dawn, trans. M. Taormina, 
New York: Semiotext(e), 2002, 173). In a previous note, I have noted that the Obama administration, 
despite its promise of a radical change from the militant Bush administration, remains within a political 
worldview predicated on a post-9/11 sensitivity, and therefore has not seen to any real deceleration of the 
militarization of the world. 
205 Spinoza: philosophie pratique, Paris: Minuit, 1981, 70. 
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animal, in other words, as it charts or traverses a politics against the State, also 
transverses such politics, leaping on a line of flight towards a life beyond the frames or 
striation of politics. The “transversal” element, that is to say, that which prevents all 
hypostasis or localization, is what enables becoming-animal to sidestep the capture of 
politics or the political.206 From not resisting the State’s prohibition to create an outside 
that can oppose State politics, to a becoming that dis-appears into an adjacent space to 
overturn State measures, and to the eventual abandonment of all political ambitions for 
a life free(d) of politics, the “transversal” or becoming-animal, in this sense, can also be 






206 The “transversal” may be said to be another form of walking away. And as I have tried to suggest in 
the earlier section on voyous and Bartleby, this does not necessarily entail the absolute abdication of one’s 
cause or objective. As said earlier, it might involve a change of strategies, when former ones become 
potentially (self-)nihilistic. The objective might change too, but that is because another trajectory toward 




 Clinamen, or the Auto-Reject for “Posthuman” Futures 
 
In following the animal in the last two sections (first the animal-messiah in Cixous, and 
then becoming-animal in Deleuze and Guattari), it would seem that the question of the 
reject has progressively taken on a “posthuman” contour, especially if one follows Cary 
Wolfe’s “posthumanism.” According to Wolfe in What is Posthumanism?, the animal 
question, particularly that which Derrida in L’Animal que donc je suis takes as its point 
of departure, is what “posthuman” discourse, if it is to free itself from the limits of 
anthropological and/ or anthropocentric humanism, must let itself be inflected with, 
alongside considerations of Niklas Luhmann’s second-order systems theory and 
disabled beings. In that regard, Wolfe’s “posthumanism” can also be said to be a 
question of the reject, since – as one has to unfortunately acknowledge – disabled 
beings, systems theory, and animals, remain in many ways rejected from any complete 
appurtenance to “normal” human communities, or to discourses that hinge on the 
“normal” human being as their primary concern. But even before Wolfe’s 
“posthumanism,” rejects are in fact no strangers to “posthuman” discourse. This is no 
doubt the case of Donna Haraway’s “posthumanism” of the 80s, through which one has 
witnessed the emergence of reject figures of that time, figures such as cyborgs and 
genomic replicants, the latter still remain some sort of rejects today since the replication 
of human selves through genomic experimentation is still forbidden territory.1 It can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 After cyborgs, Haraway has also addressed the questions of animals, especially “companion animals […] 
[like] horses, dogs, cats, or a range of other beings willing to make the leap to the biosociality of service 
dogs, family members, or team members in cross-species sports” (The Companion Species Manifesto: 
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said then that “posthumanism” so far has been motivated and mobilized largely by 
rejects in the sense of figures not included in or accepted by dominant intellectual 
discourses. It can be further said that rejects in “posthuman” discourses have been 
raised in large part to contest the certitude or foundation of the human male subject, his 
insistence on his unitary, organic holism, and what he believes he can do with that 
supposed holism. This is even true of Luhmann’s systems theory, where machinic 
categories tend to proliferate, and where one does not expect any organic entity such as 
the human subject to show up. And yet, in the preface to the English edition of Social 
Systems, the question of the human subject is raised, as he questions why people cannot 
“let [the category of the subject] go,” or why it has been “overlooked […] for so long” 
that each subject, “as an observer of his observing,” tends to denigrate others.2 And that 
denigration, as Luhmann puts it, arises “because every subject conceives of itself as the 
condition for the constitution of all others, those others could be subjects, but not real, 
so to speak, subjective subjects. From the perspective of each subject, each other one 
possesses merely a derivative, constituted, constructed existence.”3 In that sense, we are 
nowhere distant from French “post-structuralism,” which is a concern of this present 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Dogs, People, and Significant Others, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2003, 14.) I am suspicious, however, 
of Haraway’s move to render animals as “companions,” as members of human families, or else beings 
that serve humans (albeit not in any slave-like fashion as Haraway would clarify). To me, such a move 
still remains within the order of the desire of the human to appropriate or domesticate the nonhuman other 
within his or her sphere of possession, to delimit the nonhuman other as something to call his or her own. 
Deleuze and Guattari have already warned us too that such a move only reduces animals to “individuated 
animals, sentimental and familial/ familiar [familiers familiaux] animals, and Oedipal animals of little 
histories [petit histoire]: ‘my’ cat, ‘my’ dog. All these invite and lead us to regress to a narcissistic 
contemplation, and psychoanalysis only understands these animals to better discover under them the 
image of a father, a mother, a little brother […]” (Mille plateaux, 294).    
2 “On the Concept of ‘Subject’ and ‘Action’” [1991], preface to the English edition of Social Systems, 
trans. John Bednarz, Jr. and Dirk Baecker, foreword by Eva M. Knodt, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995, xlii, xl, xxxix. 
3 Social Systems, xl. I note here too that we have seen this problem of the subject before, and it is in 
Sartre’s L’Être et le néant. Sartre there will speak of the caress of a (male) subject, thanks to which, the 
caressed (female) body will assume the status of a (subjective) being.  
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work: “posthumanism” is no less engaged than “post-structuralism” in the critique of 
the (male) human subject, if not “posthumanism” is marked by that aspect of 
deconstructing the subject of “post-structuralism.” Put in yet another way, 
“posthumanism,” in continuing the unfinished project of critiquing or “deconstructing” 
the subject, may be positing itself as an heir apparent to “post-structuralism.” The latter 
seems to be how Wolfe positions “posthumanism,” since he would suggest that it also 
remains for “posthuman” discourse to bear the critical task of providing a response to 
Nancy’s question of “who comes after the subject,” that is to say, the task of articulating 
a figure of thought other than the subject.4  
 
Given the link between “posthumanism” and “post-structuralism,” the question that 
remains then is whether the rejects of “posthumanism” – its cyborgs, genomic 
replicants, machinic systems, animals, and disabled beings – can provide an adequate 
response to Nancy’s question and further the critique of the human subject. Or else, is it 
rather the case that the reject as I have elicited and developed so far from contemporary 
French thought can make a critical intervention in present or even future “posthuman” 
discourse that seeks to go beyond anthropocentric and anthropological limits imposed 
by a restrictive humanism? I would argue that it is indeed more the latter case. By way 
of conclusion then, I will examine how the reject, especially the auto-reject, as can be 
traced in contemporary French thought, can pave the way towards that future 
“posthumanism.” Now, as said, “posthumanism” has its rejects. However, I would 
argue that deploying or identifying such rejects remains inadequate, if “posthumanism” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 I recall once again that a chapter of Wolfe’s book bears the title “Learning from Temple Grandin: 
Animal Studies, Disability Studies, and Who Comes After the Subject” (What Is Posthumanism? 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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is to provide a response to Nancy’s question in a way that leads toward an “undoing far 
more comprehensive[ly] […] [than any] deconstructive engagement” of the human 
subject.5 It may even constitute a philosophical let-down, especially when “posthuman” 
discourse in-corporates or assimilates aspects of these rejects for the human. This is 
because “posthumanism” in this case only exposes itself, in a regressive fashion, to 
return to the human subject, or to be nothing but the work of the all too human subject, 
keen only to accumulate for itself predicates previously left out in its foundation. Worse, 
rejects are no longer “free” in their abandonment to be as they are, but are now striated 
within the gaze and reach of the “posthuman” subject. In this case, “posthuman” 
discourse runs the ethical risk of taming, regulating, and acculturating the differences or 
heterogeneity of rejects. Such danger of a regressive resurrection of the human subject 
in “posthumanism” has been noted by Wolfe himself, and by Keith Ansell Pearson 
much earlier in the late 90s, when Pearson expressed his suspicion of “posthumanism” 
as an (unconscious) “vicious return of outmoded grand narratives” of the human subject, 
which is especially so when thought begins to rein in elements previously regarded as 
alien to human life only to further the futures of and for the human subject.6 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, Critical Posthumanism, Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming, 1. I also 
note that for Callus and Herbrechter, there is a close link between “posthumanism” and “post-
structuralism.” They will stress the import of “post-structuralism,” in the form of Derrida’s thesis on the 
(linguistic, or rhetorical, according to Callus and Herbrechter) reiterability of all things, for what they call 
“critical posthumanism.” The “post-structuralist” critique of the human subject is also not missing in 
Callus and Herbrechter’s “critical posthumanism,” and neither is the question of the reject. In their 
“dissident manifesto of posthumanism” (ibid, 23), they seek to think the “remainder” (ibid, 1) of 
“posthumanism,” a “posthuman” category that is left aside or left behind in other words, and which is not 
only “unthinkable” but unacceptably fatuous: “a posthumanism without technology” (ibid, 3). This 
“posthumanism without technology,” or  “a posthumanism without poi!sis,” is to put in place “a negation 
of everything inherent to the potential of the human” (ibid, 8). 
6 See especially Keith Ansell Pearson, Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman 
Condition, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, 2 
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To avoid any regression to the human subject, “posthumanism” must therefore go 
beyond recognizing and mobilizing rejects in a way that those rejects remain somewhat 
passive to “posthuman” theorizations. In other words, one must also recognize the 
active force of rejection that the other might be expressing, in resistance to any 
“posthuman” theoretical endeavor to bring it within proximity, if not appropriate it. 
Perhaps one must also go so far as to allow such active rejection from the side of the 
other, in and through which is expressed with full force the other’s difference. What is 
entailed then is not only a veritable supplement to the human subject, but also a more 
adequate affirmation of the irreducibility of the other and its difference. This is where I 
would argue for the importance of foregrounding the aspect of auto-rejection or the 
auto-reject in “posthumanism,” which will allow the full expression of this active 
rejection on the part of the other. I think that this is a move that remains for 
“posthumanism” to accomplish, because, while “posthumanism” has recognized and 
sought to affirm the reject in others, it has not yet adequately recognized the reject in 
itself. That does not mean that all one has to do is to recognize the cyborg, the machinic 
system, or the animal in oneself: that would still risk appropriating the other and/ or its 
predicates for oneself, or identifying the other with oneself, reducing the other to 
oneself. Instead, one must, perhaps before everything else, take into account that one 
may always be regarded as a reject by others, which can even include conventionally 
construed rejects such as animals, cyborgs, and systems themselves. In other words, one 
has to recognize that in one’s approach towards the other, even if it is to recognize and 
affirm the latter’s existence and differences, the other may not desire at all the encounter 
or proximity. A distance instead may be desired by the other, and one has to respect this 
! 350 
distance. This distance can be maintained through auto-rejection, whereby one refrains 
from reducing the distance between oneself and the other, keeping in mind that the other 
might reject any thought of proximity with oneself. In this case, one refrains from 
making the first move to approach: the auto-reject lets the other arrive only if the latter 
desires to do so. Auto-rejection here also guarantees that the reject, which is without 
any sovereign certitude or foundation, never demands the total disclosure of the other 
and its predicates or qualities, as if it possesses a certain right or prerogative to make 
that demand.7 That is essentially a false presumption, which only leads the reject to 
appropriate the other and/ or its attributes. The auto-reject here, contrary to the subject, 
ensures that there is no circumscribing of the other within its determinations. Put 
another way, the other here, before the auto-reject, is always free to depart, always free 
even to not arrive before the auto-reject. In such auto-rejection, “posthumanism” must 
be willing to take the risk of letting fall to a state of inoperativity [désœuvrement] any 
assemblage or new forms of relations it seeks with the reject-other. Here, one may posit, 
after Nancy’s “inoperative community” [communauté désœuvrée], an unworked 
[désœuvré] “posthumanism,” that is to say, a “posthumanism” that does not seek to 
totalize all the rejects within its discourse, or a “posthumanism” that does not seek to be 
productive in the sense of constructing a domain where rejects can be unified or be in 
fusion. Or, to borrow the term of Callus and Herbrechter, which they would like to let 
resound in the word “whither” in the title “Whither Posthumanism?” of their panel at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The question of secrets is certainly at stake here too. As noted in the preceding section on politics, for 
Derrida, there is no democracy without secrecy, be it State secrets or the secrets the individual reserves in 
and for himself or herself from the State. The demand for total disclosure of all secrets would only see to 
the institutionalization of a totalitarian state. The auto-reject then, which is the recognition, beginning 
from or with the self, that it has no right to demand the disclosure of the other, can make a critical 
intervention against the degenerative slide towards a totalitarian manner of being-with others. 
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the 2011 MLA conference, one must take the chance of letting “posthumanism” wither 
away.8 
 
It is on this point of letting “posthumanism” wither away, or letting it fall into 
inoperability, where I adopt a rather critical stance with regard to Luhmann’s second-
order systems theory. This is not the place to explicate Luhmann’s complex theory of 
systems, but let it be said simply (and admittedly in an unjustified manner) that if a 
“posthuman” world or condition arises, as Wolfe sees it, from Luhmann’s world of 
interacting systems, then this “posthuman” world is a world of increasing complexity. 
According to Luhmann’s systems theory, a system (be it a human entity, a nonhuman 
organism, a physical object, or even a machinic program) is always situated in a 
complex world where systems are already interacting with other systems in complex 
ways. To partake in this world of complexity, the system generates a more complex 
process, not only to intercalate itself into the existing complexity, but also to overcome 
or surpass it, if not to reject the complexity of another system.9 This process allows 
Luhmann to arrive at his axiomatic (and paradoxical) phrase: “only complexity can 
reduce complexity.”10 To be sure, the more complex process that a system generates is 
not born of a solipsistic closure of the system itself. Instead, it is fed by the difference 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 And to reestablish the link between “posthumanism” and the Derridean strand of “post-structuralism” 
that Callus and Herbrechter are faithful to, I note that Derrida, in reflecting on the “Whither Marxism?” 
conference where he delivered the lecture that would eventually evolve into Spectres de Marx, also hears 
in the word “whither” a “withering away” (“The Deconstruction of Actuality,” in Negotiations: 
Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001, ed., trans., and intro. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002, 109).  
9 On one system’s rejection of another, see Social Systems, 27. 
10 Social Systems, 26. I say paradoxical, because the more sophisticated complexity that was generated to 
resolve existing complexities will only pose a greater complexity for other systems, which will itself 
generate a further complexity to negotiate with the new complexity, and so on. So there is no real 
reduction of complexity in Luhmann’s theory.  
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that exists between itself and its environment; or else, it is the “difference [that] holds 
what it is differentiated together.”11 As I would read it, there is, in that case, some sort 
of use-value, in the eyes of a system, of differences disseminating in the environment. 
For a system, something productive can result from interacting with these differences, 
which is to keep or hold all differences together. To put it in Bataillean-Derridean 
language, there is a restricted economy here between system and its environment. The 
question that I would pose is: why not let flow a general economy instead, a pure 
expenditure into differences without taking into account any possible return for one’s 
complexity, and see what new assemblages or networks (which can be complexities in 
themselves that negotiate with existing complexities in unforeseen ways) evolve, or 
rather devolve,12 through such unproductive immersion in complexities?13 To remain 
within the restricted economy of “complexity to end complexity,”14 I would argue, only 
runs the risk of resurrecting the subject, if not raising a more complex operative meta-
subject hovering above other systems and environments. Certainly, Luhmann has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Social Systems, 18. 
12 I do not mean any negative or nihilistic sense of devolution here, however. Instead, I follow Nancy’s 
suggestion that there is a close link between devolution and the perpetuation of the world, if not worlding: 
“Devolution is attribution, sharing [le partage], destination, contractual signings [la passation], transfer 
by progression [déroulement] (devolvere), unfolding, and disentangling [désintrication]. World, fragment: 
being devolved” (Le sens du monde, Paris: Galilée, 1993, 203). 
13 This is a question that I would pose to Henri Atlan too. Atlan speaks of an “auto-organization” that 
manifests itself through the emergence of complex structures and functions within a system, and when 
systems encounter one another. It can be said that Atlan’s “auto-organization” is without (human and/ or 
divine) subject, since it occurs “outside of all human organized intervention [intervention planificatrice 
humaine]” and “without [a] central generator [générateur central] organizing “from above” [d’en haut] 
the behavior of individuals” (Le vivant post-génomique, ou Qu’est-ce que l’auto-organisation? Paris: 
Odile Jacob, 2011, 8, 9, trans. mine). However, Atlan is also too quick to affirm an operativity for this 
“auto-organization.” While speaking of the “hazardous perturbations” [perturbations aléatoires] between 
aspects of a system that bring about “disorganization,” he would quickly add that they can also be sources 
“of reorganization at a level of greater complexity” (Le vivant post-génomique, 33). Why not stay with 
“disorganization” a little more, and see what kind of structures emerge precisely from this 
“disorganization,” and which bears no semblance to any “reorganization”? It seems that we have not 
made much headway with Artaud’s and/ or Deleuze and Guattari’s “body without organs,” which is not a 
negation of the body, but a way to think of a body that does not demand that its organs serve some 
operative, organizational function.      
14 Social Systems, 26. 
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insisted that this process is a “subjectless event.”15 However, I would say that the 
(unconscious) return of the subject is already at work in Luhmann, as betrayed by his 
reference to the concept of the self when he speaks of the higher complexity as “self-
description, self-observation, and self-simplification within systems.”16 
 
As I see it, it is the absence of auto-rejection in complexity, in other words, the refusal 
to let itself wither away or run into inoperativity, that allows the subject to haunt 
Luhmann’s “posthuman” second-order systems theory. This is why I am stressing the 
auto-reject for “posthuman” discourse, if it is seriously committed, as Wolfe’s book 
seems to intimate, to the “post-structuralist” project of critiquing the subject or of 
seeking a response to “who comes after the subject.” The auto-reject would put in place 
a radical auto-rejection that will prevent any return to a human (and humanist) subject 
in “posthumanism”: it would involve a rejection of any claimed structure that 
presumably founds any supposed constitution of a self or subjectivity. Such auto-
rejection may bring to mind once again the notion of autoimmunity, which we have 
seen especially in the earlier section on the “post-secular.” Just to briefly recall then, 
autoimmunity, as Derrida tells us, is a mechanism within a body that acts against “its 
own protection, its own policing, its very power of rejection [son propre pouvoir de 
rejet], its properness in short [son propre tout court].”17 Now, the undoing of one’s own 
power to reject through autoimmunity might appear appealing to the discourse of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Social Systems, 32. 
16 Social Systems, 9, my emphases. 
17 Foi et savoir, 67. 
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“posthumanism” or any discourse that seeks to let arrive and affirm the other.18 
However, Derrida has also warned us that autoimmunity, especially when enacted or 
mediatized spectacularly by a State of politico-economic-military power such as the US 
State war-machine, may conceal or dissimulate a will to reconsolidate a more terrifying 
monolithic self. In other words, the proper [le propre] may still lie behind simulacral 
forms of autoimmunity. In this case, any image of a limitless opening-up of one’s own 
borders to anyone or anything, which in turn gives rise to an image of a defenseless self, 
becomes mere expediency. The (extreme) difference of others, and especially the 
rejection by others of all assimilatory processes that the proper or the self demands in its 
(conditional) hospitality, become exploited or manipulated by the self, and get woven 
into the latter’s paranoid narrative of clear and present danger. With that narrative in 
place, it only allows the proper or the self to “justify” all claims to immunity or 
indemnity from laws limiting extreme and preemptive counter-defensive measures to 
eradicate others. It essentially allows the proper or the self to put in place a calculated 
preclusion of the other, “justifying” at the same time its new clinical indifference to the 
fact that the other desires to approach. Such autoimmunity, which Derrida calls 
“autoimmunitary aggression” that “terrorizes most,”19 or the terrifying and terroristic 
“pervertibility” of autoimmunity,20 and which implicates the violent rejection of others, 
is not the auto-rejection that “posthumanism” must put in place. But with respect to this 
violence, one must also not forget that before autoimmunity inscribes for itself the 
paranoid narrative to reject the other, it has in fact already programed its inner 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Derrida also suggests that the risk of autoimmunity in fact paves the way towards what he calls 
“unconditional hospitality” (see “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,”133).  
19 “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides,” 95. 
20 “Autoimmunity,” 109. 
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destruction: for that eventual expedience of rejecting the other, “autoimmunitary 
aggression” would have had, Derrida tells us, “in its own interest […] to expose its 
vulnerability, to give the greatest possible coverage to the aggressions against which it 
wishes to protect itself.”21 Such auto-nihilistic or “quasi-suicidal”22 operation that 
eventually feeds the conjuration and “justification” of an “autoimmunitary aggression” 
that rejects others is not the trajectory, not the horizon of the auto-reject. As I have tried 
to underscore throughout this present work, if the auto-reject rejects itself, it is certainly 
not in the abysmal spirit of nihilism, but creative regeneration. The question then is how 
to sidestep the terror of “autoimmunitary aggression” in auto-rejection.  
 
Recent developments in the world of microbiology seem to provide a response, 
particularly from research in bacterial life, that is to say, research concerning an element 
conventionally considered to be a form of a reject in the domain of human life, 
especially in the eyes of those who are anxious to maintain the latter’s supposed sanctity. 
Bacterial life no doubt has been considered to be something of a reject in human eyes 
(safe for the bacteria lining our stomachs or those used for making cheese), since, as 
Myra Hird has observed, not only have “bacteria […] always occupied abject status,” 
but also, in general, a “pathogen matrix overwhelmingly defines” our human 
perspective of bacteria, seeing any interaction with bacteria as “military encounters – 
invasion and defense – between my (nonbacterial) individual self and disease 
(bacterial).”23 But back to the research I was signaling: I am thinking here of the 
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21 “Autoimmunity,” 109. 
22 “Autoimmunity,” 94. 
23 Myra J. Hird, The Origins of Sociable Life: Evolution After Science Studies, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009, 36, 26. 
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controversial work published in Sciencexpress in 2010 by the biochemist Felisa Wolfe-
Simon on the bacterium GFAJ-1.24 This bacterium was placed in an extreme condition 
of high arsenic presence. Other living beings in a similar environment would find 
themselves at the brink of death, since phosphorous, which has so far been considered 
to be one of the necessary building blocks of life, will react with arsenic to produce 
fatally poisonous results. The GFAJ-1 strand of bacterium, however, supposedly proved 
itself to be able to adapt to such toxic environments. And it does that through what can 
be considered an “auto-deconstruction” of the supposed necessity of phosphorous for 
life. In other words, instead of relying on phosphorous as an irreducible or exigent 
necessity for life, it does away with such reliance and develops a taste for poison, “a 
taste for arsenic,”25 and lives on. Here, the supposed constitutive structure of life, of 
what is proper to life, to the self, to the subject, is auto-rejected or undone, and one 
witnesses an uncalculated symbiosis (or even complexity, to use Luhmann’s term) 
between bacterium and arsenic.  
 
Certainly, life, or even sur-vivre (that is to say, to survive more than mere survival), 
remains at stake for the GFAJ-1 bacterium in this auto-rejection or in what may be 
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24 See Felisa Wolfe-Simon, Jodi Switzer Blum, Thomas R. Kulp, et al., “A Bacterium that Can Grow by 
Using Arsenic Instead of Phosphorous,” Sciencexpress, published online on December 2, 2010. At the 
time of revising this current work, two other articles refuting Wolfe-Simon’s work have been published. 
See Marshall Louis Reaves, Sunita Sinha, Joshua D. Rabinowitz, et. al., “Absence of Detectable Arsenate 
in DNA from Arsenate-Grown GFAJ-1 Cells,” Sciencexpress, published online on July 8, 2012; Tobias J. 
Erb, Patrick Kiefer, Bodo Hattendorf, et. al., “GFAJ-1 Is an Arsenate-Resistant, Phosphate-Dependent 
Organism,” Sciencexpress, published online on July 8, 2012. Based on the respective arguments laid out 
by these three reports, and not on my too limited scientific knowledge, I do think that the later two reports 
do not absolutely refute Wolfe-Simon’s claim, i.e. there remains aspects of Wolfe-Simon’s findings that 
can counter-argue the refutations. In any case, it remains to be seen what definitively turns up in this 
debate, but meanwhile, I do think that Wolfe-Simon’s report nonetheless offers something interesting to 
think about autoimmunity and auto-rejection, and hence my reference to her work here. 
25 See Dennis Overbye, “Microbe Finds Arsenic Tasty; Redefines Life,” New York Times, December 2, 
2010. 
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considered a true autoimmunity (where the rejection of oneself is the greater concern 
than rejecting the other). The GFAJ-1 bacterium is after all like any other being – living 
or nonliving, human or nonhuman – exposed to the world. As such, it is traced by what 
Derrida considers to be an irreducible logic of the pharmakos, which means that it will 
risk empoisoning itself by immersing itself in the outside, in the hope that this 
empoisoning will in turn transform into a remedy that will free it from its present 
specific spatial and temporal delimitation. However, life here is now made “to live in a 
different way,”26 cleared of all references to any underlying structure that seemingly 
promises to (re)constitute the self or what is proper to the self. Perhaps it would even be 
better in this case to speak of what Deleuze calls “a life,” where, as seen in the section 
of politics, “a life” is the immanent affirmation of all singularities of existence, without 
any determination of a subject or object, without any notion of self and the other, 
without privileging one life over another. And it is because there is no reiteration of the 
previous state of life or of the subject in a hidden form, as in the case of 
“autoimmunitary aggression,” that one might claim for the auto-rejection in the GFAJ-1 
bacterium a true autoimmunity. It is such auto-rejection that a “posthumanism” seeking 
to truly depart from the human subject or subjectivity must put in place.  
 
It seems then that “posthumanism” can learn something from the GFAJ-1bacterium if it 
is to put in place something of a true auto-rejection or autoimmunity. Should 
“posthumanism” then turn to bacterial life, after having turned to the cyborg, genomic 
replicants, systems theory, and animals? Perhaps it should, just to keep itself mindful of 
auto-rejection, so that it will not reduce the reject-others that it is invested in to its 
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26 Felisa Wolfe-Simon, quoted in Dennis Overbye, “Microbe Finds Arsenic Tasty; Redefines Life.” 
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terms. But I would add that should the discourse of “posthumanism” engage itself with 
bacterial life, it must be meticulous to not cultivate or acculturate the latter such that any 
recognition or consideration of bacterial life serves only to supplement and perpetuate 
the survival (sur-vie) of the human subject. This is where I depart from Hird’s 
“microontology.” “Microontology,” as Hird defines it, is “an ethics that engages 
seriously with the microcosmos” of bacterial life.27 That is to say, instead of adopting a 
naturalized, pathogenic view of bacteria, which not only entails the refusal to give 
bacterial life any proper thought, but also drives us to eradicate them completely, 
“microontology” teaches us that not all bacteria are pathogenic, but some are even 
instrumental to our well-being, such as the bacteria that line our intestines. The latter 
example also demonstrates that we are always living with bacteria, not just with those 
without in the external environment or in the air, but also with those within. Or as 
Deleuze and Guattari put it more radically, all things in the world engage in a “peopling 
[peuplement],” which includes nonhuman entities to be sure, “by contagion,” which is 
disseminated by bacteria.28 I certainly have no disagreement with the above aspect of 
“microontology.” “Microontology” begins to be suspicious to me only when, through 
its serious undertaking of studying “bacterial self-organization, communication, 
complexity, division of labor, and communities,” it claims to be able to teach us how to 
live with others, since “microontology” highlights that “bacteria are not only social in 
and of themselves, but also – through symbioses – weave all organisms into cultural and 
social co-constructions and co-evolutions.”29 On the one hand, in gleaning from 
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27 The Origins of Sociable Life, 1. 
28 Mille plateaux, 294. See also 297. 
29 The Origins of Sociable Life, 56. 
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bacterial life what can be productive for human communities and human sur-vival,30 
“microontology” runs the risk of being a calculated move on the part of the human 
subject to totalize bacterial life within a new grand narrative of human “ethics.” On the 
other hand, in a too rapid embracing of the productive symbioses or interactions that can 
take place between humans and bacterial life, it also risks blurring, and hence not 
respecting, the distinction or difference between one and the other, as betrayed by Hird 
even, when at one point, she proclaims that “‘I’ am bacteria, [and] that bacteria are 
us.”31 Here, we are in danger of appropriating the bacterial-other such that we can 
assume its identity, while the bacterial-other is reduced to a human “us.” 
 
At this point, I would like to pose the question if it is always necessary to mobilize the 
other in order to think about auto-rejection for, and in, “posthumanism”: Must one 
always look to the other-reject to remind oneself of auto-rejection? Can we never see 
the reject in us, or rather see ourselves as rejects (in order not to confuse “the reject in 
us” with our intestinal bacteria), and therefore deploy the auto-reject without the turn to 
the other? Once again, contemporary French thought can be shown to have already put 
in place this possibility of looking to ourselves (without, to be sure, to reconstitute or re-
found a holistic, monolithic self or subject) to see how we are already in the midst of 
auto-rejection, and it is through their inclination towards the thought of clinamen, 
which is clearly evident in the works of Serres, Deleuze (and Guattari), and Nancy.32 
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30 Given the possibility that “bacterial activities (bacterial doing) differentially sustain the greater survival 
of some organisms over others” (The Origins of Sociable Life, 56), can we guarantee that we humans, all 
too human, restrain our desire to be those “some organisms,” and that in our bid to be the latter, there will 
be no expedient appropriation and cultivation of bacterial life? 
31 The Origins of Sociable Life, 26. 
32 I note here that there is even a reinvestment in clinamen in French academia today, arriving by way of a 
renewed interest in the work of Lucretius especially. The work of Élisabeth de Fontenay in promoting the 
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The thought of clinamen, in short, is predicated on some sort of subtractive thinking, 
since clinamen names the process by which atoms detach from a living body or matter 
without the latter controlling that detachment. This is evidently contrary to the 
accumulative impulse that drives the thought of the human subject or subjectivity, an 
impulse that seeks to gather as many predicates as possible to consolidate the 
foundation of that subject or subjectivity. In other words, the thought of clinamen takes 
into account that one is always already in the process of auto-rejecting some part of 
oneself, even though this takes place at a molecular or atomic scale. The question of 
rejection and/ or auto-rejection is also present in Serres’s explication of clinamen in La 
naissance de la physique. According to Serres, “there are only two objects, constitutive 
of all things: atoms, the void [le vide].”33 Things come about, or rather the event of 
things arises, when a minimal declination occurs in this void, allowing the fall or 
clinamen of atoms. Now, even before we speak of rejection in clinamen, Serres would 
have already signaled the notion of rejection with regard to this void. As Serres notes, 
“the void, inane, has for its root the Greek verb […] which signifies ‘to purge,’ ‘to 
expel,’ or, in the passive, ‘to be driven out [chassé] by a purge’.”34 And if the reject, or 
rather auto-reject, underscores the need to respect the distance between one and the 
other, Serres would also highlight the critical need for distance in clinamen. It is only 
with distance that a minimum angle of difference can take place, and hence for there to 
be clinamen. “Things,” as Serres would conclude, “are born [therefore] from distance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
latter’s philosophy is significant. But see also the collection of essays in La renaissance de Lucrèce (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne, 2010). I also point to Frédéric Neyrat’s Clinamen: Flux, absolu 
et loi spirale (Paris: Éditions è®e, 2011).  
33 La naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce : fleuves et turbulences, Paris : Minuit, 1977, 165, 
my translation. 
34 La naissance de la physique, 165. 
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[l’écart].”35 But to return to the thought of clinamen as a clear departure from the 
human subject, Élisabeth de Fontenay has noted that clinamen is a phenomenon not 
restricted to human entities, and therefore not the sole property or predicate of human 
subjects, but is also shared by animals.36 Or, according to the early atomist philosophers 
Lucretius and Epicurus, it can also be found in non-organic elements such as rain or fire.  
 
In the event of clinamen, where these deterritorialized atoms end up escapes the 
determination or control of the bodies to which they originally belong; these bodies 
cannot control or even have knowledge of which deterritorialized atoms they are 
coming into contact with. Each body, through clinamen, is then equally exposed to any 
number and type of atoms; or, according to Deleuze, each body is immanently exposed 
to a plurality of heterogeneous singularities.37 I have mentioned earlier that “peopling,” 
in the sense of the encounter between plural and heterogeneous beings, which includes 
nonhuman beings such as plants, animals, and even atmospheric elements, occurs, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, via contagion by bacteria. Nancy also speaks of “peopling,” but 
not as much as “the people [le peuple].” “The people” according to Nancy is not 
something restricted to human beings, but includes, like Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“peopling,” nonhuman entities such as animals, vegetation, minerals, and even divine 
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35 La naissance de la physique, 114. 
36 See her introduction to Lucrèce, De la nature : Livres I-VI, texte établi, traduit et annoté par Alfred 
Ernout, Paris : Les belles lettres, 2009. On this note, I would express some caution in response to Callus 
and Herbrechter’s “posthumanism without technology,” which is heavily inclined towards rhetoric, as 
they acknowledge. Rhetoric, however, is very much a characteristic of the human, if not all too human. 
Geoffrey Bennington, in his article “Political Animals” in the special issue on “Negative Politics” of 
diacritics, has noted that rhetoric is in fact the humanization of logos, a process that would lead to the 
denial of logos to animals. My reservation here is that the emphasis on rhetoric in Callus and 
Herbrechter’s posthumanism might lead to the rejection of animals, marginalizing animals once again as 
reject-others. 
37 See « Simulacre et philosophie antique », in Logique du sens, Paris : Minuit, 1969, 292-324. 
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beings (and such understanding of “peopling” or “the people” surely recalls all the 
questions of community, the “post-secular,” and (animal) politics that have been crucial 
in this work). As Nancy would argue, these nonhuman entities get brought along, 
consciously or not, when one goes about evoking a “people,” in which “are traversed, 
without joining up, the whole and the part, the high and the low, the excluded and the 
included, the right and the left, subjectivity and subjection, the one and the multiple, 
order and disorder, identity and indistinction.”38 And Nancy will attribute such a 
“people” or “peopling” to clinamen, rather than bacterial activity.39 Clinamen, for 
Nancy, is also contact, which, in his philosophy, involves touch and the withdrawal of 
that touch: “gestures, encounters [rencontres], approaches, distances [les écarts].”40 It is 
also via clinamen that a “people” keeps (d)evolving, allowing certain elements free to 
depart, and allowing remaining ones to welcome other new elements, allowing therefore 
“the invention of an other people, an other contact freed from identifications and 
adherences deposited in the word ‘people’.”41 The re-cognition of such clinamen in 
“posthumanism” can give “posthumanism” what Keith Ansell Pearson has called a 
“viroid life,” that is to say, a “viroid life” that does not need to cultivate viruses or 
bacteria. Instead, one already is, and is already immersed in, the “viroid life” of 
deterritorialized atoms.  
 
In other words, the fact of clinamen will always unhinge any subjective desire or 
phantasm to ascertain its constitution as a whole, unified subject, or to sovereignly 
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38 See Nancy,  in La Démocratie à venir: Autour de Jacques Derrida, 342. 
39 , 346. And even though Nancy does not specifically speak of bacterial activity, he 
does nonetheless speak of “contagion.” 
40 , 346. 
41 , 347. 
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decide and determine the movement or development of its supposed intact corporeal 
entity.42 Put another way, the auto-rejection of clinamen gives place to the auto-
deconstruction of the subject. For a “posthumanism” that continues the “post-
structuralist” deconstruction of the subject, or which responds to Nancy’s question of 
“who comes after the subject” by articulating the reject, especially the reject that is not 
borrowed, if not worse, appropriated, from other-rejects, but draws from itself as an 
auto-reject, clinamen may be its point of departure. Thinking clinamen can have 
political stakes for the posthuman auto-reject, furthermore. In the interview « Il faut 
bien manger: ou le calcul du sujet » for Nancy’s question of “who comes after the 
subject,” Derrida has intimated that as long as one stands before laws – and the 
contemporary or “posthuman” world undeniably remains to be governed by laws – one 
is always somewhat a subject. But with the deterritorialized atoms of clinamen, it would 
seem that “posthumanism” may begin to free itself from any attachment to the subject, 
since these atoms, like viruses or with their élan viral or élan bactériel, are always free 
to move anywhere, never governed by laws that restrict their movements across 
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42 In this respect, the thought of clinamen resonates with Hird’s “microontology,” in the sense that the 
latter does away with the myth of a pure corporeal entity evacuated of all foreign elements, but situates 
the human body back into a bacterial milieu that already exists within and without that same body. It is 
also not distant from the project on deconstructing “bodily integrity,” which has taken the form of a 
special issue of Body & Society (16 (3), 2010). Building on Aryn Martin’s intervention in that issue on 
the nationalistic and frontier rhetoric surrounding “microchimersim,” which is a phenomenon where fetal 
cells are found in the mother long after pregnancy, challenging therefore the position that a body’s 
immune-system always destroys foreign cells, Lisa Blackman, in her introduction to the issue, will say: 
“Microchimerism places the body back within its milieu, and it might be more aptly described as enacting 
human bodies as the very paradoxical beings that we are; rather than existing as bounded, autonomous 
subjects, we coexist in shared ecologies” (“Bodily Integrity,” Body & Society 16 (3), 4). In a 
supplemental introduction, Margrit Shildrick will add, “the body – my human body – is never self-
complete and bounded against otherness, but is irreducibly caught up in a web of constitutive connections 
that disturb the very idea of human being” (“Some Reflections on the Socio-cultural and Bioscientific 
Limits of Bodily Integrity,” Body & Society 16 (3), 13). However, in sum, what I find still lacking in 
“microontology” and the deconstruction of “bodily integrity” is that aspect of auto-rejection, in the sense 
by which a body detaches part(s) of itself. To think the latter, clinamen seems to me to point to a more 
adequate trajectory of thought.    
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frontiers.43 To be sure, this thought of clinamen, which is also the thought of the auto-
reject that is free(d) from the category of the subject, is not to be put in place just to 
transgress laws just for the sake of transgressing laws, or even to provoke some form of 
frontier-smashing anarchy. Instead, it is to generate the possibility of thinking how our 
being and our movements need not be always, if not solely, reduced to legal 
determinations or regulations. 
                   
Finally, I would like to add that the “posthuman” auto-reject in clinamen certainly does 
not align itself with the dystopic “posthumanism” of disembodiment that N. Katherine 
Hayles critiques, i.e. a “posthumanism” that is too quick to forget or lose the corporeal 
body, only to reify it, in the “distributed system” of teletechnological networks that 
almost all “posthuman” body is connected to, as downloadable data.44 Thinking the 
clinamen, or thinking auto-rejection via the deterritorialization of one’s corporeal 
molecular elements, is not a call for the body to precipitate into a doing or wasting away 
of itself. It is not a negation of the body. If anything, it is a reaffirmation of the body, 
paying attention to how a body is always already, to use the Derridean phrase, 
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43 According to Aryn Martin, “microchimersim,” which proves that a body can be hospitable to a foreign 
body for a duration longer than expected, or that a foreign cell can live within another body without 
affecting it negatively, can help undo the prejudices typically associated with frontier-crossing especially 
by illegal immigrants. As Martin argues, “microchimerism entails that borders of bodies (like nations) are 
blurry and change over time, and that individuals (like nations) are not discrete but constitutively 
intermingled” (“Microchimerism in the Mother(land): Blurring the Borders of Body and Nation,” Body & 
Society 16 (3), 26). 
On another note, and to return to the potential politics of clinamen, Neyrat has argued that clinamen, 
especially its aspect of (self-)subtraction, (self-)detachment, auto-rejection, or what Neyrat calls “dis-
integration” [dés-intégration], can break the totalizing operation of capital to render everything become-
fluid like capital, the operation of capital to hold everything within a controlled, absolute, and hence 
paradoxically immobile “integral flux” [flux intégral] (see Clinamen: Flux, absolu et loi spirale). “Dis-
integration” in this sense is similar to a “withering” “posthumanism,” which leaves bodies free to 
assemble with other bodies and to disassemble from existing assemblages, as they are wont to do 
naturally, rather than to order them to keep existing relations together superficially.   
44 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 290. 
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interacting with another, without the control or determination of a human subject. This 
puts a “posthumanism” of auto-rejection close to Hayles’s countermove against a 
“posthumanism” of disembodiment, and yet it is not Hayles’s “posthumanism” of 
embodiment either. The distance between a “posthumanism” of auto-rejection and a 
“posthumanism” of embodiment rests once again on the question of the subject. Now, 
Hayles has clearly stated that she is “not trying to recuperate the liberal subject.”45 Well 
aware of all the problems that have been associated with the subject, she “[does] not 
mourn the passing of a concept so deeply entwined with projects of domination and 
repression.”46 Despite being in agreement with the “post-structuralist” deconstruction of 
the subject, Hayles is not prepared, however, to lose the subject. In other words, the 
question of “who comes after the subject” is not an imperative for her to respond to. She 
does not seek another figure of thought other than the subject. For her, the category of 
the subject still has some currency, except that is has to be redefined in terms of a 
“posthuman subject,” which is, according to her, “an amalgam, a collection of 
heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo 
continuous construction and reconstruction.”47 One must therefore be precise to note 
that Hayles’s subject is not the self-proclaimed unitary, masculine, human(ist) subject, 
but a subject that experiences a “splice”48 between himself or herself as behind-the-
screen user of teletechnology (what Hayles calls “enacted body”), and himself or herself 
as represented on screen (what Hayles calls “represented body”). It is the celebration of 
the latter at the expense of negating the former, or the rush to push to the extreme the 
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45 How We Became Posthuman, 5. 
46 How We Became Posthuman, 5. 
47 How We Became Posthuman, 3. 
48 How We Became Posthuman, 290. 
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virtual possibilities of the human in certain “posthuman” discourse, that Hayle’s 
“posthuman subject” resists. In the face of a “materiality/information separation” of the 
body,49 the “deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject” presents to Hayles “an 
opportunity to put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be erased in 
contemporary discussions about cybernetics subjects.”50 
 
One can borrow the Derridean term and say that Hayle’s “posthuman subject” puts in 
effect a différance between the corporeal “enacted body” and the virtual “represented 
body” of oneself in the contemporary network-centric world. That is to say, the 
“posthuman subject” is always negotiating how one body differs and defers from the 
other, never grounding on one body and alienating the other. And the “posthuman 
subject” does this not only in relation to itself, but also in relation to other “posthuman 
subjects” and their “enacted body”-“represented body” continuum. To capture all these 
senses of différance of the “posthuman subject,” Hayles will also call the latter a 
“flickering signifier.” The term gestures towards an absence of a stable, reducible, 
singular body. The flickering highlights, when it flicks on, the presence of the virtual 
“represented body,” but it also signals, when it flicks off, to the corporeal “enacted 
body” behind that “flickering signifier,” which is not (fully) present on the screen. And 
as a “flickering signifier,” which calls for the attention of another, it is an 
acknowledgement that there is no recognition of itself without the other. Or else, it is 
flickering because it is responding to another “flickering signifier.” In any case, the 
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49 How We Became Posthuman, 12. 
50 How We Became Posthuman, 5"!I would like to quickly note here that one does not need to revert to the 
subject in order to keep in mind the body. As I have suggested above, thinking the reject, especially the 
auto-reject that is mindful of clinamen, is no less engaged with the question of the body.   
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“flickering signifier” is always in relation to the other. And yet, I would ask what 
happens with a “flickering signifier” that is more insistent in its flickering than others, 
whose flickering can become like a demand, if not command, for others to give it 
recognition, for others to give its corporeal boundary due “construction and 
reconstruction”? As I see it, it seems that one is dangerously close here to a suturing of 
that problematic subject that “post-structuralism” has put into deconstruction.51  
 
It is this anxiety to create certain sutures, which are again too operative rather than 
“inoperative,” and which risks resurrecting the subject, that a “posthumanism” of auto-
rejection takes its distance from a “posthumanism” of embodiment. As I have tried to 
suggest so far, for a “posthumanism” that not only opens to those who have been 
excluded or rejected from all consideration of what founds and establishes the human, 
but also not tame or circumscribe these others or rejects within a strictly defined 
discourse, we would need a “posthumanism” without subject. This “posthumanism” 
would furthermore not be so keen to be so productive, to produce a totalizing discourse 
or operation whereby it ascertains itself. Instead, it would be open to the chance of 
breaking down, to be rejected by others. Such a “posthumanism” is what I have been 
trying to outline as a “posthumanism” of auto-rejection.52 To go beyond the present 
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51 The question of suturing in Hayles becomes more explicit in her reading of Shelley Jackson’s 
Patchwork Girl in Hayle’s My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
52 Or, to keep things in a digital mode, one might follow Timothy Murray in Digital Baroque and think 
about the Deleuzian fold in a digital context, which would enable one “to remain open to the multiple 
becomings and machinic eventfulness of the fold rather than to seek refuge in preconceived universals 
grounded in self-presence” (Digital Baroque: New Media Art and Cinematic Folds, Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, 6). As Deleuze suggest in Le pli, thinking the fold also 
sidesteps all thoughts of the subject, especially that which seeks to impose upon others its particular point 
of view of the world. This is evident in the discussion of perception in Le pli. In any conventional 
understanding of perception, a perceiving body or subject is commonly presupposed, after which entails a 
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limits of “posthuman” discourse, or for a “posthumanism” that can respond to Nancy’s 
question of “who comes after the subject,” and for a “posthumanism,” as Wolfe would 
have it, that not only concerns “the decentering of the human by its imbrication in 
technical, medical, informatics, and economic networks” but also “[engages] directly 
the problem of anthropocentrism and speciesism and how practices of thinking and 
reading must change in light of their critique,”53 it is not a “posthuman” subject that we 
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spatiality that extends from the perceiving body to the perceived point. The bodily subject of perception 
in this case comes first. It is the center or centripetal locus of perception. But in Baroque philosophy, 
according to Le pli, the order is reversed. The perceiving body, or the point-of-view, is not a priori of 
perception. Rather, one begins with perception, which is also the fold, since Deleuze also says it consists 
of “a thousand minute perceptions.” Perception in the order of the fold is a priori of the perceiving body; 
it precedes independently of a perceiving subject. It is with perception that the body comes into being, 
that the body formalizes its form (as a subject). The bodily subject comes after perception therefore. Here, 
the bodily subject does not determine perception. In the Baroque conceptualization of perception, it is the 
fold, which constitutes perception, which in turn gives to the bodily subject. Or as Murray puts it, “folds 
expand infinitely in all directions rather than definitively in the shape of a cone, line, or sight that 
culminates in a single, utopian point of subjectivity” (Digital Baroque, 5). There is no suturing with the 
fold, furthermore. Rather, things are punctured, as Deleuze suggests in the discussion of Baroque 
architecture. According to Deleuze, matter that constitutes Baroque architecture is always cavernous, and 
the ceiling is always prepared to be smashed through, only to allow folds (from the past and the future) to 
pass through it, and to enable the folds to continue into infinity.   
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